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ABSTRACT 
 
 
My doctoral thesis examines the policy of rule-use in the UK financial 
regulation. Its case study is the current FSA conduct of business 
regulation. It consists of two parts. Part I considers the evolution of the 
policy of rule-use during the past twenty years of financial regulation 
and up to the end of 2006. It argues that it has been transformed from a 
rule-centric regime into an interpretation centric-regime, where 
emphasis is placed on the interpretive project that makes possible the 
use of regulatory requirements rather than the production of self-
contained and static rules. Part II explores the grounds of this policy 
development by looking into the nature of regulatory interpretation. 
With this regard, it discusses two alternative theoretical accounts of 
regulatory interpretation: the communicative thesis, which emanates 
from Julia Black’s study of the use of rules in financial regulation under 
the Financial Services Act 1986; and the constructive thesis, which 
draws on Ronald Dworkin’s writings on the idea of law as integrity. The 
communicative thesis regards regulatory interpretation as a form of 
communication that is bound to fail and justifies the interpretation-
centric approach as a tactic that aims to prevent or remedy failure of 
communication. The constructive thesis views regulatory interpretation 
as a dialectical practice that requires the participants of the wider 
regulatory community to work out the public standards (“principles”) 
that govern their interrelations and explains the interpretive shift in the 
policy of rule-use as an attempt to meet the demand for new and better 
interpretations. The thesis concludes that the constructive thesis is 
preferable, because it is better able to accommodate two fundamental 
intuitions about the practice of interpretation; the intuition that the 
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resolution of regulatory interpretive disputes must be the outcome of a 
genuine and reciprocal commitment to a public conception of justice 
and the intuition that scarce public resources should be wisely 
administered rather than wasted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Legal rules are widely employed as means for social organisation and 
control.1 They distribute jurisdictional competences; they guide and control 
behaviour; they determine acceptable and unacceptable modes of conduct; 
they convey expectations and, over time, shape attitudes and change public 
perceptions. As a social practice, the use of rules has three dimensions: rule-
formation, rule-application (or rule-following) and rule-enforcement. A 
perpetual interpretive process underlies these dimensions.2 The regulator 
cannot perform its rule-making function unless it interprets in some way a 
set of fundamental policy objectives. Similarly, it cannot supervise and 
encourage compliance with the rules or decide what should be the most 
appropriate mode of enforcement in light of the idiosyncratic features of 
each particular case, unless it makes a more refined interpretation of its 
regulatory requirements. By the same token, the regulated population cannot 
comply with regulatory prescriptions unless they interpret them. Ultimately, 
interpretation is an indispensable aspect of rule-use, for it is through 
interpretation that the meaning of rules is clarified, disputes about how rules 
                                                 
1
 By legal rules I have in mind both legally enforceable and non-legally enforceable regulatory requirements 
as, for example, guidance and codes of practice. Someone might object that non-legally binding regulatory 
requirements are not really ‘legal rules’ for they are not legally enforceable. Although, I cannot pursue this 
claim further, for the purposes of this thesis, it is appropriate to treat all types of regulatory requirements 
(legally enforceable and non-legally enforceable) as ‘legal rules’ in order to connote that the presence of 
legally and non-legally enforceable regulatory requirements does not suggest the existence of a social 
domain that stands outside the reign of the Rule of Law. It simply signifies the expediency and economy of 
avoiding enforcement by bringing a legal action in front of the courts, where compliance can be achieved 
with less radical and more informal means. What is important is that the power of the regulatory authority 
to promulgate legal rules and put them into practice is always licensed by the Rule of Law either by virtue 
of a statutory instrument (e.g. the FSMA 2000 or the FSA 1986 as the case may be) duly passed by the 
Parliament or ad hoc to the extent in which the judiciary acknowledges this practice as lawful. P Craig, 
Administrative Law (5th edition, 2003), ch. 16, 398-400 and 810-812; and S. Arrowsmith, ‘Judicial Review and 
the Contractual Powers of Public Authorities’, 106 Law Quarterly Review (1990), 277. Recent case law that 
expanded the scope of application of judicial review seems to lend support to my claim. See, for example, 
R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex p Datafin plc [1987] QB, 152; R v Advertising Standards Authority ex p The 
Insurance Services plc, [1990] COD 42; and Bank of Scotland v Investment Management Regulatory Organisation Ltd, 
[1989] SLT, 432. 
2 Talcott Parsons observes that the “interpretive function may be said to be the central function of the legal 
system.” W. Twinning and D. Miers, How to Do Things With Rules (1982), 165 and 170-172. 
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should be understood are resolved and their scope of application and 
consequences are crystallised. 
 
Given the crucial role of legal rules in public administration it is not a 
surprise why in recent years a special field of policy making appears to have 
emerged with respect to the effective use of rules.3 The policy of rule-use 
has as its subject matter the formation, application and enforcement of rules 
and, in a more abstract level, it underlies a two-phase interpretive project 
through which public policy objectives (occasionally specified by statute) are 
first translated into more concrete regulatory stipulations and then put into 
practice in the more refined form of regulatory requirements that are tailor 
made to the idiosyncratic features of its particular case.4 
 
This doctoral thesis examines the policy of rule-use in UK financial 
regulation.5 It takes the current FSA conduct of business regulation as a case 
study to engage with broader questions about the nature of rules, the nature 
of regulatory interpretation6 and how the Rule of Law shapes our 
understanding of the policy choices underlying the use of rules in public 
administration. It considers two questions: First, how did the policy of rule-
use evolve during the past twenty years? And second, how should we 
account for this development in regulatory policy? The thesis argues that in 
                                                 
3 Arguably, the use of rules has emerged only recently as a conscious policy concern. FSA, ‘Designing the 
FSA Handbook of Rules and Guidance’, FSA Consultation Paper No.8 (April, 1998); and D. Walker, ‘The 
New Settlement in Financial Services’, Law Society’s Guardian Gazette (July, 1989). See also below Chapters 
Two and Three. 
4 A. Georgosouli, ‘The Nature of the FSA Policy of Rule-Use: A Critical Overview’, 28 (1) Legal Studies 
(2008), 119. 
5 The term ‘(financial) regulation’ refers to the body of legal rules, regulations and administrative 
requirements established by public authorities or self-regulatory bodies as well as to its application and 
enforcement. For a similar use of this term see G. A. Walker, International Banking Regulation: Law, Policy and 
Practice (2001), 1. As a political phenomenon, ‘regulation’ is difficult to define and notoriously contested. 
Nevertheless, several leading commentators agree that broadly speaking ‘regulation’ connotes any control 
system, which has at least the following three components: (a) the capacity of standard setting, (b) the 
capacity of information gathering and (c) the capacity of behaviour modifying. A. Ogus, Regulation: Legal 
Form and Economic Theory (2004); C. Hood, H. Rothstein and R. Baldwin, The Government of Risk (2001); and 
B. Morgan and K. Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation (2007), ch.1. 
6 The term ‘regulatory interpretation’ refers to the interpretive practice that makes possible the use of rules 
in the regulatory system. 
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the past two decades there has been a clear shift towards the 
implementation of an interpretation-centric (as opposed to rule-centric) 
policy of rule-use.7 It then proposes that this policy development can be 
better explained as an attempt to facilitate the wider regulatory community 
in meeting the demand for new and better interpretations by duly identifying 
and remedying interpretive mistakes before and where possible in preclusion 
of judicial interference (the constructive thesis), rather than as a response to 
failure of communication between the regulator and the regulated 
population (the communicative thesis).  
 
 The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I (Chapters One to Three) 
examines the various stages of evolution of the policy of rule-use from the 
early 80’s until the end of 2006. To this end it makes extensive reference to 
the legal instruments that comprise the legal framework of the UK financial 
regulation in general and conduct of business rules in particular as well as to 
the relevant preparatory work and literature commentary.  Chapter One, 
which concerns the case study of the thesis, overviews the FSA conduct of 
business regime. Chapter Two explores the policy of rule-use under the 
regulatory regime that was established by the Financial Services Act 1986 
                                                 
7 Rule-centric regimes identify with policies that perceive the effectiveness of rules as predominantly a 
function of the rules themselves. Therefore, their focus is on the production of self-contained and static 
regulatory norms. These regimes are associated with command and control regulation or more generally 
with regulatory settings that are vertical, legalistic and prescriptive in character rather than horizontal open 
and participatory in nature. Ascribing meaning to regulatory requirements is not regarded as a common 
interpretive project. The exercise of interpretive discretion is tightly controlled and the outcome of 
interpretive-decision making is dictated. Deliberation by way of self-regulatory configurations may be a 
feature of the regulatory system. Nonetheless its nature is symbolic rather than substantive not least 
because self-regulation is never fully operationalised. The interpretation-centric regimes differ in that they 
regard rule effectiveness as mainly a function of their interpretation. Therefore regulatory officials place 
emphasis on the regulation of interpretive process that makes possible the formation application and 
enforcement of rules rather than their design. They are associated with meta-regulation and market-based 
regulatory settings that are substantially open, participatory and discursive in nature and whose 
implementation involves the decentralisation of interpretive decision-making. Significantly, under an 
interpretation-centric regime, regulatory interpretation is treated as a common dialectical process, which is 
administered but never curtailed by the regulator. In practice, approaches to the use of rules may not be 
‘purely’ rule-centric or interpretation centric. This distinction, however, remains useful not least because it 
offers a more comprehensive theoretical framework for the study of the interaction of the policy of rule-
use with other regulatory policies (e.g. enforcement) and for making sense of the parameters of success or 
failure of the various regimes. 
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(“self-regulation under a statutory framework”). Chapter Three continues 
the examination of the policy of rule-use this time after the introduction of 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the official launch of the 
Financial Services Authority as a single mega-regulator for the financial 
markets in the UK. Part I concludes that by the middle of 90’s there has 
been a clear shift towards an interpretation-centric approach to the use of 
rules, whose prime objective has been the control and management of the 
interpretive project that makes possible the use of rules, rather than the 
production of self-contained and static regulatory requirements. 
 
Part II (Chapters Four to Six), considers the grounds of this policy 
development drawing on the nature of regulatory interpretation. It advances 
the communicative thesis and the constructive thesis of regulatory interpretation. 
Specifically, Chapter Four makes reference to Rules and Regulators -where 
Julia Black studies the nature and use of rules in financial regulation- with 
the view of proposing a communicative account of regulatory interpretation, 
according to which regulatory interpretation should be seen as a form of 
communication between the regulator and the regulated population, that is 
prone to failure due to information asymmetries and interpretive 
divergence.8 Chapter Five resorts to a comparative analysis of the practice of 
interpretation in law and in literature. Its aim is to bring to the surface some 
difficulties that are associated with the communicative thesis and to open 
the way to an alternative theoretical account of regulatory interpretation –
the constructive thesis. The latter envisages regulatory interpretation as an 
occasion for the regulatory community to resolve interpretive disputes by 
working out the public standards that govern their relationships. The 
communicative thesis and its constructive counter-part offer two alternative 
accounts of the grounds for the interpretive shift in the policy of rule-use. 
                                                 
8 J. Black, Rules and Regulators (1997). 
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Whereas the former justifies the interpretation-centric approach to the 
policy of rule-use as a tactic that aims to prevent or remedy failure of 
communication, the latter explains this development as an attempt to enable 
the regulatory community to meet the demand for new and better 
interpretations where possible in preclusion of judicial interference. Chapter 
Six develops further the idea of a constructive reading of regulatory 
interpretation by defending it against certain objections. To this end it brings 
together insights from the work of Donald Davidson and the work of 
Ronald Dworkin on the idea of law as integrity. It suggests that the 
constructive thesis is preferable to the communicative thesis because it is 
better able to accommodate two fundamental intuitions about the practice 
of interpretation. First, the intuition that the resolution of interpretive 
disputes in the regulatory context must be the outcome of a genuine and 
reciprocal commitment to a public conception of justice, rather than the 
product of arbitrary and unprincipled negotiated trade-offs. Second, the 
intuition that procedural efficiency matters in that the dialectical practice of 
regulatory interpretation must not be conducted by using inefficient 
methods. Finally, the Conclusion brings together the main threads of my 
argument and sets out an agenda for future research. 
 
Why focus on the policy of rule-use?  To start with, there is good reason to 
think that the timing is ‘right’. Nearly ten years after the Labour’s 
Government reform of financial regulation it is about time to reflect on the 
changes that it brought about. This is even more so with respect to the use 
of rules, as the Authority’s policy choices have been constantly challenged 
after a series of events older and new as, for example, the industry’s 
persistent reservations to a principled-based approach to regulation, the 
progressive centralisation of regulatory decision-making in EU level and the 
recently shaken relationship between FSA and the Bank of England as a 
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result of the perceived regulatory failure to guard the UK market against the 
sub-prime crisis in the UK and adequately deal with the collapse of 
Northern Rock. 9 
 
In practical level, the first and most obvious reason justifying one’s interest 
with this topic is that the policy of rule-use shapes the ways in which the 
four statutory objectives of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) -namely 
market confidence, public awareness, consumer protection and reduction of 
financial crime- are translated into regulatory practice. Ultimately, FSA’s 
capacity to attain these objectives depends on the success or failure of its 
policy of rule-use. Furthermore, the policy of rule-use constitutes a 
crossroads where other policy trends meet and interact. For example, while 
the principles-based architecture of the FSA Handbook manifests a 
purposive approach to the application and enforcement of rules, the 
fostering of communicative elements is intended to bring the whole idea 
into practice.10 In this connection it pays to consider the nature of this 
interaction and how the ensuing dynamic between purposiveness and 
conversational regulation affects regulatory performance and determines the 
ways in which the regulatory Authority interacts with other institutions –
notably the judiciary. A third reason is that although there is a growing 
                                                 
9 In connection to the regulatees’ opposition to principles-based regulation, one of the senior FSA officials 
commented in a recent speech: “Firms and trade associations … sometimes in practice show a stubborn 
attachment to particular rules that the FSA seeks to remove. And within firms we often find that increased 
reliance on principles is supported by chairmen and CEOs, but opposed by compliance officers and 
lawyers who prefer the supposed certainty of prescriptive rules.” A. Sykes, ‘NEWCOB: The Practical 
Implications’, FSA Speech (19 June, 2007). The practitioners’ reaction to the FSA’s appetite for a more 
principles-based regulation and the Europeanization of the UK financial regulation are discussed in 
Chapter Three. On the Northern Rock affair and its impact on the relationship between FSA and the Bank 
of England see FSA, ‘The Supervision of Northern Rock: A Lessons Learnt Review’, FSA Internal Report 
(March 2008); House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘The Run of the Rock’, Fifth Report of the Session 
2007-2008 Volume I (available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/ 
56/56i.pdf); G. A. Walker,  ‘Northern Rock Falls’, 2 Banker’s Law (2008), 4; K. Keasey and G. Veronesi, 
‘Lessons from the Northern Rock Affair’, 16 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance (2008), 8; J. Gray, 
‘Lessons from BCCI Saga for the Current Accountability Debate Surrounding Northern Rock?’, 23 Journal 
of International Banking Law and Regulation (2008), 37. 
10 The principles-based approach to regulation, the purposive approach to the application and enforcement 
of rules as well as other terms such as conversational regulation and meta-regulation, all are discussed in 
the relevant chapters. 
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literature assessing the advantages and disadvantages of some recent trends 
in financial regulation such as fostering the discursive and participatory 
character of regulation, the shift towards meta-regulation, and the adoption 
of a risk-based approach to regulation, a systematic study of the extent to 
which the present regime differs from its predecessor is still under-
developed. Finally, it should be noted that there are very few comprehensive 
studies of the practice of interpretation in the context of regulation. Indeed, 
writings that are exclusively devoted to regulatory interpretation are 
rudimentary when compared with writings about other aspects of the use of 
rules in public administration.11 It is argued that this is regrettable. The 
examination of regulatory interpretation has the potential to advance our 
understanding on a number of issues such as the concept of rule-
effectiveness and its institutional implications12 or the question of the 
susceptibility of legal rules to true or false interpretation –an issue that is 
inextricably interwoven with our quest for authority and boundaries in the 
interpretation of rules in the regulatory context. The present thesis makes an 
attempt to fill in this gap. 
 
The thesis is built upon four inter-related assumptions. The first is that in 
financial regulation the use of rule comprises a separate branch of policy 
making which borrows from a range of other policies including those of 
rule-making, compliance, enforcement and accountability.13 The second one 
is that -despite its peculiarities- regulatory interpretation is a species of legal 
interpretation and therefore it is bound by the political history of the 
institution of law. The third assumption is that the use of rules is a two-
                                                 
11 For instance, the optimal design of rules, the inter-relation between rules and their enforcement, the 
problem of abiding by the letter rather than spirit of rules, the phenomenon of rent-seeking in the course 
of rule formation, application and enforcement of rules etc. See also note 24 below. 
12 For example, in relation to rule-effectiveness, is ‘getting the interpretation of rules right’ one of the 
parameters for regulatory effectiveness? If yes, what should be the criterion of correctness? What 
institutional arrangements guarantee that rules receive correct interpretation and that mistakes are 
appropriately remedied?  
13 Above note 3. 
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phase interpretive project in the course of which policy objectives take the 
form of concrete regulatory requirements and then are translated into more 
specific regulatory directives that are tailor-made to the idiosyncratic 
circumstances of each particular case. Whereas rule-formation falls within 
the first phase, rule-application and enforcement fall within the second 
phase. Finally, the fourth supposition is that the regulatory authority, the 
regulated population and virtually any other interest-group that is likely to be 
affected by regulation (notably, consumers) constitute a regulatory 
community whose members are involved in the interpretive project in 
various modes and intensity depending on a number of factors including 
their institutional role and the context of the interpretive dispute (rule-
formation, rule-application, rule-enforcement). These four postulates are 
further supplemented with a range of other suppositions, reference to which 
is made in the relevant chapters. 
 
The methodology of the thesis is partly descriptive, partly theoretical and 
partly interdisciplinary. In Part I, the analysis of the rationale for investor 
protection and conduct of business regulation is based on an overview of 
the economic literature on this topic, whereas the exploration of the policy 
development with respect to the use of rules in financial regulation draws on 
a critical analysis of primary and secondary resources on the evolution of 
conduct of business regulation in the UK spanning from the middle 80’s 
until the end of 2006. In Part II the discussion starts from a brief overview 
of the main theoretical postulates that underlie Julia Black’s work on the 
nature and use of rules in financial regulation and progressively embarks 
upon an intellectual journey in search of the nature of regulatory 
interpretation through a comparative analysis of the practice of 
interpretation in law and interpretation in literature as well as a critical 
appraisal of Stanley Fish’s contextualism in light of Ronald Dworkin’s 
 20
theory of law as integrity and Donald Davidson’s writings on the Principles 
of Coherence and Charity in interpretation.14 
 
The literature on the use of rules in public administration is vast and diverse.  
Some of the themes that have attracted special attention are (a) the nature of 
rules;15 (b) the susceptibility of rules to meaning16 (c) the relationship 
between rules and context;17 (d) the function of rules as instruments of 
social organisation and control18 and dimensional analysis;19 (e) the 
                                                 
14 All these are extensively discussed in Part II. 
15 The views of Herbert Hart and Ronald Dworkin are of particular interest in this respect. According to 
Hart legal rules are entrenched authoritative statements, which are meant to guide behaviour, be applied on 
an indefinite number of occasions and have sanctions attached for their breach (H. L. A. Hart, The Concept 
of Law (1994) chs 5 and 6). According to Dworkin the crucial difference between rules and principles is 
that rules function in “all-or-nothing” manner. If two rules are in conflict, one of them must be invalid or 
stands as an exception to the other. By contrast, principles have the quality of weight or importance. If two 
principles are in conflict then the decision maker must consider the relative weight of each. R. Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously (1977), ch. 2; and The Philosophy of Law (1977), 47. A third definition –this time of the 
term ‘rule’ in general- has been suggested by William Twinning and David Miers  (How to Do Things with 
Rules (2nd edition), 127) and further adopted by Robert Baldwin in ‘Why Rules Don’t Work’ (53 Modern Law 
Review, (1990), 321) where the term ‘rule’ refers to norms guiding conduct or action in a given type of 
situation. 
16 In this connection the views range from radical indeterminacy (e.g., S. Levinson, ‘Law as Literature’ 60 
Texas Law Review (1982), 373; and J. W. Singer ‘The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory’, 94 
Yale Law Journal (1984)) to moderate forms of indeterminacy (e.g., G. Graff, ‘”Drop Off Dead” ‘‘Keep Off 
the Grass” and Other Indeterminacies: A Response to Stanford Levinson’, 60 Texas Law Review (1980), 
405); and firm rejections of indeterminacy (e.g., O. Fiss, ‘Objectivity and Interpretation’, 34 Stanford Law 
Review (1982), 739). 
17 See notably S. Fish Is There a Text in the Class (1980) and Doing What Comes Naturally:  Change, Rhetoric and 
the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) and D. Davidson, Subjective Intersubjective Objective 
(2001). See further, Part II of this thesis. 
18 I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, ‘Responsive Regulation’ (1992) (The authors consider the debate on 
regulation and deregulation. They argue for a regulatory approach that is responsive to the structure of the 
regulated industry and combines techniques of persuasion and sanction); A. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and 
Economic Theory (1994) (The author resorts to the postulates of the law and economics school of thought to 
assess the appropriateness of various regulatory instruments including legal rules). T. Daintith, ‘The 
Techniques of Government’ in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution (1994), ch.8 (The 
author explores the function and effectiveness of command-based regulatory tools and economic means of 
regulation as, for example, taxes and subsidies, which are expected to enhance competition); E. Bardach 
and R. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness (1982) (The authors examine the 
causes and consequences of “regulatory unreasonableness” –the practice of enforcing rules in a mechanical 
and legalistic manner- and they argue for a “flexible approach” to regulation which entails regulatory 
strategies that rely less on direct governmental prescriptions);  F. Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical 
Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991) (The author argues against the 
conventional view, which posits that rules do little due to the problems of over- and under- inclusiveness, 
on the grounds that it fails to distinguish between those who articulate rules and those who apply them.); 
W. Twining and D. Miers, How to Do Things with Rules (2nd edition) (the authors aim to provide a systematic 
account of the practices of interpretation and application that constitute a basic aspect of “rule-handling” 
by placing emphasis on the influence of standpoint and role on the meaning of rules.);  and R. Baldwin, 
Rules and Government (1995) (The author offers a comprehensive examination of the use of rules as tools of 
government and he is particularly concerned with issues of legitimacy). 
19 According to Baldwin rules have four dimensions: (a) specificity or precision; (b) inclusiveness; (c) 
accessibility and intelligibility and (d) status or force. According to Diver, rules have three dimensions: (a) 
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relationship between administrative discretion, adjudication, enforcement 
and accountability;20 (f) the economics of rule-making, compliance and 
enforcement.21 Similarly, it is not the first time where the use of rules in the 
specific context of financial regulation becomes the subject of research. Julia 
Black was the first to study this topic about ten years ago and in relation to 
the system of regulation that was introduced by the Financial Services Act 
1986.22 A wealth of ideas such as the presence of interpretive communities 
                                                                                                                                            
transparency; (b) accessibility and (c) congruence. R. Baldwin ‘Why Rules Don’t Work’, 53 Modern Law 
Review (1990), 321; and C. S. Diver, ‘Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules’, 93 Yale Law Journal (1983), 
65. Julia Black proposes her own dimensional analysis as she distinguishes among (a) the substance and 
scope of a rule, (b) its character, (c) its legal status and (d) its linguistic nature. J. Black, Rules and Regulators 
(1997), ch.1. This is discussed in Chapter Four below. 
20 D. McBarnet and C. Wheelan, ‘The Elusive Spirit of Law’, 54 Modern Law Review (1991), 409 (The 
authors consider the phenomenon of creative compliance and cast doubt on the rule makers capacity to 
address this problem by opting for less formalism); L. Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’, 92 
Harvard Law Review (1978), 353 (The author considers the practice of adjudication in its broadest possible 
sense. He focuses on two issues: the ways in which adjudication may be organised and conducted and the 
kinds of tasks that can be properly assigned to adjudicative bodies including courts); and J. L. Jowell, Law 
and Bureaucracy: Administrative Discretion and the Limits of Legal Action (1975) (The author focuses on the trade-
off between administrative discretion and the desirability to ensure that administrative decision-making is 
controlled and explores the role of the judiciary in this respect); J. Black ‘Constitutionalising Self-
Regulation’, 59 Modern Law Review (1996), 24 (The author considers the constitutional issues that emerge 
from the operation of self-regulatory bodies and how they can be addressed); K Hawkins, Environment and 
Enforcement (1984) ch 10 (One of the main arguments, that Hawkins advances in this book, is the view that 
enforcement in the regulatory context is used as a last resort due to the symbolic character of the formal 
legal process); and R. Kagan, Regulatory Enforcement (1994) (The author argues that it is not possible to 
understand the policy of enforcement, unless we first have a look of the legal design of the regulatory 
program. He further proposes a general framework for the study of a range of factors that affect the 
regulator’s preference for one style of enforcement rather that another. In the US, a parallel debate has 
emerged with respect to constitutional interpretation and the relationship between administrative agencies 
and the judiciary. See, notably, D. Gifford, ‘The Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron Doctrine: 
Congressional Intent, Judicial Judgement, and Administrative Autonomy’, 59 Administrative Law Review 
(2007), 783; R. Pierce, ‘How Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes they Administer: A Response 
to Mashaw and Strauss’, 59 Administrative Law Review (2007), 197; J. Mashaw, ‘Agency-Centred or Court-
Centred Administrative Law? A Dialogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation’, 59 
Administrative Law Review (2007), 889; and C. Sustein, ‘Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as 
Common Law Courts’, 47 Duke Law Journal (1997-98), 1013. 
21 Three of the most well known papers in this relation are the (a) ‘The Economic Analysis of Legal Rule 
Making’ by I. Ehrlich and R. Posner, in which the authors discuss the degree of precision with which a 
legal rule must be drafted so that to promote the efficiency of the legal process;  (b) the ‘Law Enforcement, 
Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers’ by G. Becker and G. Stigler, who argue in favour of a full 
privatisation of the enforcement procedure; and (c) ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’ by R. Landes and R. 
Posner, where they argue that enforcement by private actors may be less optimal then Becker and Stigler 
suggest. See, I. Ehrlich and R. Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Legal Rule Making’, 3 Journal of Legal 
Studies (1974), 257; G. Becker and G. Stiger, ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of 
Enforcers’, 3 Journal of Legal Studies (1974), 1; R. Landes and R. Posner, ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’, 
4 Journal of Legal Studies (1975), 1. 
22 The Financial Services Act 1986 was subsequently replaced by the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000. See also Chapter Three below. 
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in the regulatory arena and the putting into practice of a conversational style 
of regulation (just to mention a few) are attributed to her.23   
 
My thesis draws on these earlier writings and in some sense continues the 
work that has been done already in relation to the use of rules in financial 
regulation. However, it differs from the mainstream literature in various 
respects. One of the most noticeable points of departure concerns the 
treatment of the subject matter under examination. In this thesis, the 
attempt is made to approach the use of rules as a distinct field of policy 
development and not as a matter incidentally discussed in the context of 
other branches of policy making such as compliance, enforcement and 
accountability.24 In addition, the thesis seeks to account for certain policy 
trends by examining the nature of regulatory interpretation instead of 
focusing on the rules per se and conducting dimensional analysis, or by 
relying on the economics of rule-making, compliance and enforcement. 
 
Furthermore Part II of my thesis, which explores the nature of 
interpretation in regulation, is premised on Dworkin’s famous distinction 
between “conversational” and “constructive accounts” of interpretation in 
law and adjudication.25 It should be noted however, that here the term 
“communicative” is used in place of “conversational” for mainly two 
reasons: The first one is the prevention of any confusion with Black’s work 
in regulatory literature regarding “regulatory conversations” and the 
                                                 
23 Her work is extensively discussed in Chapter Four. 
24 How to Do Things With Rules by W. Twining and D. Miers seems to be one of the rare exceptions. Still, it 
should be noted that the authors are not concerned with the nature of regulatory interpretation but with 
the practice of interpretation and application as aspects of “rule-handling.” See also above note 11. 
25 To be precise, Ronald Dworkin propounds three different kinds of interpretation; “conversational”, 
“constructive”, and “scientific interpretation.” “Scientific interpretation” does not qualify as a candidate 
theory of regulatory interpretation because it is causal rather than purposive in nature. Here the term 
“communicative is used in place of “conversational” as more appropriate for capturing the idea that in the 
public domain taking part in a conversation always serves some purpose like the provision of clarification, 
the resolution of disputes the promotion of social order or cooperation. R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (2000), 
49-53. 
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adoption of a “conversational model of regulation”. The second reason is 
that the term “communicative” as an attribute to one of the two theoretical 
accounts of regulatory interpretation here advanced was thought to be more 
appropriate as better able to convey the intuition that  -contrary to private 
contexts- in the public domain conversations are always conducted for some 
purpose as, for example, making sense of controversial regulatory 
provisions, resolving disputes, keeping social order and promoting the co-
ordination of a joint project.  
 
In any rate, to the extent in which this analysis borrows from Dworkinian 
jurisprudence, it differs from earlier writings in that it is not based on legal 
positivism and the critical legal studies movement, which have dominated 
the intellectual landscape.26 This signals a departure from mainstream 
thought given that one of the consequences of the Dworkinian affiliation of 
this thesis is that it propounds the idea that our stance towards policy 
developments in the regulatory context and more generally in the public 
domain should be informed by a substantive theory of justice.27 In this 
manner, this thesis aspires to contribute to the relevant literature in the 
                                                 
26 Some of the main postulates of the critical-legal studies school of thought are the idea that the law is 
mere politics serving the interests of the powerful and preserving the dominant ideology of the time and 
the idea that law is fundamentally indeterminate. Proponents of the critical legal studies school of thought 
include Duncan Kennedy, Mark Tashnet and Roberto Unger. Legal positivism is the view that the 
existence and the content of law depend on social facts and not on its merits. This is not say that the merits 
of a legal system are not important to the philosophy of law. They are important but they do not determine 
whether law or a legal system exists. Accordingly, legal positivism is the doctrine that focuses on the 
institutional aspects of law and treats law as a social construction. Some of the most prominent legal 
positivists of recent times are Herbert Hart, Hans Kelsen, Joseph Raz, and Jules Coleman. A look at the 
literature leaves little doubt of the impact of these suppositions on mainstream scholarly thought. On the 
critical legal studies movement see, C. Sypnowich, ‘Law and Ideology’ in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
(2001), available at www. plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-ideology. On legal positivism see L. Green, ‘Legal 
Positivism’ in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2003), available at www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-
positivism. 
27 This view is clearly at odds with current orthodoxy. For example, R. Baldwin argues that our inquiry into 
the legitimacy of rules in public administration should not be based on a generalised theory of democracy 
because it is difficult to come up with a non-controversial theory to which the legitimacy claims appeal. 
Furthermore, he posits that trade-offs among competing policy objectives should not be grounded on a 
purely “personal vision of the ideal of democratic legitimacy” but only on “anticipated reactions to the 
legitimacy of the process based on competing legitimacy claims of others”. Rules and Government  (1995), 58; 
and T. Prosser, ‘Book Review: Rules and Government by Robert Baldwin,’ 59 Modern Law Review (1996), 
762. 
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following two ways: By offering an up to date analysis of the policy of rule-
use in the UK financial regulation and by exploring how the jurisprudence 
of Ronald Dworkin could enrich our understanding of the workings of 
regulatory interpretation and even challenge the current orthodoxy that 
perseveres contemporary studies of the use of rules in public administration. 
 
Moreover, a special note should be made about the relationship between the 
communicative thesis of regulatory interpretation that is here advanced and 
Black’s conversational account of regulation. Similarly to Black’s theory, the 
communicative thesis pays attention to the discursive aspect of the process 
of regulation. It differs however in terms of subject matter, aim and 
theoretical foundation. Contrary to Black’s theory, the communicative thesis 
is not a general theory of regulation. It is only a theoretical account of the 
nature of interpretation in regulatory settings and considers issues that are 
specific to the nature of interpretation as, for example, the possibility of 
right answers to questions of interpretation and the source of authority. 
Furthermore it is not framed on discourse analysis and legal positivism. Its 
theoretical foundation lies with Dworkinian jurisprudence. 
 
Finally, a brief note on what this thesis does not claim to be. This study does 
not intend to offer a systematic critical overview of the literature on the 
policy of rule-use (making special reference to Rules and Regulators) 
administrative discretion and control, optimal design of rules and 
enforcement. In addition, it is not concerned with recent case law dealing 
with the jurisdictional competences of administrative agencies vis a vis the 
judiciary. Similarly, it is not its purpose to assess the FSA conduct of 
business regulation in terms of substantive requirements -for instance, the 
effectiveness of Chinese Walls as a method for managing conflicts of 
interest, or the problems of definition and enforcement associated with best 
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execution. Furthermore, this thesis does not aim either to offer a systematic 
critique of Professor Hart’s legal positivism or to defend Dworkin’s 
jurisprudence. By the same token a comprehensive examination of the law 
as interpretation movement falls beyond the scope of this analysis and so it 
does a full exploration of the perceived merits and difficulties associated 
with Stanley Fish’s contextualism.  Finally, this thesis does not claim to be a 
treatise on the idea of objectivity in law and interpretation. Rather, it draws 
on various strands of thought and disciplines in so far as this would befit a 
study of the evolution of the policy of rule-use in financial regulation and 
the grounds underlying its transformation into an interpretation-centric 
regime.  
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PART I -THE POLICY OF RULE-USE IN THE UK 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
 
 
The Case Study 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the case study of this thesis. It examines that branch 
of financial regulation, which governs the provision of financial services and 
products in the retail sector.1 Conduct of business rules (COB) stand at the 
centre of this regime.2 They are built around the FSMA 2000 authorisation 
and financial promotion regime.3 They are part of the FSA Conduct of 
Business Sourcebook4 and comprise regulatory requirements whose 
principal aim is to provide investor protection.5 COB rules govern a variety 
of issues including client classification, financial promotion, information 
                                                 
1 A definition of the term financial regulation is provided above, in note 5 of the Introduction. On the 
growth of the consumer market for financial services see J. Gray and J. Hamilton, Implementing Financial 
Services Regulation: Theory and Practice (2007), 188-192. Although the term “retail sector” refers to the market 
for investment products and services that are sold to private individuals (‘consumers’), I will discuss COB 
rules that apply to transactions with private customers and occasionally intermediate customers. I. McNeil, 
An Introduction to the Law of Financial Investment (2005), 165. 
2 The Treating Customers Fairly regime supplements the rules governing conduct of business with 
consumers. This is not part of the FSA Handbook but a regulatory initiative that aims to put into practice a 
principles-based approach to investor protection. O. Page, ‘Treating Customers Fairly’, FSA Speech (16 
February 2005); C. Briault, ‘Treating Customers Fairly’, FSA Speech (20 March 2006); and S. Wilson, 
‘Treating Customers Fairly –Principles-Based Regulation in Practice, FSA Speech (August 2007). 
3 FSMA 2000, ss. 19 and 21. 
4 The FSA Conduct of Business Sourcebook (COB Sourcebook) originates from the Conduct of Business 
Rulebook of the Securities and Investment Board (SIB) and the Conduct of Business Rulebooks of the 
various Self-Regulatory Organisations (SROs). B. Rider, C. Abrams and E. Ferran, A Guide to the Financial 
Services Act 1986 (second edition), ch.6.  On the November the 1st, 2007, the Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook will be replaced by a new one –the NewCoB Sourcebook (also referred to as “COBS”)- as a 
result of the UK implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive. I will return to this 
point in various occasions below. 
5 Consumer protection figures among the statutory objectives that the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
is bound to pursue. Alongside consumer protection, the FSA is entrusted with the promotion of market 
confidence, public awareness and the reduction of financial crime. See FSMA 2000, ss.3-6. 
 28
disclosure, unfair practices, suitability of advice and best execution.6 Below I 
discuss the economic rationale for conduct of business regulation and 
review the core conduct of business rules.7  The discussion would remain 
incomplete if no reference was made to the implementation of the Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in the UK and the launch of the 
new Conduct of Business Sourcebook (NEWCOB) by November 2007. 
Thus, towards the end of this chapter I offer an epigrammatic overview of 
this significant piece of EU legislation and explain how it will affect the UK 
conduct of business regime in terms of substance, by considering briefly key 
points of departure from the existing regime.8 
 
 
2. Arguments for and against the economic rationale for conduct of 
business regulation 
 
2.1. The scope of the debate 
 
Before moving on, it is essential to make a clarification about the scope of 
the economic rationale for (financial) regulation. When we reflect on the 
economic grounds that may justify the State’s intervention in economic life, 
we need a conception of the economic rationale that captures the spectrum 
of all possible factors that have an impact on the costs of regulation. One 
option is to draw on the work of David Llewellyn and his influential paper 
prepared for the Financial Services Authority, where he propounds a narrow 
definition of the economic rationale for financial regulation. Llewellyn 
                                                 
6 Broadly speaking, investor protection is pursued by a plethora of requirements including, disclosure of 
information, licensing and authorisation, market structure, solvency and liquidity requirements. 
Consequently, it involves the application of a much wider array of regulatory requirements than rules 
regulating conduct of business. A. Page and R. Ferguson, Investor Protection (1992), chs.4 and 5. 
7 For a critical overview of the debate over the economic rationale for investor protection regulation see, 
A. Georgosouli, ‘The Economic Rationale for Investor Protection Regulation: A Critical Overview’, 15 (3) 
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance (2007), 236-249. 
8 Changes in relation to rule-design and the overall policy of rule-use will be examined in Chapter Three. 
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argues that the economic rationale for regulation (why it might be justified on 
economic criteria) must be distinguished from the reasons for regulation (why in 
practice regulation may be imposed), and the objectives of regulation (the aims, 
that a particular regulatory regime seeks to achieve).9 Though plausible, this 
distinction does not seem workable for our purposes because it falls short 
from offering a comprehensive account of all cost-determinants of financial 
regulation. Let me illustrate this by the following example. Instances of 
regulatory capture boost the cost of regulation and, therefore, -common 
sense suggests- we should take them into account when we are assessing the 
desirability of financial regulation. If we were to follow Llewellyn, however, 
we would have to exclude them from consideration, on the feeble ground 
that regulatory capture provides an explanation of why regulation may be 
imposed in practice –not a justification of regulation on economic criteria. 
To remedy this flaw, in the subsequent sections, I adopt a broader 
definition.   
 
 
2.2. Arguments for the economic rationale for investor protection 
 
2.2.1. Introduction 
 
As David Llewellyn points out, an investment contract may go wrong for 
one of the following reasons:10 
“(i) the consumer receives bad advice –perhaps because an agency conflict is 
exploited; 
 (ii) the supplying institution becomes insolvent before the contract matures; 
 (iii) the contract turns out to be different from what the consumer was 
anticipating; 
                                                 
9
 D. Llewellyn, ‘The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation, FSA Occasional Paper (1999), 8. 
10 Above, 12. 
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(iv) fraud and misrepresentation; and 
(v) the financial institution has been incompetent.” 
What are the causes of these problems? Is conduct of business regulation 
eligible to control these causes and reduce the probability of them occurring 
in an economically efficient manner? Below I discuss some of the main 
arguments that are set forth by those commentators that answer these 
questions in the affirmative. 
 
2.2.2. Informational problems and qualitative uncertainty 
 
Arguably, the ultimate rationale for the state’s concern to protect retail 
investors is the correction of market failures and imperfections.11 In the 
retail financial sector the peculiar features of long-term investment contracts 
and the “principal-agent” problem12 inherent in the fiduciary relationship 
between the financial intermediary and its client mould the phenomenology 
of market imperfections and failures into what economists describe as the 
problem of “uncertainty about the quality of the products and services”.13 
Its first component refers to the inability of consumers to distinguish good 
quality from bad quality products.14 Its second component describe 
consumer inability to assess the quality of services provided, the latter being 
advice, asset management etc. and is closely related to the question of 
suitability of the products and/or services offered.  
                                                 
11 Above n. 9, 21-23; and D. Llewellyn, ‘Regulation of Retail Investment Services’, 15(2), Economic Affairs, 
(Spring 1995), 12-17 at 13. 
12
 The problem of economic agency is discussed in a separate subheading below. 
13
 Informational asymmetries lie in the heart of this problem. S. Collins and J. Black, Cranston’s Consumers 
and the Law, (2000), 30-4. They mainly take the following two forms: (a) inequalities in the capacity to have 
access and evaluate information and; (b) under-production of information. Above note 6, 36-38. 
Informational problems are due to the fact that information is a “public good”. Yet, precisely because it is 
a “public good” not all consumers need to be perfectly informed. See, I. D. C. Ramsey, Rationales for 
Intervention in the Consumers Marketplace (1984), 26-28; On the impossibility of informational efficient markets 
see, S. J. Grossman and J. E. Stiglitz, ‘On the Impossibility of Informational Efficient Markets’, 52 
American Economic Review (1980), 393. 
14  G. A. Akerlof, ‘“The Market for Lemons”; Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’, 84 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (1970), 488; C. Wilson, ‘The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse 
Selection’, 11(2) Bell Journal of Economics (1980), 108. 
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2.2.3. Consumer inability to make informed choices and the peculiar 
characteristics of the investment contract 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that consumers are financially illiterate to an 
alarming degree.15 Lack of information owes partly to the fact that they do 
not have equal access to sources of information and partly because they are 
incapable to adequately evaluate available information.16 At the same time, 
consumers tend to under invest in the acquisition of information due to free 
riding problems and the costs of research. These circumstances leave hardly 
any scope for consumers to transact in a manner that would promote the 
efficient allocation of resources. 
 
The peculiar characteristics of investment contracts exacerbate this 
problem.17 Their complex and technical nature and their prolonged duration 
bear out a multitude of problems for consumers including difficulties in 
gaining experience of the quality of the financial product through frequent 
purchase and great reliance on the advice, guidance and professional skills of 
their counterparty. A third feature of the investment contract that arguably 
diminishes consumers’ capacity to make informed choices is that both the 
investment contract and the product/service offered are “credence goods”. 
This means that it is impossible for the parties in the contract to know at the 
time of purchase the future performance of the investment.18  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 FSA, A New Regulator for the New Millennium (January 2000), 7. 
16 C. Sergeant, ‘Dealing with Consumers – the Opportunities and the Costs of Getting this Wrong’, FSA 
Speech (7th May, 2003). 
17 C. A. E. Goodhart, Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now?, (1998), 7-8. 
18 J. Franks, C. Mayer and L. C. da Silva, Asset Management and Investor Protection: An International Analysis 
(2003), 269; P. Nelson, ‘Information and consumer behaviour’, 78 Journal of Political Economy (1970), 311. 
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2.2.4. Economic agency 
 
The principal-agent problem is a dominant feature of the fiduciary 
relationship under examination and arises whenever there is imperfect 
information about what action an agent has undertaken or should undertake 
on behalf of his principal.19 Even where the principal can observe the action 
taken by his agent, the principal is not in the position to know whether the 
agent took the action he himself would have taken in the given 
circumstances, because the agent acts on information different from that 
available to the principal. Since the pay-offs to agents will normally differ 
from those to the principals, the agent will not in general take the action, 
which the principal would like him to take in the presence of perfect 
information. 
 
Consequently, the fact that the financial firm should act as the fiduciary of 
its customer, does not guarantee that in practice the former will not deviate 
from its fiduciary duties.20 Conflicts of interest, inherent in every agency 
relationship, may create counter-incentives for complying with contractual 
obligations. Especially in long-term contracts and in conditions of 
asymmetric information, the possibility of opportunistic behaviour is 
increased because the value of the contract and the investment depends on 
the firm’s performance after the point of purchase.21 Contracting out would 
be a way in which consumers could avoid being exposed into the risk of 
                                                 
19 D. Simpson, ‘Regulating Pensions: Too Many Rules, Too Little Competition’, Hobart Paper No. 131 
(Institute of Economic Affairs, 1996), 24; and above note 17. 
20 Managing vertical (film-client) and horizontal (client-client) conflicts of interest is one of the core issues 
in modern financial regulation and enforcement. C. Band ‘Conflicts of Interest in Financial Services and 
Markets. The Regulatory Aspect: Part 2’, 22 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation (2007), 88 and 
‘Conflicts of Interest in financial Services and Markets’, 21 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 
(2006), 677. See also above note 9, 26-8. 
21
 Ramsey, above note 13, 28-37. 
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their counter-parties’ misconduct, nevertheless, the costs involved 
discourage them from doing so. 22   
 
2.2.5. Moral hazard, adverse selection and sub-optimal production of 
information 
 
Information asymmetries bear out two additional problems: moral hazard 
and adverse selection.23 While the former may occur in the behaviour of 
either the consumers or the providers of financial services, “adverse 
selection” crops up where public confidence is low and describes a 
particular consumer behaviour, which generally distorts competition among 
financial firms.24 Consumers are induced to hazardous behaviour that is, 
taking advantage of other market participants’ activities without sharing the 
costs involved, in their attempt to overcome all those difficulties they 
confront when engaging in market transactions or because they show 
reliance on regulatory measures protecting them.25 In the case of financial 
firms, hazardous behaviour is either due to the agency relationship or as a 
result of adverse selection from the part of consumers.  
 
Moral hazard and adverse selection may expand to the whole industry and 
take the form of herd behaviour affecting competition and consequently the 
overall market performance.26 With regard to retail investors, one could 
mention two examples of macroeconomic concern. 
 
                                                 
22 A corollary problem is the prohibitive costs of gathering information and monitoring compliance. I 
discuss this below. Above note 17, 9-10. 
23 Franks, et al., above note 18, 268-272. 
24 Akerlof, above note 14, 488; Ramsey, note 13, 33. 
25 Above note 9, 29-30; note 17, 61-64. 
26 Akerlof, above note 14, where the lack of market confidence leads to a complete market breakdown; and 
note 9, 28-9; D. Scharfstein and J. C. Stein, ‘Herd Behaviour and Investment’, 80 American Economic Review 
(1990), 465-479; and A. V. Banerjee, ‘A Simple Model of Herd Behaviour’, 107 Quarterly Journal of Economics 
(1992), 797-817. 
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The first one is the problem of sub-optimal information. Under these 
circumstances, one would expect that consumers would feel compelled to 
do anything they can to gather information and put in place effective 
mechanisms of monitoring their counterparty’s conduct.27 However, things 
are different in reality. Consumers tend to under-invest in information for 
mainly two reasons: Either because the costs for doing research, hiring 
monitoring services and operating mechanisms of compliance are 
prohibitive or because they prefer to “free-ride”.  
 
The second problem that raises issues of macro-economic concern relates to 
the situation, where the demand for products and services is considerably 
reduced due to imperfect information and lack of market confidence.28 With 
regard to financial intermediaries it suffices to point out that under the same 
conditions, good firms may be induced to behave badly where they lack the 
incentive to continue offering high quality of business or to distinguish 
themselves from their competitors because the anticipated costs are far 
greater to the benefits of going into trouble to do so.29 
 
2.2.6 Summary of the argument for investor protection regulation 
 
The thesis for regulation concludes that the proper means to eliminate 
“qualitative uncertainty” in the retail financial sector is to put in place 
conduct of business regulation. By imposing standards and rules of conduct 
of business more information would be available and the retail investors 
would be in better position to make efficient choices. It is also desirable that 
the public authority in charge has certain powers of supervising and 
                                                 
27 Above note 17, 9-10; and D. Llewellyn, ‘Regulation of Retail Investment Services’, 15(2), Economic Affairs, 
(Spring, 1995), 14. 
28 Akerlof, Above n. 14. 
29 S. Grossman, ‘The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure About Product Quality’, 24 
Journal of Law and Economics (1981), 461-483. 
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monitoring the firm’s behaviour and enforcing claims in case of misconduct. 
This would decrease the pertinent costs and at the same time enhance the 
effectiveness of various mechanisms of compliance. It would further aid in 
maintaining market confidence, strengthen sound competition and in the 
long run encourage economic growth.30 Regulation is not costless.31 It is 
strongly asserted, however, that its benefits will override the anticipated 
costs.32 
 
2.3. Counter-arguments 
 
2.3.1. Introduction  
 
The thesis against regulation is broader in scope. On the one hand, its 
adherents question the competence of governmental agencies to regulate 
financial markets in general and the conduct of investment business in the 
retail industry in particular. On the other hand, they bring in the surface an 
additional source of costs that goes hand in hand with regulation; the 
difficulties associated with the use of legal rules as instruments of social 
organisation and control. 
 
2.3.2. Defeating the claim that the market fails to respond to 
qualitative uncertainty efficiently 
 
It is argued that it is wrong to assume that the market fails to respond to the 
core informational problem of uncertainty about the quality of products and 
services. The optimal amount of information and, consequently, the optimal 
                                                 
30 See above note 9, 26 the discussion on the fall in the sales of life assurance and personal pension 
products. 
31 Franks et al., above note 18, 270-2. 
32 C. Briault, ‘The Costs of Regulation’, FSA Speech (10th July 2003). 
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degree of quality is always determined by the rules of demand and supply.33 
In particular, there are a number of ways in which consumers can get 
enough information to make informed choices34 yet, in doing so, they are 
not left alone.35 The market furnishes financial services providers with 
strong incentives to voluntarily provide investors with the information they 
require.36 Other things being equal, investors want to purchase financial 
instruments with the highest expected returns. These returns are reduced by 
the costs investors must incur to evaluate instruments and assess risks. 
Therefore, it pays producers of the instruments to reduce these investor-
borne costs by determining what information investor’s want and by 
providing them with this information. 
 
2.3.3. Consumer illiteracy, agency, moral hazard and adverse 
selection: Four overstated problems 
 
The argument that retail investors are incapable of making informed choices 
should be rejected, for it is based on the faulty assumption that informed 
choice requires perfect information. Where consumers calculate the net 
costs of their transactions and decide to rely on the reputation of the firm or 
the experiences of other consumers because the cost of research exceed the 
benefits, they makes an “informed judgement” despite the fact that they are 
less than perfectly informed.37 Similarly, it would be a mistake to say that the 
                                                 
33 For a discussion of the various market institutions generating, evaluating and disseminating information 
see, J. Blundell and C. Robinson, ‘Regulation Without the State’ (1999), Occasional Paper No.109 (Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 1999); P. M. Booth, ‘Who Should Regulate Financial Institutions?’, Economic Affairs, 
(Spring 2003), 28 at 29-31; The achievement of informational efficient market, however, appears to be 
impossible. On that point see above Grossman and Stiglitz, note 13, 393.  
34 D. L. Mc Fadden and K. E. Train, ‘Consumers’ Evaluation of New Products: Learning from Self and 
Others’, 104(2) Journal of Political Economy, (1996), 683; D. E. Smallwood and J. Conslisk, ‘Product Quality 
In Markets Where Consumers Are Imperfectly Informed’, 93 Quarterly Journal of Economics (1979), 1. 
35 Ramsey, above note 13, 26. 
36 Above note 16; J. Franks et al., note 18, 269-270; note 28; and J. Horner, ‘Reputation and Competition’, 
92(3) American Economic Review (June 2002), 411-433. 
37 G. J. Benston, ‘Regulating Financial Markets: A Critique and Some Proposals’, Hombart Paper No.135 
(Institute of Economic Affairs, 1998), 61. 
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amount of information produced is sub-optimal, given that it suffices for 
the parties to decide whether it would be for their benefit to transact or not.  
 
Consumer illiteracy is not the only phenomenon that has been overstated by 
the proponents of conduct of business regulation. The problems arising out 
of the agency relationship as well as those of moral hazard on the part of 
firms and adverse selection on the part of consumers have been 
embroidered. The firm’s incentives to breach its fiduciary duties are 
frequently counter-balanced by the incentive to distinguish itself from other 
competitors. The latter entails investing in the quality of products and 
services and in the disclosure of information. For the same reason cases of 
opportunistic behaviour and misconduct in the form of herd behaviour are 
less common then it is thought, under circumstances of asymmetric 
information.38 In any rate, regulation, as a response to these contingencies, 
cannot be justified in so far these do not create negative externalities, 
monitoring services are already offered by the market and private 
enforcement of rights is economically efficient.39 
 
2.3.4. Economic agency in non-market context 
 
There is a multiplicity of agency relationships embedded in the institutional 
structure of a public authority charged with the task to regulate financial 
markets. Of particular importance are the following two: On the one hand, 
the agency relationship between the regulators (‘agents’) and retail investors 
(‘principals’) since the former undertake the commitment to protect the 
welfare of the latter and generally promote their interests.40 On the other 
hand, the agency relationship between the regulators and the regulated 
                                                 
38 Above note 37, 62. 
39 Above 51-52.  
40 Above note 9. 
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firms, namely the financial services suppliers.41  In this particular case, the 
regulators are the ‘principals’ and the regulated firms are the ‘agents’ in the 
sense that they agree to comply with a given regulatory regime. 
 
These two agency relationships are not different from any other case of 
agency. Informational asymmetries exist and conflicts of interests do arise 
here as well.42 In the absence of any effective mechanism of monitoring and 
compliance and to the extent the interests of the parties do not coincide, 
there is ample space for the agent to deviate from one’s initial commitment 
to further the principal’s interests. The regulated firms have an incentive not 
to comply with regulation insofar as compliance is not anticipated to bring 
about optimal outcomes for their business. Regulators will not serve the 
interests of consumers to the extent in which the implementation of the 
pertinent policies militate against their self-interests and/or those of their 
administrative clientele.43 
 
What distinguishes, however, the sketched interaction of interests from any 
other agency relationship is the following: In the marketplace, competition 
and the decentralisation of power control the occurrence of conflicts of 
interest and filtrate the quality of services.44 By contrast, in the public 
domain, it is difficult to establish an effective accountability regime, in view 
of the complex bureaucratic institutional structure and the monopolistic and 
centralised character of the government’s political power and its respective 
administrative agencies.45 It is also difficult to make any safe assessment of 
the value of the services offered by the public authority as means to 
                                                 
41 Above note 17, 47-48.  
42 Above. 
43 Above note 37, 18, 22 and 23. 
44 Simpson, above note 19, 51-53. 
45 Simpson, above note 19, 47; and note 17, 68-72. 
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appreciate their quality given the absence of a price mechanism equivalent to 
the one operating in the market.46  
 
2.3.5. The pathology of legal rules and side-effects of regulation 
 
Consumer protection is contingent on the capacity of legal rules to deliver 
the intended public policy objectives. The use of legal rules, however, is not 
free from problems.47 Rules may regulate more cases than it was initially 
intended (over-inclusiveness) or vice versa (under-inclusiveness). At the 
same time, it may be extremely difficult to determine their meaning with 
certainty (legal indeterminacy). In any rate, it is essential that regulatory 
standards be designed in such a manner so that the cost of rule-deficiencies 
is kept at minimum.48 With regard to conduct of business rules, recent 
studies suggest that policy makers have found it extremely difficult to meet 
this objective. This has been attributed to a range of factors including the 
use of vague terms (e.g. ‘suitability’, ‘reasonable’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’ advice)49 
and the fact that drafting conduct of business rules is essentially about 
setting quality standards which are difficult to determine in advance because 
they are contingent to entirely individual circumstances and personal 
consumer tastes. 50 
 
A corollary issue is the competence of an administrative public body to 
define the amount and content of information as well as the way this should 
be made available to customers.51 Given the remoteness of the relationship, 
how would it be possible for a governmental agency to know what 
                                                 
46 Survey techniques help assessing the value of non-market services like regulation but such a “quasi-
market mechanism” is not devoid of problems. See above note 17, 68-9. 
47
 J. Black Rules and Regulators (1997), ch.1. 
48 R. Landes and R. A. Posner, ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’, 18 Journal of Legal Studies (1975), 1. 
49 S. Read, Competition or Regulation: An Alternative Approach to Investor Protection (Adam Smith Institute, 1998), 
7. 
50 Collins and Black, above note 13, 28; and note 19, 49-51. 
51 Above nove 37, 48-49, 55 and 72. 
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information individual investors might find necessary or useful? This 
depends on various factors such as tastes wealth and risk preferences and 
many of them have no generally accepted metrics. By contrast, a financial 
firm seems to be in better position to identify the individual needs of each 
customer and it should be encouraged to do so to the extent the benefits of 
providing such facilities do not exceed the anticipated costs. 
 
Apart from the difficulties associated with the use of legal rules in the 
regulatory context, one should not lose sight of the fact that regulation is 
also liable to bring about a plethora of other side effects. It encourages 
hazardous behaviour on the part of consumers52 and imposes constrains on 
competition and innovation for the overall detriment of consumers.53 Entry 
controls and the setting of minimum standards, for example, serve the 
interests of financial firms and not those of the consumers, because they 
protect financial services suppliers from being exposed into harder 
competition. These problems should be taken into account as well when 
assessing the desirability of conduct of business regulation. 
 
2.3.6. Summary of the argument against investor protection regulation 
 
The argument against regulation concludes that it is competition and not 
protective policies that further consumer welfare.54 While cases of market 
failure and their consequences have been overstated, several other problems 
have passed unnoticed. For example, no proper attention has been given to 
various instances of governmental failure, the limitations of regulatory 
standards to deliver public policy objectives and the competence of a 
specialist public agency to know beforehand what is best for each consumer. 
                                                 
52 J. Franks et al., above note 9, 29; note 18, 19-20 and 270-2; and note 17, 62-63, where the author points 
out that for the majority of consumers, financial regulation appears to be a free good.  
53 Above note 37, 62; and Simpson, note 19, 50. 
54 J. Vickers, ‘Healthy Competition and Its Consumer Wins’, 12 Consumer Policy Review (July 2002), 142. 
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Clearly, market dynamics that could work for the benefit of consumers have 
not been fully exploited but rather suffocated. On this view, a shift in 
attitude and a change of focus would serve consumer interests better. 
 
 
3. The FSA Conduct of Business Regulation 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Rules governing the conduct of business of firms with their clients 
(‘investors’) stand at the centre of UK financial regulation.55 These comprise 
the COB Sourcebook,56 a lengthy piece of secondary legislation, which is 
part of the FSA Handbook of Rules and Guidance.57 Breach of these rules 
gives rise to a range of remedies. In addition to those provided by the 
general law of contract, negligence and misrepresentation, the aggrieved 
party has the right to bring a legal action for damages under section 150 of 
FSMA. Moreover, contravention of COB requirements may give rise to 
disciplinary action by FSA.58 Subject to exceptions, COB rules apply to 
every firm in respect of the activities set out in COB 1.3.1.59 Specifically, 
                                                 
55 The common law principles of agency and tort provide an additional layer of investor protection. 
Although their significance has been gradually marginalized, they still provide a source of interpretive 
guidance for the proper application of regulatory requirements. M. Blair and G. A. Walker, Financial Services 
Law, (2006), ch.11; and I. McNeil, above note 1, 186-190. 
56 There are separate COB rules for mortgages (MCOB) and for non-investment insurance contracts 
(ICOB). The FSA COB replaced the earlier regime under the Financial Services Act 1986. Its predecessor 
was a three-tier system of rules generally dealing with identical issues such as disclosure of information, 
suitability of advice, best execution, customer’s understanding of risk, financial promotion (‘misleading 
statements’ and ‘unsolicitated calls’), soft commissions and unfair practices. B. Rider, C. Abrams and E. 
Ferran, Guide to the Financial Services Act 1986 (1989), ch. 6. By the end of 2007, the COB Sourcebook will 
be replaced by the NEWCOB Sourcebook, which will implement the MiFID into the UK. The 
implementation of MiFID and the key changes that will be introduced are discussed in section 3.12 below. 
57 COB rules are part of Business Standards alongside, Conduct of Business rules for non-investment 
insurance contracts (ICOB), Conduct of Business rules for mortgages (MCOB), Client Assets (CASS), 
Market Conduct (MAR) and Training and Competence (TC). 
58 Above note 55, ch.11. The aggrieved party has also the option to resort to the Financial Services 
Ombudsman and or use other forms of redress avoiding court litigation. On that point see above I. 
McNeil, note 1, 190-203. 
59 COB 1.2.1 in combination with COB 1.4.1, 2 and 3, which set out the territorial scope of COB rules. 
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they regulate “designated investment business”60 in line with the FSA eleven 
principles for business. These are the following: 
1. “A firm must conduct its business with integrity. 
2. A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence. 
3. A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs 
responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems. 
4. A firm must maintain adequate financial resources. 
5. A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct. 
6. A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat 
them fairly. 
7. A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, 
and communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair 
and not misleading. 
8. A firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself 
and its customers and between a customer and another client. 
9. A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice 
and discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely 
upon its judgement. 
10. A firm must arrange adequate protection for client’s assets when it is 
responsible for them. 
11. A firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, 
and must disclose to the FSA appropriately anything relating to the 
firm of which the FSA would reasonably expect notice.”61 
 
 
The application of COB rules follows the FSA system of client 
classification. By and large, COB rules govern dealings with “private 
customers”, that is consumers of financial services and products 
(“unsophisticated investors”). COB rules provide consumer protection in a 
number of ways including by way of provisions requiring the disclosure of 
information, provisions regulating the quality of advice, and execution of 
                                                 
60 The Glossary of the FSA Handbook contains a long and non-exhaustive list of activities that fall within 
the scope of “designated investment business”. These are, for example, (a) dealing in investments as 
principal or agent; (b) arranging (bringing about) deals in investments; (c) managing investments; (d) 
safeguarding and administering investments; (e) safeguarding and administration of assets; (f) establishing, 
operating or winding up a collective investment scheme; (g) acting as trustee of an authorised unit trust 
scheme, (h) advising on pension transfers and pension opt-outs etc. See also Part II of the Regulated 
Activities Order (Specified Activities).  
61 It should be pointed out that the application of the eleven principles for business is much broader and 
covers –apart from conduct of business rules (COB) other fields of financial regulation such as the ‘Client 
Money’ regime (CASS), Market Conduct, the ‘Approved Persons’ regime and ‘Systems and Controls’. 
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orders, provisions restricting unfair practices and provisions furnishing 
consumers with certain rights and remedies. Product regulation is not absent 
but nevertheless rare as, for example, in the case of stakeholder contracts 
where limited “basic advice” may be given.62 Below I offer a brief overview 
of the main COB rules.63 
 
3.2. Financial promotion, inducements and unsolicitated calls 
 
A wide range of COB rules deal with the marketing64 of retail investments to 
the public (“financial promotions”).65 The overall objective of these 
regulatory provisions is to protect consumers from the risk of taking 
decisions on the basis of misleading and/or inaccurate information.66 The 
COB rules on financial promotion should be read in light of section 21 of 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which sets out a general 
restriction of activities constituting “financial promotion” broadly 
conceived67 and of the Financial Promotions Order, which introduces a 
number of exceptions.68 The scope of activities falling within the definition 
of financial promotion is further refined by a range of extensive guidance as 
                                                 
62 For a critical appraisal of product regulation see, J. Gray, ‘Personal Finance and Corporate Governance: 
The Missing Link: Product Regulation and Policy Conflicts’, 4 Journal of Corporate Law Studies, (2004), 187. 
63 The following COB chapters are not included in the discussion: (a) chapter 9 on client assets, since this 
topic is dealt with separately in CASS; (b) a number of chapters which contain special provisions in relation 
to the operators of regulated investment schemes (COB 10), trustee and depository activities (COB 11), 
and Lloyd’s (COB12) and; (c) chapter 8A, which deals with the handling of claims in relation to long-term 
care insurance contracts. 
64 The marketing of financial services and products involves the use of newspaper, television and website 
advertisements, brochures, mailshots, telemarketing, sales aids and marketing activity in the form of letters, 
telephone calls and meetings. Articles 12 to 73 of the Financial Promotions Order contains numerous 
exceptions, which are further regulated by PERG 8. 
65 M. Blair and G. A. Walker above note 55, ch.11 at paras. 60 to 71. 
66 J. Davies, ‘What is Misselling?’, 19(1) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation (2004), 1 at 5-8; Fox 
Hayes v FSA (decision of the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal, 14 June 2007)  FSA v Fradley (t/a 
Top Bet Placement Services), [2005] 1 BCLC, 479; Seymour v Caroline Ockwell and Co [2005] PNLR 39. 
67 Breach of the restriction that is set out in section 21 is a criminal offence (section 25 FSMA), whereas 
resulting agreements are prima facie unenforceable (section 30 FSMA). The FSMA provisions on financial 
promotions replace the earlier regimes of investment advertisement and unsolicitated calls. It intends to be 
medium neutral. 
68 The Financial Promotion Order ‘The FSMA 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005, SI 2005/1529. 
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to the application of the financial promotion restriction, the exemptions, 
and the conditions applying. 
 
In particular, section 21 of the FSMA states that “a person must not, in the 
course of business, communicate an invitation or inducement to engage in 
investment activity unless the communication is made or approved by an 
authorised person”.69 In accordance with section 21, chapter 3 of COB 
contains more specific rules on financial promotion, which run in parallel 
with other FSMA and COB provisions as, for example, the rules on 
financial advice in chapter 5 of COB.70 Specifically, COB 3 provides rules 
and guidance for a firm, which wishes to communicate or approve a 
financial promotion, by amplifying the content of Principles 6 (customers’ 
interests) and 7 (communication with client) of the FSA Handbook.71 Some 
of the provisions are applicable to all types of financial promotions,72 while 
others apply only to specific types of financial promotions that is, real time 
financial promotions73, non-real time financial promotions74 and direct offer 
financial promotions.75  
                                                 
69 In light of section 21 (13), communication is broadly defined to include any activity, which is aimed at 
causing a future communication. The concept of inducement refers to those situations where the degree of 
incitement goes beyond the provision of purely factual information (PERG 8.4). Engaging in investment 
activity is also defined widely by reference to controlled activities and controlled investments (section 21 
(8) and (9) FSMA and Schedule 1(4) of FOP. In accordance with section 31 FSMA, ‘an authorised person’ 
is one of the following: (a) a person who has a Part IV permission to carry one or more of the regulated 
activities; (b) an incoming EEA firm; (c) an incoming Treaty firm; (d) a UCITS qualifier; (e) an ICVC; (f) 
the Society of Lloyd’s. See also GEN 2.2.18 for the position of an authorised partnership or 
unincorporated association, which is dissolved. M. Blair and G. A. Walker, above note 55, ch.11 para. 64. 
For commentary on the notion of “in the course of business” see, J. Thomas, ‘The Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 and Financial Promotions –The Meaning of “in the Course of Business”’, 13 (6) 
International Company and Commercial Law Review, (2002), 233-236. 
70 It may also be necessary to consider other areas of law including industry codes as, for example, the 
British Code of Advertising, Sales Promotion and Direct Marketing. 
71 The meaning of ‘communicate’ and ‘approve’ is explained in COB 3.2.1. 
72 See COB 3.5.2. 
73 In accordance with article 7 (1) of the Financial Promotions Order, a real time financial promotion, is a 
promotion that is made in the course of a personal visit, telephone conversation or other interactive 
dialogue. See also COB 3.5.5 (1) 
74
 In accordance with article 7 (2) of the Financial Promotions Order, a non-real time financial promotion 
is any form of financial promotion that does not fall within the definition of real time financial promotion 
in Article 7 (1). See also COB 3.5.5 (2). 
75
 According to the Glossary’s definition, a direct offer financial promotion is a financial promotion which 
contains: “(a) (i) an offer by the firm or another person to enter into a controlled agreement with anyone 
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According to COB 3.8, financial promotions should be clear, fair and not 
misleading.76 Firms are under the obligation to confirm that financial 
promotions comply with the COB rules.77 Due to their nature and the risks 
that trigger to consumers, unsolicitated real time financial promotions are 
dealt with separately.78 COB 3.10 introduces a general prohibition of real 
time unsolicitated promotions, subject to the exceptions set out in COB 
3.10.3, as, for instance, where the recipient of the unsolicitated real time 
financial promotion is in an existing customer relationship with the firm. 
Chapter 3 of COB further contains special guidance for financial promotion 
through electronic means (e.g., email).79  
 
COB 2 imposes an additional requirement to a firm. With the view of 
avoiding conflicts of interest, it requires a firm to abstain from marketing a 
product or service to another person, if this is likely to engender a material 
conflict with duties that a firm owes to its customers.80 In the same spirit, 
COB 2.2.6 requires that inducements from a product provider to a firm 
advising private customers on packaged products must not be such as to 
induce material bias as regards the choice of product. It should be noted, 
however, that there is a detailed list of “indirect benefits” that fall outside 
                                                                                                                                            
who responds to the financial promotion; or (ii) an invitation to anyone who responds to the financial 
promotion to make an offer to the firm or another person to enter into a controlled agreement; (b) 
specifies the manner or response or includes a form in which any response is to be made (for example by 
providing a tear-off slip); and (c) is not a real time financial promotion.” This will typically be a tear off 
coupon. 
76 COB 3.8.4 and 3.8.22. The implementation of MiFID will bring about a range of changes with respect to 
communication with clients. This is briefly discussed in sub-section 3.12 below. 
77 COB 3.6. 
78 In accordance with article 7 (1) of the Financial Promotions Order, a real time financial promotion, is a 
promotion that is made in the course of a personal visit, telephone conversation or other interactive 
dialogue. 
79 COB 3.14. 
80  See also Principles 1 and 6.  
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the scope of the above-mentioned rule prohibiting inducements. A standard 
example, in this connection, is the supply of product literature.81 
 
3.3. Client classification  
 
Client classification is set out in COB 4.1.4.82 According to this provision, a 
firm’s customer may fall in one of the following three categories: he might 
be either a “private customer” or an “intermediate customer” or “market 
counterparty”.83 Private customers receive the greatest level of protection, 
since in this category fall unsophisticated investors that is, consumers of 
financial products and services. Market counterparties, stand at the other far 
end of the spectrum, while intermediate customers are found in the middle. 
In the retail sector the assumption is that the customer will be a private 
customer. The purpose of imposing to the firm the obligation to classify its 
customers before carrying out any of the “designated activities” is to ensure 
that regulatory protection is focused on those clients that it is needed most, 
“while allowing an appropriately light touch approach for inter-professional 
business”.84 
 
3.4. Terms of business and client agreement 
 
                                                 
81 COB 2.2.7. Other examples are joint marketing exercises, seminars, conferences and technical services. I. 
McNeil, above note 1, 180-181. 
82 M. Blair and G. A. Walker, above note 55, ch.11 para.72. Special provisions deal with client classification 
in other contexts as, for example, in the case of collective investment schemes, exchanges and clearing 
houses. See notably, COB 4.1.7A, 4.1.8A and 4.1.9A. A new client classification regime will be introduced 
by the end of 2007 as a result of the implementation of MiFID into the UK. See section 3.12 below. 
83 Examples of intermediate customers include local authorities, a body corporate whose share has been 
listed or admitted to trading or any EEA exchange, a special purpose vehicle, a collective investment 
scheme etc. Examples of market counterparty include governmental or quasi-governmental bodies, a 
recognised investment exchange when it is not classified as intermediate customer, a clearing-house when it 
is not classified as an intermediate customer etc. A private customer is a client who is not intermediate 
customer or market counterparty including an individual who is not a firm, an overseas individual who is 
not an overseas financial services institution etc. 
84 COB 4.1.3. A different client categorisation is set out in MiFID, which will substitute the existing one. 
This is briefly discussed in sub-section 3.12 below. 
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A firm is expected to provide its customers with information about how it 
intends to do business with them.85 To this effect, it must furnish its clients 
with the terms of business and a client agreement (COB 4.2).86 The terms of 
business contain all contractual terms and conditions in conformity with 
COB 4 Annex 2.87 These must be made available to the customer well in 
advance (in “good time”) so that he has enough time to make up his mind. 
The terms of business may be changed unilaterally without the customer’s 
consent. In this case, however, the firm is under the obligation to give at 
least ten days notice and keep record of any amendments.88 Apart from 
client classification, and the provision and content of terms of business and 
client agreements, chapter 4 of COB deals with a number of other issues. 
One of them is set out COB 4.3, which requires the disclosure of key 
information to private customers with respect to services fees and 
commissions of packaged products.89 
 
3.5. Managing conflicts of interest 
 
In light of Principle 8,90 COB 7.1.3 aims to ensure that a firm pays due 
regard to the interest of its customer and manages conflicts of interest 
fairly.91 Conflicts of interest may occur either between the firm and its 
                                                 
85 M. Blair and G. A. Walker, above note 55, ch. 11 at paras. 73 to 82 and; note 1, 176. 
86 COB 4.2 amplifies Principle 6 (customers interest) and Principle 7 (communication with clients). See, 
COB 4.2.4. 
87 This requirement does not apply in case of telephone calls. See further COB 4 Annex 1(1). 
88 COB 4.2.13 and COB 4.2.14. 
89 Packaged products are defined as: “(a) a life policy; (b) a unit in a regulated investment scheme; (c) an 
interest in an investment trust savings scheme; (d) a stakeholder pension scheme; whether or not (in the 
case of (a), (b) or (c) held within a PEP, an ISA or a CTF and whether or not the packaged product is also 
a stakeholder product.” 
90 C. Band, ‘Conflicts of interests in financial services and markets’, 21(12) Journal of International Banking 
Law and Regulation (2006), 677. 
91 Most of COB rules in chapter 7 (dealing and managing) apply to customers that is, to private customers 
and intermediate customers. Despite their application to private customers they do not necessarily apply to 
retail products. COB 7.1, 7.7, 7.12 to 7.17 and COB 7.5.4, which provides an example of retail products 
(notably, the purchase of life policy or of unit in a regulated CIS from the scheme operator) where the duty 
of best execution does not apply. M. Blair and G. A. Walker, above note 55, ch. 11, paras. 51 to 54. The 
regulatory requirements on conflicts of interest will be removed from the Conduct of Business Sourcebook 
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customer,92 either between two different customers of the same firm.93 
Specifically, it prohibits firms to “knowingly advice or otherwise deal in 
relation to a transaction in which the firm has or may have a material 
interest or in relation to a transaction that gives rise or may give rise to 
conflicts of interest”.94 
 
In managing conflict of interests, the firm has the option95 (a) to disclose the 
interest to the customer; (b) to rely on policy of independence; (c) to 
establish internal arrangements (Chinese Walls) or (d) to decline to act for a 
customer.96 This is simply a guidance on what may constitute “reasonable 
steps” in managing conflicts of interest and, as paragraphs 2 and 3 of COB 
7.1.4 make clear, contravention (or alternatively compliance) with this 
guidance will only be treated as “tending to establish” contravention (or 
compliance as the case may be) with the rule set out in COB 7.1.3. It is 
argued that this bears out legal uncertainty, given that conformity with this 
rule does not guarantee exclusion of liability.97 
 
                                                                                                                                            
and further changes will be introduced as a result of the implementation of MiFID in the UK. The reform 
of the conflicts of interest regime is briefly considered in sub-section 3.12 below. 
92 The term “customer” refers to the private customer and “intermediate customer”. Certain provisions of 
chapter 7, however, apply one to private customers. See for example, COB 7.8 and 7.11, which mainly 
relate to investment and portfolio managers and regulate activities such as the realisation of private 
customers assets, lending, margin requirements and non-exchange traded securities. 
93 For the rule to apply suffice is the probability that the transaction in question will give rise to conflicts of 
interest. 
94 The concept of “material interest” is defined in the Glossary as “any interest of material nature other 
than (a) disclosable commissions on the transactions (b) goods or services which can reasonably be 
expected to assist in carrying on designated investment business with or for clients and which are provided 
or to be provided in compliance with COB 7.18.3 (use of dealing commission to purchase goods or 
services).” 
95 COB 7.1.4 (1). 
96 Special rules regulate deal with each of these options for managing conflicts of interest separately. COB 
7.15, 7.1.6, 7.1.7, 7.1.8, 7.1.9. 
97 COB 7.1.10 establishes additional requirements for broker fund advisers, the operator of the broker fund 
adviser and to long-term insurers. 
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As it was mentioned above, one of the methods for managing conflicts of 
interest is the establishment of Chinese Walls.98 These are communication 
barriers between members or departments of the same financial institution 
whose objective is to ensure that no improper trading occurs.99 The 
provision of Chinese Walls is specifically dealt with in COB 2.4.4. Failure to 
comply with these requirements deprives the firm from certain defences 
against a legal action brought either under section 147 FSMA 2000 or any 
action for damages brought under section 150 FSMA 2000.100 Furthermore, 
conformity with Chinese Walls requirements safeguards a firm against 
allegations of market abuse.101 
 
3.6. Advising and selling 
 
Part of a firm’s obligation is to make sure that private customers are 
adequately informed about the nature of the advice they receive and that 
they have a clear picture about the scope of the products as well as the 
capacity of the product providers on which their advice is based upon.102 To 
this effect chapter 5 of COB contains a number of requirements for firms. 
One of them is the so-called “know your customer rule”.103 According to 
COB 5.2, a firm must obtain sufficient information about its private 
customer and keep records of the personal and financial circumstances of its 
customer for at least three years. FSA considers that this piece of 
information is crucial for otherwise the firm will be unable to comply with 
the additional requirement of ensuring the suitability of advice to its 
                                                 
98 N. Poser, ‘“Chinese Wall” or Emperor's New Clothes? Regulating Conflicts of Interest of Securities 
Firms in the U.S. and the U.K. Part I, Part II and Part III’ in 9 Company Lawyer (1988), 119, 159 and 203 
respectively; and I. McNeil above note 1, 322. 
99 COB 2.4. In practice, for multi-disciplinary investment firms, Chinese Walls are not only permitted but 
they are considered essential. 
100 COB 2.4.5. 
101 On market abuse see section 118 and Part VIII of FSMA 2000. 
102 M. Blair and G. A. Walker above note 55, ch.11 at paras. 83 to 89; FSA v Fraser & Ors, [2001] WL 
1612602. 
103 Above n. 1, 177; and G. McMeel and J. Virgo, Financial Advice and Financial Products: Law and Liability 
(2001), ch. 14, paras 52-57. 
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customers needs.104 The suitability rule in COB 5.3.5 applies with respect to 
personal recommendations to private customers, to income withdrawals, 
pension transfers and opt-outs.105 In case of packaged products, the firm 
must choose the most suitable product from the range of packaged products 
on which advice is given to the client.106 In the absence of a suitable product 
within the range advised upon, no recommendation can be made.107 
Moreover, the firm must furnish the customer with a suitability letter, which 
explains why the firm has concluded that the transaction is suitable for the 
customer. The suitability letter must contain a summary of the main 
consequences and possible disadvantages of the transaction and overall be 
in conformity with the guidance laid out in COB 5.3.30.  
 
An additional obligation for a firm carrying out activities in the retail sector 
is to take all reasonable steps so that its customer understands the risks 
involved in the transaction.108 The rule is established in COB 5.4.3 and 
applies where a firm makes “a personal recommendation, acts as a 
discretionary investment manager or arranges/executes a deal in warrant or 
derivatives”. A plethora of evidential provisions purport to clarify when the 
firm will be deemed to have taken reasonable steps, while in various 
occasions –notably for warrants and derivatives- the firm must furnish its 
customer with written risk warnings in the form specified by the relevant 
COB.109 
 
Moreover, COB 5.1.6A makes possible for a firm to select products either 
from the whole market, or from a limited number of product providers or 
                                                 
104 G. McMeel and J. Virgo, above, ch 14, paras 58-61; G. Cameron and M. Sah, ‘Controlling the Quality of 
Financial Advice: The Use of Regulatory Form to Satisfy Fiduciary Obligations’, Journal of Business Law 
(1997), 143; and above note 66, at 3-4. 
105 COB 5.3.5 (1) (a). 
106 COB 5.3.5 (2) (a). See also G. McMeel and J. Virgo, above note 103 , ch. 14, paras 62-66. 
107 COB 5.3.5 (2) (b). 
108 I. McNeil, above note 1, 179-180. 
109 COB 5.4.6 and Annex 1. 
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from a single provider.110 Yet, in doing so, a firm “must not hold itself out 
as the packaged products producer”. In the same vein a firm “must not… 
say anything which may reasonably lead a customer to be mistaken as to the 
identity of the product’s producer” or describe itself as “acting 
‘independently’”.111 In any case, the firm must keep a written and accurate 
record of the scope of advice, which it can give and the range of packaged 
products to be advised upon.112 A firm may change the scope of the advice 
but before doing so it must communicate to its customer any changes by 
way of a durable medium.  
 
Finally the “basic advice” regime in COB 5A deserves special attention. This 
is a simplified advice process, and it intends to make the provision of 
financial advice simpler, quicker, more accessible and cost effective for 
consumers. The principal rule on the provision of basic advice is that the 
sales process must incorporate the questions that are set out in COB 5A.4.1. 
Recommendation of a stakeholder product113 cannot be made unless the 
firm considers that the recommendation is suitable to its customer needs 
and has reasonable grounds to assume that the consumer understands the 
advice and the basis on which it was given.114 
 
3.7. Best execution 
 
                                                 
110 Before the abolition of the polarisation regime and up till 2005, advisers had to be either “independent” 
offering advice for a selection of products from the whole market or “tied” offering advice on the products 
of just one supplier.  
111 COB 5.1.6.F and COB 5.1.11A. See further, M. Blair and G. A. Walker above note 55, ch.11 para. 77. 
112 This applies to both the firm itself and to its appointed representatives. COB 5.6.1D and E. 
113 For the definition of stakeholder products see article 52B (3) of the Regulated Activities Order and 
Stakeholder Regulations (SI 2004/2738). 
114 COB 5A.4.2. M. Blair and G. A. Walker above note 55, ch.11 para. 89. 
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The regulatory requirements of best execution are dealt with in COB 7.5.115 
This provision sets out a range of standards that are applicable to firms 
when executing customers’ orders in designated investments –particularly in 
the securities and derivatives markets.116 The purpose of these standards is 
to amplify the requirement of conducting business with due skill, care and 
diligence (Principle 2) paying due regard to the customers interests 
(Principle 6). The rule in COB 7.5 is subject to the exceptions of COB 7.5.4. 
Examples of these exceptions include customer’s order for the purchase of 
life policy, customer’s order for the sale of units in a regulated investment 
scheme and customer’s order for personal pension scheme. To provide best 
execution a firm must (1) take reasonable care to ascertain the price which is 
the best available for the customer order in the relevant market at the time 
for transactions of the kind and size concerned; and (2) execute the 
customer order at the price which is no less advantageous117 to the 
customer, unless the firm has taken reasonable steps to ensure that it would 
be in the customer’s best interests not to do so.118 COB 7.5.6 contains a 
range of evidential provisions concerning the taking of reasonable steps 
under COB 7.5.5. For example, a firm must disregard any charges and 
commission made by it or to its agents that are disclosed to the customer 
under COB 5.7.119 In addition a firm needs to have access to competing 
exchanges, or to all or a minimum number of available price sources etc.  
 
                                                 
115 M. Blair and G. Walker, above note 55, para. 109; and I. McNeil, note 1, 185. In light of the 
implementation of MiFID in the UK, the best execution regime will be reformed. This is discussed in sub-
section 3.12 below. 
116 COB 7.5.1, COB 7.5.2 and COB 7.5.3. 
117 COB 7.5.8 offers by way of guidance an example where a firm may execute a customer order at a price, 
which is less advantageous than the best available price. This is when a firm has a continuing relationship 
with a customer, and reasonably expects that it will be able to secure compensating advantages for the 
customer over a period or a series of transactions. 
118 COB 7.5.5. 
119
 COB 7.5.7 provides guidance as to the disclosure of charges and commission in relation to non-
standard settlement under COB 7.5.6 (4)(e). 
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The firm has also the duty to ensure the timely execution of client’s 
orders.120 Timely execution is dealt with in COB 7.6. It applies to a firm 
when it agrees or it has decided in the exercise of its discretion to execute a 
current customer order in a designated investment.121 It requires a firm to 
select the most appropriate time to execute the current customer order.122 
Once a firm has agreed or decided in its discretion to execute a current 
customer order in a designated investment, it must do so as soon as 
reasonably practicable.123  
 
In assessing timely execution, it is important to define when a transaction is 
deemed as executed. With the exception of orders executed in normal 
market hours, where things are straightforward, there is a range of situations 
where ambiguity lurks as, for example, in the case of trading outside normal 
market hours or when a firm allocates a customer order with an own 
account order or with another customer order. These issues are now 
addressed in COB 8.1.12. According to this rule, when a firm executes 
outside normal market hours, the transaction must be treated as executed on 
the following business day.124 Similarly, when a firm allocates a customer 
order with an own account order or with another customer order, the 
transaction must be treated as executed at the time of allocation.  Other 
important FSA provisions include COB 7.6.6, which offers guidance as to 
when a firm should take particular care to assess the timing of execution, 
                                                 
120 “Timely execution” amplifies Principle 2 (skill, care and diligence) and Principle 6 (customers’ interests) 
and it is subject to the exception introduced in COB 7.6.5. 
121 According to the Glossary, a current customer order is “(a) a customer order to be executed 
immediately; (b) a customer order, which is to be executed only on fulfilment of a condition after the 
condition have been fulfilled.” 
122 COB 7.6.1, 7.6.2, 7.6.3. 
123 COB 7.6.4. COB 8.1.12 states when a transaction is treated as executed. 
124 In relation to transactions that are done or to be done in the UK, “business day” is any day which is not 
Saturday, Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or Bank Holiday. In relation to transactions that are done 
or to be done outside the UK, ‘business day’ is any day, which that market is normally open to business. 
See the Glossary definition of ‘business day’ and section 167 of the Companies Act 1989 (recognised 
exchanges and clearing houses). 
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and COB 7.6.8, which requires record keeping in conformity with COB 
7.12. 
 
3.8. Unfair practices 
 
In light of Principle 6, which requires a firm to pay due regard to the 
interests of its customers and treat them fairly, a number of COB rules 
prohibit unfair practices.125 Specifically, COB 2.5 provides that firms are not 
allowed to exclude or restrict any duty or liability they may have to their 
customers. Similarly, COB 5.6.3 stipulates that firms must not impose 
excessive charges to private customers and lays out a number of factors to 
be taken into account in determining whether charges are excessive. These 
include “competitors’ charges, the nature and extent of disclosure, and 
whether the charges constitute a breach of the trust placed in the firm by the 
customer”. 126  Special care has been taken in relation to distance contracts. 
In this connection, COB 2.6 rules inter alia that pre-contract information 
must be consistent with the applicable law if the contract were concluded 
and that if the customer requests the firm to change the means of 
communication, then the firm must comply with that request.  
 
Finally, churning and switching are prohibited.127 In this respect, COB 7.2 
explicitly states that firms should enter into transactions with unnecessary 
frequency. Similarly, a firm should not switch a private customer within or 
                                                 
125 M. Blair and G. Walker above note 55, ch. 11 at paras. 55 to 57; I. Mc Neil, note 1, 181-182 and; G. 
McMeel and J. Virgo, note 103, ch 14 paras 74-76. 
126 M. Blair and G. Walker above note 55, ch. 11 at para. 57. The Glossary defines a “distance contract” as 
“any contract concerning financial services, the making or performance of which constitutes or is part of a 
regulated activity including, a regulated activity that was concluded under an organised distance sales or 
service provision scheme run by the contractual provided of the service who, for the purpose of that 
contract, makes exclusive use (directly of through an intermediary) of one or more means of distance 
communication up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded.” 
127 An example of churning in packaged products is when a firm recommends a house buyer to replace his 
existing endowment policy with a new one, which he will have to buy for the whole sum borrowed, 
because the alternative of retaining the existing endowment policy produces less commission for the firm. 
M. Blair and G. Walker above note 55, ch. 11 at para. 110. 
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between packaged products unnecessarily. In the same spirit, COB 7.2.3 
makes clear that firms must not deal or make personal recommendations, 
unless they have taken all reasonable steps to ensure that this is in the best 
interests for their clients. 
 
3.9. Withdrawal and cancellation rights  
 
COB rules furnish customers with the right to withdraw (COB 6.7.19) from 
or cancel (COB 6.7.5A) an investment contract. The purpose of these rules 
is to give customers appropriate time for reflection during which they can 
decide whether to proceed with their transaction or not.128 Whereas 
withdraw rights can be exercised before a contract has been concluded, 
cancellation rights arise after the conclusion of the contract.129 The right to 
cancel must be sent to the customer within 14 days of the conclusion of the 
contract and within 8 days if shortfall provisions apply.130 It may be 
exercised by way of serving a notice or communicated electronically.131 A 
notice on paper or other durable medium must be treated as served when 
dispatched, rather than when received.132 The firm has the duty to inform its 
retail customer about his right to cancel in accordance to COB Appendix 
1.1 (17). If it fails to do so the contract remains cancellable and the retail 
customer will not be liable for any shortfall.133 Where the cancellation right 
is validly exercised, the firm must repay within 30 days any sums received 
subject to certain deductions that the firm may be entitled to. 
 
 
                                                 
128 COB rules on pre-sale withdrawal and post-sale cancellation rights should be read in conjunction with 
Principle 6, which requires a firm to pay due regard to the interest of its customer and treat them fairly. M.  
Blair and G. A. Walker, above note 55, ch. 11, paras. 100-104. 
129 I. McNeil, above note 1, 184-185. 
130 COB 6.7.30 and COB 6.7.57. 
131 COB 6.7.27 and COB 1.8. 
132 COB 6.7.44. 
133 COB 6.7.41. 
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3.10. Post-trade reporting requirements 
 
Firms conducting business with unsophisticated investors must comply with 
a number of post-trade reporting requirements, whose purpose it to ensure 
that customers are kept updated and promptly advised about essential details 
of their transactions.134 These constitute the subject matter of Chapter 8 of 
COB. Among the post-trading reporting requirements figure the provision 
of a written confirmation of the transaction and the provision of periodic 
statements. Although confirmations and periodic statements are permitted 
in electronic form, certain conditions must be satisfied.135 Specifically, firms 
must have in place all appropriate arrangements to ensure their secure 
transmission, their receipt, they should be able to verify their authenticity 
and further demonstrate that their customers wish to communicate in 
electronic form.136 
 
According to COB 8.1.3, a firm must dispatch a written confirmation of the 
transaction no latter than the business day following the day the transaction 
was executed.137 This rule is subject to a number of exceptions138 as, for 
example, life policies and personal pension contracts. Furthermore, 
confirmation is not necessary where the customer has agreed that it need 
not be supplied.139 The content of the confirmation must be in conformity 
with the evidential provisions of chapter 8.140 The firm is further expected to 
make a copy of the confirmation for record-keeping purposes.  
 
                                                 
134 Specifically, COB 8.1.2 and COB 8.2.3. Chapter 8 of COB implements Principle 7, which requires that 
every firm pays due regard to the information needs of its customer. 
135 COB 8.1.4, COB 1.8.1 and GEN 2.2.14. 
136 COB 1.8.2. 
137 COB 8.1.5 (2). 
138 COB 8.1.6. 
139 In case of private customer the agreement must be in writing. 
140 COB 8.1.15 (general requirements), COB 8.1.16 (additional content in particular circumstances), COB 
8.1.17 (additional content in relation to transactions in units in regulatory collective investments, COB 
8.1.18 (additional content in relation to derivatives) and COB 8.1.19 (additional content in relation to 
options). 
 57
Alongside a written confirmation, a firm must furnish the customer with 
periodic statements containing information on the customer’s investment 
portfolio. The rule is set out in COB 8.2.4, which should be read in 
conjunction with a range of evidential provisions specifying inter alia the 
content, promptness and adequacy of information. The firm must keep 
records of the periodic statements, unless the customer has requested the 
firm not to do so or the firm has taken reasonable steps to establish that the 
customer does not wish to receive them (COB 8.2.6). 
 
3.11. Claims handling 
 
In light of Principles 3 (management and control), 6 (customer’s interests) 
and 8 (conflicts of interest), chapter 8A of COB governs the handling of 
clients’ orders and regulates claims made by or one behalf of policyholders 
of long-term care insurance contracts.141 It sets out regulatory requirements, 
whose purpose is (a) to ensure that claims are handled “fairly and 
promptly”;142 (b) that policyholders are provided with information on the 
claim handling process as well a with an explanation of when a claim is 
rejected or not settled in full and (c) that conflicts of interest are managed 
appropriately.143 These regulatory requirements create a range of duties for 
firms.144 Alongside the general duty to handle client orders up to the 
standards set out in COB 8A.4, insurers must in addition comply with more 
specific requirements including the obligation to give policy holders 
reasonable guidance on how to make a claim, not to reject a claim 
unreasonably and to keep records.145 
 
                                                 
141 COB 8A.1.1 to 5. 
142 COB 8A.2.2, COB 8A.2.3 and COB 8A 2.4 in combination with COB 8A.4, SYSC 3.2 and TC1. 
143 COB 8A.1.6 (1). 
144 That is the insurer or the managing agent as the case may be. See COB 8A1.2. 
145 COB 8A.2.5, COB 8A.3, COB 8A.4 and COB 8A.5. 
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3.12. The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and the NEW 
COB Sourcebook (COBS) 
 
The COB Sourcebook has been the subject of extensive review during the 
past three years and it will soon be replaced by a new Sourcebook 
(NEWCOB Sourcebook). The catalyst of this review has been the 
implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID),146 a EU legal instrument that arguably is the epicentre of the 
European Union’s Financial Services Action Plan.147 MiFID comprises two 
levels of European legislation. ‘Level 1’, the Directive itself, was adopted in 
April 2004. ‘Level 2’ measures –also known as ‘technical implementation 
measures- were developed by the Commission on the basis of advice 
received from the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). 
They were the subject of extensive negotiations and compromise and 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 2 September 
2006.148 
                                                 
146 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and the Council (21 April 2004) on markets in 
financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/ EEC and 93/6 EEC and Directive 
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC 
[20yb04] OJ L145/1. As amended by Directive 2006/31/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 
of April 2006 amending Directive 2004/39 EC on markets in financial instruments as regards certain 
deadlines [2006] OJ L114/60. The latter Directive postponed the date on which the measures on MiFID 
would be applied to investment firms to 1 November 2007 in order to give firms a 9-month period after 
national measures were finalised. 
147 The objective of the Financial Services Action Plan was to speed up European market integration by 
reducing barriers and increasing cross-border retail financial activity. See generally, HM Treasury, FSA and 
the Bank of England, The Financial Services Action Plan: A Guide (31 July 2003). The other European 
Directive that stands at the core of the Financial Services Action Plan is the Capital Requirements 
Directive (that is, Directive 2006/48/EC and Directive 2006/49/EC), which was published in the Official 
Journal in 30 June 2006. 
148 MiFID is the epitome of the Lamfalussy process. “Level 1” and “Level 2” measures are followed by 
“Level 3” and “Level 4” measures. The following instruments are the “Level 2” measures: Commission 
Regulation No1287/2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council as regards recording keeping obligations for investment firms, transactions reporting, market 
transparency, admission of financial instruments to trading, and defined terms for the purposes of that 
Directive [2006] OJ L241/1 (‘the implementing regulation’) and Commission Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 
August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms, and defined terms for 
the purposes of that Directive [2006] OJ L241/2, 26 (the ‘implementing Directive’). See also, Final Report of 
the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (2001) available at 
http://ec.Europa.eu/internal_market/securities/lamfalussy/index_en.htm; and A. Shaub, ‘The Lamfalussy 
Process Four Year On’, 13 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance (2005), 110-120. 
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The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive will come into effect on 1 
November 2007 and will replace the existing Investments Services Directive 
(ISD).149 Similarly to ISD, MiFID aims at setting out provisions governing 
the internal organisation of firms and conduct of business requirements as 
well as harmonising a number of conditions governing the operation of 
regulated markets. It differs, however, in that it introduces significant 
changes to the regulatory framework in order to reflect developments in 
financial services and markets since the adoption of ISD. One of these 
changes is the widening of the scope of the “core investment services and 
activities” that firms can passport. In addition to those investments services 
and activities provided by ISD, MiFID covers a range of other services and 
activities such as (a) advice involving personal recommendations to a core 
investment service; (b) the operation of a multilateral trading facility (MTF) 
and (c) commodity derivatives, credit derivatives and financial contracts for 
differences.150 Furthermore, a plethora of ISD provisions have been 
redrafted in order to describe with greater clarity and certainty the allocation 
of jurisdictional competences between the home-member State and the 
host-member State. Other novelties include measures such as pre-trade and 
post trade transparency requirements for equity markets, the creation of a 
new regime for “systematic internalisers”151 and more extensive transaction 
reporting requirements. 
 
With respect to conduct of business requirements, MiFID covers nine key 
areas of activity: (a) client classification; (b) marketing; (c) information about 
                                                 
149 Directive 93/6 EEC and discuss the rationale for amending its requirements with a new Directive. 
150 In practice this means that MiFID will affect a greater number of firms including investment banks, 
portfolio managers, stockbrokers and broker dealers, corporate finance firms and some commodities firms. 
In certain occasions, however, things are less clear. Retail banks and building societies will be subject to 
MiFID for some parts of their business (e.g. when selling securities or investment products) –but not 
others. 
151 The term “systematic internaliser” is defined in Article 4 (1) of MiFID. 
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the firm and its services; (d) client agreements; (e) suitability and know your 
customer; (f) appropriateness and execution-only services; (g) best 
execution; (h) client order handling; (i) reporting information to clients. 
While the substantive requirements established in MiFID are by and large 
consistent with existing FSA requirements, novelties are not rare.152 Several 
key points of departure from the present regime are briefly discussed in the 
remaining paragraphs of this sub-section. 
 
To begin with, MiFID introduces a different classification system.153 It 
categorises clients as “retail clients”, “professional clients” or “eligible-
counterparties” namely it places them into categories that are conceptually 
different from their FSA equivalent. Similarly, it changes the criteria and 
procedures for permitting a client to be treated as though it falls within a 
different category. For instance, under MiFID a firm is under the obligation 
to notify its client of his right to request a different categorisation. It is also 
interesting to note that whereas MiFID makes it more difficult to opt-up 
from the retail sector, it relaxes the requirements under which eligible 
counterparties and professional clients will be able to request greater 
regulatory protection than they are normally entitled to.154  
                                                 
152 On the reform of the FSA Conduct of Business regime see, various FSA publications including the 
following: FSA, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/What/International/EU; FSA, ‘Implementing the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)’, 07/2 FSA Newsletter (January 2007); FSA, ‘Implementing MiFID 
for Firms and Markets’, (July 2006) FSA CP06/7; FSA, ‘Reforming Conduct of Business Regulation’, 
(October 2006) FSA CP06/19; FSA, ‘Financial Promotion and Other Communications’, (October 2006) 
FSA CP6/20; FSA, Understanding the basics of the new Conduct of Business sourcebook (COBS) for retail markets 
(September, 2007) available at, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Publications; FSA, ‘FSA confirms decision to retain 
consumer protection measures in the revised investment rules’ (30 July 2007) FSA/PN/092/2007 available 
at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2007/092.shtml; A. Sykes, ‘NEWCOB: 
The practical implications’, FSA Speech (19 June 2007)  [ 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/0619_as.shtml. An exhaustive 
account of all the changes in the FSA conduct of business rules as a result of the implementation of 
MiFID falls beyond the scope of this chapter. 
153 Articles 4 (1) and 24 (2) of MiFID and article 28 of the implementing Directive (Commission Directive 
2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006). N. Moloney, EC Securities Regulation (2008), 595-598. 
154 FSA, Implementing MiFID’s Client Categorisation Requirements (August 2006), para.1.9. It should be noted 
that the Directive contains certain transitional –also known as ‘grandfathering’ provisions- as for example 
Art 71(6) on client classification. J. Long (FSA Retail Policy), ‘Reforming Conduct of Business Regulation’ 
(15 November 2006). The paper was presented in SII Compliance Forum. FSA. ‘Understanding the Basics 
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Communication with clients and product disclosure are two additional areas 
where the implementation of MiFID is expected to bring about changes. In 
relation to client communication, although the core requirement of clear, 
fair and not misleading communication will remain the same, the new 
regime will apply more widely than the existing COB regulation covering all 
clients and all communications and affecting MiFID and non-MiFID firms 
as, for example, life insurance companies.155 Furthermore, additional 
information disclosure requirements will be introduced in relation to the 
provision of services such as advice. With respect to product disclosure, 
article 19 (3) sets out a number of requirements that firms must comply with 
while, at the same time, the attempt is made to simplify the requirements on 
packaged products.156  
 
One finds further points of deviation from the present regime in MiFID 
provisions dealing with conflicts of interest. The first notable difference will 
be that provisions on the management of conflicts of interest will no longer 
be part of the conduct of business Sourcebook. These materials will be 
moved to a more appropriate location and constitute part of the FSA 
regulatory provisions on Organisational Systems and Controls for common 
platform firms.157 The second remarkable difference is that the Directive 
sets out a much more detailed and prescriptive regime.158 According to FSA 
regulation, in managing conflicts of interest, firms have the following 
                                                                                                                                            
of the new Conduct of Business sourcebook (COBS) for retail markets’ (September 2007); C. Skinner (ed), 
The Future of Investing in Europe’s Markets after MiFID (2007), 19 and ch. 4. 
155 Article 19 (2) MiFID and article 27 of the implementing Directive (Commission Directive 2006/73/EC 
of 10 August 2006); and above, J. Long. 
156 It is worth noticing, however, that with regard to financial promotions there is less product specific 
prescription and some degree of deregulation. See N. Moloney above note 153, 599-600; and J. Long, 
above note 154. 
157 These will be set out in Senior Management Arrangements Systems and Controls and, in particular, 
SYSC 10, which will replace chapters 7.1, 5.10 and 2.4 of the COB Sourcebook. This is further discussed in 
Chapter Three, page 145 below. 
158 Conflicts of interest are dealt with in article 18 of MiFID. See also articles 21 to 23 of the implementing 
Directive (Commission Directive 206/73/EC of 10 August 2006). 
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options: to disclose the interest to the customer, or rely on policy 
independence, or establish eternal arrangements or simply decline to act for 
a customer. The four options will no longer have equal weight and 
disclosing conflicts of interest will no longer automatically amount to 
conflict managed.159 In conformity with MiFID, the NEWCOB regulation 
will permit disclosure only as a last resort measure provided that a firm is 
satisfied that it is an appropriate tool to use compared with other methods. 
Finally, client classification is no longer relevant for the purposes of 
managing conflicts of interest requirements. This is a significant departure 
from existing FSA requirements –specifically, PRIN 8- which does not 
apply in relation to market counterparties.160 
 
The FSA best execution regime will also undergo major changes.161 In this 
relation, the firm’s duty to obtain the best possible result for its client is of 
particular interest. Under the FSA COB Sourcebook, a firm must take 
reasonable care to ascertain the best available price for the customer order. 
It is not part of its duty, however, to have access to competing Exchanges 
or to at least a minimum number of price sources. This is going to change, 
for article 21 MiFID provides that a firm must take all reasonable steps to 
obtain the best possible result, taking into account a number of prescribed 
factors: price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlements, size, 
nature, or any other consideration relevant to the order.162 Under current 
COB rules a firm is allowed to agree with its intermediate customers that it 
will not provide best execution. Furthermore, certain spread betting, venture 
capital and stock lending are excluded from the FSA best execution regime. 
                                                 
159 FSA, ‘Organisational Systems and Controls –Common Platform for Firms’, FSA CP 06/9 (May 2006), 
para 9.10. 
160 Above, para 9.8. 
161 FSA, ‘Implementing MiFID’s Best Execution Requirements’, FSA DP 06/3 (May 2006); and N. 
Moloney, above note 153, 621-634.  
162 Article 21 of MiFID is further explicated by articles 44 to 46 of the implementing Directive 
(Commission Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006). 
 63
By contrast, MiFID neither permits clients to waive best execution 
protection nor provides for certain trading practices that are excluded for 
best execution requirements 
 
Finally, the MiFID appropriateness regime deserves special attention, as it is 
quite novel and unparalleled.163 Appropriateness should not be confused 
with suitability. These two requirements will run in parallel and will be 
complimentary, in that appropriateness requirements will be applicable to 
non-advised (that is “execution only”) services. The appropriateness regime 
will be introduced in the UK with the NEWCOB Sourcebook and will 
cover a wide range of investment firms including firms, which do not 
provide investment advice or discretionary investment management 
services. Providers of execution-only services with respect to non-complex 
financial instruments, bonds or other forms of securitised debt and UCITS 
do not fall within the scope of the MiFID appropriateness regime. 164 
   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This introductory chapter considered the case study of this thesis, namely 
the FSA regime on conduct of business regulation and focused on the 
following two issues: On the one hand, the economic rationale for investor 
protection regulation by means of conduct of business rules and, one the 
other hand, the subject matter of the FSA conduct of business regime, as it 
is presently crystallised in the FSA Handbook of Rules and Guidance. 
 
                                                 
163 MiFID, Article 19 (3), (4) and (5) subject to the exceptions introduced in 19 (6). J. Long, above note 
154; N. Moloney, above note 153, 614-620; and FSA, ‘Reforming COB Regulation’, FSA CP 06/19 
(October 2006), chapter 15. 
164 The Level 2 Directive sets out criteria for determining which other types of financial instruments should 
be considered non-complex.  
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With respect to the economic justification for conduct of business 
regulation it was pointed out that supporters of investor protection 
regulation doubt the capacity of the market to perform its self-corrective 
function in order to protect consumers of financial products and services. In 
their view, the only sound response to the informational problems that pose 
a constant threat to consumer welfare is public regulation –in this particular 
case, a conduct of business regime regulating the behaviour of financial 
services providers in the retail financial sector. Sceptics of regulation hold 
the diametrically opposite view. They content that it is competition and not 
protective policies that further consumer welfare. Insofar as common law 
controls cases of fraud and negative externalities, the remedial performance 
of market forces is more than satisfactory. They reject the thesis for investor 
protection regulation by way of rules governing conduct of business 
because, as they explain, supporters of regulation tend to exaggerate cases of 
market failure and play down governmental failure.  
 
Despite the controversy surrounding the economic justification of conduct 
of business regulation, the Financial Services Authority is a strong advocate 
of regulation dedicated to protect consumers of financial products and 
services. Not only do conduct of business rules figure as one of the most 
important pieces of secondary legislation but also consumer protection is 
included among the statutory objectives that the FSA is bound to pursue. At 
present, the core body of conduct of business requirements is set out in the 
Conduct of Business Sourcebook of the FSA Handbook and deal with a 
variety of issues such as: (a) client classification, (b) financial promotion, (c) 
disclosure of information before, during and after the transaction, (d) 
suitability of advice, (e) best execution and (f) unfair practices. However, in 
1 November 2007, the Conduct of Business Sourcebook will be replaced 
with the New Conduct of Business Sourcebook (NEWCOB).  
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The NEWCOB will implement the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID), which is arguably the centrepiece of the European 
Financial Services Action Plan. The implementation of MiFID is going to 
affect FSA regulation in two levels. It will bring about changes in the 
content of conduct of business rules and it will reshape the FSA policy of 
rule-use including the design of the FSA New COB Sourcebook. This 
chapter overviewed some of the key changes that will be introduced in 
accordance to the Directive’s stipulations with respect to client 
classification, client communication, product disclosure, conflicts of interest, 
best execution and appropriateness. The impact of MiFID on the 
Authority’s policy of rule-use will be discussed towards the end of Chapter 
Three, where the latest phase of the FSA policy of rule-use will be 
considered in detail. At present my priority is to describe how the policy of 
rule-use in financial regulation evolved, and this will be the objective of the 
remainder of Part I. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
The Evolving Regulatory Policy of Rule-Use: The Pre-FSMA 
Era 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter focused on the rationale and subject matter of 
conduct of business regulation. This chapter and the next one are devoted 
to the historical evolution of the policy of rule-use in the UK financial 
regulation making special reference to the conduct of business regime.1  
 
The first seeds of controlling the conduct of investment business root back 
to the era of self-regulation2 and the first statutory attempts to eliminate 
fraudulent and deceitful behaviour in the securities industry3. This chapter, 
however, starts the discussion from a later stage namely, the era launched by 
the Financial Services Act 1986, as we cannot literally speak of ‘regulatory 
policy of rule-use’ with respect to the regulation of investment activities 
                                                 
1 A definition of the term “policy of rule use” is provided above at pages 13 to 14, and note 7 of the 
Introduction. 
2 What distinguishes self-regulation from other forms of regulation –notably statutory regulation- is the 
ancillary function of coercive legal institutions. The mechanisms through which market behaviour is 
influenced and constrained are predominantly consensus-based. R. Baldwin and M. Cave, Understanding 
Regulation (1999), ch.10; B. Morgan and K. Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials 
(2007), 164; and A. Ogus, ‘Rethinking Self-Regulation’, 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1995), 97-108. 
Prior to the FSA 1986, there was a clear tradition of self-regulation. The incidence of regulation was 
fragmented and its legal underpinnings rudimentary. While legal restrictions were few, strict de facto 
segregation of the various sub-industries was ensured by means of cartel-like arrangements and restrictions 
on the membership of organised markets. I. MacNeil, ‘The Future for Financial Regulation: The Financial 
Services and Markets Bill’, 62 Modern Law Review (1999), 725 at 726. 
3 With regard to statutes, of particular importance was the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939 as 
amended in 1958. With regard to codes, of particular importance was the Code of Conduct formulated by 
the London Stock Exchange. L. C. B., Gower, ‘“Big Bang” and the City Regulation’, 51 Modern Law Review 
(1988), 1 at 6. 
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before the middle 80’s.4 Indeed, the question of how to model and use rules 
became a conscious policy concern only after the upheavals of the Big Bang 
in the City of London and the institutional reform they precipitated. Before 
that, the perceived advantages of self-regulation were by and large 
unquestioned.  
 
The chapter is divided into two thematic areas. The first one discusses the 
legal framework and institutional structure of the financial regulation of that 
time. The second thematic area concerns the policy of rule-use making 
special reference to the design of the regulatory norms and the presence of 
self-regulatory elements. It explores the reasons for the detailed and 
complex nature of the SIB initial rulebooks, the factors underlying the 
restructuring of the rules, which occurred under the label of the New 
Settlement, and the developments in the policy of rule-use after the Large 
Report. 
 
 
2. Legal framework and institutional structure  
 
2.1. Market developments and institutional reform leading to the 
Financial Services Act 1986 
 
Nearly thirty years ago securities regulation in the UK was primitive and 
investment activities were strictly self-regulated.5 Persuasion and other 
informal means of control was the norm. The Prevention of Fraud Act 
                                                 
4  There were three separate streams of financial regulation: the regulation of investment activities, the 
regulation of banking activities and the regulation of a range of other activities which fell outside the scope 
of banking or investment as, for example, the activities of insurance companies, Lloyds and building 
societies. While the first two industries were self-regulated initially, the regulation of the third one was 
statutory based.  My focus is on the regulation of investment activities only. 
5 A. C. Page and R. B. Ferguson, Investor Protection (1992), 82; and B. Rider, ‘Self-Regulation: The British 
Approach to Policing Conduct in Securities Business, with Particular Reference to the Role of the City 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers,’ Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation (1979), 319. 
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(Investments) 1958 was the main legal instrument that provided a 
framework for regulation.6 This was coupled with a myriad of rules and 
regulations that were made under this Act or produced by self-regulatory 
bodies like the London Stock Exchange (LSE), the Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers and the Council of the Securities Industry. Despite the fact that it 
had no specific mandate over the securities industry, the Bank of England 
was perhaps the most important player in this informal scheme of regulation 
in the sense that it was entrusted with a range of key tasks as, for instance, 
to initiate the Panel of Takeovers and supervise the creation of other self-
regulatory groups. 
 
By the end of the 70’s this regime was becoming increasingly obsolete and 
inadequate in regulating investment transactions.7 Self-regulation operated 
like a club-like arrangement whose main objective was the protection of its 
members against competition, rather than keeping market ethos high by way 
of standard setting, monitoring of compliance and enforcement.8 In this 
connection, the case of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) –the most 
prominent association in the securities industry at that time- is of particular 
interest. LSE imposed a number of restrictions and protective measures for 
its members. Its rules prohibited outside companies to obtain any 
substantial financial interest in its members. In addition, it did not allow the 
undertaking of investment activities by firms operating in the form of 
limited companies and required firms to always act in a single capacity -
either as market makers trading as principals (“jobbers”) or as a brokers 
trading as agents. Moreover, LSE rules prescribed a fixed minimum 
                                                 
6 The Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958, like its predecessor 1939 Act, was concerned with the 
regulation of activities of ‘fridge stock’ and share dealers. Respectable firms, as for example, stockbrokers 
who were members of the London Stock Exchange, were not subject to this regime. B Rider, C. Abrams 
and M. Ashe, Guide to Financial Services Regulation, 6-7; and above, Page and Ferguson, 225. 
7 On the failure of self-regulation as a scheme of regulating the UK financial markets at the end of 70’s and 
early 80’s see, A. Page, ‘Self-Regulation: The Constitutional Dimension’, 49(2) Modern Law Review, (1986), 
141 at 144-148. 
8 The Bank of England, Bank of England’s Evidence to the Wilson Committee para. 5.8; and J. Seligman, ‘The 
Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System,’ 9 Journal of Corporation Law 1 at 55-56. 
 69
commission. This protectionist regime dominated the securities market 
landscape in an era of significant transformation in financial markets both 
domestically as well as internationally (especially in the USA and Japan). Yet, 
it was a matter of time for the UK market to open up to these 
developments. Despite the hostile environment for foreign firms, the City of 
London continued to attract business from all over the world due to the 
Eurobond market.9 
 
In 1979 the Conservative Government took a number of courageous 
measures that meant to change the UK financial market forever. The most 
decisive of all was the choice to refer the LSE Rule Book to the Restrictive 
Practices Court.10 This instigated a ponderous judicial procedure, which 
made clear that anti-competitive practices would no longer be tolerated.11 
Since the proceedings in the judicial tribunal proved lengthy and 
cumbersome the government officials started parallel negotiations with the 
LSE hoping to persuade it to amend the Rule Book. In July 1983 these 
negotiations brought fruits. LSE agreed to recommend to its members the 
amendment of the Rules on condition that legislation would be introduced 
exempting the Stock Exchange from the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
(Stock Exchange) 1984. 
 
Meanwhile, LSE had already abolished exchange controls and had relaxed 
the rules of membership so that member firms were allowed to incorporate 
outside interests up to 30 per cent.12 Reform did not stop there. Fixed 
commissions were brought to an end and the scope of application of the 
                                                 
9 On the UK Eurobond market in the 80’s see, S. L. Hayes, Investment Banking: A Tale of Three Cities (1989), 
ch.3. 
10 Rider et al., above note 6, 12-13. 
11 The reference to the Restrictive Trade Practices Court was mainly concerned with the following three 
issues: minimum commissions, separation of capacity and access to membership. Above, 23-26. 
12 On the reforms that took place see, generally, Above note 3, 1; and J. Littlewood, The Stockmarket, Fifty 
Years of Capitalism at Work (1998), ch. 27. 
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single capacity rule was trimmed down. Moreover, the London Stock 
Exchange changed its constitution to reflect the de facto changes in the 
composition of its membership. It was no longer an unregistered Deed of 
Settlements company but it became a registered limited company named 
“The International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and Republic of 
Ireland Ltd.”13  
 
Overall the regulatory reform facilitated the transformation of the UK 
financial markets. It precipitated the breaking down of barriers, which had 
started with the abolition of exchange controls. It created favourable 
conditions for the emergence of well-capitalised financial conglomerates, it 
unified the formerly divided domestic and international markets and 
eventually placed the City of London among the top three major financial 
centres in the world.14 Nevertheless, things were far from ideal. The 
dramatic transformation of UK firms into wholly owned subsidiaries 
exposed the weaknesses of the indigenous financial services industry. 
Furthermore, it caused a wide spread disillusionment as to the actual 
robustness of the traditional system of self-regulation and triggered 
scepticism about its expediency.15 At the same time, the deregulatory 
developments of the Conservative government eroded public confidence. 
This was the result of a massive increase in conflicts of interest and market 
abuse, which led to the proliferation of financial scandals.16 It should not be 
a surprise therefore why in early 80’s there was a cry for investor protection 
and a strong demand for effective regulation. The launch of the Financial 
Services Act 1986, to which I turn next, was the response to this call. 
                                                 
13  Above note 3, 4-5. 
14 This was the result of further reform that took place between July 1983 and the Big Bang Day, which led 
to the introduction of a new method of marketing gilts, the revision of the equity market rules and the 
constitutional reform of the London Stock Exchange. 
15 E. J. Kane, ‘How Market Forces Influence the Structure of Financial Regulation’ in R. M. Kushmeider 
(ed) Restructuring Banking and Financial Services (1988, American Enterprise Institute). 
16 Above note 3, 16-17; R. B. Ferguson, ‘Self-Regulation at Lloyd’s: The Lloyd’s Act 1982’, 46(1) Modern 
Law Review (1983), 56-65. 
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2.2. The Financial Services Act 1986 
 
The aim of this section is not a detailed analysis of all the provisions of the 
Financial Services Act 1986 (the “Act” or “FSA 1986”). Its purpose is to 
highlight the subject matter and scope of application of the Act and 
overview the system of regulation that was put in place. The Financial 
Services Act 1986 emerged from the Gower Review.17 It was the product of 
intensive lobbying from the financial services industry and consumer 
interest-groups.18 The Act introduced a system of “self regulation within a 
statutory framework” or as more accurately Professor Gower prefers to 
describe it “statutory regulation monitored by self-regulatory organisations 
recognised by and under the surveillance of a self-standing Commission.”19 
This regime marked a significant departure from the club-like structure that 
flourished before. Nevertheless, in the early days of the Act, its self-
regulatory aspect was extolled so that to make it easier for the financial 
services community to consent to the dramatic shift away from the informal 
regulatory arrangements that prevailed up till then.  
 
The FSA 1986 replaced the Prevention of Fraud Act 1958. In many respects 
it had a broader scope of application.20 The FSA 1986 defined the term 
“investments” in such a manner so that securities, underwriting corporate 
                                                 
17 L. C. B. Gower, Review of Investor Protection: Report Part I (Cmnd.9125, 1984); Review of Investor Protection: Part 
II (HMSO, 1985) and; Financial Services in the United Kingdom: A new framework for Investor Protection 
(Cmnd.9432, 1985). The Government responded to Gower’s recommendation with the publication of a 
White Paper in 1985. Despite some significant points of departure, most of Gower’s recommendations 
were accepted. On the reactions of the Government and the industry see Rider et al, above note 6, 14-21. 
18 L. C. B. Gower, Review of Investor Protection.  A Discussion Document, (HMSO, January 1982); Review of Investor 
Protection: Report Part I (Cmnd.9125, 1984); Financial Services in the United Kingdom: A new framework for Investor 
Protection (Cmnd.9432, 1985). 
19 Above note 3, at 11; and White Paper, Financial Services in the United Kingdom: A New Framework for Investor 
Protection, (Cmnd. 9432, 1985). The nature of the regulatory regime under the Financial Services Act 1986 is 
further discussed in J. Black, Rules and Regulators (1997), 77-80. The characterisation of the pre-FSMA 2000 
regime as a “system of self-regulation within a statutory framework” is attributed to her. 
20 For example, it covered for the first time the provision of products such as personal pensions and life 
assurance. Above note 3, 18-20. 
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finance and investment management business came, to a greater or lesser 
degree, within its remit.21 Deposit taking and lending activities were 
excluded and were regulated under the Banking Act 1987.22 At the core of 
the system was the requirement that those operating in the investment 
industry must be authorised.23 Carrying on of investment business in the UK 
without authorisation was a criminal offence.24 The 1986 Act also set out the 
legal framework for the establishment of the Securities and Investment 
Board (SIB) -a “designated agency” which would be chiefly responsible for 
the regulation of financial markets- and the creation of Self-Regulatory 
Organisations (as well as other self-regulated agencies) which would 
transplant vital self-regulatory elements into the FSA 1986 regulatory 
regime. Special provisions dealt with the dissemination of jurisdictional 
competencies, the exercise of supervisory, rule-making and enforcement 
powers as well as issues of accountability and judicial review.25 
 
The FSA 1986 introduced a system of self-regulation under a statutory 
framework.26 This was grounded on hybrid institutional forms, which 
combined state and private elements and which took the shape of a multi-
tiered regulatory structure. Specifically, securities regulation consisted of 
three regulatory levels: At the top (governmental level) were the Treasury 
and the Office of Fair Trading and Industry.27 At the middle was SIB and at 
                                                 
21 Above note 19. On the broad definition of “investment” see, R. White, ‘The Review of Investor 
Protection: The Gower Report’, 47(5) Modern Law Review (1984), 553 at 561. Lloyd’s syndicates came within 
the Act’s definition of collective investment schemes. 
22 Banking activities were regulated by the Bank of England under the new Banking Act 1987. See also 
Financial Services Act 1986, Schedules 1 and 5. In addition, the Bank of England issued the London Code 
of Conduct, which set out principles governing conduct of business with clients in order to ensure that 
proper standards of integrity and fair dealing were observed. 
23 This was similar to the licensing requirement under the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958. 
24 Another form of authorisation was, for example, the granting of licence for the provision of consumer 
credit under the Consumer Credit Act 1974. 
25 I discuss these provisions below. 
26 Rider et al, above note 6, 38. 
27 The Office of Fair Trading and Industry exercised certain enforcement powers jointly with the Securities 
and Investment Board (SIB). A number of other governmental and quasi-governmental institutions were 
also involved in the regulation of financial markets. Alongside the Bank of England were the Building 
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the bottom (the “practitioner level”) were the Self-Regulatory Organisations 
(SROs), Regulated Professional Bodies (RPBs), Exchanges and Clearing 
Houses.28  
 
With respect to investor protection and conduct of business regulation, the 
FSA 1986 contained provisions that introduced marketing restrictions of 
general application such as restrictions on uninvited telephone calls and 
personal visits (so called ‘cold-calling’), and restrictions on the issue of 
investment advertisements in the UK.29 In addition, organisations that were 
interested to receive recognition as SRO’s were required to demonstrate that 
they provided investor protection equivalent to that afforded by SIB. 
Investor protection were further reinforced by section 62 of the FSA 1986, 
which provided for a private right of action for those aggrieved as a result of 
breach of rules made under the 1986 Act.30 Certain aspects of the FSA 1986 
–particularly the statutory provisions on the regulatory structure and 
rulemaking- had an immediate impact on the shaping of the policy of the 
rule-use of the time. These are discussed below. 
 
2.3. The SIB, the SROs and the production of rules 
 
Originally the 1986 Act did not entrust SIB with the regulation of financial 
markets. Legislative, investigative and enforcement powers were given to the 
Secretary of State for the Trade and Industry. The Act only enabled the 
Secretary of State –if he wished to- to delegate the majority of his powers to 
                                                                                                                                            
Societies Commission, the Registry of Friendly Societies and the Occupational Pensions Board. See A. 
Page, and R. Ferguson, above note 5, 88-90. 
28 Above, 95-99. 
29 For a general discussion of the FSA 1986 Conduct of Business regime see above note 6, Rider et al, ch. 5.  
30 The idea behind the provision of a private right of action was to encourage compliance. Nevertheless, 
there were voices expressing concerns that section 62 might cause an unprecedented waive of litigation. 
The availability of a private right of action had a significant impact on the way in which the policy of rule-
use was subsequently evolved. 
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a “designated agency”31 provided that certain statutory conditions were 
met.32 These concerned the agency’s organisational structure, Board 
membership, monitoring and enforcement complaints, disciplinary 
procedures, and rule-making function.33 Specifically, SIB had to satisfy the 
following requirements. First of all, its chairman and other members of its 
governing body had to be appointed by the Secretary of State acting jointly 
with the Governor of the Bank of England.34 In addition, SIB was expected 
to make sure that its rules complied with the principles set out in Schedule 8 
of the Act and that its Rulebook afforded investors a degree of protection 
that was equivalent to that provided under SIB rules.35 Moreover, SIB was 
under the obligation to consult publicly and ensure that the impact of its 
measures on competition was commensurate to considerations of investor 
protection.36 Finally, SIB was required to put in place a satisfactory system 
of monitoring and enforcing compliance, and more generally to be willing 
and able to promote high standards of integrity and fair dealing in the 
conduct of investment business.37 
 
SIB achieved the status of the designated agency in May 1987.38 As a result 
the following functions were conferred to it: (a) the responsibility to 
establish a new and comprehensive system for the regulation of investment 
business, based on the recognition and subsequent supervision and 
monitoring of self-regulating organisations, professional bodies, investment 
exchanges and clearing houses; (b) the power to produce rules; (c) the power 
                                                 
31 FSA 1986, s.114 (2). J. Black, Rules and Regulators (1997), 66-67. 
32 Until 1989, this was subject to approval by the Parliament. See, FSA 1986 s. 114 (11). Responsibility for 
the Act was transferred to the Treasury in 1992. 
33 FSA 1986, s.114 and Schs.7 and 8. 
34 In this manner government control over SIB was secured. 
35 FSA 1986, section 114 (9) (b). 
36 FSA 1986, Schedule 8 para. 12. Before the insertion of Schedule 7 para. 2A by the Companies Act 1989, 
SIB was under no statutory obligation to take into consideration the costs of rule-making. 
37 FSA 1986, Schedule 7 paras. 3, 4 and 5. 
38 FSA 1986 (Delegation) Order 1987 and FSA 1986 (Delegation) (No.2) Order 1988. The system came 
into operation on 29 April 1988. See further, B. Rider et al., above note 6, 27-30; and J. Black, above note 
31, at 67. 
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to give authorisation to carrying on investment business to those firms that 
chose to be directly regulated by SIB; (d) powers of enforcement and 
intervention;39 and finally (e) the power to authorise and recognise 
investment schemes, as well as administer the provisions of the Act relating 
to such schemes.40 
 
The organisational structure of SIB was a peculiar constitutional hybrid 
combining both private and public elements. SIB was a company limited by 
guarantee. Its costs were borne by practitioners, except for the residuary 
cost of the Department and the new Tribunal, which was covered by the 
public budget.41 Thus, SIB could use its fee income to improve its services 
without having to confront limitations coming from staff establishments or 
civil service salary scale. Arguably, this gave SIB greater independence and 
flexibility and enabled it to recruit the nucleus of a first class staff. 
 
Various arrangements ensured the accountability of SIB.42 The FSA 1986 
required that the composition of its Board had to reflect a proper balance of 
interests between the industry and the public at large.43 The Secretary of 
State had the right to appoint the Chairman and other members of the 
Board as well as the power to remove, dismiss or replace them.44 In this 
manner, SIB was answerable to the Secretary of State and through the 
Secretary of State to the Parliament. Moreover, SIB was expected to submit 
an annual report to the Secretary of State, a copy of which had to be 
                                                 
39 Including powers to seek injunctions and restitution orders, to issue disqualification directions, to 
discipline directly regulated firms and institute criminal proceedings. 
40 A. Page and R. Ferguson, above note 5, 90-91. 
41 It also carried the symbolism that the industry would continue to be actively involved in the regulatory 
system. Above note 5, 91. 
42 On issues of accountability see, generally, above note 7. 
43 FSA 1986, Sch.7 para.1(2) and Sch.7 para.1(3). Nonetheless, the initial appointment of the SIB members 
was made by the Bank of England. J. Black, above note 31, at 67. 
44 FSA 1986, section 115. The power to remove the delegated powers was meant to work as a deterrent. A 
less radical measure was provided by FSA 1986, Schedule 7 para 1 (2) by virtue of which the Chairman and 
the other members of the governing body of SIB were appointed by the Secretary of State acting together 
with the Governor of the Bank of England. 
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submitted in Parliament.45 Finally, SIB was subject to judicial review while 
the FSA made special provision for the Financial Services Tribunal, a 
judicial body with power to review the exercise of certain of SIB’s powers.46 
 
The impact of SIB regulation on competition received special attention. 
Specifically, the 1986 Act required the Chancellor to consult with the 
Director General of Fair Trading47 and gave him the power to demand the 
amendment of the rules where rules were thought to be anti-competitive.48 
In addition, the Director General had the continuous duty to review SIB 
rules and their effects to competition.49 The Chancellor, who was charged 
with the task to ensure that SIB provided the desired level of investor 
protection, was not furnished with similar power to order the alteration or 
revocation of rules. The only thing, that the Chancellor could do, was to 
resume any of the transferred functions in whole or in part.50 This was a 
radical measure and the intention was only to deploy the threat of it in order 
to discipline and manipulate the workings of SIB. 
 
To perform its role, SIB was vested with a multitude of enforcement 
powers.51 It could require information and its investigation powers were 
similar to those of the Department of Trade and Industry.52 SIB was also 
allowed to apply to court for a restitution order53 or an injunction in order 
                                                 
45 In addition, the Secretary of State was vested with the power to give directions to SIB with respect to its 
accounts and audits. FSA 1986, section 117. J. Black, above note 31, 67. 
46 FSA 1986, sections 96-101. Rider et al, above note 6, 31-32. On the judicial review of quasi-public 
regulatory agencies see generally, Lord Alexander, ‘Judicial Review and City Regulators’, 52(5) Modern Law 
Review (1989), 640-648. 
47 FSA 1986, ss. 119 and 122. In 1992 the responsibility for supervising the financial services regulation was 
transferred to the Treasury. 
48 FSA 1986, ss. 119 and 122. J. Black above note 31, 67-68. 
49 FSA 1986, s. 122. 
50 FSA 1986, s.115. 
51 Above note 6, Rider et al, 388-402. 
52 FSA, 1986, ss.104, 95, 105 and 106. See further, J. Black, above note 31, 73-74. 
53 FSA 1986, s.61. 
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to prevent breach of its own rules or those of SROs.54 Moreover, SIB had 
the power to issue disqualification directions, the effect of which was the 
prohibition of employment of a particular person, as well as to make public 
statements as to a person’s misconduct.55 
 
SIB stand at the top of the hierarchical structure yet, it was not alone in 
regulating the carrying out of investment activities. The FSA 1986 provided 
for Self-Regulatory Organisations (SROs),56 which were intended to 
supplement and in certain respects reinforce the operation of SIB.57 SROs 
were organised on functional basis.58 Apart from being the primary route to 
authorisation,59 SROs made their own rules,60 monitor compliance and 
could even take enforcement action.61 Interestingly enough, the 1986 Act 
did not vest enforcement powers with SROs. It was the contract of 
membership that enabled SROs to enforce their rules and regulations.62 
Nevertheless, enforcement action was subject to judicial review.63 
 
A body or association, that wished to operate as Self-Regulatory 
Organisation, had to be “recognised”. To this effect, it was expected to 
                                                 
54 FSA 1986, s.61; SIB’s power to issue and enforce rules or guidance against members of SROs was 
discussed in R v. Securities and Investment Board&Anor. Ex p. Independent Financial Advisers Association & Anor. 
[1995] CLC, p.872. 
55  FSA 1986, s.59 and s.60. 
56 FSA 1986, section 7 (1). Investment exchanges and clearing houses were not treated as SROs. They were 
granted certain privileges, provided that they become recognised by SIB. FSA, 1986 ss. 36-41. A. Page and 
R. Ferguson, above note 5, 92-96. Major firms of solicitors or accountants were called Recognised 
Professional Bodies. FSA 1986, ss.15-21 and Schedule 3. 
57 According to FSA 1986 Schedule 2, SIB was under the duty to grant recognition on condition that it was 
satisfied that SROs’ rules provided investor protection at least as effective as the regulation of SIB. Once 
the recognition was granted investment firms had the option either to become members of a SRO or 
become directly subject to the regulation of SIB. 
58 The organisation and number of SROs were not prescribed in the Act. See, L. C. B. Gower, Review of 
Investor Protection, Discussion Document (1982); R. White, above note 21, at 558; and J. Black above note 31, 69. 
59 On the authorisation regime under the FSA 1986 see B. Rider et al, above note 6, ch. 3. 
60 The rule making powers of SROs is discussed below. 
61 FSA 1986, Schedule 2 para 4 (1), as amended by section 206 of Companies Act 1989. 
62 B. Rider, et al, note 6, 42. 
63 R. v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc and Anor [1987] 1 All.E.R., 564; R. v Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness plc [1989] 2 WLR, 863; and Lord Alexander, above note 46. 
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satisfy certain statutory requirements64 as, for example, the requirement to 
have in place “adequate arrangements” and resources for monitoring 
compliance and enforcement,65 the requirement to ensure that members 
were “fit and proper” persons to carry on investment business of the kind 
with which the self-regulatory organisation was concerned’66 and the 
requirement that a proper balance was maintained among the interests of its 
members and between the interests of the organisation and the interests of 
the public.67 In recognising a self-regulatory body, SIB’s chief concern was 
to create a comprehensive system of SRO’s capable of providing 
authorisation to all potential investment business and to keep their number 
as limited as possible, given that their proliferation would make supervision 
more difficult.68 SIB’s role did not end once SROs were granted recognition. 
SIB had a continuous duty to ensure that SROs observed statutory 
requirements at all times by monitoring their performance and imposing 
sanctions where necessary.69 
 
Originally seven, SROs merged into five, and latter on into three bodies, 
namely: (a) the Securities and Futures Authority (SFA, formed in 1991 by 
the merger of the Securities Association and the Association of Future 
Brokers and Dealers); (b) the Investment Management Regulatory 
Organisation (IMRO); and; (c) the Personal Investment Authority (PIA, 
formed by the merger of the Financial Intermediaries, Managers and 
Brokers Regulatory Association and the Life Assurance and Unit Trusts 
Regulatory Organisation). The names of these organisations were broadly 
                                                 
64 For a discussion on the criteria for recognition and instances of complete or partial revocation of 
authorisation see, B. Rider, et al, above note 6, 39-41. 
65 FSA 1986, Sch.2 paras 4, 6 and 7 (SROs), Sch.3 (RPBs), Sch.4 (RIEs) and s. 39 (RCHs). SROs did not 
enjoy investigative powers similar to those of SIB. However, SIB could delegate some of them by virtue of 
section 105 of FSA 1986. Perhaps the most important powers that were given to SROs were the power to 
present a petition for an administration order against a member and the power to block SIB’s enforcement 
action in certain circumstances. On that see ss. 74 and 72(5), FSA 1986. 
66 FSA 1986, Sch2 para.5. See further, J. Black, above note 31 at 71. 
67 FSA 1986, Sch.5 para.5 and Sch.3 para. 4(5). 
68 A. Page and R. B. Ferguson, above note 6, 93. 
69 FSA 1986, section 12 and section 13 (2). J. Black, above note 31, 71. 
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descriptive of the type of investment business of their members.70 The 
incorporation of SROs into the institutional structure of financial regulation 
was expected to bring about a number of advantages. These included the 
channelling of practitioner input into the regulatory system, the 
enhancement of compliance levels and the conduct of the day-to-day 
regulation in a manner that would keep the industry happy and willing to co-
operate.71 
 
The relationship between SIB and SROs deserves special attention. As it 
was noted already, SIB’s mandate was not exhausted in the regulation of 
investment activities. It was in addition responsible for the supervision of 
SROs. This allowed SIB to act as a buffer between SROs and the political 
process.72 Specifically, SIB monitored the rules and practices of the SROs 
and had to make sure that they provided investor protection to the level that 
satisfied the statutory “equivalence test”. To assess this, SIB had to take into 
consideration the nature of the investment business, the nature of the 
investors and the effectiveness of the organisation’s enforcement 
arrangements.73 However, monitoring of compliance used to take place 
through a series of self-assessment exercises undertaken by the SROs and 
then sent to SIB. At first sight, this was regrettable because, it meant that 
SIB was not able to assess in any reliable manner the amount and quality of 
information it received; obviously this was under the exclusive control of 
the assessed SROs. The monitoring process was further undermined by the 
fact that SIB had no other powers apart from refusing recognition to an 
SRO. For example, SIB could not ask those who applied for membership 
through it to opt for an SRO. Nor could it force SROs to redefine their area 
                                                 
70 Most banks that were engaged in investment business under the FSA 1986 had to get authorisation from 
the SFA, IMRO and/or PIA. 
71 Above note 3, 14; note 7, 144-148; and R. White, note 21, at 559. 
72 A. Page and R. Ferguson, above note 5, 95. 
73 See, FSA 1986, Sch.2 para.3 and Sch.3 para.3 as amended by s. 203 of the Companies Act 1989. J. Black, 
above note 31, at 72. 
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of regulation in the absence of a breach of the recognition requirements.74 
Suspicious as this lenience might seem, it was grounded on the concern that 
a stricter approach would suffocate the autonomy of SROs and erode public 
confidence as to the Government’s commitment to preserve self-
regulation.75  
 
Rule-making powers were shared between SIB and SROs.76 The Financial 
Services Act 1986 required the promulgation of rules and regulation, which 
would address a variety of issues.77 Broadly speaking these regulatory 
requirements aimed at making sure that persons were fit and proper to 
undertake investment business, that firms complied with conduct of 
business and client’s money rules, and that firms provided their clients with 
known and appropriate channels of complaint. Furthermore, they provided 
for a compensation fund for clients in the event of the firm’s insolvency and 
offences were detected and duly prosecuted. 
 
By virtue of its rule-making powers, SIB produced a set of regulatory 
requirements governing the firm’s conduct of business.78 These included 
rules establishing disclosure requirements, controlling excessive charging 
and churning, requiring due care skill and diligence, fairness between 
customers, Chinese walls, customer agreement, cancellation rights, and 
unsolicited calls. Alongside this, SIB promulgated notification regulations, 
indemnity rules and rules making provision for a compensation fund.79 In 
performing its rule-making function, SIB was under the duty to publish its 
proposed rules, together with a statement inviting representations within a 
                                                 
74 This relationship later on changed. On that see discussion below. 
75 See, for example, 1985/6 HC Standing Committee E, cc. 227-228 and cc.303-306. 
76 FSA 1986, s.114; See also Financial Services Act 1986 (Delegation Order) 1987 (SI 1987/942); Financial Services 
Act (Delegation) (No.2) Order 1988 (SI 1988/738); Financial Services Act 1986 (Delegation) Order 1991 (SI 
1991/200) and; Financial Services Act 1986 (Delegation) (No.2) Order 1991 (SI 1991/1256). The Companies Act 
1989 reformed the rule-making regime. I discuss this below. 
77 Above note 3, 17. 
78 B. Rider et al, above note 6, 103-116. 
79 FSA 1986, ss. 48, 49, 55, 48, 51, 56, 52, 53 and 54 respectively. 
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specified period of time.80 However, there was no equivalent duty to consult 
the Chancellor or seek his approval or to pay due regard to the costs and 
benefits of the promulgated rules. SIB was only expected to meet the 
competition requirements set out in the Act. SROs’ rule-making powers ran 
in parallel with those of SIB. Similarly to SIB, SROs were under the duty to 
consult with their members, but the exercise of SROs’ rule-making powers 
was not directly subject to competition scrutiny. Suffice was that SROs rules 
provided investor protection equivalent to that of SIB.81 
 
In principle, SIB rules were applicable only to those firms that were 
authorised directly by SIB, while SRO rules were applicable only to SRO 
members. In practice, this was subject to exceptions. For example, 
indemnity rules were applied to members of SROs only at the body’s 
request, whilst rules concerning the compensation fund applied only to 
SROs after consultation with them. Similarly, the FSA 1986 established a 
special regime for client money, unsolicitated calls and cancellation rules. 
These rules were applicable to all authorised persons unless SROs had 
already made rules dealing with these issues.82 In any case the extension of 
the scope of application of SIB rules aimed at filling regulatory gaps and was 
generally justified in the name of investor protection. 
 
 
3. The regulatory policy of rule use 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
                                                 
80 This was subject to exception where delay would harm the interests of investors. FSA 1986, Schedule 9, 
para 12(1) and para 13 (2). See further, J. Black above note 31, 76-77. 
81 B. Rider et al. above note 6, 117-118. 
82 Strangely enough the FSA 1986 was explicit only in relation to client money and unsolicitated calls. With 
respect to cancellation the letter of the Act was silent. J. Black, above note 31, 74. 
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So far the discussion centred on the market developments and the 
institutional organisation of financial regulation nearly twenty years before 
the enactment of the Financial Services and Market Act 2000. In this 
section, the focus of attention turns on the nature of the policy of rule use 
of that time.83 Particular emphasis will be placed on the design of the rules, 
as well as the self-regulatory features that served to operationalise their 
formation, application and enforcement. It will be argued that the use of 
rules as a policy concern evolved into three subsequent stages: The initial 
Conduct of Business Rule Book, the New Settlement which created a more 
sophisticated three-tier system of rules and the Large Report, which brought 
about a series of substantial improvements and set the foundations for 
further reform. These marked a dramatic shift away from self-regulation and 
other traditional patterns of rule-use, which found its full expression only 
recently.84  
 
3.2. The initial rules   
 
The initial conduct of business rules contained in the 1987 SIB Conduct of 
Business Rulebook,85 a piece of secondary legislation that was produced by 
virtue of the Financial Services Act 1986.86 These were formulated by the 
Marketing and Investment Board Committee (MIOBOC), which 
subsequently submerged with SIB, and were the outcome of endless debates 
between the regulator and the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). 
                                                 
83 Here my focus is on rule-design. The substantive aspect of the SIB and SRO rules governing conduct of 
business will not be considered. In this relation, suffice is to point out that by and large they dealt with 
similar issues to those of the present FSA Conduct of Business regime as, for example, “cold calling”, 
client money, due skill care and diligence, information disclosure, Chinese walls, customer agreement, and 
cancellation rights. See B. Rider et al, above note 6, ch.6. 
84 This is the subject of extensive discussion in the next chapter. 
85 SROs created their own conduct of business rulebooks, which supplemented the rules contained in the 
SIB rulebook. Although these were different in approach and detail they were nevertheless linked by the 
equivalence test and reflected the standards of investor protection that were inherent in SIB rules. B. Rider 
et al, above note 6, 117-118. 
86 The rules governing conduct of business were only one of the eight sets of rules, which SIB had to 
produce before it could meet the statutory criteria, as a “designated authority”. J. Black above note 31, 83. 
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In terms of their design, the provisions of the Rulebook followed by and 
large a standardised pattern with the dominant style being that of a general 
statement or provision followed by a long list of exceptions.87 This feature 
did not make the Rulebook an easy to ready text. As a matter of fact the 
provisions of the initial Rulebook were far more detailed and complex than 
it had been anticipated.88 Most of the provisions and particularly those 
setting out information to be contained in documents were highly detailed, 
specific and precise. Furthermore, complexity dominated the design of the 
initial Rulebooks due to the presence of long definitions, the frequent use of 
cross-references to other rules and the fact that rules were subject to 
constant amendments introducing substantive changes to the rules, their 
requirements or scope. At this stage no special care was taken to improve 
the navigability and user-friendliness of the Rulebooks. 
 
Despite the fact that the 1986 Act provided for the possibility of drafting 
rules in the form of guidance, SIB did not make use of this option.89 
Guidance would have been a flexible tool for SIB to advise SROs in their 
rule making function and indeed invaluable in light of their duty to provide 
investor protection at least equivalent to that of SIB. However, for reasons 
that will be explained in more detail below, both DTI and SIB felt that it 
was expedient not to take advantage of this possibility and rely exclusively 
on legally binding prescriptive requirements.90 Guidance was not the only 
form of regulatory provisions that was absent in the initial conduct of 
business rulebook. Regulatory provisions written in high level of 
abstractness and occupying a distinct place in the Rulebook were also 
                                                 
87 J. Black, above note 31, 91. My focus is on the SIB Rulebook as at this preliminary stage SRO’s enjoyed 
hardly any scope of deviating from SIB’s stipulations. This was due to a number of factors, which are 
discussed below. 
88 Above, 84-85. 
89 FSA 1986, section 114(10), (11) and (12). 
90 See the discussion below. 
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missing.91 At this early stage, it was thought that the preservation of self-
regulatory elements into the organisational structure of financial regulation 
was enough to ensure flexibility where this was necessary and overall deal 
with problems like under-inclusiveness and interpretive ambiguities. 
 
The operation of SROs was expected to add two crucial dimensions in the 
policy of rule-use. The first one was the presence of various communities of 
interpreters, which played a significant role in the interpretation and 
subsequent application and enforcement of regulatory norms.92 Specifically, 
the members of each SRO were supposed to do something more than 
merely share information relevant to the interpretation of rules. They were 
expected to share a certain market ethos and develop a common 
understanding of it. Furthermore, the community of interpreters was 
expected to impose a sort of psychological pressure upon its members to 
abide by the accepted norms.93 This suggests that despite appearances to the 
contrary, the policy of rule use was not of the kind that one encounters in a 
conventional “command and control” regime.94 It was unique in the sense 
that the attempt was made to preserve at least to some degree practitioner 
involvement and to deploy informal means to encourage compliance. 
 
                                                 
91 Schedule 8 of the Financial Services Act contained a list of principles that were applicable to SIB’s rules 
and regulation. This provision bears similarities with the Financial Services Authority eleven principles for 
business. The fact, however, that it was incorporated in the Act signifies major differences between the two 
regimes. Not only did their production remain in the exclusive jurisdiction of the UK Parliament but also, 
SIB was intended to be their sole recipient. Schedule 8 of the Financial Services Act 1986 was not directly 
binding for the regulated population. 
92 Julia Black calls this collective enterprise “interpretive community”. J. Black, above note 31, 30-37. I use 
the term “community of interpreters” to avoid any unnecessary association with Stanley Fish’s thesis on 
interpretive communities. The notion of “interpretive communities” is further analysed in Chapters Four 
and Five below. The impact of SRO’s on the policy of rule-use is further discussed in J. Black note 31, 81-
83. 
93 With the entry of new members into the various SROs and the rapid transformation of the marketplace 
it became increasingly difficult for these communities of interpreters to preserve all those things that had in 
common. Therefore, their potential progressively faded away and restored only after the Large Report. See 
discussion below. 
94 On “command and control” regulation see R. Baldwin and M. Cave, Understanding Regulation (1999), 35-
39; and B. Morgan and K. Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Texts and Materials (2007), 80-81. 
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The second dimension that the presence of SROs was to supposed to affix 
into the policy of rule use was the adoption of a communicative style of 
regulation, namely a process of rule formation, application and enforcement 
that was essentially dialectical and which facilitated the modification and 
refinement of regulatory requirements on ad hoc basis.95 SROs were 
supposed to ensure that the production of rules would be the outcome of 
consultation and input coming directly from the industry. SROs were 
deemed to operate as direct sensors of market developments and, 
consequently, as a reliable source of recommendations about the need to 
qualify certain rules, clarify them or otherwise amplify their content.96 
Moreover, by facilitating the flow of information, SROs were expected to 
boost compliance levels, so that enforcement officials would not have to 
rely exclusively on the uncertain success of frequently cumbersome 
enforcement practices.97 
 
The communicative elements were not confined within the jurisdictional 
perimeter of SROs. The workings of SIB were also dialectical at least to the 
extent in which they entailed the flourishing of an on-going communication 
leading to the clarification or refinement of regulatory requirements. For 
instance, the list of FSA requirements that SROs had to meet in order to 
gain recognition by SIB –particularly, the equivalence test- generated an 
occasion for conversation between SIB and SROs whose aim was to help 
SIB assess their capacity to provide the prescribed level of investor 
protection.98 By the same token statutory provisions, which empowered the 
                                                 
95 The notion of conversational regulation is discussed in J. Black, ‘Talking about Regulation”, Public Law 
(1998), 77-105. 
96 Frequent amendments to the rules due to reconsiderations, requests or exemptions served exactly this 
purpose. 
97 In light of the prescriptive and detailed regime of the initial SIB rulebook the conversational elements 
performed poorly. 
98 FSA 1986, Schedule 2 (requirements for recognition) and section 114 (9)(b) (equivalence test, which was 
later on replaced with the adequacy test by virtue of Companies Act 1989, section 203). 
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Secretary of State to modify rules99 or grant indemnity orders100 as well as 
statutory provisions, which vested SIB with a similar power to alter SRO 
rules, were expected to have the same result, namely to create fruitful 
conditions for the realisation of a communicative style of regulation.101  
 
To sum up, at this early stage of evolution the policy of rule-use was a 
peculiar mixture of detailed and prescriptive rules and of self-regulatory 
elements, which were manifested in the presence of communities of 
interpreters and the adoption of a communicative style of regulation. The 
design of rules was soon to change. Progressively, detailed and prescriptive 
rules gave way to statements of principle namely, regulatory provisions 
termed in high level of abstractness and generality. Similarly, self-regulation 
was gradually downplayed and by the time of the introduction of the 
Financial Services and Market Act 2000, it faded away. However, the same 
did not happen with respect to the communities of interpreters and the 
conversational dimension of the policy of rule-use. Below I discuss the 
factors that urged the initial appetite for precision and detail, explore the 
reasons that led to its decay and how the departure from a regime that was 
essentially legalistic ironically opened the way to the adoption of a more 
sophisticated approach in the policy of rule-use where emphasis was placed 
on interpretation rather than the design of rules per se. 
 
3.3. Factors that influenced the production of detailed rules and the 
preservation of self-regulatory elements 
 
Two were the dominant characteristics of the policy of rule-use during the 
short life of the initial SIB conduct of business rulebook and the respective 
                                                 
99 FSA 1986, section 50 (1) and (2). 
100 FSA 1986, section 53. 
101 FSA 1986, section 13. 
 87
SROs’ conduct of business rules.102 In relation to the design of the 
regulatory norms emphasis was placed on detail and precision, while in 
relation to the procedural aspects of their formation, application and 
enforcement the preservation of self-regulatory elements was more than 
profound. This trend in the policy of rule-use was due to a range of factors 
including the flawed conceptualisation of the idea of certainty, the 
institutional structure of financial regulation, the lack of experience and 
forseeability and the regulators’ inability to appreciate the interaction 
between rule-design and the operationalisation of informal means of 
regulation. 
 
Specifically, three policy considerations shaped the design of the SIB 
Rulebook:  
“certainty: the need for firms to know what they must do, can do or 
cannot do; for customers to know what to expect and to what they are 
entitled; for the rules to be monitored effectively and efficiently; and 
for the sanctions under the Act whether discipline of firms or of 
individuals or redress by the courts for individuals who have suffered 
loss, to operate effectively; 
consistency: the risk that rules drafted in general terms will be  
interpreted too diversely by different firms in a huge, competitive and 
diverse industry, penalising firms who take a strict interpretation and 
the customers of other firms; 
standards: the difficulty, given a starting point of considerable 
variations in standards of competence and honesty, and given the 
                                                 
102 I will refer to the SIB Rule Book because –as I will explain in a while- at that stage of evolution SROs 
had hardly any scope to exercise their discretion in producing their own conduct of business rules. The 
quite inflexible statutory “equivalence test” and a myriad of other unfavourable factors led SROs to 
essentially opt for a blind copying out of SIB’s regulatory requirements. 
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highly competitive environment, of assuming that without specific 
guidance all firms will operate to the standards of the best.”103 
 
These considerations suggest that SIB officials were apprehensive of the 
new state of affairs that was beginning to emerge as a result of the 
deteriorating homogeneity of market landscape in the City of London. They 
thought that, in the absence of uniformity, a common understanding of 
regulatory norms would be unattainable, and the possibility to foster 
compliance by way of informal means would be dramatically limited. 
Interpretive divergence threatened the success of the newly launched system 
of financial regulation. Accordingly, it was paramount to deal with this 
problem and the best way to do so was by producing rules that would allow 
SIB to control the interpretive discretion of SROs and through them the 
interpretive attitude of the regulated firms. To this end, it was thought that 
rules had to be self-contained. Their literal reading should have been enough 
to convey all the necessary information about what was acceptable and what 
was non-acceptable behaviour, so that to preclude any scope of 
manoeuvre.104  
 
The time of the drafting of the initial rulebook was an additional factor that 
tipped the balance in favour of precision and against abstractness and 
vagueness. The fact that SIB produced conduct of business rules before 
gaining the status of the “designated agency” meant that the driving force 
behind its rule-making strategy was to please DTI officials.105 The latter were 
sceptical about the future performance of SIB. They sensed that they had a 
unique opportunity to stir up regulatory developments at the level of SIB 
                                                 
103 SIB, The SIB Rulebook: An Overview (Oct. 1987), para. 10 (emphasis provided); and J. Black, above note 
31, 88. 
104 This was consistent with the prevailing narrow interpretation of the idea of certainty. J. Black above 
note 31, 88-89; and note 106, para.10. 
105 J. Black, above note 31, 83-84. 
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and did the most of it by putting psychological pressure and setting strict 
interpretive boundaries to circumscribe SIB’s prospective exercise of 
discretion.106  
 
It was not difficult for DTI to persuade SIB about the need for detailed 
rules. SIB itself had its own reason to favour this prospect.107 With respect 
to SIB’s relationship with the various SROs, SIB was found in a similar 
position to that of DTI. It was part of SIB’s responsibility to make sure that 
SROs provided the desirable level of investor protection and detailed rules 
appeared to be a helpful tool to control SROs’ exercise of rule-making 
powers and assess –though in a rather mechanical manner- their capacity to 
protect investors up to the statutory standard that was captured in the 
“equivalence test”. 
 
But even the wider political context militated in favour of legalism and 
precision.108 A number of scandals and fraud cases challenged public 
confidence as to the competence of self-regulation to deliver an appropriate 
level of investor protection. Therefore the demand for tough regulation was 
high at the time of the drafting of the initial Rule Books. To restore public 
trust, the architects of the regime made provision for a private right of 
action (section 62 of the FSA 1986).109 This increased the pressure for legally 
binding and specific regulatory requirements, for, it was feared that abstract 
rules would encourage a litigious atmosphere.110 
 
                                                 
106 Apart from the power to challenge SIB’s rule-making in light of its impact on competition, DTI lacked 
any substantial power to force changes in SIB level. 
107 J. Black above note 31, 88-89. 
108 Above, 90. 
109 On the rationale for the provision of a civil right of action, see A. Page and R. Ferguson, above note 5, 
106-108; and B. Rider et al, note 6, 61-65. 
110 Above. 
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The emphasis on certainty and predictability that dominated the design of 
the initial SIB rulebook was supposed to be counter balanced by the 
preservation of self-regulatory elements into the organisational structure of 
financial regulation. The incorporation of self-regulation into an otherwise 
purely “command and control” regime makes sense in light of the perceived 
advantages associated with the adoption of informal techniques of 
regulation.111 We should not lose sight of the fact however that the survival 
of self-regulatory practices under the FSA 1986 was a necessary compromise 
rather than a policy choice that was prescribed after careful consideration of 
its benefits. To put it differently, so much were bureaucratic officials 
obsessed with controlling each other’s interpretive discretion so that 
concerns about the flexibility, adaptability and cost efficiency of the policy 
of rule-use did not figure at the top of their priorities. At the early phase of 
evolution, self-regulation survived the birth of statutory regulation simply 
because and to the extent in which it was essential to secure the industry’s 
co-operation by keeping rebellion low. 
 
3.4. Problems and further reform 
 
The policy of rule-use that emerged out of the initial conduct of business 
Rulebooks did not last long. As soon as the DTI powers were delegated to 
SIB, the deficiencies of this regime became apparent and criticism against 
the complicated structure of the rulebooks started to gain ground. 
 
The de-facto suffocation of self-regulatory elements was at the core of the 
problem.112 Not only were SROs excluded from the formation of the initial 
rules (at the time of their drafting Self-Regulatory Organisations did not 
officially exist) but they were also discouraged to deviate from SIB rules and 
                                                 
111 R. Baldwin and M. Cave, above note 2. 
112 J. Black, above note 31, 88-89 and 93. 
 91
introduce their own special regime. SIB stipulations as to what would 
amount to adequate investor protection for the purposes of the Financial 
Services Act were so extensively detailed so that blind adherence to these 
directions was the only way to ensure that SROs ‘played safe’.113 
Consequently, regulation failed to benefit from practitioners’ input in 
practice. The regulatory system was incapable of either adapting to the 
changing market environment or creating the necessary psychological 
conditions, which would promote optimal compliance without the need to 
resort to enforcement action. 
 
The communicative style of regulation did not work either. Modifications 
and indemnities involved a burdensome procedure114 and there was no 
provision for post hoc review of decisions. The presence of a complex 
network of communication was a further downside.115 Communication was 
time consuming, informational failure was frequent and the whole process 
was too perplex to be transparent. Furthermore, interpretive communities 
were malfunctioning because SROs were not given the time to create 
bounds with their new members in order to cultivate a common 
understanding of the regulatory norms. Finally, the extensively detailed 
drafting of the 1987 Rulebooks induced the regulated firms to comply with 
the letter rather than the spirit of the rules.116 It was the culmination of all 
these difficulties that precipitated major changes in the policy of rule-use, 
which I discuss next.  
 
                                                 
113 FSA 1986, Schedule 2 para. 3(1) as it was amended by Companies Act 1989, section 203. On the 
equivalence test see B. Rider et al, above note 6, 61; and, A. Page and R. Ferguson, note 5, 94. 
114 For example, FSA 1986, section 50 provides a time consuming procedure for the modification of 
conduct of business rules. 
115 This was the outcome of the complex institutional structure. The architects of the regime were not able 
to appreciate the actual difficulties involved in their attempt to combine self-regulation and statutory 
regulation within the same regulatory framework.  
116 SIB, Conduct of Business Rules: A New Approach (November, 1988), para. 1. A. Whittaker, ‘Financial 
Services. Developing the Regulatory Structure’, Butterworths Journal of International Business and Finance Law 
(1989), 5. 
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3.5. The New Settlement  
 
The New Settlement was the official response to the persistent calls for 
reform. It was introduced by the Companies Act 1989, which changed the 
previous regulatory regime both in terms of substance and technical 
design.117 Specifically the Companies Act 1989 reformed financial regulation 
in the following respects: First of all, it restricted the private right of action 
under section 62 of the Financial Services Act 1986 only to a particular class 
of investors.118 Second, it extended the rule making power of SIB. Under the 
new regime, SIB was in a position to state regulatory principles, designate 
rules as directly applicable to members of the SROs and issue codes of 
practice.119 Third, it modified the criteria on the basis of which the 
competence of SROs was to be assessed.120 In particular, it substituted the 
requirement of ‘equivalent’ level of investor protection with the more lax 
requirement of ‘adequate’ investor protection.121 Finally, the Companies Act 
1989 required that both SIB and SROs maintain the necessary arrangements 
that would make possible for them to assess the cost of compliance with 
their rules.122  
 
In terms of design, the New Settlement introduced a three-tier system of 
rules. The aim was to simplify and rationalise the drafting and wording of 
the rules and to re-establish the relationship between SIB and the various 
SROs. In particular the new Chairman of SIB, David Walker, envisaged a 
different role for regulation and rules, a role in which rules do not prescribe 
                                                 
117 J. Black, above note 31, 75 and 92-93. 
118 FSA, 1986, section 62A inserted by the Companies Act 1989, Part VIII, section 193. 
119 FSA 1986, section 47A (1), section 63A and section 63C introduced by the Companies Act 1989, Part 
VIII, section 192 (statements of principle), section 194 (designated rules and regulations) and section 195 
(codes of practice) respectively. 
120 Companies Act 1989, Part VIII, section 203 which amended FSA 1986, Schedule 2 para 3(1). 
121 A. Page and R. Ferguson, above note 5, 94. 
122 Companies Act 1989, Part VIII, section 204. 
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in detail what and how things should be done but only what ought to be 
done.123 In this spirit the 1988 Paper introduced a more elaborate definition 
of “self-regulation,” stressed the appropriateness of statements of principle 
in bringing about the desired policy outcomes,124 and set out a list of 
qualities that the design of the statements of principle had to concentrate 
on.  
 
In relation to the definition of self-regulation, the regulated population was 
reminded that ‘self-regulation’ essentially meant “regulation of the self.”125  
This implied that the management of each regulated firm had an essential 
role to play in maintaining a high corporate ethos. The regulatory policy of 
rule-use had to mirror the active role of senior management and facilitate 
the performance of the tasks that “the regulation of the self” entailed. 
Therefore, it was necessary to design regulatory provisions in such a manner 
so that to allow scope for manoeuvre. Making explicit reference to self-
regulation was both expedient and symbolic. It was expedient because it 
made clear that the move towards more statute-based regulation did not 
intend either to discharge the regulated firms from their own responsibility 
to ensure adherence with regulatory requirements or to discourage them 
from adopting a critical attitude when deciding appropriate modes of action. 
Furthermore, the remark on self-regulation was symbolic because it 
purported to get the message across that, despite appearances to the 
contrary, the architects of the regime believed in the desirability of self-
regulation and were keen to ensure that this would actually work.  
 
                                                 
123 D. Walker, ‘The New Settlement in Financial Services’, Law Society’s Guardian Gazette (July, 1989). 
124 J. Black above note 31, 103. 
125 J. Black above note 31, 103-104. See further, R. Leigh Pamberton, ‘Takeovers and Standards in the 
City’. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (1989), 545; and D. Walker, Some Issues in Regulation of Financial Services 
(Lecture, Irish Centre for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin, November 1991). 
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With respect to the design of the statements of principle, the New 
Approach recommended that these should have the following 
characteristics:126 
“-consistency and cohesiveness in the standards applying, as a backbone 
which draws the rules together; 
-intellectual rigour on the part of the regulators, in ensuring that the new 
requirements really are justified; 
-practitioner understanding of and support for the provisions made; 
-emphasis on the spirit, rather than the letter, of what is prescribed; and 
-a dynamic quality in the rule books, enabling them to apply to new 
situations without constant reformulation.” 
 
The New Approach signalled out a major change of mind in the policy of 
rule-use at least on paper. For the first time emphasis was placed on rules 
drafted in high level of abstractness and generality. Special care was taken to 
waive any doubt that the regulated firms had to do their own part in 
ensuring compliance with the spirit rather than the letter of the rules. 
Moreover, the role of SIB was refined. SIB was expected to distance itself 
from rulemaking. Its task now was to exercise leadership by setting 
standards and supervising their effective implementation and enforcement. 
To get a deeper understanding of the implications of the New Approach, 
below I will consider the design and structural inter-relation of the 
regulatory requirements that comprised the three-tier system of rules. The 
discussion will then pave the way to an exploration of the factors that made 
possible the materialisation of these developments. For the sake of clarity 
and comprehensiveness, some repetition will be inevitable. However, the 
effort has been made to keep this at minimum. 
 
                                                 
126 Above note 123, 51 and J. Black above note 31, 101. 
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3.6. Analysis of the three-tier system of rules 
 
In the first tier of rules one finds the SIB Principles.127 These were drafted 
by SIB and characterised by a high level of generality.128 The shift from 
detailed rules to abstract rules was intended to give guidance to firms, to 
highlight the underlying policy objectives and overall promote compliance. 
Moreover, now that the management had a more essential role to play in 
maintaining a high corporate ethos,129 the Principles helped chief executives 
to identify a range of basic moral principles that had to govern the conduct 
of their business. A variety of drafting techniques was deployed in 
formulating the SIB Principles.130 For example, words such as ‘reasonable’, 
‘proper’, ‘adequate’, ‘fair’ were incorporated to make the Principles appear 
vague and open-ended, whilst phrases and words that were in need for 
definition and further clarification were avoided.131 
 
The second tier comprised the Core Rules namely those rules, which SIB 
decided to designate as directly applicable to SRO members.132 The Core 
Rules were “the outcome of protracted negotiations between SIB and the 
SROs”.133 They were intended to provide a common core of regulatory 
provisions, containing the essential duties, which would apply to SRO 
members and, at the same time leave enough room for SROs to produce 
their own rulebooks. In this manner, it was thought, that the Core Rules 
would provide coherence in a way that was much less intrusive to the SROs 
                                                 
127 The Principles came into effect in April 1990. These were largely derived from “the ninety-three 
principles contained in the New Approach, including the Introduction to the 1987 Rules and the principles 
set out in Schedule 8 of the FSA 1986”. J. Black above note 31, 100. 
128 J. Black above note 31, 100-108. 
129 SIB, above note 116, para.1; and J. Black above note 31, 101-3. 
130 J. Black above note 31, 105. 
131 The only exception to that was the definition of the word “customer”. J. Black above note 31, 105-107. 
132 J. Black above note 31, 101-3. 
133 J. Black above note 31, 109. The negotiating process was affected by a number of factors, notably the 
requirement for speed and the need to make sure that the Core Rules are kept brief and simple. They were 
eventually published in January 1991. 
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jurisdiction.134 Compared with the SIB Principles, the Core Rules were of 
intermediate generality. They were imprecise in the sense, that they neither 
contained a list of factors, which had to be considered or taken, nor did they 
indicate the manner in which some course of action should have been 
carried on. Other structural features that are worth mentioning were the 
provision of a glossary135 and the inclusion of derogations.136 While the 
glossary was employed as a drafting technique to ensure that the Core Rules 
were kept simple, brief and durable, the availability of derogations aimed at 
resolving the tension in SIB and SROs relationship that ensued from the 
direct application of the Core Rules to SROs’ members. Indeed, derogations 
were relied upon as a technique that would allow the creation of a common 
core of rules without undermining the industry’s involvement into the day-
to-day regulation.137  
 
Compared with the Core Rules, the Third Tier rules were extensively 
detailed.138 These were supposed to derive from the Core Rules. They were 
written by the SROs exclusively and with the view of covering matters 
relevant to their particular area of expertise. The designation of the Core 
Rules obviously limited the scope for practitioner input, but the SROs 
differed in the extent to which they felt bound by it.139 The third tier rules 
performed five main functions: “detailing, clarifying, expanding, gap-filling”, 
and defining the application of the rule.140 Finally, the SROs made extensive 
use of Guidance, as it was hoped that this technique would make the 
                                                 
134 A. Large, Financial Services Regulation: Making the Two Tier System Work (May, 1993), para. 4.15(iv). 
135 The glossary was used for a multitude of purposes as, for example, to define certain terms, to correct 
mistakes made in the drafting of the Core Rules and, provide exceptions or safe harbours. J. Black above 
note 31, 120-121. 
136 Derogations were part of the amendments that were introduced by the Companies Act 1989, where the 
provision was made for the designated rules to specify the extent to which the rules would apply to a firm, 
subject to the rules of its SRO, and for the rules to prohibit any modification or waiver in respect of any 
member. See specifically FSA 1986, section 47B and 63B, which were inserted by the Companies Act 1989, 
section 194. J. Black above note 31, 75 and 113-116. 
137 In this manner the need to subject the Core Rules to frequent amendments was avoided. 
138 For a detailed examination of the Three Tier Rulebooks see J. Black above note 31, 112-119. 
139 J. Black above note 31, 123. 
140 Above, 124. 
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conduct of business regime more flexible and adaptable to the rapidly 
changing market environment.141 Guidance explicated the application of a 
rule, indicated methods of compliance and stipulated conditions or 
standards that had to be met.142 The SROs also published periodic bulletins, 
whose main objective was to draw members’ attention to market and policy 
developments, to make them aware of newly discovered problems and to 
update them with respect to the SROs views about matters that have been 
referred to it. 
 
3.7. Factors that influenced the three-tier system of rules 
 
Several factors shaped the policy choice to introduce a three-tier system of 
rules. The problems that emerged as soon as the initial conduct of business 
Rulebooks were put into operation, the tension in the relationship between 
SIB and SROs and a number of changes in the institutional organisation of 
financial regulation -all left their own mark in these developments. 
 
The latter was perhaps the only factor that had a beneficial impact on the 
policy of rule-use.143 As soon as powers were transferred to SIB, DTI had 
no further statutory control over the formation of SIB rules. As a 
consequence any political pressure for detail became weaker and weaker, 
and SIB enjoyed greater scope in performing its role as the principal 
regulatory authority. The pressure for speed was also moved away. Drafting 
rules to catch up with the rapid developments in the marketplace was no 
longer at the top of the regulators’ agenda. Once the initial rulebooks were 
                                                 
141 J. Black above, 124-125. 
142 Formal guidance should be distinguished from informal guidance, for example, interpretation of a 
particular provision given to a firm over the telephone. The former was binding, while the latter was not. 
Above, 125. 
143 Above note 123, 92-93. 
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put into practice, their main concern was to remedy their deficiencies by 
making any necessary amendments.  
 
Specifically, it didn’t take long for the regulators to realise the flaws of their 
approach to rule-use.144 Clearly, the balance was tipped too much in favour 
of certainty and predictability and at the expense of flexibility and 
adaptability. Practitioners were effectively excluded from the regulatory 
process, legalism prevailed and the regulated industry tended to comply with 
the letter rather than the spirit of the regulatory provisions.145 It should be 
noted, however, that the regime was faithful to considerations of legal 
certainty only in theory. In practice, it was becoming evident that any 
attempt to produce self-contained regulatory requirements was a chimera, 
and that the attainment of legal certainty and predictability entailed going 
beyond perfecting rule-design; more than anything, it required seeking ways 
to actively engage the regulated population with the day-to-day regulation 
and helping them become conscious of the burdens and responsibilities that 
this involved. 
 
For once again, the increasing friction in the relationship between SIB and 
SROs made things worse.146 Practitioners had plenty of reasons to complain 
about. SIB’s approach to rule making manifested a profound and 
unwelcome departure from the originally envisaged model of self-regulation 
within a statutory framework. Indeed, SIB had a more dominant role than 
the one it was anticipated. Under these circumstances it was simply not 
possible to reap the benefits of self-regulation. It was urgent therefore to 
settle down the augmented discontent.  
                                                 
144 These are discussed at some length above. 
145 In relation to the initial involvement of SROs in the production of rules it has been pointed out that 
“before…  SROs had not been in a position to participate in the forming of the initial rules.” J. Black 
above note 31, 94. D. Walker ‘Some Issues in Regulation of Financial Markets’, Lecture at the Irish Centre for 
Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (1991). 
146 Things were intense between SIB and SROs. J. Black above note 31, 92-93. 
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The New Settlement addressed these problems. To start with, it redefined 
the relationship between SIB and SROs. The promulgation of statements of 
principle sent a firm message that SROs were going to play a more active 
role in rule-making, whereas SIB would concentrate its efforts and resources 
in providing leadership, standard setting and overall supervising and 
enforcing regulation. From then onwards, senior management would enjoy 
greater freedom –and heavier responsibility- to choose the techniques that 
would secure compliance with the rules. To reinforce the position of 
practitioners in the regulatory process, one more critical step was made. The 
rigid and in many respects unworkable “equivalence test” was replaced with 
the more lenient “adequacy test” as a measure for assessing SROs capacity 
to provide the appropriate level of investor protection in conformity with 
the statutory requirements. Furthermore, through the New Settlement, the 
attempt was made to reconcile two sets of clashing but equally desirable 
policy objectives: on the one hand, the need for certainty and predictability 
and, on the other hand, the need for flexibility and adaptability. The drafting 
of regulatory requirements in the form of guidance and the creation of the 
Core Rules served exactly that purpose. Finally, the incorporation of several 
innovative features into the design of rules, notably the glossary and the 
availability of derogations intended to make the rules brief, simple and 
adaptable. 
 
3.8. Further problems and the publication of the Large Report 
 
The analysis so far suggests that a number of initiatives were taken to 
simplify the design of rules, to reduce legalism and make the conduct of 
business regime more flexible and adaptable. It also reveals that special care 
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was taken to restore the troubled relationship between SIB and SROs. 
Despite these positive steps the situation was far from satisfactory. 
 
The regulatory regime received various criticisms.147 It was widely felt that 
the objectives of the Act were not well defined, while the structure of the 
financial services regulation as well as the rulebooks had developed without 
a sense of overall purpose. The general impression was that regulators were 
too much absorbed drafting rules rather than setting broader objectives. 
Moreover, creative compliance continued to be an issue.148 The 
dissatisfaction with the policy of rule-use, which was introduced by the 
Companies Act 1989, did not stop there. It also derived from the fact that, 
despite the good intentions, the New Settlement failed in practice to 
rationalise the structure of the rules and tackle complexity. In this regard, 
the utilisation of the glossary and derogations is of particular interest.  
 
It was said earlier that the glossary was a device that helped the drafters of 
the Core Rules to keep them brief, simple and durable. It was questionable, 
however, whether the glossary really made the rules more comprehensible 
and easy to read. Complexity did not vanish but removed from the rules to 
the appendix, whilst the lack of continuity in the text of the Core Rules 
made their reading confusing. An additional problem was that the glossary 
made the reading of the second-tier rules misleading because quite often it 
contained definitions that were different from market usage.149  
 
                                                 
147 Above note 134, para.1.3; and J. Black note 31, 129-132. 
148 The term “creative compliance” describes a situation where the interpretation fails to reflect the 
underlying purpose of the rule in question as a result of a strictly literal reading of the legal text. D. 
McBarnet and C. Whelan, ‘The Elusive Spirit of Law: Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control,’ 54 
Modern Law Review (1991), 848-873. 
149 J. Black above note 31, 122. 
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The use of derogations was also problematic.150 For one thing, there were 
serious concerns that the sub-delegation of rule-making powers by virtue of 
derogations was ultra vires and therefore unlawful. It was also pointed out 
that derogations gave rise to legal uncertainty, as “they were not so much 
rules as an indication of something to follow”.151 Furthermore, their 
availability was at odds with the principal aim of drafting the Core Rules 
namely, the harmonisation of regulation through the provision of a 
backbone of Core Rules.152 For example, it was feared that the frequent use 
of derogations would undermine the statutory requirement of adequate 
investor protection to the extent it would allow inconsistencies between an 
SRO rulebook and other SRO rules.  
 
Moreover, the role of SIB did not fit the overall character of financial 
regulation. SIB continued to act as the main rule-making agency. 
Accordingly it was felt that more progress had to be made in order to place 
SIB in a position, where it could actually act as the leading authority in 
financial regulation and as a guardian of the public interest. 
 
Finally, the relationship between SIB and the SROs continued to be a 
thorny issue.153 For instance, the jurisdictional boundaries between the 
regulatory agencies were still under-defined and in several occasions 
contradictory. Undoubtedly, SIB had the complicated task to regulate the 
market and at the same time to be the regulator of the other regulatory 
bodies. In practice, the concentration of these conflicting duties required 
SIB officials to do the impossible namely, take decisions and act as if they 
had two different minds. Indeed, SIB had to treat SROs like partners in 
                                                 
150 The availability of derogations undermined the initiative to create a “common core of rules.” The 
variety of definitions of market-counterpart and indirect customers testifies this. Above, 116-119.  
151 Above, 115. 
152 J. Black above note 31, 113. 
153 Above note 134, paras. 1.31, 1.37-1.39. 
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order to regulate the markets, but keep distance and objectivity where it had 
to supervise and monitor the performance of SROs or handle complaints 
against them.  
 
In July 1992, the Large Report reviewed and partly addressed these 
criticisms.154 Based on the assumption that the above-mentioned problems 
were highly correlated, the Report focused on what it was thought to be the 
source of all evils that is, the problematic relationship between SIB and 
SROs. In this regard the Large Report recommended that SIB needed to act 
more as a guardian of the public interest in the regulatory system.155 It had 
to become more committed to the objective of investor protection and to 
be willing and able to exercise leadership. This entailed that SIB had to 
devote more efforts in setting objectives and standards of performance, 
ensuring that these were properly understood, and enforcing and 
supervising their performance156 rather than creating rules per se. 
Furthermore, the Report stressed the importance of greater transparency in 
the regulatory process as well as the need to pay attention to the costs of 
regulation. 
 
SIB welcomed these recommendations and responded by taking a number 
of measures. These included the publication of a clear statement of the 
regulatory objectives in November 1993, the development of standards of 
regulation and the launch of standards of investor protection, which were 
accompanied by performance measures.157 The immediate result of these 
initiatives was a significant improvement of SIB’s capacity to monitor the 
performance of the various SROs and communicate effectively what it was 
                                                 
154 I. MacNeil, above note 2, 732. 
155 Above note 134, para. 1.64. 
156 Above, para. 1.3. 
157 Performance measures were intended to offer an objective basis for assessing compliance with what 
would still be subjective standards such as ‘integrity’ and ‘suitability’. Above note 134, para. 3.15-3.18. J. 
Black above note 31, 130-131. 
 103
expected by the regulated firms and what was the level of protection that 
investors were entitled to.158 
 
The Large Report had a remarkable impact on the evolution of the 
regulatory policy of rule-use. For one thing, it reformed the role of SIB. SIB 
was no longer the chief rule-maker. Instead, it became the leader regulator 
within the institutional structure of financial regulation, whose prime 
concern was the setting of standards as well as the supervision and the 
effective enforcement of regulation. As a matter of fact, “SIB would only be 
involved in rule-making and policy-making” in relation to the workings of a 
SRO, where the SRO in question “lacked the resources necessary to form 
policy, where an issue crossed regulatory boundaries,159 or where the 
importance of a subject for the system as a whole” warranted “SIB taking 
the lead, in the interests of securing adequate standards and promoting 
consistency among front line regulators”.160 
 
Given that SIB were expected to provide leadership, the drafting of legally 
binding and highly specific rules, which would allow it to intrude into the 
workings of SROs and keep a close eye on how they exercised their 
discretion, was no longer considered to be necessary. The more intensive 
use of statements of principle and the introduction of management-oriented 
techniques (for example, the publication of statements of aims and 
objectives, the identification of action points, the reorganisation of internal 
management of SIB, the production of management and budget plans, and 
the design and implementation of quantifiable performance targets) were 
thought to be more appropriate in assisting SIB to its new role.161  
                                                 
158 Above, para. 3.12. 
159 Above, paras. 6.9-6.10. J. Black, above note 31, 132. 
160 SIB, Management and Budget Plan 1996-7 (1995), para. 26. J. Black, above note 31, 132. 
161 Above; and J. Black, above note 31, 131. 
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The renewed emphasis on statements of principle manifested a more general 
change of attitude towards rule following. It indicated that the architects of 
the regime were now confident that public support and political approval 
could be gained through persuasion rather than by way of harsh measures 
and tight controls. Of course, it was not the first time that officials 
expressed their commitment not to exclude practitioners from the workings 
of the day-to-day regulation. However, it was the first time after the launch 
of the Financial Services Act in 1986 that conditions were mature for this to 
happen. Indeed, the policy choice to draft rules in the form of statements of 
principle created the necessary space for SROs to facilitate the channelling 
of practitioners’ input into the regulatory process, to promote the 
flourishing of communities of interpreters and to make possible the 
adoption of a communicative style of regulation. 
 
Although the Large Report was well received, several policy choices raised 
concerns and scepticism. For example, in relation to self-regulation, it was 
pointed out that when it comes to policy-making, rule-making and 
enforcement some kinds of self-interest might be difficult to detect and 
control.162 Similarly, the expediency of introducing a system of process 
related, quantitative standards as a benchmark device for clarifying the 
purposes of the FSA 1986 was criticised because it would encourage 
regulators to operate in a mechanical way.163 By the end of 90’s, growing 
dissatisfaction triggered a new wave of developments that were eventually 
crystallised in the policy of rule-use of our days. 
 
 
                                                 
162 C. A. E. Goodhart and D. Schoenmaker, ‘A Comment on Financial Services Regulation – Making the 
Two Tier System Work’, LSE Financial Markets Group, Special Paper No 56 (October 1993), 6. 
163 Above, 2-3 and 12. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I examined the evolution of the policy of rule-use in financial 
regulation that preceded the FSMA regime. I argued that the policy choice 
to construct conduct of business rules of a particular type as well as to 
deploy them in a certain fashion was shaped by the interaction of mainly 
two factors: the institutional structure of regulation and the special features 
of the regulated industry of the time.  
 
Specifically, the policy of rule-use evolved into three subsequent stages. The 
first phase had as its starting point the introduction of the Financial Services 
Act 1986, which was the Government’s response to a chain of dramatic 
market changes in the City of London. Under the FSA 1986 financial 
regulation was grounded on hybrid institutional forms combining state and 
private elements. The result was a multi-tier regulatory structure and 
comprised three levels. At the top (‘governmental level’) were the Treasury, 
the Office of Fair Trading and the Department of Trade and Industry. At 
the central level was the Securities and Investments Board (SIB). At the 
third level (‘practitioners level’) were the self-regulatory organisations, 
regulated professional bodies, exchanges and clearing houses.  
 
The institutional and market context of the time had a remarkable impact on 
the policy of rule-use. The eroded market homogeneity, the mounting 
uncertainty, which caused by the unprecedented changes in the market 
landscape combined with the distrust among DTI, SIB and SROs led 
initially to the production of extremely detailed and prescriptive conduct of 
business rules. Rules drafted in high level of detail served a wide range of 
purposes: to make the production of rules less time consuming, to control 
the exercise of interpretive discretion, to keep the increased litigation risk –
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the outcome of a generous provision of a civil right of action in section 62 
of the Act- at minimum etc. Yet, the FSA 1986 policy of rule-use was not an 
ordinary “command and control” regime. Self-regulatory elements were 
incorporated into the institutional structure to keep the regulated population 
happy and secure its co-operation. 
 
The initial policy of rule-use failed not least because it suffocated any 
attempt to take advantage of the self-regulatory elements that were 
preserved under the FSA 1986. Clearly the balance was tipped too much in 
favour of certainty and predictability and at the expense of flexibility and 
adaptability. The New Settlement launched a number of measures to address 
these shortcomings. It restricted the private right of action under section 62 
of the FSA. It substituted the statutory requirement of ‘equivalent’ level of 
consumer protection with the more lax requirement of ‘adequate’ investor 
protection. In terms of rule design, it emphasised the crucial role of 
Principles and introduced a three-tier system of rules. A number of factors 
put pressure towards the adoption of a less prescriptive regulation. The need 
to address the flaws of the initial rulebooks was one of them. An additional 
source of change was the fact that SROs was allowed for the first time to 
have some contribution to the production of rules and that DTI could no 
longer influence rule making. 
 
The New Settlement was not free from problems. It was felt that the 
objectives of the Act were flawed and that the rulebooks were developed 
without a sense of overall purpose. Furthermore, the relationship between 
SIB and the various SROs remained in many respects unsettled. The Large 
Report in 1992 dealt with these problems in the following way. It cemented 
SIB’s leadership role in financial regulation and stressed the desirability of 
adopting a more purposive and compliance oriented approach to regulation. 
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These ideas figured in policy debate before. However, with the Large Report 
the attempt was made to spell out their institutional implications in a more 
sophisticated manner. The progressive reliance on Principles, the resort to 
cost-benefit analysis, the emphasis on regulatory transparency and the 
putting into place of concrete performance measures all testify this 
development. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
The Evolving Regulatory Policy of Rule-Use -the FSMA 2000 
Regime 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter continues to explore the regulatory policy of rule use -this time, 
as it evolved as soon as the Labour Government announced substantial 
institutional reform in financial regulation and up until the end of 2006. The 
chapter falls into four parts. The first part considers the policy 
developments that led to the promulgation of the Financial Services Act 
2000 and the launch of a single megaregulator –the Financial services 
Authority (FSA)- as well as the present institutional structure of financial 
regulation. The second part examines the background of the FSA policy of 
rule-use. Its characteristics are discussed in the third part. In this connection, 
emphasis is placed on the sophisticated design and structural interrelation of 
the regulatory norms and on the purposive, communicative and risk based 
nature of their application and enforcement. Finally, the fourth part of this 
chapter engages with some difficulties that are endemic in the FSA’s policy 
of rule use. In this context special reference is made on the impact of the 
implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 
on the FSA policy of rule-use. 
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2. Further institutional reform: the move towards as single regulator 
 
After the Large Report, things didn’t rest for long. Mounting dissatisfaction 
triggered a new wave of developments. On May 1997 the Chancellor of the 
new Labour government announced in Parliament that the Bank of England 
would be given operational independence in matters of monetary policy.1 
Later on he confirmed that the supervisory and regulatory functions of the 
Bank of England under the Banking Act 1987 would be transferred to SIB 
and SIB would replace SROs and thus become directly responsible for the 
supervision of the securities industry on statutory basis. The Chancellor 
justified this decision by bringing attention to the inefficiencies of the 
existing system of regulation and its failure to deliver a high level of 
consumer protection. He further pointed out that the proliferation of hybrid 
financial products and services –a clear manifestation of the increasing 
blurring among the banking, securities and insurance industry- meant that it 
no longer made sense to subdivide the responsibility for financial regulation 
on functional basis.2 
 
A number of transitional steps followed.3 On July 1997 a report was 
prepared by SIB (in cooperation with eight other sectoral self-regulatory and 
statutory bodies) and submitted to the Chancellor. The report set out the 
core proposals for the creation of economies of scale and scope both in 
institutional and normative level, it included an outline of the necessary 
arrangements for their implementation, as well as a timetable. On August 
1997 the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England -Howard Davies- was 
                                                 
1 This reform was implemented by the Bank of England Act 1998. M. Blair, R. Cranston, C. Ryan and M. 
Taylor, Blackstones’s Guide to the Bank of England Act 1998 (1998). G. McMeel and J. Virgo, Financial Advice 
and Financial Products: Law and Liability (2001), ch.4 paras 1-15. 
2 HM Treasury, Financial Services and Markets Bill: A Consultation Document. Part One. Overview of Financial 
Regulatory Reform, 1998, 8. 
3 During the transitional period sectoral regulators formally retained their responsibility for their respective 
areas but the supervisory responsibilities were carried out by FSA.  
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appointed Chairman of SIB and was entrusted with the task to lead the 
transition and head the new megaregulator. Existing staff that was 
previously employed by the SROs was re-employed by the FSA on a 
subcontract basis. On 28 October 1997, the Financial Services Authority 
was launched and the publication of a Memorandum of Understanding set out 
the relationship between FSA, the Treasury and the Bank of England.4 The 
banking supervisory functions of the Bank of England were transferred to 
FSA under the Bank of England Act 1998.5 Around the same time the 
sectoral regulatory statutes were replaced by a single, unitary statutory 
framework the Financial Services and Market Act 2000 (FSMA).6 The 
FSMA is the normative counterpart to the organisational integration of the 
regulatory authorities. It contains provisions concerning the establishment 
of the new authorisation and permission regimes, the issuance of rules and 
guidance, enforcement, accountability and transparency and rules making 
provision for a new integrated Ombudsman and Compensation 
arrangements.7 The FSMA regime differs from its predecessor in various 
respects. Self-regulation was abandoned for a statutory based regime.8 The 
scope of regulation was expanded and so it did the scope of the functions 
                                                 
4FSA, Memorandum of Understanding Between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA. 
[http//:www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/launch.pdf.] 
5 This is referred to as ‘N1’. Before that FSA had the statutory responsibilities of SIB. 
6 FSA has regulatory powers under a number of other non-FSMA legislation: (a) the Building Societies Act 
1986; (b) the Friendly Societies Act 1974 (and 1992); (c) the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965; 
(d) the Enterprise Act 2002 (it is designated as consumer enforcer where collective consumer interests are 
at stake); (e) Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 (may seek an injunction to prevent the 
use of the contract term drawn up for general use in a financial services contract that appears to the FSA to 
be unfair); (f) Distance Marketing Regulations 2004 (it may take action against persons responsible for 
breaching specified contracts); (g) Electronic Money Directive (it is responsible for the regulating the 
issuing of e-money).  
7 Before the FSMA 2000 was enacted FSA was operating as a de facto single regulator. A. C. Fawcett, 
‘Examining the Objectives of Financial Regulation. Will the New Regime Succeed? A Practitioner’s View’ 
in E. Ferran and C. A. E. Goodhart (ed.) Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the 21 Century, ch.4 at 37. 
8 H. Davies, ‘Reforming Financial Regulation’ in E. Ferran and C. A. E Goodhart (eds.) Regulating Financial 
Markets in the Twenty First Century (2001), ch.2 at 20. E. Lomnicka ‘Making the Financial Services Authority 
Accountable’, Journal of Business Law (2000), 65-81; L. C. B. Gower, Review of Investor Protection Part I (Cmnd. 
9125, HMSO, 1984), para. 3.15 and E. Ferran and C. A. E. Goodhart ‘Regulating Financial Markets in the 
Twenty First Century: An Overview’ in C. A. E. Goodhart and E. Ferran (eds.) Regulating Financial Markets 
and Services in the Twenty First Century (2001), ch.1, 5. 
  
 
111
vested to the new megaregulator.9 Yet, the real novelty of the FSMA 2000 
has been the inclusion of four regulatory objectives and the assignment to 
FSA of important policing functions especially with regard to money 
laundering and market abuse. On June 14, 2000 the FSMA received Royal 
Assent, almost after two years of its original publication in draft form.10  On 
December 1, 2001 the FSMA 2000 entered into full force and FSA acquired 
full and direct responsibility for the regulation and supervision of the UK 
financial intermediaries (banks, building societies, insurance companies, 
friendly societies, credit unions, Lloyd’s, securities firms, derivatives traders, 
investment and pensions advisers and managers, collective investment 
schemes).11 The transitional period was fully complete by early 2004 when 
the regulatory responsibility in respect of mortgage sales and general 
insurance was transferred to FSA.12 
 
 
3. The current institutional structure 
 
FSA is a quasi-independent administrative agency. It is a company limited by 
guarantee vested with direct statutory functions by virtue of which it is the 
policy-maker, rule-maker and enforcer of financial regulation.13 FSA is 
responsible to promote a multitude of statutory objectives14 namely, market 
confidence, public awareness, consumer protection and the reduction of 
financial crime according to principles of good administration as stated in 
                                                 
9 C. Briault ‘The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator’, FSA Occasional Paper (1999), 
5. 
10 On the legislative process and the topics of debate see H. Davies, above note 8, 17-9 and 19-21. 
11 This date is referred to as ‘N2’. From that time the new system was in effect in law as well as in practice. 
W. Blair, A. Allison, G. Martin, K. Palmer, P. Richards-Carpenter and G. A. Walker, Banking and Financial 
Services Regulation  (2002), paras. 2.1-2.3. 
12 This date is known as ‘N3’. See above, paras.2.2-2.3. 
13 See, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/Accountability/legal. 
14 FSA, A New Regulator for the New Millennium FSA, (January, 2000), 5-9 [available at, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/P29.pdf]; and G. McMeel and J. Virgo, above note 1, ch 4, paras 24-
31. 
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the FSMA 2000.15 Its public powers include: (a) the authorisation and 
supervision of financial intermediaries;16 (b) the investigation of suspected 
misconduct;17 (c) the imposition of administrative sanctions18 and the 
prosecution of criminal offences;19 (d) the monitoring the conduct of the so-
called ‘approved persons’ (that is individuals carrying in key functions within 
authorised financial institutions) and;20 (e) the official listing of publicly 
traded securities in the UK.21  
 
FSA performs its operation along the lines of a single managerial structure. 
The rationale for this choice was the achievement of economies of scale and 
scope.22 It consists of (a) the Board;23 (b) the Chief Executive; (c) three 
managing directors, each leading a business unit –retail markets, wholesale 
and institutional markets and regulatory services; (d) a number of functions 
which report direct to the Chief Executive and; (e) eight ‘sector leaders’ that 
is, staff directors with cross-FSA responsibilities for defined sectors or 
issues.24 There are also sectoral teams, which develop expertise and ensure 
that issues relevant to their sector are identified and resolved as quickly as 
possible. 
 
The accountability of FSA is secured by way of corporate governance 
requirements and provisions relating to the exercise of public control.25 The 
FSMA 2000 requires the participation in the Board of a majority of non-
                                                 
15 The principles of good regulation are: (a) efficiency and economy; (b) responsibility of business 
managers; (c) proportionality; (d) facilitating innovation; (e) maintaining the UK’s competitive position 
internationally; (f) no unnecessary distortion of competition; and (g) the facilitation of competition. 
16 FSMA 2000, s.31. 
17 FSMA 2000, Part XI . 
18 FSA, ‘Enforcement Section’ FSA Handbook of Rules and Guidance, ch.14. 
19 FSMA 2000, s.168. 
20 FSMA 2000, s.33. 
21 FSMA, Part VI (ss. 72-103) and Sch.7-11. 
22 Above note 9. 
23 FSMA 2000, Sch.1. 
24 See, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/Management/index.shtml. 
25 R. M. Lastra and H. Shams, ‘Public Accountability in the Financial Sector’; and A. Page, ‘Regulating the 
Regulator- A Lawyer’s Perspective’ in E. Ferran and C. A. E. Goodhart (eds.) Regulating Financial Services and 
Markets in the Twenty First Century’ (2001), chs.12 and 10 respectively. 
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executive members and the establishment of a committee of non-executive 
members with financial scrutiny role.26 In addition, FSA has the obligation 
to submit the annual report to the Treasury and the Houses of Parliament 
and publish it.27 The Treasury retains the power to appoint and remove the 
agency’s Chairman and the Board.28 It is also authorised to initiate 
independent inquiries for the investigation of serious regulatory failures in 
the public interest,29 as well as independent audits.30 Apart from that, the 
Treasury is entitled to order FSA to change rules and practices in various 
occasions as, for example, when regulatory provisions are deemed to be 
anti-competitive by the Director General of Fair Trading or where FSA fails 
to comply with UK international obligations.31  
 
To ensure compatibility with the Human Rights Act 1998, FSA is expected 
to comply with a range of other procedural and consultation requirements 
when taking disciplinary action. Furthermore, the regulatory Authority is 
under the obligation to maintain internal procedures guaranteeing that 
enforcement action is fair and consistent.32 A major development in this 
regard has been the separation of functions between FSA staff investigating 
a case and FSA staff taking the decision to proceed with enforcement 
action. 
 
Under the FSMA, a broad range of financial and quasi-financial activities fall 
within the regulatory pitch: dealing and arranging deals in ‘investments’, 
                                                 
26 FSMA 2000, s.7 and Sch.1. 
27 FSMA 2000, Sch.1 para.10. 
28 FSMA 2000, Sch.1 para.2(3). 
29 FSMA 2000, ss.14-18. 
30 FSMA 2000, ss.12-13. 
31 FSMA 2000, ss. 163 and 405. 
32 D. Waters and M. Hoper, ‘Regulatory Discipline and the European Convention of Human Rights; and 
T. Beazley, ‘Holding the Balance –Effective Enforcement, Procedural Fairness and Human Rights’ in E. 
Ferran and C. A. E. Goodhart (eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the Twenty First Century (2001), 
chs. 8 and 9 respectively; Above note 9, 23; H. B. Mistry, ‘The Loss of Direct Parliamentary Control: Does 
This Mean a Financial Services Regulator Without Accountability’, 22 Company Lawyer (2001), 246-248; and 
E. Lomnicka, above note 8, 65-81. 
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deposit taking, safe-keeping and administration of assets, investment 
management, investment advice, the establishment of collective investment 
schemes, the use of computer-based systems for giving investment 
instructions.33 The regulatory regime is built around a statutory prohibition 
on carrying on any regulated activity or promoting investments without 
authorisation.34 FSA has the power to grant, modify and withdraw such 
authorisation as well as to continuously supervise authorised institutions. 
Authorisation does not involve an automatic right to provide financial 
services of all descriptions. It simply means that the institution has been 
given permission to conduct a specified range of financial activities, which 
FSA deems appropriate in the view of the institution’s individual 
circumstances.35 The FSMA contains threshold conditions for the granting 
of permission to an institution.36 It should be noted, however, that FSA’s 
decision is discretionary. 
 
Authorised institutions as well as the individuals who carry out certain key 
managerial and control functions on their behalf are subject to supervision 
and must adhere to prudential and conduct of business requirements.37 
Changes in the ownership of regulated institutions are subject to regulatory 
vetting.38 FSA has extensive powers to request information on ad hoc basis 
and to launch investigations on suspected contraventions of regulatory 
requirements.39 Similarly, the enforcement powers of the Authority are 
much more comprehensive than those under the predecessor regime. FSA 
has a variety of enforcement tools in its disposal.40 It can take disciplinary 
                                                 
33 FSMA 2000, s.22 and Sch.2. 
34 FSMA 2000, ss. 19 and 21. 
35 FSMA 2000, s. 31(1) and Part IV (ss.40-55). 
36 FSMA 2000, s.41 and Sch. 6. 
37 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer on Financial Services: Investigations and Enforcement (2001). 
38 FSMA 2000, Part XII (ss.178-192). 
39 FSMA 2000, Part XI (ss. 165-177). 
40 H. Davies, above note 8, at 24. Considerable emphasis has been given to civil law enforcement. C. 
Hadjiemmanuil, ‘Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation: A Trend Towards ‘Megaregulators’?, 
Yearbook of International Financial and Economic Law 2000-2001 (2003), 181. 
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measures in the form of public censure or administrative fines.41 It can 
initiate court proceedings for injunctions or restitution orders.42 FSA may 
also initiate insolvency proceedings against regulated institutions43 and 
prosecute offences under the FSMA and subordinate legislation.44 To avoid 
arbitrariness, FSA has established a clear separation of roles between those 
who investigate a case and those who decide on potential enforcement 
action.45 In the same spirit, enforcement action follows a standard pattern 
which involves the service of formal warning and final decision notices 
explicating the reasons for action, the disclosure of relevant evidence, 
allowance of a period for representations to the institution concerned as well 
as to certain third parties.46 
 
FSA also has extensive policy and rule making powers. Numerous statutory 
provisions enable FSA to adopt norms on a wide range of substantive 
matters.47 Granted that the FSMA 2000 contains a set of four general policy 
objectives, which are coupled with relatively fewer concrete policy 
prescriptions, the regulatory Authority enjoys considerable scope of 
legislative autonomy both with regard to the substantive content of the 
regulatory norms and the means and intensity of their application. 
Nonetheless, the FSMA sets up certain procedural safeguards in relation to 
                                                 
41 FSMA 2000, Part XIV (ss.205-211). According to FSMA 2000 section 66, this is exercisable over 
approved persons in the event of their “misconduct”. R. v FSA, ex parte Davies [2003] 1 WLR 1284; and 
FSA Final Notice for St James Place UK plc, St James Unit Trust Group Ltd, St Jame’s Place International Plc  (24 
November 2003); FSA Final Notice for Abbey National Asset Managers Ltd (9 December 2003); FSA Final 
Notice City Index Ltd (22 March 2005). 
42 FSMA 2000, Part XXV (ss.380-386). See, for example, FSA v Martin, [2006] PNLR 11 (restitution order); 
FSA v Fitt, [2004] EWHC 1669 (freezing injunction). 
43 FSMA 2000, Part XXIV (ss. 355-379). See, for example, FSA v Dobb White & Co, [2003] EWHC 3146; 
and FSA v Goodwill Merchant Financial Ltd, [2001] 1BCLC 259 (winding up petitions). 
44 FSMA 2000, Part XXVII (ss.397-403). 
45 FSMA 2000, ss.395-396; HM Treasury, Financial Services and Market Bill: Progress Report (March 1999), at 
20. On the FSA’s internal decision procedure, see the ‘Decision-Making’ module in the FSA Handbook of 
Rules and Guidance. 
46 FSMA 2000, Part XXVI (ss.387-396). Despite these procedural requirements, the fairness of the scheme 
has been disputed in a number of decisions by the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal. Geoffrey Alan 
Hoodless and Sean Michael Blackwell v FSA (3 October, 2003); and Sir Philip Watts v Financial Services Authority 
(7 September 2005). 
47 FSMA 2000, Part X (ss.138-164). 
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regulatory rulemaking. FSA has the obligation to establish a consumer and a 
practitioner panel, and consult with them when making policy or rules.48 
Rulemaking is further subject to public consultation.49 Moreover, where the 
rule is likely to involve huge regulatory costs, its publication must be 
coupled with cost benefit analysis.50 
 
In exercising its policy and rule making functions, FSA must pursue a set of 
express statutory objectives. These are the maintaining of confidence in the 
financial system, promotion of public awareness, consumer protection and 
the reduction of financial crime.51 In doing so, FSA must take into account a 
number of mandatory considerations, known as “principles of good 
regulation;”52 the need to use its resources in the most efficient and 
economic way, the responsibilities of the management of authorised firms, 
the principle that the regulatory burdens and restrictions imposed on private 
persons are proportional to the benefits which accrue from them, the 
desirability of facilitating innovation, the international character of financial 
services and markets, the need to protect the UK’s competitive position and 
the principle that regulation should not restrict or distort unnecessarily 
competition between market participants.53 FSA is also committed to a 
system of risk-based regulation.54 
 
Although FSA is now the UK’s single financial regulator, the Bank of 
England and the Treasury have key roles in the regime.55 The Memorandum 
                                                 
48 FSMA 2000, ss.8-11. 
49 FSMA 2000, s.155. 
50 Cost benefit analysis essentially means ‘cost-effectiveness’. I. Alfon and P. Andrews, ‘Cost –Benefit 
Analysis in Financial Regulation: How to Do it and How it Adds Value’, FSA Occasional Paper, No.3 (1999). 
51 FSMA 2000, ss.2-6. The provision of a set of statutory objectives alongside principles of good regulation 
served as a benchmark for evaluating FSA’s performance and cementing its public accountability. E. 
Lomnicka, above note 8, 65. 
52 FSMA 2000, ss.2 and 7. Above note 14, 10-11. 
53 FSMA 2000, s.2(3). 
54 H. Davies, above note 8, 23-24; and note 14. 
55 FSA, Memorandum of Understanding Between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA. 
[http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/launch.pdf.]. 
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of Understanding between the regulatory bodies provides a framework of 
cooperation for the attainment of the common policy of objective of 
financial stability. It contains a clear description of the roles of each of the 
bodies involved in the regulation of financial markets and, further, amplifies 
the four fundamental principles, which form the basis of the division of 
regulatory power under the FSMA 2000. These are (a) clear accountability of 
the regulatory bodies; (b) transparency of functions; (c) no overlap of 
functions and (d) exchange of information to ensure efficient discharge of 
functions. According to the Memorandum of Understanding each body is 
required to inform the others and consult with them if a policy change 
appears to have an impact on the responsibilities of the other bodies. 
Furthermore, the Bank of England is represented on the FSA Board and 
likewise, the Chairman of FSA has a seat on the Board of the Bank of 
England. 
 
 
4.  Policy background 
 
Most of the ideas that lie beneath the FSA policy of rule-use were already in 
place before the introduction of the FSMA 2000. The emphasis on 
outcomes, the progressive decentralisation of decision-making and reliance 
on the discretion of the regulated firms, the idea that regulatory responses 
must be reflexive and proportionate to the particular circumstances of each 
individual case, the desirability of strengthening the cooperation between the 
regulator and the regulated population with the view of cultivating a 
common understanding of the regulatory norms figured already in the latest 
phase of the policy of rule-use under the FSA 1986 regime. The effective 
operationalisation of these ideas, however, was less than satisfactory. 
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The major institutional reform in the field of financial regulation at the end 
of 90’s gave an excellent occasion to review these ideas and to work out new 
ways to bring them into practice.56 The publication of the FSA Consultation 
Paper on the Design of the FSA Handbook of Rules and Guidance in April 
1998 instigated a painstaking preparatory work on the architecture of the 
normative aspect of financial regulation.57 At this preliminary stage, the aim 
was to clarify the design-objectives and design-principles of the FSA 
Handbook. FSA identified three sets of objectives: (a) communication, 
namely the capacity of regulatory provisions to communicate to the 
regulated population what is required for them in organisational and 
behavioural terms; (b) consistency, which was understood as making sure 
that regulatory provisions are internally coherent and differentiate only 
where it is appropriate and; and (c) implementation, which required striking 
a balance between effective enforcement and maintaining a level of latitude 
for regulated firms to decide how to comply with regulatory requirements.58 
 
The elaboration of the design principles that would underlie the architecture 
of the Handbook proved to be a more challenging project, given that the 
design-principles had to be carefully crafted so that they would be effective 
in dealing with problems as diverse as making rules durable and at the same 
time adaptable, promoting effective enforcement but also preserving some 
space for firms to decide themselves how to comply with regulation, 
promoting certainty and being at the same time flexible when differentiation 
was prescribed on policy considerations. In an attempt to accommodate all 
these competing objectives, FSA came up with five design principles:59 (a) a 
                                                 
56 These changes constitute part of the so-called ‘Better Regulation Movement,’ a broader initiative of the 
Labour Government to improve the performance of public administration, whose roots can be traced back 
to the deregulation policies of the Conservative Government in the 80’s. R. Baldwin ‘Is Better Regulation 
Smarter Regulation?’, Public Law (2005), 485 at 485-487. 
57 FSA, ‘Designing the FSA Handbook of Rules and Guidance’, FSA Consultation Paper No.8 (April, 1998). 
58 See above, 10-12. 
59 Above note 57, 15-16. 
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succinct authoritative statement of high-level principles, (b) a backbone of 
further rules to cater for the enforceability and other needs; (c) guidance; (d) 
presumption against differentiation;60 (e) regulatory standards should focus 
on firms’ outputs and the adequacy of internal systems and controls.  
 
In August 1998, nearly six months after the publication of the design-
objectives and design-principles, the development of the FSA’s policy of 
rule-use entered into an interim phase of evolution. This was marked by the 
publication of an additional paper where FSA discussed the industry’s 
reactions to its proposals, clarified certain aspects of the practical 
implications of its proposed policy and, set out further proposals dealing 
with the final design of regulatory provisions and the approach that were to 
be followed in setting and implementing regulatory standards.61 FSA 
declared that the regulatory requirements would be implemented according 
to their purpose and underlying values62 and always in light of the 
peculiarities of each situation. To this end, the regulatory Authority would 
communicate and cooperate with the regulated firms and –where 
appropriate- avail itself with the use of modifications, waivers and other 
more informal methods for ensuring compliance with regulatory 
requirements.63 In addition, it would rely on the extensive use of codes and 
guidance to promote certainty and predictability.  
 
The development of the FSA’s policy of rule use accomplished its latest 
phase with the integration of financial regulation into a single normative 
framework -the Financial Services and Market Act 2000.64 Several chapters 
                                                 
60 On the principle of appropriate differentiation see, HM Treasury, Financial Services and Market Bill: A 
Consultation Document. Part One Overview of Financial Regulatory Reform, (July, 1998); HM Treasury, Financial 
Services and Market Bill: Progress Report, (March 1999), FSA, FSA: Meeting Our Responsibilities (August, 1998). 
61 FSA, Financial Services Authority: Meeting our responsibilities, (August 1998). 
62 Above, para. 96. 
63 Above paras. 87 and 88. 
64 C. Hadjiemmanuil, above note 40, 127-190; and note 8, H. Davies, 20.  
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and sections of the Act are devoted in laying down a comprehensive 
framework for the FSA’s policy of rule-use along the lines of the earlier 
policy proposals. Of particular importance are those chapters and provisions 
setting out principles of good regulation and governing the exercise of rule-
making powers65, provisions establishing accountability benchmarks66 and 
provisions prescribing the procedural aspects of disciplinary and 
enforcement action.67 Based on these statutory prescriptions, FSA published 
a sophisticated net of secondary legislation, the FSA Handbook of Rules 
and Guidance (the Handbook).68 The Handbook is an exemplary case of 
legal draftmanship and comprises currently six modules on high-level 
standards,69 nine modules on business standards,70 four modules on 
regulatory processes71 and a number of specialist rulebooks and guides 
applicable to more idiosyncratic categories of regulated firms. Ever since its 
publication the FSA Handbook has been the subject of a laborious revision 
whose purpose has been to ensure that the design of the Handbook keeps 
up with market developments and reflects more accurately the regulator’s 
policy of rule-use. The nature of this policy is considered next. 
 
 
 
                                                 
65 Part X of the FSMA 2000 confers upon FSA rule making powers for authorised persons and, in 
addition, gives FSA the power to issue guidance on regulatory matters. 
66 Examples include FSMA provisions from Part I such as section 2 (the Authority’s general duties), 
sections 3 to 6 (the regulatory objectives, section 7 (corporate governance) and, sections 8 to 11 
(arrangements for consulting practitioners and consumers). 
67 See, for example, Part XXVI of FSMA 2000 on the issuance of notices especially section 387 (warning 
notices), section 388 (decision notices), section 395 (the Authorities procedures) and section 396 
(statements under section 395: consultation). 
68 M. Blair and G. A. Walker, Financial Services Law (2006), 108-112. On the content of the FSA Handbook 
see W. Blair et al, above note 11, para.2.87. 
69 Including general principles for business; rules on senior management; systems and controls; threshold 
conditions for authorisation; a set of principles and a code of conduct for person exercising certain 
regulated functions within authorised institutions (‘approved persons’ FSMA, Part V); a fitness test for 
‘approved persons’; and general provisions. 
70 Including separate prudential sourcebooks for banks, building societies, insurers, friendly societies and 
investment business; and modules of conduct of business, market conduct, training and competence of 
staff, and money laundering. 
71 That is authorisation, supervision, enforcement and decision-making. 
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5. Decoding the nature of the FSA’s policy of rule-use 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Having summarised the development of the FSA’s policy of rule-use, I will 
now attempt to overview the key elements of this policy. As it will be 
shown, the Authority’s policy of rule-use is a unique amalgam, on the one 
hand, of outstandingly sophisticated architectural features of the Handbook 
and, on the other hand, of a purposive (commonly known as “principles-
based”), communicative and risk-based practice of rule formation, 
application and enforcement. While the sophisticated design of the 
regulatory norms and their legal framework was considered to be the crucial 
step to make rules more accessible and easy to understand, purposiveness 
was expected to foster compliance with the spirit rather than the letter of 
the regulatory norms, encourage the development of market-based solutions 
and overall reduce the cost of rule-use. Furthermore, the incorporation of 
communicative elements and the adoption of a risk-based approach were 
intended to cement the participatory and reflexive nature of the Authority’s 
policy of rule-use in an economically efficient manner. 
 
5.2. The design of FSA Handbook 
 
The FSA Handbook of Rules and Guidance is a piece of secondary 
legislation that sets out the bulk of the FSA’s regulatory provisions and 
epitomizes its policy of rule-use. Overall, the Handbook is an extraordinary 
case of legal draftmanship. A mixture of different types of rules72 has being 
                                                 
72 According to the FSMA 2000, FSA is endowed with powers to promulgate secondary legislation in a 
variety of forms such as principles, rules, guidance and codes of practice, directions and requirements. 
FSMA 2000, Part X chapter I (rule-making powers) and chapter II (guidance) and Part V, section 64 
(conduct and statements and codes). Significantly, not all of them are legally binding, whereas some of 
them may be limited in their scope of application. M. Blair et al. note 13 (2002), 138-141. On the design of 
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used in order to address the problems of over- and under- inclusiveness and 
that of legal indeterminacy.73 Their typology is extremely refined and their 
lay out follows a complex –though standardised- pattern. Alongside high-
level principles, rules and guidance now figure regulatory provisions 
identified as “directions”, “requirements”, “standards” and “evidential 
provisions”. Those of the regulatory provisions that are stated in an abstract 
manner are linked with a range of other provisions framed in more concrete 
terms. Together, they comprise an organic whole, in the sense that the latter 
serve to explicate the content of the former, to give information about its 
legal status and enforceability, to advise on its proper interpretation and to 
offer examples or further guidance.74 Additional information on regulatory 
requirements is contained in separate schedules included in the modules. 
These deal with issues such as transitional provisions, record keeping, 
notification and reporting requirements, rules that can be waived or 
modified and rights of action for damages under section 150 of the FSMA 
2000.75  
 
The provisions in the Handbook are found in hierarchical order. In line with 
a principles-based approach76 to regulation, high-level principles stand at the 
top of the hierarchical ranking. They are superior in that they are the 
ultimate regulatory norms in written form that define what will be regarded 
as acceptable or non-acceptable market behaviour.77 Detailed prescriptive 
rules and guidance are inferior in that they perform a supplementary 
                                                                                                                                            
the FSA Handbook, see A. Georgosouli, ‘The Nature of the FSA Policy of Rule-Use: A Critical Overview’, 
28(1) Legal Studies (2008), 119 at 123-125. 
73 J. Black, Rules and Regulators (1997), ch.1. 
74 FSA considers that there is such an intimate link between high-level principles and the detailed rules, so 
that in one of his recent speeches Callum McCarthy, the Chairman of the FSA, pointed out that it is 
misleading to characterise the FSA’s regulation as ‘principles-based’. Taking into account that there are 
currently 8,500 pages of rules, the FSA could “equally … be described as rule bound regulator.” C. 
McCarthy, ‘Financial Regulation: Myth and Reality’, FSA Speech, (13 February, 2007). 
75 FSA, Reader’s Guide: an introduction to the Handbook, ch.5. 
76 FSA, Better Regulation Action Plan (December, 2005), 6 and; J. Tiner, ‘Better Regulation: Objective or 
Oxymoron?’, FSA Speech (9 May, 2006), 2. 
77 Above, J. Tiner, 1-4. 
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function.78 Rules are used only when it is absolutely necessary and serve to 
explicate the content and implications of high-level principles and -
depending on their level of concreteness- stipulate enforcement action. 
Guidance performs a multitude of functions including the clarification of 
the form and manner of compliance, the development of market-based 
solutions to market failure and the overall maintenance of communication 
between FSA and the regulated population.79 All these regulatory provisions 
comprise currently the content of specialist sourcebooks, guidance, sector-
specific Handbooks80 and glossaries.  
 
An impressively wide range of accessories and other navigating tools are 
intended to make the Handbook user-friendly and accessible. The FSA 
Handbook is accompanied by Handbook Guides and Regulatory Guides as 
well as a special booklet –the Reader’s Guide-, which is designed to inform 
on the structure and contents of the Handbook and its related materials, 
their interpretation and further explain how different modules fit together.81 
Letter icons ensure that the type and legal status of each provision is always 
made clear. For instance, the letter R stands for rules, the letter E for 
evidential provisions, the letter G for Guidance and the letter C to signal out 
paragraphs made under section 119(2)(6) of the FSMA 2000 specifying 
descriptions of behaviour that in FSA’s opinion do not amount to market 
abuse. Flag icons serve to distinguish those legislative materials that were 
not produced by FSA.82 Numbering, cross-referencing and italics are 
employed extensively to indicate terms defined in the Glossary while 
informative notes are added for the convenience of the readers. Finally, the 
                                                 
78 Above, 2-5. 
79 Tiner, above note 76, 4-5. 
80 FSA has produced fourteen sector-specific Handbooks for small firms. Each one of them is about 90% 
smaller than the full FSA Handbook. Above, 16 
81 Above note 75, 2. 
82 These fall in either of the two categories: non-FSA UK or EU materials that are directly applicable. The 
UK flag icon is used for the former, while the EU flag icon designates the latter. 
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technological advantages of the Internet have made possible for the firms to 
create their own personalised Handbooks and focused-on Handbooks.83 
 
The various provisions of the Conduct of Business Sourcebook offer an 
excellent case study of the design of the FSA Handbook.84 The first thing to 
notice is that there is a division of labour among regulatory provisions. For 
example, COB 2.1, which provides that firms have the obligation to conduct 
clear, fair and not misleading communication, contains separate rules and 
guidance explaining the application (COB 2.1.1 (R)) and purpose (2.1.2 (G)) 
of this regulatory requirement and separate rules and guidance stating the 
regulatory requirement per se (COB 2.1.3 (R), COB 2.1.4 (G) and COB 
2.1.5 (G). In addition, COB 2.1.2 (G) establishes the structural inter-relation 
between COB 2.1 and Principle 7 of the FSA Handbook (‘Communication 
with Clients’) and explains the rationale for using a detailed and prescriptive 
rule alongside Principle 7, which is inter alia to enable a customer to bring a 
legal action for damages under section 150 of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000. Moreover, the interaction between COB 2.1.3 (R) and 
COB 2.1.4 (G) and 2.1.5 (G) is of particular interest as it is a standard 
example where the content of a legally binding regulatory requirement (COB 
2.1.3 (R)) is further explicated by way of non-legally binding guidance in the 
sense that regulatory provisions COB 2.1.4 (G) and COB 2.1.5 (G) help 
firms to understand whether their conduct is in conformity with the 
regulatory requirement to communicate in clear, fair and not misleading 
manner.85 Similarly COB 2.4 (Chinese Walls) consists of (a) subsections 
COB 2.4.1 (R), COB 2.4.1 A (R), COB 2.4.2 (G) and COB 2.4.3 (G), whose 
                                                 
83 Personalised Handbooks present the content of the FSA Handbook in a manner that fits the peculiar 
features of the firm. Focus-on Handbooks deliver the content of the FSA Handbook presented by subject 
matter. Above note 76, FSA, 11. 
84 This regime will be replaced by the NEWCOB (also referred to as ‘COBS’), which will take force on 
November 1, 2007. It is expected that COBS will be more detailed and prescriptive. See also the discussion 
on the implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and its impact on the FSA’s 
policy of rule-use below. 
85 For instance, COB 2.1.4 (G) states that ‘when considering COB 2.1.3 (R) a firm should have regard to 
the customer’s knowledge of the designated investment business to which information relates.’ 
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sole objective is to explain the application and purpose of this regulatory 
requirement, (b) subsection COB 2.4.4 (R), which sets out what FSA 
requires from firms to do; and (c) a number of other subsections, which by 
way of guidance explain matters such as the legal effect of complying with 
COB 2.4.4 (R), and the attribution of knowledge in certain circumstances. 
For once again special care is taken to stress the hierarchical inter-relation 
between COB 2.4 and Principle 8 of the FSA Handbook governing conflicts 
of interest.  
 
Finally, all COB provisions -including COB 2.1 (clear, fair and non 
misleading information) and 2.4 (Chinese Walls)- are ornamented with all 
the accessories and navigating tools that were mentioned above as for 
example letter icons indicating the legal status of the regulatory provisions. 
In addition, the electronic form of the text opens up a wide range of 
possibilities for the reader including immediate access to the glossary, other 
parts of the FSA Handbook or even to other legal instruments that it might 
be of his or her interest as well as the taking of notice of the New Conduct 
of Business Sourcebook that is going to have legal force from 1 November 
2007.86  
 
Given the notional and structural link between COB regulatory 
requirements and the eleven Principles for Business, the former cannot be 
read with out reference to the latter.87 In terms of their lay out, the 
Principles for Business bear similarities with COB regulatory requirements. 
Features that share in common include the division of labour among 
different regulatory provisions, the presence of a regulatory provision 
(PRIN 1.1.9 (G)) that emphasises the hierarchical inter-relation between the 
high-level principles and COB rules and guidance, which are found in 
                                                 
86 See http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook. 
87 The Principles for Business are part of the Second Block (‘High Level Standards’) of the FSA Handbook. 
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separate Block of the FSA Handbook, and the extensive availability of 
navigating tools and other accessories which aim at making their reading 
user-friendly.88 However, there are several structural characteristics that are 
peculiar to the high-level Principles for Business due to their different 
functional purpose. For example, PRIN 1.1.2 (G) explains the purposes of 
regulatory requirements that fall under the heading of Principles for 
Business and, in addition, stress the notional link between the Principles of 
Business and the regulatory objectives stated in the FSMA 2000. Likewise 
PRIN 1.1.8 makes clear how the Principles for Business become relevant to 
the exercise of various FSA powers (e.g. powers to gather information, 
conduct investigation and vary a firm’s permission or apply in court for an 
injunction or restitution) and explicitly states that Principles “do not give 
rise to actions for damages by a private person...” Last but not least, PRIN 
1.1.9 makes special reference to the implication of the nature of the 
Principles for Business with respect to other FSA rules and guidance, stating 
that “since the Principles are also designed as a general statements of 
regulatory requirements applicable in new or unforeseen situation, and in 
situations in which there is no need for guidance, the FSA’s other rules and 
guidance should not be viewed as exhausting the implications of the 
Principles themselves”.89 
 
5.3. Purposive regulation  
 
The purposive character of the FSA’s policy of rule-use manifests that the 
FSA’s approach to regulation is outcome-oriented. Its roots can be traced 
                                                 
88 Of particular interest is note 1, which provides access to the statutory instrument ‘MIFID 
(MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS) Instrument 2007’ that introduces changes to various PRIN 
provisions so that they are in conformity of MiFID requirements. 
[http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/PRIN/1/1] 
89 See, http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/PRIN/1/1. Recent case where FSA made use of its power to 
initiate enforcement action on the basis of general standards is the Standards of Regulatory Responsibility in 
Legal and General Assurance Society v FSA (Financial Services and Markets Tribunal, 18 January 2005). 
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back to the four regulatory objectives specified in the Act.90 It underpins the 
genesis, application and enforcement of rules and becomes particularly 
evident in the architecture of the FSA Handbook, which is conspicuously 
principles-based.91 Considering the process of rule-formation first, FSA 
must state clearly the purpose of the rules as early as the moment it 
proposes to draft new rules or amend existing regulation.92 As soon as the 
legal text is finalised, it takes the form of ‘high-level standards’, which 
capture what the regulator seeks to achieve in terms of outcomes. Once the 
rules become part of the Handbook, FSA’s priority changes. From clarifying 
the purpose of the rules, the Authority’s main concern is now to guide the 
regulated population towards a purposive interpretation of the regulatory 
requirements. To this effect, ‘high-level’ statement of purpose93 set the tone 
for interpretation.94 To assist the regulated population in interpreting 
regulatory requirements, FSA has also put in place the so-called “Treating 
Customers Fairly” (TCF) initiative.95 This is not a bunch of new rules. It is a 
project that involves developing a common view on the rights and 
responsibilities of both consumers and firms and helping senior 
                                                 
90 The terms ‘principles-based’ and ‘purposive’ are used interchangeably. The adjective ‘purposive’ is 
introduced here instead of the commonly used term ‘principles-based’, in order to emphasise the rationale 
behind this policy (‘attaining certain outcomes’) rather than the typology of regulatory provisions that are 
chiefly deployed to put it into operation (‘high-level principles’). See A. Georgosouli, above note 72, 125; S. 
Wilson, ‘Supervision in a Principles Based World’, FSA Speech (27 February, 2007). In EU level there is a 
similar drive for a principles-based approach to regulation. D. A. Sabalot, ‘The World Turned Upside 
Down: Radical Ideas in Regulation’, 21(4) Journal of International Banking and Finance Law Journal (2006), 147. 
It will be shown below that the similarity of the two regimes is only apparent. 
91 Tiner, above note 76, 2. 
92 FSMA 2000, section 2 para. (1)(b) sets out that “In discharging its general functions the Authority must, 
so far as reasonably possible, act in a way which is compatible with the regulatory objectives; and which the 
authority considers to be appropriate for the purpose of meeting those objectives.” The Authority is under 
the same duty when it comes to the issuance of guidance under section 157(3) of the Act. 
93 High-level standards apply generally to authorised persons, approved persons and to senior management 
and they are principles-based. At their centre stand the Principles of Business; eleven high-level principles, 
which set overarching objectives for all financial services firms. J. Tiner, above note 76, 2. 
94 In this manner FSA acts in accordance to section 155(2)(b) of the FSMA, which stipulates that FSA 
must always explain the purpose of the rules that it proposes to put in practice. High-level statements of 
purpose are found at the beginning of each section of the Handbook. Significantly, the FSA Handbook is 
subject to its own rules of interpretation. To a considerable extent, these rules of interpretation deviate 
from the provisions of the Interpretation Act 1978, which applies to secondary legislation. 
95 S. Wilson, ‘Treating Customers Fairly –Principles-Based Regulation in Practice’, FSA Speech (7th August 
2007); FSA, Towards Fair Outcomes for Consumers, (19 July 2006); C. Briault, ‘Treating Customers Fairly’, FSA 
Speech (20 March, 2006); O. Page, ‘Treating Customers Fairly’, FSA Speech (16 February, 2005); and J. 
Edwards, ‘Treating Customers Fairly’, 14 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance (2005), 242-279. 
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management to work out for themselves what practices guarantee fair 
treatment for their clients especially consumers. With other words, TCF is 
designed to bring about cultural change all the way down at practitioner 
level so that financial services providers remain focused on delivering the 
desirable policy outcomes for retail consumers at all times. Finally, FSA 
enjoys plenty of scope to adjust the application and enforcement of COB 
rules, where this is considered necessary. For instance, FSA may decide to 
grant modifications or waivers provided that it is satisfied that this is the 
best way to promote the purpose of the regulatory requirement.96 
 
5.4. Communicative elements 
 
While the principles-based architecture of the FSA Handbook manifests a 
purposive approach to the application and enforcement of rules, the 
fostering of communicative elements is intended to bring the whole idea 
into life.97 Several aspects of the way in which regulatory requirements are 
formed, followed and enforced lend support to this claim.98 The distinctively 
participatory character of the procedure that FSA must follow in order to 
issue rules, the fact that FSA is in constant communication and dialogue 
with the regulated firms so as to ensure that its regulatory requirements are 
                                                 
96 See for example FSMA 2000, section 148(4)(a). Similar consideration guides the FSA’s choice of 
enforcement strategy in case of contravention of regulatory requirements. 
97 On the importance of communication in a principles-based approach to regulation see A. Georgosouli, 
above note 72, 126; and J. Tiner, note 76, 4-6. 
98 The drafters of the FSMA 2000 placed great emphasis on enhancing the openness, transparency and 
participatory character of the FSA’s exercise of regulatory powers. In this connection, not only does 
section 8 of the FSMA 2000 provide that the regulator has a general duty to make and maintain effective 
arrangements for consulting practitioners and consumers on the extent to which its general policies and 
practices are consistent with its general duties specified in section 2 of the Act but the FSMA also contains 
a multitude of other provisions where a net of consultation procedures for specific purposes is laid down 
in considerable detail. One of these is section 155 of the Act, which places consultation at the heart of the 
rule-making process. 
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properly understood,99 the essentially discursive nature of FSA’s strategy of 
compliance and enforcement are but some of them.  
 
All these communicative components perform a multitude of crucial 
functions. They promote flexibility and facilitate the channelling of 
information.100 They provide a forum of debate and scrutiny of the FSA’s 
policies.101 Perhaps more importantly, they deal with problems such as (a) 
the tendency of legal rules to regulate more or less cases than it was initially 
intended;102 (b) the uncertainty that surrounds the task of FSA to fulfil a 
range of broadly defined and frequently conflicting regulatory objectives; 
and (c) the uncertainty pertaining to the definition of complex problems 
where the consequences of regulatory action are hard to appraise.  
 
The presence of communicative elements signifies that the formation, 
application and enforcement of rules are largely practised through the 
function of communities of interpreters.103 These are associations 
encompassing on the one hand, the FSA as the regulator and, on the other 
hand, the regulated industry, consumers as well as other interest groups. 
These vary in terms of composition and inclusiveness depending on 
whether the subject of deliberation is the formation of rules or the 
application and enforcement of the existing ones. Apart from providing the 
necessary channels for the flow of information, these associations are relied 
upon to cultivate the necessary psychological conditions for compliance and 
                                                 
99 The implementation of the ‘Treating Customers Fairly’ initiative offers a standard example of methods 
that FSA deplores to communicate with the regulated population. D. Waters, ‘Implementing Principles 
Based Regulation’, FSA Speech (7 December, 2006). 
100 Above note 56, at 493. 
101 Above. 
102 Similar problems have been addressed nearly in the same way during the earlier regimes of self-
regulation and self-regulation with in a statutory framework (the Financial Services Act 1986 regime) 
although currently the preservation of communicative elements in financial regulation became a more 
conscious project. 
103 Here I draw on J. Black’s account of interpretive communities although I do not strictly follow it. See 
above note 73, 30-31. The notion of interpretive communities in Rules and Regulators is discussed in Chapter 
Four below. 
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to help the regulated firms become conscious of their new more active and 
challenging role in the regulatory system.104  
 
5.5. Risk-based regulation 
 
A third characteristic of FSA’s policy of rule-use is its risk-based nature,105 
which can be traced back to the regulator’s mandate to make sure that it lays 
out policies that are proportionate, economically efficient and eligible to 
preserve competition, innovation and the leading position of the UK in the 
international arena.106 Specifically, the formation, application and 
enforcement of rules are currently guided by the ARROW II framework.107 
The aim of ARROW II is to provide a common risk assessment framework 
for all regulated firms and to promote a regulatory approach that is 
proactive, integrated and transparent.108 ARROW II intends to interact with 
                                                 
104 Arguably the FSA’s policy of rule-use as currently practised pushes towards a new phase of de facto 
changes in the institutional lay out of the UK financial regulation. I return to this point below, when I 
discuss certain difficulties that pertain to the implementation of a communicative approach to rule-use.  
105 A. Georgosouli, above note 72, 126-127.  
106 FSMA 2000, section 2. This general duty finds special expression in a range of other provisions in the 
Act. Examples include, sections 155 and 65 setting out the procedural aspects of rule formation and the 
procedure for the issuance of statements of principle and codes of practice under section 64 respectively, 
Part X, chapter III subjecting FSA’s regulatory requirements under competition scrutiny, section 148(4) 
stipulating that waivers and modifications are justified provided that FSA is satisfied that compliance with 
regulatory requirements as they stand would be unduly burdensome or would not achieve the purpose for 
which the rules are made. 
107 ARROW stands for the Advanced, Risk-Responsive, Operating frameWork. FSA, The FSA’s Risk-Based 
Approach (November, 2006), 3. On the evolution of the FSA’s risk-based approach to regulation see, FSA, 
The FSA’s Risk-Assessment Framework (August, 2006) and; J. Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk-Based 
Regulation and the New Public Risk Management Regime in the United Kingdom’, Public Law, (2005), 512-
548, at 524-530. For an extensive commentary on the theoretical background and nature of the FSA’s risk-
based regime see, J. Gray and J. Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice (2007), chs. 1 
and 2 respectively. ARROW II constitutes a revised version of the earlier risk-based framework (ARROW 
I). Compared to its predecessor, ARROW II concentrates the following advantages: (a) It allows a more 
accurate comparison of risks in different areas; (b) it makes possible for FSA to have better control of the 
supervisory process as well as to ensure consistency; (c) the revised ARROW assessment letters increase 
practitioners’ involvement in the risk assessment process, so that FSA gets a more accurate picture of the 
risks imposed by each firm and (d) they improve FSA’s capacity to undertake analysis work and overall 
become duly aware of emerging risks and other trends in the industry. 
108 As with the earlier risk-based regime (ARROW I), ARROW II is used to determine regulatory priorities 
and resource allocation, to assess firm-specific risk for monitoring purposes; to assess market and industry-
wide risks, to determine policy objectives on annual basis; and assess possible changes in regulatory scope 
(e.g. additional responsibilities). FSA, The FSA’S Risk-Based Approach – A Guide for Non-Executive Directors 
(November 2006) and; FSA, The FSA’s Risk-Assessment Framework (August 2006) chapter 2 paras. 6 to 9. 
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the Authority’s policy of rule-use in a manner that promotes flexibility, 
economic efficiency and ultimately regulatory effectiveness.109 
 
The risk-based framework is thought to increase flexibility110 in the sense 
that it allows FSA to formulate rules, and to apply and enforce them in a 
manner that is proportionate to the risks that each regulated firm 
individually or the market as a whole imposes upon the regulator’s activities. 
Relying on ARROW II, FSA can issue generally applicable rules and later on 
adjust their application, for example, by regulating more extensively those 
firms that fail to put in place adequate systems and controls and by 
rewarding those firms that are successful in satisfying this requirement by 
way of adopting a much less intrusive regulatory attitude.111  
 
Moreover, it is generally assumed that the application of ARROW II 
promotes economic efficiency. Up to this point it is important to stress the 
crucial link that exists between FSA’s risk-based framework and the internal 
systems and control that each regulated firm puts in place to manage risk 
exposure.112 Due to this interdependence it is now possible for the Authority 
to use its own set of rules efficiently in the sense that FSA can rely on the 
firm’s self-regulation, once the firm’s risk assessment suggests that the firm 
maintains internal systems that are eligible to manage risk-exposure 
adequately. Costs are further reduced because ARROW II enables the 
Authority to direct the application and enforcement of rules only to one 
firm or to a sub-sector of firms. Arguably, this opens up a multitude of 
other cost-effective possibilities for FSA.113 Examples include the targeted 
use of rules (a) as a cost-effective method for clarifying the regulator’s 
                                                 
109 FSA, The FSA’s Risk-Assessment Framework (August 2006), chapter 2 para.4. 
110 Above, chapter 2 para. 5 and chapter 3 para. 33. 
111 Above note 109, chapter 2 paras.13 to 20. 
112 Above note 109. 
113 Above, chapter 2 para.3. 
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expectations and conveying its intentions for future regulatory action; (b) as 
a strategy that aims to create compliance incentives; and (c) as a vehicle to 
test its policies keeping the costs of experimentation to a small and 
controllable scale. 
 
Finally, one should not lose sight of the fact that FSA’s capacity to meet its 
regulatory objectives depends on the following two things; first, on its ability 
to translate them into operational aims and second, on its capacity to launch 
these aims as a policy agenda that demands full acceptance, adherence and –
ideally- unquestioning cooperation by the regulated population.114 Arguably, 
ARROW II helps FSA to succeed on both fronts. On the one hand, it 
provides a reliable framework through which the four vaguely termed 
FSMA objectives are rationally interpreted and become operationalised into 
the organisation while, on the other hand, it dresses their interpretation with 
the suit of unfailing scientific truth.115 
 
 
6. Some problems 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
None of the above mentioned characteristics of the FSA’s policy of rule-use 
are free from difficulties. In this section, the discussion will pave the way to 
a detailed statement of their flaws and how these flaws may adversely affect 
the regulator’s performance. Although there is a considerable overlap 
                                                 
114 Indicative of this point is the fact that FSA places great importance in fostering a shared appreciation of 
the regulatory outcomes that it seeks to achieve and the range of risks that threatens them. FSA, ‘The 
Open Approach to Regulation’, FSA Policy Statement (1998). 
115 In light of the scientific status of ARROW II, the contingency of disobedience as a manifestation of a 
deeper disagreement with the regulator’s interpretation of rules becomes a remote threat and, in any case, 
an eventuality that is much easier to manage. J. Mayer and B. Rowan ‘Institutionalised Organisation: 
Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony’, 83(2) American Journal of Sociology (1977), 340. 
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between them, for systematic purposes the discussion is divided into four 
thematic parts, as many as the number of the elements of the FSA’s policy 
that were identified above. Towards the end of this section, special reference 
is made to the implementation of the MiFID in the UK, which arguably 
poses its own set of difficulties to FSA’s plans for a more principles-based 
approach to regulation. 
 
6.2. Problems relating to the architecture of the FSA Handbook  
 
The drafters of the FSA Handbook had a difficult task to accomplish. They 
had to ensure that the content of the Handbook is accessible and that the 
regulatory requirements are expressed in a simple language. They had to 
strike the appropriate balance between types of rules of varying levels of 
generality, abstractness, specificity and prescriptivity so as to end up with a 
regime that is flexible but at the same time certain and predictable. Finally, 
they had to ensure that the use of the Handbook is economically efficient. 
There are several reasons why we may question the capacity of the 
Handbook to meet all these aims. 
 
Not only did the sophisticated design of the Handbook fail to deal with the 
problem of complexity but, in fact, it made it worse. Indeed what appears to 
be the end result of the present organisational structure of the Handbook is 
persistent complexity taking a range of different forms.116 Paradoxically, 
complexity is well hidden behind those features that were originally intended 
to reduce it. It takes the form of new but not necessarily clear terminology; 
it lies behind the innumerable specialist glossaries and guidebooks; and it 
survives in the multitude of navigating tools surrounding the provisions of 
                                                 
116 Strictly speaking neither simplicity nor clarity is an inherent feature of the Handbook. Rather they are 
states of affairs to be perpetually attained provided that and to the extent in which the regulator is effective 
in communicating the meaning of the regulatory requirements to the regulated population. A. Georgosouli, 
above note 72, 129-131 
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the Handbook. The fragmented way in which the various provisions can be 
accessed and the lack of continuity in the text exacerbate this problem and 
make them difficult to read.  
 
For example, if a firm wishes to find out whether it is subject to the 
Conduct of Business Sourcebook (COB), it must read COB 1.2.1 rule in 
combination with COB 1.3.1 rule. The trouble is that both these rules 
require that the reader must make frequent use of the Glossary in order to 
define almost every word that is contained in the text and, in addition, to 
refer to other parts of the Handbook or other statutory instruments (for 
instance COB 1.3.1 rule refers to the Financial Services and Markets Act 
(Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (SI 2001/544)) to make sense of the initial 
regulatory provision, which in turn are not designed to be read in isolation 
but only in conjunction with other regulatory provisions and through the 
help of a range of navigating tools. 
 
FSA seems to be aware of the limited capacity of the various navigating 
tools to make the Handbook user-friendly. Therefore, it has set up a 
sophisticated communication network to help financial firms cope with the 
massive and fast changing body of regulatory requirements. For instance, 
large firms are assigned to a FSA relationship manager who is responsible 
inter alia to carry out an open dialogue with the firm and FSA, while small 
firms –nearly 90% of the regulated population- can contact the FSA Firm 
Contact Centre that handle inquiries about regulation and the Handbook 
and they can also benefit by attending regional or thematic visits of FSA 
representative and partaking of industry training.117 Nevertheless the 
effectiveness of these communicative elements in bringing about clarity, 
predictability and consistency in the interpretation of regulatory 
                                                 
117 For a detailed account of the recent developments that intend to improve FSA business capability see, 
FSA Business Plan 2006/2007. 
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requirements has its own limitations.118 
 
Other flaws of the design of the FSA Handbook derive from FSA’s 
controversial attempt to strike a proper balance between certainty and 
flexibility in an economically efficient manner. It is dubious whether the 
drafters of the FSA Handbook were successful in this regard.119 Arguably, 
the balance is optimal where the combined application of high-level 
principles and detailed prescriptive rules does not increase the cost of 
compliance and does not engender competitive discrepancies. However, the 
possibility of discretionary enforcement and the availability of ex post facto 
waivers and modifications suggest that there is no guarantee that this will be 
observed in practice.120 Moreover the creation of economies of scale and 
scope in normative level may not lead to the initially anticipated cutting of 
costs,121 due to the ensuing complexity, the cost of maintaining a 
sophisticated network of communication and the top-heavy procedural 
benchmarks that underpin the use of rules. 
 
6.3. Problems relating to the purposive nature of the FSA’s policy of 
rule-use 
 
At first sight, nothing seems to be wrong with the idea of adopting a 
purposive approach to the policy of rule-use. Emphasis on outcomes is 
                                                 
118 These limitations are discussed below in a separate subsection. 
119 Ever since the FSA Handbook was brought into being, the balance between high level principles and 
detailed rules has been the subject of constant review. See above note 74. This point is further discussed 
below in the context of the perceived difficulties that are associated with purposive regulation. 
120 One might object that there are benchmarks to make sure that FSA gets the balance between high-level 
principles and detailed prescriptive rules right, pointing out that FSA is held accountable on the basis of 
the four statutory objectives and principles of good regulation, which inter alia require the use of cost-
benefit analysis and a risk-based approach to financial regulation. This argument, however, does not 
impose a serious challenge to my claim, given that the content of the statutory objectives, the principles of 
good regulation and the implications of findings of empirical research are subject to interpretation and FSA 
is the ultimate arbitrator of their meaning and implications in terms of public policy. After all FSA’s cost-
benefit methodology has its own flaws. In a recent report the National Audit Office suggested that FSA 
“needs to enhance its grip on information on the cost of its activities.” National Audit Office, NAO Report 
HC 500, (2006-2007) The Financial Services Authority, Executive Summary, (April 2007). 
121 Above note 9, 18-19. 
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welcome in light of the benefits that this policy is expected to bring with it, 
for example, the development of market-based solutions as an antidote to 
regulatory failure and the fostering of compliance with the spirit rather than 
the letter of regulatory requirements. However, a more careful look into the 
peculiarities of its implementation suggests otherwise.122 
 
One source of concern relates to the use of ‘high-level principles’ as the 
main instrument for putting purposive regulation into practice. The 
successful use of high-level principles –namely, rules termed in high level of 
generality and abstractness- relies heavily on the regulator’s capacity to 
clarify their content.123 Although FSA has put in place arrangements to 
ensure certainty and predictability, these do not always work well. The 
Handbook is accessible but not necessarily user-friendly. Its complex 
structure stands in the way of making sense of the regulatory requirements 
with any certainty. The numerous provisions in the form of guidance intend 
to clarify the content of ‘high-level principles’ but FSA’s choice to stipulate 
that some of them are legally binding while others are not, left the regulated 
community bewildered and struggling to understand how each of them 
interacts with ‘high-level principles’ and how they define the parameters of 
compliance.124 Furthermore, the open dialogue with the regulated firms –
perhaps the most important means to waive obscurity and uncertainty- may 
not live up to FSA’s expectations due to some problems that are 
endogenous to the conversational and risk-based nature of the policy of 
rule-use, that are discussed in more detail below.125  
 
                                                 
122 A. Georgosouli, above note 72, 131-133. The impact of the implementation of MiFID on the FSA 
policy of rule-use will is discussed in a separate section below. 
123 S. Wilson, above note 95.  
124 D. Waters, above note 99; and note 7, 48. 
125 See the discussion in the relevant subsections below. 
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It is also suggested that the bad reception of FSA’s appetite for more 
reliance on high-level principles should not be regarded as a trivial matter.126 
For one thing some of the industry’s concerns pertaining to FSA 
enforcement action on the basis of general standards are reasonable.127 For 
example, it is true that the gradual adoption of principles-based regulation 
has been coupled with a proliferation of informal guidance materials, which 
are published outside the Handbook and are not subject to the meticulous 
consultation procedure that is set out in section 155 of FSMA 2000. 
Similarly, it has been pointed out that both formal and informal guidance are 
of uncertain evidential weight. But, even if we assume that the sceptics in 
the regulated community are wrong in thinking that FSA’s intentions are 
going to open up a new era of litigation risk and uncertainty, it is suggested, 
that the impact of their hostile attitude on FSA’s plans to decentralise 
decision-making at the level of each regulated firm and encourage a non-
formalistic strategy for the interpretation of rules, will be tremendous. If the 
FSA’s scheme is to work at all, it is essential that the regulated firms have 
confidence in their judgements as well as in their capacity to fairly predict 
the consequences of their actions. Their reaction towards the Authority’s 
announcement for a more principles-based approach to regulation reveals 
that this is exactly what they seem to lack. 
 
Finally, the inter-relation between a purposive regulation and the imperative 
need to control the exercise of discretion in public administration poses its 
own challenges. The success of a principles-based approach to regulation is 
contingent to the optimal function of mechanisms that intend to aid the 
                                                 
126 On the industry’s reaction see above note 123; and, S. Wilson, note 95. 
127 A. Hayes, ‘Enforcing FSA Principles in Practice’, 21(11) Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 
(2006), 507. See for example the House of Lords decision in Lloyds TSB General Insurance Holdings Ltd and 
others v Lloyds’ Bank Group Insurance Co Ltd [2003] 4 AllER, 43, where their Lordships expressed concerns 
over the FSA’s attitude to commence enforcement action relying solely on rules drafted in high level of 
abstract and generality as it happened in Standards of Regulatory Responsibility in Legal and General Assurance 
Society v FSA (decision of the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal, 18 January 2005). For an eloquent 
discussion of this issue see J. Gray and J Hamilton, above note 107, 248-261. 
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regulator in making informed choices128 and to the effectiveness of 
mechanisms that purport to control FSA’s exercise of discretion when 
defining what outcomes are ‘desirable’ and how to attain them in an 
‘appropriate’ manner.129 None of these mechanisms works perfectly. Their 
defects are transmitted into the regulatory system making principles-based 
regulation susceptible to failure. 
 
6.4. Problems relating to the communicative character of the FSA’s 
policy of rule-use 
 
The architects of the FSA’s policy of rule-use placed great emphasis in 
establishing a regime that is communicative in character. The idea was 
twofold: On the one hand to render the regulatory process open and 
transparent and on the other hand to ensure that the policy of rule-use 
becomes reflexive and sensitive to market developments. Common to both 
was the precondition that the regulated population is warmly encouraged to 
take a more active part in the-day-to-day regulation. Although in theory 
sound, in practice the adoption of communicative patterns for the 
formation, application and enforcement of rules is not free from problems.  
  
The standard criticism against the introduction of communicative elements 
into the policy of rule-use can be summarised into the following two 
arguments. The first one is the claim that communities of interpreters tend 
to undermine regulatory accountability.130 Arguably, regulatory systems that 
are designed to increase participation and openness may operate more easily 
                                                 
128 All those features of the FSA policy of rule-use that can be described as ‘communicative elements’ are 
examples of mechanisms that aid the regulator in making informed choices providing at the same time an 
additional layer of public scrutiny. 
129 The risk-based approach to regulation as it finds expression in ARROW II framework is the standard 
example to evoke in this connection. 
130 Above note 73, 42-44. This problem is intrinsically linked with the phenomenon of regulatory capture. 
G. Stigler, ‘The Theory of Regulation’, 2 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (1971), 21. 
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at the stage of rule formation rather than rule application and enforcement. 
Indeed, taking into account that FSA’s enforcement is compliance-oriented 
and that the regulatory Authority is allowed to resort to waivers and 
modifications, conversation is more likely to be a dialogue between the 
enforcement officials and the regulated firm rather than a discussion 
embracing a wider range of interests. This being the case, the capacity of the 
rest of the regulated population to monitor the regulatory process and hold 
the regulator accountable becomes progressively frail. The second one is the 
claim that communicative patterns of regulation are more likely to increase 
the cost of regulation rather than reduce it.131 Not only do they require the 
maintenance of complex networks of communication and sophisticated fora 
of deliberation but they also create conditions that render decision-making 
particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture.   
 
These criticisms aside, there is another aspect of the communicative nature 
of the FSA’s policy of rule-use that is equally suspect. Arguably, the 
progressive reliance on communicative patterns of rule-use132 has caused an 
unintentional chain of evolution with respect to the way in which regulation 
is currently practised to the effect of transforming it into what might be 
described as a de facto quasi-model of deliberative democracy.133 To the 
extent in which this claim is valid, participatory regulation of this sort 
assumes something more than consulting with the regulated population, 
sharing information and cultivating common perceptions of what counts as 
‘problem’, ‘proper mode of action’ and ‘desirable result’. It carries with it the 
promise that the regulator gradually steps back so as to allow the various 
                                                 
131 Above note 73, 42. 
132 The purposive character of the FSA’s policy of rule-use may be evoked in support of this view as it 
clearly indicates an emphasis on meta-regulation. 
133 On meta-regulation see, C. Parker, The Open Corporation: Self-Regulation and Democracy (2002); J. 
Braithwaite ‘Meta-Risk Management and Responsive Regulation for Tax System Integrity’, 25(1) Law and 
Policy (2003), 1-16; and J. Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation Part II’, 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2001), 
33-58. 
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interest groups (the deliberants that take part in communities of interpreters) 
to become themselves the arbitrators of their fate. Clearly, this would 
suggest a new role for FSA; that of the mediator as the facilitator of a 
discursive project that would enable the parties to recognise each other’s 
rationalities by helping create a new common language to make sense of the 
pathology of their relationship and what should be a proper mode of 
action.134 
 
Is FSA capable of performing this role?135 One of the key tasks of the 
regulator as mediator is to be able to find ways of explaining and reflecting 
on the different logic of each discussant in such a way that others can 
understand it.136 To carry out this task FSA must show a sincere 
commitment to be open to others’ views. It must be able to understand 
them and put the arguments of each deliberant into a form that other co-
discussants could understand. There are several factors that stand in the 
regulator’s way in performing this role.137 Information, time and other 
constraints over FSA’s capacity to conduct debates are one of them. 
Another one is that public officials have their own world views that affect 
the way in which information is sought and understood, what is seen to be a 
problem requiring attention, and what solutions are seen to be 
appropriate.138 This means that in reality FSA may simply not be sufficiently 
open to other rationalities in order to understand them.  
                                                 
134 A. Georgosouli, above note 72, at 134-135. In practice things are far from the ideal of a scheme of 
deliberative democracy that would justify the communicative mode of regulation. Very frequently the 
regulated population is expected to tolerate FSA’s intrusive tactic to put informal pressure without being 
able to legally challenge FSA’s practice due to its informal character. See, for example, the decision of the 
Financial Services and Markets Tribunal in Geoffrey Alan Hoodless and Sean Michael Blackwell v FSA (3 
October, 2003), where the firm had to terminate a range of management-level functions “due to pressure 
from FSA”. For a useful discussion of this case see, J. Grey and J. Hamilton, above note 107, 126-130. 
135 In elucidating the pathology of the communicative aspects of the FSA’s policy of rule-use, I am only 
concerned with a question of fact: “Is the FSA capable to perform this role?” The corollary question of 
principle namely, whether the regulator should perform this role falls outside the scope of my inquiry. 
136 A. Georgosouli, above note 72, at 135. 
137 Above. 
138 J. March and J. Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in Political Life’, 78 American 
Political Science Review (1984), 734 and; W. R. Scott, Institutions and Organisations (1995). 
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Whatever the case, the fact of the matter is that as long as the institutional 
structure of FSA remains strictly hierarchical and the regulator insists to 
emphasise its commitment to a distinctively participatory approach to rule-
use –namely, an approach that pushes towards the development of 
heterarchical systems of regulation- the regulated population receives mixed 
and contradictory messages.139 It senses that the regulator’s call for its more 
active involvement in regulatory practice –something that brings with it 
more freedom but also heavier burdens and responsibilities- and at the same 
time, realises that it cannot be trusted with deciding its fate for itself. 
Ultimately, this militates against the creation of the desirable psychological 
conditions to achieve the level of cooperation and compliance that FSA 
envisages to achieve.140 It risks disorientating the regulated community, it 
breads distrust and in the long run it distorts its willingness to take part in a 
discursive project that requires from its regulated firm a sincere 
commitment to reconcile conflicting interests and work out mutually shared 
agendas for actions and solutions.  
 
6.5. Problems relating to the risk-based nature of the FSA’s policy of 
rule-use 
 
FSA’s risk-based framework intends to interact with the policy of rule-use in 
a multitude of ways. It adds flexibility in the sense that FSA’s strategy for 
the formation, and application and enforcement of rules becomes 
proportionate to the risks that firms individually -or the market as a whole- 
impose on the regulator’s agenda. It makes possible for the regulatory 
Authority to make efficient use of its own set of regulatory requirements in 
the sense that the FSA can rely on the firm’s ‘self-regulation’. Last but not 
                                                 
139 A. Georgosouli, above note 72, at 135. 
140 Above note 99. 
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least, ARROW II provides a reliable framework through which the four 
vaguely termed statutory objectives are rationally interpreted and become 
operationalised into regulatory practice. A careful examination of the 
function of the FSA’s risk-based regime reveals that the risk-based approach 
may paradoxically have an adverse effect on the Authority’s performance. 
  
One of the dominant features of any risk management model -and ARROW 
II is not an exception to this rule- is to provide a common risk assessment 
framework for all firms regulated by FSA.141 Homogeneity thus stands at the 
core of risk-based regulation.142 This feature, however, is found in striking 
contrast with FSA’s commitment to ensure that its policy is responsive and 
flexible enough to adapt to the changes of the market environment let alone 
to the peculiarities of each individual firm whose activities fall within the 
scope of FSA’s jurisdiction.143 Flexibility requires that the application and 
enforcement of rules take into account the uniqueness of each particular 
case. By contrast, ARROW II seeks to achieve uniformity in place of 
diversity and stipulates what should be the regulator’s appropriate mode of 
action once the idiosyncratic elements of each particular case have been 
aggregated and homogenised into a set of commensurate “risk elements” 
and “quantitative impact indicators” contained in the framework. 
 
There is an additional reason explaining why the end result of a risk-based 
approach to the application and enforcement of rules may engender 
sclerosis and stiffness instead of flexibility and responsiveness. Similarly to 
any other risk management system, the success of ARROW II is based on 
the prediction of a particular type of future. To the extent in which future 
contingencies turn out to be different from those captured by the 
                                                 
141 J. Black, above note 107, 531. 
142 Above. 
143 A. Georgosouli, above note 72, 136. 
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framework, they escape the attention of the officials.144 In this manner the 
inability to predict, becomes institutionalised within the framework in such a 
way that negates the regulators’ capacity to adjust their strategy to the 
changing market environment.145 It is true that FSA intends to implement 
ARROW II in a manner that allows supervisory overrides where the 
regulator considers that the ensuing numerical measure is not a fair 
reflection of the firm’s risks and their impact.146 It is equally true, however, 
that it is unlikely that the regulator will put aside the ARROW II assessment 
and rely on his discretion for ARROW II provides him with some sort of a 
‘safe harbour’ to which he can resort so that he will not be blamed in case of 
failure.147 
 
Moreover, FSA itself has recognised that the enforcement of regulatory 
norms on the basis of ARROW II presents major flaws.148 Due to its 
compliance-oriented nature, the effectiveness of FSA’s enforcement regime 
is contingent to the regulator’s capacity of creating incentives for 
compliance. This is where things go wrong. ARROW II dictates the 
Authority to concentrate its enforcement resources where they will have 
more impact. This means that FSA’s enforcement action is chiefly directed 
against large firms. Small firms namely, the majority of the regulated 
population, escape the threat of enforcement action and, consequently, they 
may be led to believe that they can transgress regulation without facing a 
serious risk of punishment. The erosion of compliance incentives is 
potentially a serious problem for FSA, as regular disobedience on the part of 
                                                 
144 On the phenomenon of ‘process-induced myopia’ see J. Black, above note 107, 543. 
145 Regulators are further discouraged in light of the new politics of accountability that risk-based 
regulation brought with it. J. Black, above note 107, 545-546. 
146 S. Wilson, above note 95. 
147 On the lack of incentives to adopt an imaginative approach to regulation see more generally, M. 
Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft (2000) at 310; and N. Gunningham and P. Grabosky, Smart Regulation  (1998). 
148 See above note 74. 
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small firms is bound to cause the resentment of compliant firms and 
engender regulatory arbitrage. 
 
Finally, the claim that the risk-based nature of FSA’s policy of rule-use aids 
economic efficiency is flimsy.149 This point becomes plain once we consider 
the interdependence between FSA’s risk-based approach and the firms’ 
internal systems and control.150 Specifically, the argument that FSA can 
make efficient use of its own set of rules by relying on the firms own self-
regulation151 assumes inter alia that the regulator and the regulated firm 
share a common understanding of the objectives that must be pursued and 
of the risks that must be combated. But this is hardly the case.152 The firm’s 
internal controls are directed at ensuring that the firm achieves profits and 
market share that is, objectives different from those of the regulator. 
Despite the fact that many steps have been taken towards promoting some 
sort of revision of the objectives that each firm’s internal systems and 
control are set up to achieve, so far the end result is not impressive. 
 
6.6. The implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) and its impact on the FSA policy of rule-use 
  
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) is regarded by 
many the cornerstone of the European Union’s Financial Services Action 
Plan.153 It comprises four levels of European Legislation:154 (a) “Level 1” 
                                                 
149 A. Georgosouli, above note 72, 136-137. 
150 S. Wilson, above note 95; and J. Braithwaite, note 134. 
151 On self-regulation see, B. Morgan and K. Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation (2007), 92-96. 
152 Above note 56, 505. 
153 The Financial Services Action Plan aims to speed up the integration of the financial markets of the EU. 
P. Richards, ‘The EU Financial Services Action Plan: A Guide’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin  (Autumn, 
2003) and; E. Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market (2004), 1-4. 
154 The MiFID was the ‘child’ of the Lamfalussy legislative process, which aimed at maximum 
harmonisation and the increase of transparency of the legislative process in the EU. On the Lamfalussy 
process see M. Ortino, ‘The Role and Functioning of Mutual Recognition in the European Market of 
Financial Services’, 56(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2007), 309 at 318-322; N. Maloney, 
‘Financial Market Regulation in the Post-Financial Services Action Plan Era’, 55(4) International and 
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that is the Directive itself;155  (b) “Level 2” which refers to various measures 
that were subsequently taken in the form of Directives and Regulations with 
the view of facilitating the technical implementation of the Directive;156 (c) 
“Level 3” comprising non-binding guidance and common standards, whose 
chief objective is to ensure the coherent implementation of MiFID and 
consequently the new conduct of business rules157; and (d) “Level 4” which 
constitutes of a range of initiatives that seek to monitor the effective 
implementation of EU legislation in national level.158 MiFID brings about 
significant changes in order to reflect developments in the field financial 
services and markets since the implementation of its predecessor 
Investment Services Directive (ISD). It broadens the range of “core” 
investment services and activities that firms can passport, it clarifies the 
allocation of responsibilities between home state and host state, it requires 
firms to comply with certain capital requirements and, overall, it increases 
harmonisation by setting out detailed requirements governing the firms’ 
organisation and conduct of business.159  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Comparative Law Quarterly (2006), 982 at 982-983; and N Reinhardt, The Lamfalussy Process: A Guide and 
Evaluation (2004). 
155 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in 
financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC 
[2004] OJL 145/1. As amended by Directive 2006/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 5 April 2006 amending Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments, as regards certain 
deadlines [2006] OJL 114/60. 
156 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1287 of 10th August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council as regards record keeping obligations for investment firms, 
transaction reporting, market transparency, admission of financial instruments to trading, and defined 
terms for the purposes of that Directive [2006] OJL 241/1 (the implementing Regulation) and 
Commission Directive 2006/73/EC of 10th August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39 of the 
European Parliament and Council as regards organisational requirements and operating conditions for 
investment firms, and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive [2006] OJL 241/2 (the 
implementing Directive). The Commission’s “Level 2” measures were developed on the basis of advice 
provided by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). 
157 D. Vitkova, ‘Level 3 of the Lamfalussy Process: An Effective Tool for Achieving Pan-European 
Consistency?’, 2(2) Law and Financial Markets Review (2008). 
158 N. Maloney, ‘Building a Retail Investment Culture through Law: The 2004 Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive’, 6(3) European Business Organization Law Review (2005), 341-422. 
 159 FSA, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) [http:// 
www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/What/International/ EU/fsap/mifid/index.shtml]; B. Penn, ‘Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID): An Introduction’, 21(8) Journal of International Banking and 
Financial Law (2006), 338. 
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The implementation of MiFID in the UK has offered an occasion for FSA 
to review the design of the Handbook and rebalance the overall mixture of 
high-level principles and more detailed rules.160 The NEWCOB, which will 
soon replace the existing FSA Conduct of Business Sourcebook, is expected 
to be simpler and shorter in terms of its design. Its structure will be 
chronological in order to reflect the successive stages of a firm’s relationship 
with its clients starting with marketing, moving on to the point where a 
contract is made and so on. Furthermore, in relation to certain issues, 
specialist material will be brought together to make it easier to use for 
reference purposes, whereas other materials will be removed to more 
appropriate places.161 
 
In addition, the NEWCOB will be the first major part of the FSA 
Handbook to come into force once revised in accordance with principles-
based regulation.162 In this connection, it is worth pointing out that despite 
the keenness of the MiFID drafters to adopt a principles-based approach163 
to regulation, their perception of what counts as a ‘principles-based’ policy 
of rule-use diverges from that of FSA.164 Take the example of the FSA 
                                                 
160 A. Sykes, ‘NEWCOB: The Practical Implications’, FSA Speech (19 June, 2007). 
161 Regulatory provisions dealing with distance marketing and with-profits are examples of areas in which 
specialist materials will be brought together. Regulatory requirements on managing conflicts of interests are 
examples of regulatory provisions, which will no longer be part of the FSA Handbook on Conduct of 
Business. These will be removed to SYSC. See also the discussion in section 6.6 of Chapter One above. 
162 As Dan Waters –the Director of the FSA Retail Policy Division- put it: “We consider NEWCOB to be 
our flagship project for more principles-based regulation”. D. Waters, ‘NEWCOB and More Principles-
Based Regulation’, FSA Speech (January/February, 2007). 
163 D. A. Sabalot, ‘The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas In Regulation’, 21(4) Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law (2006), 147. The nature of the policy of rule-use that has been 
adopted by EU rule-making bodies during recent years cannot be discussed here in detail. Suffice is to 
point out, however, that the move towards some sort of a ‘principles-based approach’ to rule-use –at least 
in theory- is evident in several features of the Lamfalussy process as, for example, the attempt to include 
within a single legal instrument (Level 1 measure) a framework of principles –the so-called “essential 
elements”- of the proposed regulatory regime, the emphasis on openness and transparency and the use of 
informal means (e.g., guidance) to ensure consistent implementation of EU legislation in domestic level. 
See E. Ferran, above note 153, 82-84 and 99-100. 
164 N. Maloney notes that the “most dramatic operational change from the ISD regime …concerns the new 
conduct of business regime (Articles 19, 21 and 22). The skeletal set of principles in Article 11 of the ISD 
has been replaced by a highly detailed conduct of business regime, which has been further amplified at 
level 2.” N. Maloney, above note 158, 984-985; B. Penn, note 159, 341; B. Penn, ‘Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MIFID): Conduct of Business’, 22(1) Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 
(2007), 20; and, A. Sykes, ‘NEWCOB: The Practical Implications’, FSA Speech (19 June, 2007), where he 
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Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) initiative.165 It was pointed out earlier that 
TCF relies heavily on informal means and aspires to bring about cultural 
change at practitioner level to the effect of changing the firms’ attitude 
towards their unsophisticated clients. One would expect that a similar 
initiative exists in EU level but this is far from true. A plethora of MiFID 
rules, including those of conflicts of interest166 and best execution167 lay out 
a net of detailed and prescriptive regulatory provisions, which seem to be 
completely at odds with TCF. What is more, FSA’s principles-based 
approach is further eroded by the presence of ‘Level 2’ measures, whose aim 
is to refine the already detailed MiFID requirements leaving little –if 
anything- to be decided by the national regulator.  
 
The presence of essentially two distinct principles-based approaches to 
regulation should not be treated as a trivial matter.168 On its surface it 
appears to be just a problem of how to deal with the industry’s concerns 
that the implementation of the MiFID will trigger legal uncertainty and a 
significant increase in the cost of regulation,169 to which FSA has responded 
by adopting the practice of “intelligent copy out” as a method of bringing 
the requirements of the MiFID into the UK jurisdiction.170 At a deeper level, 
however, things are much more perturbing. The Lamfalussy reform has 
                                                                                                                                            
admits that “very often directives contain many detailed rules, which we have to copy-out into our 
Handbook to avoid imposing any unintended additional obligations.” 
165 The fact that the FSA report published in July 2006 on ‘Treating Customers Fair Outcomes for 
Consumers’ does not mention MiFID legislation is supportive of the claim that we are dealing with two 
parallel initiatives running alongside each other but without interacting.  
166 Article 13(3) of MiFID and Chapter II, section 4 of the Implementing Directive. 
167 Section 21 of MiFID is clearly process-oriented rather than outcome-focused. See also Chapter III, 
section 5 of the Implementing Directive. 
168 FSA has officially recognised that the implementation of EU legislation is one among other constraints 
in moving towards a more principles-based approach to regulation. FSA, ‘Principles-Based Regulation: 
Focusing on the Outcomes that Metter’, FSA Policy Statement (April 2007), 20-21. 
169 For example, firms will have to spend a considerable amount of time and resources re-writing their 
conflict of interests’ policies and develop procedures in accordance with MiFID requirements.  
170 Intelligent “copy out” is thought to be desirable because it reduces discrepancies between EU and 
national legislation, preserves legal certainty and promotes maximum harmonisation throughout EU. 
Furthermore, it is a safe way for FSA to ensure that its rule making is in conformity with article 4 of the 
Implementing Directive, which imposes certain constraints over the regulator’s rule-making function in 
order to deter any attempt to “gold-plate” the Directive. 
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pushed forward the centralization of financial services regulation, to the 
effect of decreasing the scope of jurisdictional competences and 
responsibilities of national regulators.171 FSA is not an exception to this rule. 
The UK regulatory Authority must conform to EU stipulations, which the 
more process-oriented and detailed they become the more they circumscribe 
FSA’s discretion when designing regulatory provisions and deciding the 
appropriate mode of interpretive strategy. Indeed, for as long as EU 
institutional developments envisage national regulators in the role of 
supervisor rather than in the role of policy maker and rule-maker,172 FSA’s 
capacity to reap in full the perceived benefits of its policy of rule-use will be 
limited. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored the latest phase of the policy of rule-use in the UK 
financial regulation, as it was fleshed out soon after the emergence of the 
Financial Services Authority and the publication of FSMA 2000. Three 
stages of evolution were identified. During the first stage, its architects 
defined the design-objectives and design-principles of the FSA Handbook. 
During the second stage, they set out in more detail the typology of rules 
that were going to be used by the Authority as well as the nature of the 
policy of rule formation, application and enforcement. The preparatory 
                                                 
171 Arguably, this has gone too far. The choice to introduce “Level 2” measures in the form of Regulation 
raises concerns that the principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality -as envisaged in paragraph 6 of 
Protocol 30 of the EU Treaty- are unduly infringed. See E. Ferran, above note 153, 70-71 and 99-100; M. 
Ortino, note 154, 318-319. The problem does not stop there. It is also evident in “Level of 1” measures at 
least to the extent in which the nature of Directives, as legal instruments that are supposedly tailor-made to 
allow significant scope of manoeuvre for Member-States as to the means of implementation, is distorted by 
the systematic and occasionally deliberate inclusion of detailed and process-oriented provisions alongside 
provisions incorporating the framework principles of the proposed legislation. Y. V. Avgerinos, ‘Essential 
and Non-Essential Measures: Delegation of Powers in EU Securities Regulation’, 8 European Law Journal 
(2002), 269, at 271-283. 
172 M. Ortino, above note 154, 318-319; K. Lanoo, ‘The Transformation of Financial Regulation and 
Supervision in the EU’ in D. Masciandaro (ed), Handbook of Central Banking and Financial Authorities in Europe 
-New Architectures in the Supervision of Financial Markets (2005), 485-513; E. Ferran, note 153, 61. 
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work entered its third phase with the integration of financial regulation into 
a single normative framework –the FSMA 2000- and the emergence of the 
FSA Handbook of Rules and Guidance.  
 
All these developments set the basis for a policy of rule-use that comprises 
currently four elements. The first element is the sophisticated architecture of 
the FSA Handbook, which manifests itself in the extensive use of regulatory 
provisions that are termed in high level of abstractness and generality, the 
complex and fluid structural inter-relation of the regulatory norms and the 
plethora of navigating tools that aim to make the Handbook user-friendly 
and accessible. The second element is the purposive (“principles-based”) 
approach to rule use, which means that the FSA produces, applies and 
enforces rules in a manner that is essentially outcomes-oriented. The third 
element of the FSA’s policy of rule-use is its communicative nature that is, 
the distinctively participatory dialectical practice that underpins the use of 
rules and, finally, the fourth element is the risk-based approach, which 
makes possible the proportionate and cost efficient issuance of new rules or 
modification of the existing ones as well as the adoption of a targeted and 
commensurate compliance and enforcement strategy. 
 
The FSA policy of rule-use is in theory sound. While the sophisticated 
design of the rules and their legal framework is expected to make rules more 
accessible and easy to understand, purposiveness is anticipated to foster 
compliance with the spirit rather than the letter of the regulatory norms, 
encourage the development of market-based solutions and reduce the cost 
of rule-use. Similarly, the inclusion of communicative elements in the policy 
of rule-use and the adoption of a risk-based approach were intended to 
cement the participatory and reflexive nature of the Authority’s policy of 
rule-use in an economically efficient manner. 
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In practice, however, the use of rules has proved to be problematic. The 
Handbook remains complex and hard to read -let alone make sense of. The 
emphasis on high-level principles tends to tip the balance in favour of 
flexibility and at the expense of certainty and predictability. It is also unlikely 
to reduce the cost of regulation because it involves the maintenance of a 
costly communication network. Purposiveness precipitated the creation of a 
new climate of risk and uncertainty, while an additional source of concern is 
that its effective implementation is particularly exposed to the perceived 
flaws of discourse-practices and other accountability mechanisms with 
which it interacts. The adoption of communicative style of rule-use triggers 
conditions of regulatory capture, and -to the extent it pushes institutional 
developments towards heterarcical structures of governance- breeds 
problems of cooperation and coordination. ARROW II may not aid the 
Authority in using rules in a proportionate, targeted and efficient manner 
not least because future risks may turn out to be different from those 
predicted. Finally, the implementation of MiFID is considered to be an 
additional source of constraints holding back FSA’s plans for innovation 
and experimentation. 
 
Taking all these considerations into account, it is suggested that the current 
FSA policy of rule-use brings little new in terms of the objectives that must 
be achieved. Financial regulators in the UK have always sought flexibility, 
certainty and predictability, clarity and economic efficiency and for nearly 
two decades they have been consciously trying to direct the interpretive 
strategy of the regulated population towards adhering with the spirit rather 
than the letter of the regulatory requirements.173 That said the major 
difference between the present and the past regulatory practice lies in the 
                                                 
173 Above note 73, ch.3 
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ways in which these objectives are brought into fruition. Under the FSA 
regime, all these goals are pursued through novel means, which signal out 
the emergence of an interpretation-centric approach in the policy of rule-use.  
 
As the analysis revealed, traditional patterns of self-regulation have been 
transformed into a sophisticated regime of meta-regulation, where the 
balancing of policy objectives as conflicting as certainty and flexibility is 
pursued by way of managing the interpretive process of rules per se rather 
than by way of opting for different combination of rule-type and rule-
restructuring.174 To this effect, the de-centralisation of interpretive decision-
making has been so immense that regulatees have a much more active and 
indeed burdensome role to perform in making sure that they regulate 
themselves properly. To assist them in this challenging task, FSA officials 
have started to change the way in which they perceive their role. In the 
FSMA era ‘being a regulator’ resembles to being in the role of a facilitator of 
a complex network of communication, which is interpretive in nature and 
whose aim is twofold: to explicate, review, and rework the essence of 
regulatory norms; and to bring about cultural change as to what it means ‘to 
be regulated’ and what it is like to ‘abide by the rules’. Contrary to what one 
would expect from a statutory-based system of regulation, ‘being regulated’ 
and ‘abide by the rules’ are now discharged from any connotations of 
passive adherence with exogenous commands coming directly from the 
above. More than ever before, the regulated population is asked to work out 
for itself and on ad hoc basis what it is like to internalise basic moral norms 
into its business, and it is deemed capable to become cognisant of the 
collective responsibility that its active participation in regulation entails. 
 
                                                 
174 FSA elaborated a policy of rule-use that institutionalises the dynamic inter-relation in which legal 
interpretation and social context is found. Behind this development lies the assumption that ‘what an FSA 
rule requires’ is not a static property of the text of the legal rule but an end-result to be perpetually worked-
out rather than discovered. 
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For the moment the FSA policy of rule-use is still in progress. However, a 
clearer insight into its nature allows this conclusion To the extent in which 
the postponement of the interpretive shift in the policy of rule-use is not a 
realistic option, the success of this policy depends on the willingness of the 
regulated population to change the way in which it perceives ‘how it would 
like to be regulated’ under the new regime, the readiness of the regulator to 
redefine its institutional structure in order to mirror the heterarchical 
process of regulatory deliberation that has started to come into sight in the 
ways in which it makes use of rules, and the willingness of EU policy-
makers to embrace a more UK-like approach to financial regulation. 
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PART II –THE NATURE OF REGULATORY 
INTERPRETATION AND THE RATIONALE 
FOR THE INTERPRETIVE SHIFT IN THE 
POLICY OF RULE-USE 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
The Communicative Theory of Regulatory Interpretation 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Part I of this thesis examined the development of the policy of rule-use in 
the UK financial regulation, making special reference to the FSA conduct of 
business regime. It was argued that the policy of rule-use has been 
transformed into an (quasi) interpretation-centric regime. In Part II, the 
attempt will be made to shed light on the grounds for this policy 
development by considering the nature of interpretation in the regulatory 
context (regulatory interpretation).1  
 
Although studies on regulatory interpretation are rudimentary when 
compared with the length and sophistication of scholarly inquiry on 
rulemaking, enforcement, rule type and discretion in public administration, 
it is suggested that the first seeds for a theory of regulatory interpretation 
can be found in the current literature.2 In the field of financial regulation the 
work of Julia Black is a prominent one with this regard. Building on a 
jurisprudential and linguistic analysis of rules, she develops in Rules and 
Regulators a thesis for the nature of rules to spell out their limitations and to 
                                                 
1 I am going to use the term ‘regulatory interpretation’ to stress that interpretation in the course of 
regulation is a species of legal interpretation. Those involved in the regulatory system and participate in the 
interpretation of rules do not act outside the spectrum of law but they are bound by it. The Rule of Law 
sets strict limitations in the exercise of their interpretive discretion. On the various conceptions of the Rule 
of Law see notably, R. Fallon, ‘The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’, 97 Columbia 
Law Review (1997) 1; A. Scalia, ‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’, 56 University of Chicago Law Review 
(1989), 1175 and R. Dworkin, ‘Political Judges and the Rule of Law’, 64 Proceedings of the British Academy 
(1978), 259. 
2 See above, Introduction. 
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propose ways in which rules could be used more effectively.  It will be 
argued however that the author does more than that. Her thesis offers key 
insights into the practice of interpretation, which –when put together- can 
help us answer questions that are intrinsic to any inquiry into the 
justification of the interpretive shift in financial regulation, such as questions 
about the subject of interpretation (The interpreters’ utterances? The text of 
the rule?), its objective (That rules are correctly interpreted? To attain a sort 
of consensus?), and the presence of constraints (The prevailing ideology of a 
particular community of interpreters? The legal text?). My task then is to 
bring these insights together and assemble the theory of regulatory 
interpretation that emanates from her claims.   
 
This chapter has two aims. The first one is to familiarise the reader with 
Black’s thesis on the nature and use of rules. The second one is to illuminate 
the theory of regulatory interpretation that ensues from her claims and 
account for its merit.3 Before moving on, I should make clear that this 
chapter is almost entirely expository. This means that it may not necessarily 
get Julia Black right. Rather its ultimate objective is to elicit from her 
analysis, what -I think- makes a very interesting description of regulatory 
interpretation. In terms of structure, the chapter is divided into two parts. 
Below I start with a very brief overview of Rules and Regulators where Black 
advances her account of the use of rules in financial regulation and, then, I 
discuss in more detail the theoretical part of her thesis. Using this as a 
background, in the second part of this chapter, I unfold those underlying 
assumptions that provide the first materials for a theory of regulatory 
interpretation.  
 
                                                 
3 Progressively, the discussion will become more and more focused on her theory of regulatory 
interpretation. 
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It will be suggested that the theoretical account of regulatory interpretation 
that emerges from her work is communicative in nature. According to the 
communicative thesis of regulatory interpretation the practice of 
interpretation in the regulatory context is similar to the method of 
interpretation that we deploy when we try to understand our co-discussants 
in the course of a conversation. On that view, interpreting rules equals to 
communicating each other’s beliefs about how regulatory requirements 
should be understood; it is an opportunity for sharing information and for 
bridging differences through persuasion.  
 
Although the communicative thesis places emphasis on the communicative 
aspect of regulatory practice, it should not be confused with Black’s 
argument for the adoption of a “conversational model of regulation” and 
her writings on “regulatory conversations”.4 This is because it differs in 
terms of subject matter, aim and theoretical foundation. Whereas I focus on 
the nature of interpretation in regulatory settings and consider issues such as 
the source of authority and the point or purpose of regulatory 
interpretation, Black’s field of inquiry is the institution of regulation in 
general and its effective operationalisation. Similarly, whereas my distinction 
between the communicative thesis and the constructive thesis of regulatory 
interpretation is based on Dworkin’s distinction between conversational and 
constructive accounts of interpretation in law and adjudication, Black’s work 
is informed inter alia by discourse analysis.5 
 
In Rules and Regulators, the author offers an analysis of the regulatory regime 
under the Financial Services Act 1986. For the purposes of this chapter and 
                                                 
4 See for J. Black, Rules and Regulators (1997) at 37-44 and; “Regulatory Conversations”, 29(1) Journal of Law 
and Society (2002), 163-196. 
5
 On Dworkin’s distinction see note 107 below. The reasons for using the term “communicative” instead 
of “conversational” in developing the theoretical counter-part of the constructive thesis of regulatory 
interpretation are also discussed in the Introduction of this thesis and particularly at page 23. 
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taking into account the ramifications of Professor Black’s thesis to our 
understanding of the current regulatory regime, I use the more general terms 
‘regulatory Authority’ and ‘regulator’ interchangeably when referring to the 
institutional scheme that is delegated with the power to produce, apply and 
enforce rules as well as the discretion to decide matters about the policy of 
rule use.  
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 Brief overview of ‘Rules and Regulators’ 
 
Rules and Regulators6 engages with the traditional debate about rules in 
administrative law. It complements earlier work on discretion and 
enforcement7 and on rules, discretion, and adjudication as mechanisms for 
public policy implementation.8 Its aim is threefold.9 The first one is to 
develop an understanding of the nature of rules in order to propose ways in 
which rules could be used effectively in the regulatory process. The second 
one is to enrich this analysis with examples taken from the regulation of 
financial services in the pre-FSMA era. The third one is to understand the 
nature of rule making in the regulatory domain in greater depth. Her analysis 
draws together H. L. A. Hart’s analytic jurisprudence10 and the work of 
modern contextualists, such as Stanley Fish.11 To a certain degree, it bears 
                                                 
6 J. Black, Rules and Regulators (1997). 
7 K. Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement (1984); R. Baldwin and K Hawkins, Discretionary Justice: Davis 
Reconsidered (1984); and A. Ogus and P. Burrows, Policing Pollution (1983). 
8 L. L. Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’, 92 Harvard Law Review (1978), 353; J. L. Jowell ‘The 
Legal Control of Administrative Discretion’, Public Law (1973), 179; K. C. Davis, Discretionary Justice (1978) 
and; L. J. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice, (1983). 
9 Above note 6, at 2. 
10 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1994). The principal aim of his analytical jurisprudence is to elucidate 
the meaning of the concept of law. S. Burton, ‘Ronald Dworkin and Legal Positivism’, 73 Iowa Law Review 
(1987), 109 at 112. 
11 S. Fish, Is There a Text in the Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (1980) and Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989). See also note 63 and the 
discussion at pages 167-168 below. 
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similarities with the New Chicago School12 and further contains the first 
seeds for applying discourse analysis13 to the study of legal rules in the 
context of financial regulation.  
 
As Laurence Lessig observes, Julia Black considers issues as diverse as the 
following: “(1) the selection among rule-types; (2) the strategic and non-
strategic use of rules; (3) non-instrumental values that might be advanced in 
the selection of particular rule-types; (4) the trade-off between rule-types 
and the formation of different interpretative communities; (5) the use of 
rule-types to help construct interpretive communities; (6) the use of 
strategies to develop thicker interpretive communities…; (7) the institutional 
and market constraints on the possible functioning of rules, and (8) the 
interests that rules themselves create and the dynamic induced by that 
creation.”14  In terms of structure, the theoretical part of her inquiry into the 
nature and use of rules in the regulatory context is developed in the first 
chapter while the empirical part occupies the rest of the book that is 
chapters two to five where examples are drawn on the regulation of conduct 
of business in the UK financial industry under the Financial Services Act 
1986.15  
 
                                                 
12 One of the main postulates of the New Chicago School is that alongside the typical modalities of 
regulation –namely, norms, the market and law- figures a fourth modality; the architecture within which 
regulation functions. L. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999) and ‘The New Chicago School’, 27 
Journal of Legal Studies (1998), 661. 
13 Discourse analysis is among the most vast and least defined areas of linguistics with numerous 
applications in a wide range of disciplines. It considers how language enacts social and cultural perspectives 
and identities or –to put it simply- how language is organised and manipulated to convey information 
about the world, the speaker and the speaker’s social relationships. One of the most well-known discourse 
theories is the one developed by Jugern Habermas according to which, social order is contingent to the 
capacity of actors to recognise the intersubjective validity of the different claims on which social 
cooperation depends. D. Schriffin, Approaches to Discourse (1994); J. P. Gee, An Introduction to Discourse 
Analysis (2000); J. Bohman and W. Rehg, ‘Jurgen Habermas’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007) 
[available at: www.plato.standford.edu/entries/habermas/#HabDisThe]; and J. Black ‘Regulatory 
Conversations’, 29 Journal of Law and Society (2002), 163. 
14 L. Lessig ‘Book Review: Julia Black, Rules and Regulators’, 62 Modern Law Review (1999), 803 at 804.  
15 Above note 6, 2-3. 
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One of the core ideas in her analysis is the view that the function of rules 
depends on their content as much as on their sociological context within 
which they are interpreted and applied.16 The assertion that there is an 
indispensable link between rules and context shows that the structure of 
rules plays an ancillary role in the demand for certainty; what is important is 
to ensure that rules are clear to the regulatees. Now given that clarity is a 
function of the interpretation that a rule receives from a particular 
community, the policy of rule use should focus on how to establish 
conditions that encourage a shared understanding of rules. Thus cultivating 
a relationship of trust and ensuring that an on-going dialogue is always 
maintained becomes of particular importance. This has significant 
implications in terms of institutional design. It involves the creation of 
interpretive communities,17 the adoption of conversational style of 
                                                 
16 The interaction between meaning and social context signals out the affiliation of Black’s analysis with 
conventionalism, the stream of thought that emphasises the inter-relation between a practice and its social 
context. Conventionalists hold that we understand a concept –not when we grasp some fact but- when we 
are able to successfully use that concept within a language game of a given social context. Furthermore, 
they posit that truth is a function of the agreement of those participating within a practice and not the 
other way around for there is “nothing out there” in the world to be discovered and if there were we could 
not possibly know it. Legal conventionalism, in particular, is the school of thought according to which a 
legal system cannot be sustained unless those practising law see themselves as working together for the 
purpose of achieving coordination or for the bringing into fruition of a joint endeavour. Conventionalism 
is associated with the latter writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and according to some commentators 
including Herbert Hart himself it permeates legal positivism. L. Witgenstein, Philosophical Invetigations (G. 
Anscombe trans 1953); O. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 Southern California Law Review (1985), 177; and H. L. 
A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1994) at 137, where he explicitly concedes that “the rule of recognition” is 
conventional in nature. For a different account of the nature of the rule of recognition see J. Dickinson, ‘Is 
the Rule of Recognition Really a Conventional Rule?’, 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2007), 1. On legal 
conventionalism see, D. Kyritsis, ‘What is Good About Legal Coventionalism?’ 14 Legal Theory (2008), 135. 
17 The notions of “community” and “interpreters” are here broadly conceived. Apart from the regulator, 
the financial firms conducting business in the retail financial sector and consumers, they virtually include 
any interest - group that takes part in or may affect or be affected by the interpretive decision-making in 
the regulatory context. As it will become clear later, the term “community of interpreters” (used 
interchangeably with the term “regulatory interpretive community” unless otherwise stipulated) connotes 
that one belongs to a distinct community of interpreters not as a result of a shared understanding of the 
regulatory norms, but in light of a shared commitment to make the best possible sense of the object of 
interpretation. In this sense it differs from the notion of “(regulatory) interpretive community” as 
conceived in Julia Black’s work (discussed below). Similarly, the notion of “interpretive communities” 
suggested here differs from the concept of “interpretive communities” as it was originally elaborated in the 
writings of S. Fish. This is also discussed in various places below, particularly, at page 168 and note 63 as 
well as notes 27 and 45 of Chapter Five. Progressively the terms “community of interpreters” and  
“(regulatory) interpretive community” will be replaced with the broader term “regulatory community”. 
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regulation and the closing-off of the regulatory system from external 
interference.18  
 
Having this as a background, she studies rulemaking in financial regulation 
under the regime of the Financial Services Act 1986. In this regard, she 
offers an insightful description of the ways in which rules have been used 
and how their inherent limitations have been addressed. Finally, she 
proposes that the findings of her study in the field of financial regulation 
may be applicable to other areas of regulation and may form the basis for 
developing a positive theory of rule making.19 In the remaining sections I 
focus on the first chapter of Rules and Regulators, where the author develops 
her thesis on the use of legal rules in financial regulation and considers the 
nature of rules, their limitations and how rules could be used more 
effectively. 
 
2.2 The nature of rules and their limitations 
 
Julia Black offers a fresh analysis of the nature of rules.20 Drawing on the 
linguistic nature of rules, she attempts to answer the following questions:21 
What kind of statement do they express? Are legal rules meaningful? Do 
they admit of an objectively ‘correct’ or ‘real’ meaning? What is the 
mechanism for attaching meaning to legal rules? With regard to the first 
question the answer is rather straightforward. Legal rules are “entrenched 
authoritative statements, which are meant to guide behaviour, be applied on 
an indefinite number of occasions, and have sanctions attached for their 
                                                 
18 Closing-off the regulatory system is considered essential for otherwise there is an increased risk that the 
court’s interpretation upsets the shared understanding of rules that supposedly holds among the members 
of the regulatory community. 
19 These are (a) the importance of the design of the regulatory system, (b) the significance of the market 
context, (c) the circumstances in which interpretive communities can be built and (d) the relevance of the 
regulatory system’s evolution. Above note 6, 247. 
20 Above note 6, 2. 
21 B. Bix, ‘Introduction’ in Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993), 1-6. 
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breach”.22 As a result of the authoritative element of legal rules, law has 
developed its own rules of interpretation.23 In connection to the second 
question, Julia Black asserts that rules have meaning; she explains, however, 
that whether they admit of objectively ‘correct’ or ‘real’ meaning is an 
irrelevant question for the purposes of discussing the nature of rules.24 By 
contrast, what is important is to inquire into how meaning is attached to 
rules in practice. In this relation, she follows the conventionalist school of 
thought, according to which meaning is constituted by interpretation, which 
in turn is a function of varying combinations of shared understandings, 
knowledge of language, conventions and context.25 
 
Based on these observations, Julia Black spells out the inherent limitations 
of legal rules.26 These are their tendency to be over- or under- inclusive, 
their indeterminacy and their interpretation. A legal rule is under- or over- 
inclusive where there is an imperfect match between the rule and its 
purpose.27 This mismatch can occur for a number of reasons as, for 
instance, where the use of general terms “suppresses properties that may 
subsequently be relevant or include properties that may in some cases be 
irrelevant”.28 The indeterminacy of rules arises from the nature of language, 
the anticipatory nature of rules and the fact that rules rely on others for their 
application.29 Echoing Hart’s legal positivism, Black contends that a peculiar 
                                                 
22 Above note 6, 10; W. Twining and D. Miers, How to Do Things With Rules (1982), 126-133; note 11; R. 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) at 22, J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (1975), 117, 186. 
23 See above note 6, at 17; and G. Graff ‘ “Drop Dead,” “Keep Off the Grass” and Other Indeterminacies: 
A Response to Stanford Levinson’, 60 Texas Law Review (1980), 405 at 411. 
24  Above note 6, 14-15. 
25 Above note 16. Concerning the question as to whether rules admit of objectively correct interpretation, 
writers adhering the conventionalist school of thought express different views. S. Fish, What Comes 
Naturally (above note 12) as opposed to D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (2001). This point is 
further discussed in Chapters Five and Six below. 
26 W. Twining and D. Miers, above note 22, ch. 5. 
27 Ideally a legal rule should be inclusive that is, the general authoritative statement that is contained in the 
rule and its purpose should be in congruence. Above note 6, 7-8. 
28 Above at 11; and F. Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in 
Law and in Life (1992), 35. 
29 On the indeterminacy of rules, see above note 6, at 10-11. For once again the author echoes Professor 
Hart and his view of partial indeterminacy. H. L. A. Hart, note 10, 125; and note 21, 18.  
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feature of rules is their ‘open texture’.30 Apart from their “core meaning” -
that is, particular fact situations that clearly fall within the scope of the 
paradigm case- there is always a “penumbra of uncertainty” surrounding 
them.31 Indeterminacy, however, occurs, not because the meaning of the 
word is unclear in itself,32 but because in applying the rule the question will 
always arise as to whether the general term used in the rule applies in this 
particular fact situation. Agreement can remedy this problem but only to 
some degree.33 The practical impossibility to predict all feature events 
suggests that legal indeterminacy is permanently present.34 Interpretation -
that is, the process through which rules are followed and applied- 
complements the list of features that trim down the effective use of rules.  
In this connection Julia Black points out that rules are only as good as their 
                                                 
30 The concept of open texture was drawn from a theory of language developed by Waismann and further 
elaborated by Hart and others. Above note 7, 124-136; note 18, 7-10; F. Weismann, ‘Verifiability’ in A. G. 
N. Flew (ed.) Logic and Language: First Series (1951), 117-144; and J. Braithwaite, ‘Rules and Principles: A 
Theory of Legal Certainty’, 27 Australian Journal of Philosophy (2002), 47 at 57 [available at www.ssrn.com]. 
31 Julia Black follows Hart’s famous distinction. It should be noted, however, that many commentators 
regard this distinction problematic. Hart hopes to explain the difficulties in the interpretation of legal rules 
by assuming that a word will have a single core meaning. The trouble is that in practice there is a number 
of possible meanings that could be taken as the “core meaning” of a rule. H. L. A. Hart, above note 10, 
124-6; ‘Positivist and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harvard Law Review, (1958), 593 and; I. 
McLeod, Legal Theory (2007), 87-88. 
32 Thus, Julia Black draws a crucial distinction between Hart’s thesis on legal indeterminacy and the ‘radical 
indeterminacy’ thesis in jurisprudence and literary theory, which focuses on the questions of meaning and 
interpretation and essentially holds that as far as legal interpretation is concerned ‘anything goes’. Above 
note 6, 10 and footnote 18. On the radical indeterminacy stream of thought see, J. W. Singer, ‘The Player 
and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory’, 94 Yale Law Journal (1984) 1; and J. Stick, ‘Can Nihilism Be 
Pragmatic?’, 100 Harvard Law Review (1986), 332 at 332-335. In defence of the view that indeterminacy in 
law is moderate rather than radical see, K Kress ‘Legal Indeterminacy’, 77 California Law Review (1989), 283. 
33 Following Wittgenstein’s thesis on unreflective rule-following, J. Black stresses that agreement helps 
effective rule following but it is not a condition of correctness. This seems to be at odds with a claim she 
makes later on, when she discusses the idea of interpretive communities, arguing that correct interpretation 
-‘correct’ within quotes- is the interpretation that is accepted (that is, agreed upon) by the community of 
interpreters. See above note 6, 30-37. On unreflective rule following see, L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations (G. E. M. Anscombe trans.) (1953) paras. 185-242. An insightful commentary on 
Wittgenstein’s thesis on rule following and further references can be found in A. Bileztki and A. Matar, 
‘Ludwig Wittgenstein’ (November, 2002) Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy [www.plato-
standford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#Phi] 
34 Even the ‘core meaning’ of the rule may not be as determinate as Hart suggested. The source of the 
problem is that the boundaries of the category of the paradigm case are not always determinate. Language 
contains ‘family resemblance’ concepts, in which the category borders could change depending on the 
context in which it is used. G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein Understanding and Meaning (1980), 
320-43. It is also argued that some terms are intrinsically vague so that there are no boundaries between 
when the term applies and when it does not. R. M. Sainsbury, ‘Is there a Higher Order Vagueness?’, 41 
Philosophical Quarterly (1991), 167.  
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interpretation.35 Rules “cannot apply themselves; they rely on others for 
their application.”36 Accordingly, they need a sympathetic and informed 
audience, “that is one, which understands the context of assumptions and 
practices in which the rule is based, which gave rise to it and which it is 
trying to address”.37  
 
The social dimension of the process of interpretation also implies that there 
is a definite link between the meaning attributed to the rule and the social 
context in which those involved in the project of interpretation live in, 
influence and are influenced by. A range of consequences arises out of this 
connection. The first one is that “a rule has a ‘literal’ or ‘plain’ meaning” 
when “participants in a community would unreflectively assign to it.”38 The 
second one is that there is no objectively clear rule or objectively plain case. 
Rather the clarity of a rule is a function of agreement within an 
interpretative community.39 Finally, the third one is that legal certainty is not 
solely a function of the rule itself but it is a function of the community 
interpreting the rule.40 
 
2.3. Ways to use legal rules effectively 
 
                                                 
35 By saying that  “a rule is as good as its interpretation” Julia Black does not have in her mind an 
interpretation that must be (objectively) correct. As she categorically makes clear, when theorising about 
the use of rules in financial regulation and their effectiveness we are not concerned with their “meaning per 
se, and whether there is an objectively ‘correct’ or ‘real’ meaning….” Above, note 6, 15. Later on, I will 
return to this point in order to consider the implications of this claim with respect to the nature of 
regulatory interpretation.  
36 Above note 6 at 12. 
37 Above. 
38 Above note 6 at 15-17. The author draws on Wittgenstein’s writings concerning unreflective rule 
following in mathematics and language who argued that automatic, unreflective rule-following arises from 
shared judgements in the meaning and application of that rule. Above note 33. The same description of 
“plain cases” was adopted by H. L. A. Hart. Hart, above note 10, 123. 
39 Above note 6 at 18. The author follows Stanley Fish who argued that agreement is a function of the fact 
that interpretive assumptions and procedures are so widely shared in a community that the rule applies to 
all in the same (interpreted) shape. S. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, above note 11, 122. It is worth 
noticing that, contrary to Stanley Fish, Black does not regard agreement or consensus as prerequisites for 
correct interpretation. In her view, agreement simply facilitates the smooth application of rules. Above 
note 34. 
40 Above note 6 at 18-19. 
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The overview of the first chapter of Rules and Regulators would be 
incomplete, if it did not include a brief discussion of the ways in which the 
inherent limitations of rules may be addressed. According to Black, one of 
the main obstacles that stands in the way of making effective use of rules is 
the almost insurmountable difficulty to reconcile contradictory policy 
objectives: on the one hand, flexibility and certainty and, on the other hand, 
adaptability and inclusiveness. How is it possible to address this problem? 
She argues that a compromise can be achieved by using different types of 
rules, by encouraging the creation of a regulatory interpretative community 
and by adopting a conversational style of regulation.41  
 
According to the prevailing view in the literature, legal norms can take two 
forms. They can be either rules or standards.42 Rules are usually seen as 
relatively precise formulations. Standards are described, as less precise 
authoritative prescriptions, which require some judgement for their 
application. Julia Black rejects this pattern of analysis. Although a detailed 
discussion of the reasons for her dissatisfaction fall beyond the purpose of 
this chapter, these can be summarised in the statement that the traditional 
approach fails to capture the multi-dimensional nature of rules and 
embraces a simplistic method for resolving the tension between conflicting 
policy objectives.43  
 
                                                 
41 Above 24-44. 
42 Above R. Dworkin, note 22, 22; note 10, 259-263; J. Raz, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of the Law’, 81 
Yale Law Journal  (1972) at 823; F. Schauer ‘Prescrpitions in Three Dimensions’, 82 Iowa Law Review (1997), 
914; N. Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence (2008), 200-201; and R. Goodin, Political Theory and Public 
Policy (1982), ch.4. Interestingly, Goodin is a fervent supporter of the view that the distinction between 
rules and principles is artificial because in practice collapses. For further reading see D. Kennedy, ‘Legal 
Formality’, 2 Journal of Legal Studies (1973), 351 and ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’, 89 
Harvard Law Review (1976), 1685; L. Alexander and K. Kress ‘Against Legal Principles’, in A. Marmor (ed.), 
Law and Interpretation (1996). 
43 For a detailed account of the problems associated with the traditional distinction of legal norms between 
rules and standards see above note 6, 20-24. 
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Black proposes an alternative model of analysis. She identifies four 
dimensions of rules:44 “the substance and scope of a rule; its character; its 
legal status and the sanction attaching to it; and its linguistic structure”.45 
The substance of the rule is its operational facts or factual predicate. Its 
scope is a function of the relationship of the operational facts to the rule’s 
purpose. The term ‘character’ refers to the consequence of the rule, which 
can be mandatory, directory, discretionary or permissive. “The third 
dimension of status and sanction reflects the context of the present analysis 
of rules, viz. the use of rules in a regulatory system.”  Indeed, rules may be 
of direct or indirect legal effect, they may be embodied in a statutory 
instrument or be part of a voluntary code or they may be even found in a 
contractual form as, for example, in licences or association membership 
agreements. They may have criminal or civil sanctions attaching to them, or 
give rise to disciplinary action. 
 
Compared to the first three dimensions of legal rules, the fourth one –
namely, the linguistic structure of rules- deserves more detailed examination 
because it explains the crucial role of interpretive communities in securing 
the effective use of rules. Black posits that in terms of linguistic structure 
rules have “three aspects: precision or vagueness, simplicity or complexity 
and clarity or opacity”.46 The characterisation of a rule as precise or vague 
depends on the degree to which the operative facts of the rule are specified. 
There are a number of ways in which a rule may be vague: To quote from 
the relevant passage: “There could be a lack of specification as to the 
manner in which an action is to be performed (‘inform’, ‘publish’), or as to 
time or place (‘promptly’, within the vicinity) … the meaning of the word 
                                                 
44 Dimensional analysis of rules is fairly common in scholarly writings. C. S. Diver, ‘The Optimal Precision 
of Regulatory Norms,’ 65 Yale Law Journal (1983), 65 at 67-68 and ‘Regulatory Precision’ in K. Hawkins 
and J. Thomas (eds.), Making Regulatory Policy (1989); R. Baldwin, Rules and Government (1995), 8-11 and; 
‘Why Rules Don’t Work’, 53 Modern Law Review  (1991), 321. 
45 Above note 6, 21-24. 
46 J. Black above note 6, 22; and W. Twining and D. Miers, above note 22, 205-216. 
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itself could be vague in that it is evaluative (‘reasonable’, ‘fair’, ‘suitable’) 
…or … it could be vague in that it uses generic terms (…‘financial 
instruments’ as opposed to ‘securities’).”47 The simplicity or complexity of a 
rule’s structure refers to the factual situations or assessments involved in a 
determination of the rule’s applicability. A simple rule is, for example, the 
following: “‘no licences may be granted to firms with less than twenty five 
employees’”. A complex rule is, for example, the following: “ ‘licences may 
be granted to firms which comply with the following conditions…”48 
Finally, the clarity or opacity of a rule refers to “the extent to which the rule 
is understood by those applying the rule, be they following or enforcing the 
rule.”49 Julia Black contends that clarity is a subjective assessment in the 
sense that it depends on the interpretation, which the rule receives in a 
particular community.50 Consequently, the meaning of a vague rule may in 
fact be crystal clear in a particular community, although it may be opaque to 
those outside it. 
 
The analysis of rules in light of their dimensions opens up the possibility of 
formulating rules in a more sophisticated manner. It is no longer necessary 
to treat the issue of rule formation as a matter of striking the appropriate 
balance between rules and standards and stipulating the level of discretion 
accordingly.51 Instead –Black argues- we can think of the dimensions of 
rules as representing different decision points and model out rules on this 
basis.52 It also makes possible the application of rule-type to address issues 
as diverse as the problem of over- and under- inclusiveness, the distribution 
of decisional jurisdiction and the choice of interpretative strategy.53 For 
                                                 
47 Above note 6, 22-23. 
48 Above at 23. 
49 Above. 
50 Above at 24. 
51 D. J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (1986), ch.4. 
52 Above note 6, 24. 
53 Above at 25-27. 
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example, the problem of under-inclusiveness, which becomes particularly 
acute when emphasis is placed on rules drafted in high level of precision, 
can be ameliorated either by making the rule purely recommendatory or by 
providing that sanction in case of breach will be discretionary.  
 
It was noted earlier that the effective application of rules depends on their 
interpretation.54 Consequently, it is important for the rule-maker to know 
how the rule will be interpreted and whether the terms he uses will be clear 
to the regulated population, so that the rule will convey as much certainty as 
it is so demanded.55 Moreover, he needs to know the extent to which the 
rule’s addressees can be relied upon to ‘read in’ the tacit assumptions on 
which the rule is based.56 
 
This is essentially a problem of informational asymmetry. The typical way to 
deal with it has been to regulate the ensuing relationship of economic 
agency57 between the regulator and the regulated through the formation of 
precise, prescriptive and complex rules that is, rules tailor-made to leave 
hardly any scope of discretion to the regulatees as to the proper meaning 
and application of rules.58 However, as it was explained a few paragraphs 
above, relying too much on prescriptive and detailed rules comes at the cost 
of under-inclusiveness.59 Therefore, Julia Black argues that a better way to 
deal with this problem is to encourage and sustain a shared and informed 
understanding of the rules and the practices they regulate.60 Indeed, the 
greater the shared understanding of the aim of the rule and the context in 
                                                 
54 Above at 12-13 and note 16. 
55 Above 33. 
56 Above. 
57 S. A. Ross, ‘The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem’, 63(2) The American Economic 
Review (1973), 134; K. M. Eisenhardt, ‘Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review’, 14(1) The Academy of 
Management Review, (1989), 57; M. C. Jensen and E. F. Fama, ‘Agency Problems and Residual Claims’, 
Journal of Law and Economics  (1983), 26 and; J. Stiglitz, 3 New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (1987), 966. 
58 Above note 6, 20. 
59 E. Bardach and R. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness (1982). 
60 Above note 6, 30-31. 
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which it operates, the less the need for explicitness and, consequently, the 
less the need to draft rules in high level of precision, for the rule-maker can 
be confident that the way in which he understands a particular regulatory 
norm and the way in which the regulated population understands it 
converge. Accordingly, there will be more scope to put in place a greater 
variety of rules to reduce instances of over- and under-inclusiveness –
including rules containing vague terms. 
 
The development of regulatory interpretive communities is the key to fostering the 
requisite shared and informed understanding.61 These constitute 
“institutional practices, which may exist in the form of shared cultures, 
norms, goals, definitions, and can be created through … training and 
education”.62  Julia Black offers an account of regulatory interpretive 
communities drawing heavily on the earlier work of Stanley Fish on 
interpretive communities.63 Fish sees the interpreter and reader of the (legal) text 
as a member of a community whose institutions shape his perception of the 
world. He declares that those who belong to the same interpretive 
community can judge the correctness of an interpretation by applying the 
community’s shared standards and values. The latter are not static. They 
change as the interpretive community changes. 
 
The creation of regulatory interpretive communities has significant 
implications for the design of the institutional structure of the regulatory 
                                                 
61 Above note 6 at 31 and note 17. 
62 Above note 6 at 31-32. 
63 S. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?, above note 9. Fish develops his ideas further in Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989). For an insightful review 
of the book Is There a Text in This Class? see, G. Graff ‘Culture and Anarchy (Book Review),’ New Republic 
(14 February, 1981) at 36. For a useful review of Doing What Comes Naturally see, R. Shiner, ‘Doing What 
Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies’, 49 The Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (1991), 375. For an eloquent criticism of the notion of interpretive 
communities see O. Fiss, ‘Objectivity and Interpretation,’ 34 Stanford Law Review (1982), 739; 
‘Conventionalism’, 58 California Law Review, 177-197; and A. Goldsmith ‘Is There Any Backbone in this 
Fish? Interpretive Communities, Social Criticism and Transgressive Legal Practice,’ (23) Law and Social 
Inquiry (1998), 373 at 385-391. 
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system. Apart from the implications concerning the accountability of 
regulators,64 which could be addressed by ensuring that those affected by the 
regulation are involved in the formation of the rules, a crucial precondition 
for their development is the ‘closing-off’ of the regulatory system from 
external interference so that the interpretation ultimately accepted as 
‘correct’ by the adjudicator is in accord with that of the regulator’s.65 
Significantly, this requires conferring the monopoly of the formation and 
application of rules to a regulatory body and/or giving precedence to the 
regulator’s interpretation.66  
 
Nevertheless, it must be stressed, that even if the system is closed-off so 
that the rule maker can rely on the adjudicator to confirm his interpretation 
of the rule, relying solely on adjudication is not recommendable not least 
because adjudication is linked with reactive means of enforcement, namely 
regulatory tools that may not always be appropriate due to their drastic 
nature and the high cost associated with their application.67 Consequently, 
the aim in fostering interpretive communities should be to create conditions 
which will ensure that rules receive mutual interpretation by all those 
involved in the regulatory process: rule-maker, enforcer, and the regulatees.68 
                                                 
64 Above note 6, 37. 
65 There are at least three potential interpretive actors in the regulatory system: the regulator, the court and 
the regulated population. Each has to share the other’s interpretive approach and each needs to be aware 
of that of others. Frequently their interpretive approaches are in conflict. This is particularly intense 
between the regulator and the court. A device to minimise this conflict (favoured in Rules and Regulators), is 
to bring together the regulator and the regulatees and exclude the court from the interpretation of rules. 
Above at 34-35; and J. Black, ‘Using Rules Effectively’ in C. McCrudden (eds), Regulation and Deregulation 
(1999), 95 at 101-104. 
66 This means that the court will be bound to strike down the regulator’s interpretation only if it was not 
within the range of interpretations that could be reasonably expected of the rule. This interpretive 
approach has been suggested in R v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex p.Datafin [1987] 1 All ER, 564 and by 
Professor Paul Craig, Administrative Law (2005), 375-378. 
67 This is a familiar argument made by those who believe that is better to prevent breach of regulation 
rather than diagnose it and then try to remedy it. Above note 45; R. Baldwin, Rules and Government (1995), 
ch.6; and P. Kagan and J. Scholz, ‘The Criminology of the Corporation and Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies’ in K. Hawkins and J. M. Thomas (eds) Enforcing Regulation (1984). 
68 R. Baldwin and M. Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999), ch.4. 
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To this effect it is necessary to adopt an educative as well as a command and 
control approach.69  
 
According, to Black, interpretive communities may provide solutions to a 
wide range of problems especially that of uncertainty and the selection of 
interpretive strategy.70 For example, uncertainty can be tackled through the 
promotion of “instinctive compliance” with the rules. Similarly, the need for 
explicitness may be reduced where members of the regulatory community 
share a common understanding of their purpose and context in which they 
operate. Furthermore, it is thought that once the regulatory system is sealed 
from external interference, the regulator becomes better able to deal with 
creative compliance because he is in better position to control and 
manipulate the interpretive strategy of the regulated population. 
 
Conversational regulation encapsulates the idea of setting into operation a 
style of regulation that resembles that of conversation.71 Its main advantage 
is that it can afford the use of generalisations and vague terms because it has 
the capacity for qualification and clarification of the meaning of regulatory 
norms in a manner that is attentive to the idiosyncratic features of each 
particular case.72 Perhaps the most distinguished feature of conversational 
regulation is the emphasis on the individualised application of rules.73 The 
routinely adjustment of regulatory norms is made possible through the 
                                                 
69 B. Morgan and K. Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation (2007), 80-81; and I. Ayres and J. 
Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (1992), 38-40. 
70 Above note 6, 32-36. 
71 Above 37-44. 
72 Where a conversational style of regulation is adopted, rules and enforcement are found in a relationship 
of ‘reflexive equilibrium’. This means that rules may affect the enforcement strategy but the enforcement 
strategy may also influence the type of rule that may be adopted. Above note 6, at 38 and 41 respectively. 
73 This may be put into practice either by enforced self-regulation in which individual firms formulate their 
own rules under the supervision of a regulatory body or through a procedure where the regulator 
negotiates with a firm the application of a rule. On the concept of enforced self-regulation, which is 
essentially a method of rule-formation rather than application of existing rules, see I. Ayres and J. 
Braithwaite, above note 69, 101-106. 
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deployment of a plethora of formal and informal means.74 For instance, 
waivers and exceptions facilitate the application of rules on individual basis 
by substituting informal procedures of rule-adaptation especially where 
these are not deemed to be time and cost efficient.75 The advantages of 
adopting a conversational style of regulation are obvious especially with 
regard to the problems of inclusiveness and those of lack of foresight.76 For 
example, the availability of waivers ensures that an over-inclusive rule will 
not apply where it was not intended to. By the same token, negotiations may 
extend the application of an under-inclusive rule in case of new and 
unforeseen circumstances. 
 
A number of difficulties are ingrained in the choice of rule-type, the 
function of interpretative communities and the adoption of a conversational 
style of regulation. These can be classified into the following overlapping 
categories: (a) institutional constraints such as the prevailing bureaucratic 
ethos, the size of the regulated population, informational asymmetries 
within the regulatory organisation and scarcity of resources; (b) economic 
agency triggering conditions of rent-seeking and regulatory capture; (c) the 
often conflicting nature of the objectives of the regulatory policy of rule-use 
and last but not least; (d) problems of accountability.  
 
In relation to the use of different types of rules, Julia Black identifies two 
kinds of problems. The first one is the inevitable tensions in the choice of 
rule-type.77 These are the outcome of the often-conflicting objectives that 
the regulator needs to accommodate when shaping the policy of rule use. 
For instance, certainty clashes with flexibility in that the former calls for 
precision and control of interpretive discretion while the latter points to the 
                                                 
74 Above note 6, 39-40. 
75 A. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (1994), ch.1. 
76 Above note 6, 38-41. 
77 Above at 28-30. 
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quite opposite direction requiring vagueness and reliance on the interpretive 
judgement of the regulated population.78 Similarly the need to pre-empt 
complexity is at odds with the goal to reduce instances of over-
inclusiveness.79 Furthermore, the desirability to tackle creative compliance 
and complexity contrasts with the desirability to decentralise the 
enforcement of rules through a system of private enforcement given that the 
prosecutability of rules requires tipping the balance in favour of detail and 
precision.80 The second kind of problem is that some times rules fall short 
from controlling the behaviour of bureaucratic officials.81 In this regard, it 
has been pointed out that the automatic association of interpretive strategy 
or relative amounts of discretion with a particular rule-type may not control 
bureaucratic discretion but simply displace it.82  
 
With respect to the first problem Black argues that the tensions in the 
choice of rule-type can be mitigated through trading-off the conflicting 
objectives against one another and compromising their accomplishment. 
For instance, the tension between certainty and flexibility can be reduced if a 
mixture of different types of rules is used to provide both the desirable 
adaptability and assurance.83 She also contends that regulators would be in a 
position to control literalism by allowing for some degree of interpretive 
discretion to the regulatees and ensure at the same time that the discretion 
granted is appropriately used, if the technique of rule-type was used in 
                                                 
78 Above note 6, 28-29. 
79 Above. 
80 This is because some types of rules are not appropriate for all enforcement systems and strategies. For 
example, studies on the economics of private enforcement suggest this operates efficiently where it is put 
in practice through precise and detailed rules. By contrast, where a compliance strategy of enforcement is 
adopted involving negotiation, advice, education and compromise with the regulatees, then less precise 
rules can aid the enforcement process. R. Landes and R. A. Posner, ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’, 
Journal of Legal Studies (1975), 1 and; R. Baldwin, ‘Why Rules Don’t Work’, 51 Modern Law Review (1991), 
321 and Rules and Government (1995), 143-57. 
81 Above note 6, 28. 
82 Above note 6, 28; and R. Baldwin and K. Hawkins, note 7, 570. 
83 Above note 6, 29. 
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conjunction with the development of interpretive communities.84 However, 
the second kind of problem -that of controlling bureaucratic behaviour 
through the use of certain types of rules- can be resolved only by changing 
the bureaucratic ethos through constant training and education of the 
members of staff. 
 
The resort to interpretive communities is no less controversial. Interpretive 
communities require the closure of the regulatory system from external 
interference.85 This however is bound to create conditions where regulatory 
accountability can be easily undermined.86 In this connection, Black suggests 
that accountability can be eventually restored by ensuring that all those 
“affected by regulation are involved in the formation of the rules”87 and by 
allowing regulatory decisions and actions to be open to judicial review 
provided that courts will tend to give precedence to the regulator’s 
interpretations of its rules “striking them down only if they are not within 
the range of interpretations that could be reasonably expected”.88  
 
Finally, the adoption of a conversational style of regulation presents its own 
challenges. As with the function of interpretive communities, one source of 
concern is that conversional patterns of regulation may jeopardise regulatory 
accountability.89 This eventuality is particularly acute where the number of 
the regulated firms is large.90 In these circumstances the relative standing of 
those conducting the conversation becomes blurred and it may not be 
possible to consult with everyone that is likely to be affected by regulation.91 
                                                 
84 Above note 6 at 29-30. 
85 Closing-off the regulatory systems entails that the regulatory Authority has the monopoly of formulating 
and applying rules and, as a result, the exclusivity in deciding matters of interpretation.  
86 Above note 6, 36-37. 
87 Above note 6, 37; and P. Harter, ‘Negotiation Regulation’, 17 Georgetown Law Journal (1982), 1. 
88 Above note 6, 37; R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin [1987] 1ALL ER, 564; and P. Craig, 
Administrative Law, 375-378. 
89 Above note 6, 43-44. 
90 Above at 42-43. 
91 Above. 
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A further problem is that fairness may not be observed given that it is 
difficult to secure consistent decision-making. Finally there are difficulties 
with the operation of waivers per se. In theory, the waivers are desirable 
because they allow regulatory responses to be targeted. However, if a rule is 
more often waived rather than applied, the use of waivers becomes 
problematic because they turn out to operate like a device that negates 
rather then reinforces the regulatory norm that constitutes the essence of 
the rule itself.92 
 
These difficulties can be ameliorated in a number of ways. For instance, 
record-keeping and the availability of regular post hoc review of waivers can 
help preserve consistency,93 whereas accountability can be secured by 
making decision-making open and transparent. It must be pointed out, 
however, that systems designed to increase participation and openness 
operate more easily at the stage of rule formation rather than the stages of 
rule application and enforcement. Nevertheless, it is submitted that this 
problem can be addressed, for -unlike the stage of rule formation- the 
application and enforcement process need not involve the participation of a 
wide range of interests.94 Suffice is, that the consideration of wider interests 
is secured at the stage of rulemaking. 
 
 
3. The communicative theory of regulatory interpretation 
 
3.1 A first look at the underlying assumptions of Black’s thesis: The 
idea of interpretive convergence 
 
                                                 
92 Above note 6 at 44. In this manner the application of rule offers an occasion of negotiation, which 
eventually erodes the capacity of rule in bringing about the intended policy objective.  
93 Above 42-43. 
94 Above 44. 
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Black builds her thesis on a pragmatic depiction of the interpretive process 
that makes possible the use of rules in financial regulation. Under this 
account, regulatory interpretation is a form of communication –a 
conversation that is full of shortcomings.95 Specifically, the analysis is 
particularly attentive to the conspicuous fragmentation that dominates the 
financial markets landscape. Being itself the outcome of increased 
specialisation and diversity of products and services and taking the form of 
sectoral and sub-sectoral market divisions, whose participants develop their 
own shared cultures, norms, goals, definitions and interpretive attitudes,96 
market fragmentation brings about two important consequences. On the 
one hand, it gives rise to the flourishing of a variety of idiosyncratic 
understandings of regulatory requirements (interpretive discrepancy) and, on 
the other hand, it makes communication between the regulator and the 
regulated population remote and difficult to conduct effectively.97 Moreover, 
in the absence of arrangements designed to strengthen networks of 
communication, interpretive discrepancy becomes greater and greater not 
for market fragmentation preserves conditions that discourage the creation 
of a common ground of communication, influence and persuasion.  
 
With this setting as a background, interpreters are depicted as they actually 
are namely, as individuals who do not posit any universal truth about how 
rules should be understood. As it was just pointed out, the regulatees are 
taken to develop their own understandings of regulatory prescriptions. 
Furthermore, they are described as generally unable to know whether their 
interpretation of rules is in agreement with that of the regulatory Authority –
something, which leaves them exposed to an increased risk of litigation as 
                                                 
95 Various passages in Rules and Regulators regarding the adoption of a conversational style of regulation 
testify that regulatory interpretation is seen as a dialectical practice pretty similar to ordinary conversation. 
Above note 6 at 37-44. 
96 On the causes of fragmentation that prevailed prior and throughout the Financial Services Act 1986 
regime see, L. C. B. Gower, ‘The Big Bang and City Regulation,’ 55(1) Modern Law Review, (1988) 1. 
97 C. A. E. Goodhart, Financial Regulation: Where, How and Where Now? (1999) at 7-8. 
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well as other costs. Similarly, regulatory officials are not deemed to possess 
perfect knowledge when exercising their rulemaking, supervisory or 
enforcement functions. Rather, they are taken to be aware of their own 
limitations. For example, they are cognisant of how essential practitioner’ 
input is in making informed choices and consequently how crucial it is to 
gain the trust and cooperation of the regulated population.  
 
All these observations make plain that information asymmetries and 
interpretive discrepancy are the root of the evil, the source where all 
deficiencies in the use of rules come from. Compared to informational 
asymmetries, interpretive discrepancy is a far more pervasive problem when 
it comes to the effective use of rules. This is because it is conceivable to 
suppose that interpreters posit perfect information and still lack the requisite 
“tacit understanding” of regulatory norms, which is the catalyst for 
automatic adherence with regulatory stipulations.98 With this in mind it is 
safe to conclude that if rules are to work at all in the regulatory context, then 
interpretation should primarily aim at promoting some sort of interpretive 
convergence that is, a state of affairs where the regulatees’ understanding of 
regulatory norms and the regulator’s understanding of them coincide or -to 
put it differently- where there is a consensus about the ad hoc interpretation 
of regulatory prescriptions without the need of further clarification and 
guidance.99 
 
                                                 
98 By contrast, it is not intelligible to assume that interpreters have reached a state of affairs where they 
have developed a tacit understanding and at the same time argue that information asymmetries jeopardise 
effective communication. The idea of unreflective rule following is discussed in J. Black, note 6, 16-19. 
99 With respect to the interaction between the interpretation of rules and social context, Black 
demonstrates how “agreement” in judgements is a function of shared understandings (or “forms of life” as 
Wittgenstein puts it) and uses the term “mutuality of interpretation” instead of interpretive convergence used 
here. Above note 6, 16 and 30-37. Stanley Fish in his turn talks about “agreement.” As he explains, once an 
interpretive community is fully fleshed its members “will necessarily agree because they will see … 
everything in relation to the community’s assumed purposes and goals.” S. Fish, Is There A Text in the 
Class?, above note 11, 15. 
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Black proposes some interesting ways in which interpretive convergence can be 
attained without harming market competition and innovation. One of the 
first things that she recommends is the combined use of various types of 
rules with an emphasis on high-level principles.100 There is a good reason 
why high-level principles should be preferred in this occasion. Rules drafted 
in a high-level of generality usually take the form of brief authoritative 
statements, which have mainly two advantages. They communicate clearly 
what objectives must be pursued and they leave for the regulated population 
to decide what is the best means to achieve these objectives. In this manner, 
high-level principles aid the regulator in his task to guide the regulated firms 
on how regulatory requirements should be understood and, at the same 
time, they de-centralise the interpretive process so that decision-making as 
to the appropriate mode of action is transferred down to each individual 
firm and business where it is needed most.  
 
Firms are not left alone in exercising their interpretive discretion.  A number 
of initiatives are proposed in support of the function of high-level 
principles.101 Under the proposed scheme in Rules and Regulators, a range of 
rules drafted in various levels of concreteness and specificity are used in 
order to explicate the content of high-level principles as well as to regulate 
their prosecutability,102 whereas certainty is reinforced by the creation of 
interpretive communities and the adoption of a communicative style of 
regulation.103 Indeed these techniques ameliorate informational asymmetries 
in various ways as, for example, by (a) cultivating a shared understanding of 
the rules; (b) aiding the regulator’s attempt to make an informed 
interpretation of regulatory norms and; (c) by ensuring that -in case of 
                                                 
100 Above note 6, 22-27. 
101 Above at 31-33 and 37-44. 
102 These rules prescribe acceptable and non-acceptable behaviour either by way of legally binding 
regulatory requirements or by way of guidance. Above at 24-30. 
103 Clarity is not a function of the rule per se. Above at 18. 
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doubt- firms become duly informed about the regulator’s understanding a 
particular regulatory requirement.  
 
Finally, Julia Black addresses a third challenge, namely the need to 
coordinate the decentralised interpretive process in order to ensure 
consistency in the interpretation of rules and differentiation only where it is 
considered absolutely necessary. To some extent interpretive discretion is 
controlled through the use of legally binding detailed rules.104 However, 
detailed rules cannot create a shared understanding of the regulatory norms 
on their own. Instead, interpretive communities do and they are extensively 
relied upon to create the necessary conditions for co-ordination.105  
 
This is a raw and rather untidy description of the theoretical account of 
regulatory interpretation that ensues from Rules and Regulators. I suggested 
that an emerging theme in Black’s thesis is the idea of interpretive convergence as 
an essential precondition for using rules effectively. Standing on its own, this 
claim sets the tone for a very interesting theory of regulatory interpretation 
where procedural efficiency is regarded the measure of effectiveness and the 
common denominator when trading-off conflicting policy objectives. 
Having said that, I am still far from offering a concrete account of the 
communicative thesis of regulatory interpretation. Clearly this project goes 
far beyond exploring the purpose of interpretation in regulation (interpretive 
convergence). It further requires discerning the subject matter of regulatory 
interpretation and defining the source of interpretive authority. These issues 
are discussed below.  
 
3.2. Towards a more accurate picture of the communicative theory of 
regulatory interpretation  
                                                 
104 Above, note 6 at 28-29. 
105 Above at 31-32. 
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Julia Black seems to argue that rules work effectively when there is some 
sort of interpretive convergence that is, when the regulated population interprets 
the regulatory requirements in a manner that is in agreement with the 
regulator’s interpretation.106 We notice, for example, that her 
recommendations about the level of specificity in which rules should be 
drafted is a function of how much it is considered essential to control 
interpretive discretion. Similarly, the policy choice of using rules that are 
drafted in high level of abstractness and generality -namely the policy choice 
to rely on the interpretive discretion of the regulated population- is always 
coupled with parallel policy initiatives such as interpretive communities and 
a communicative approach to regulation whose purpose is to help the 
regulator guide, coordinate, manipulate and monitor the interpretive 
decision-making of regulatees. What theory of regulatory interpretation 
ensues from these observations? Drawing on Ronald Dworkin and his 
analysis of interpreting a social practice like rule following, we can argue that 
a theory of regulatory interpretation can be either communicative either 
constructive in nature.107  
 
The distinct characteristic of the communicative theory of interpretation is that it 
resembles the method of interpretation that we deploy when we try to 
understand our co-discussant in the course of a conversation. In this case 
we allot meaning to the speaker’s utterances in light of his motives or 
concerns and we report our conclusions as statements about his intentions 
in saying what he did. So to put it simply, we try to grasp the speaker’s 
                                                 
106 S. Fish, Is There a Text in the Class?, above note 11 at 15 and note 6, 24-44. 
107 To be precise, Ronald Dworkin propounds three different kinds of interpretation; “conversational”, 
“constructive”, and “scientific interpretation.” “Scientific interpretation” does not qualify as a candidate 
theory of regulatory interpretation because it is causal rather than purposive in nature. Here the term 
“communicative is used in place of “conversational” as more appropriate for capturing the idea that in the 
public domain taking part in a conversation always serves some purpose (e.g. the provision of clarification, 
the resolution of disputes, the promotion of social order or cooperation etc). R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
(2000), 49-53. 
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intention in speaking as he does. Under this theoretical model, interpretation 
is a means for communicating each other’s rationalities. Interpreters are not 
concerned with finding out what the rule “really” requires from them to do, 
but what their co-discussant think that the rule in question requires from 
them to do. Their modest ambition is to ensure effective communication. 
Significantly, the latter commands overcoming information asymmetries and 
ideally the attainment of a common understanding of the regulatory norms. 
With these down-to-earth concerns in mind, interpreters treat interpretation 
as a medium for becoming aware of each other’s rationalities and point of 
views and, as a vehicle of persuasion and consolidation of conflicting 
interpretations.108 
 
Contrary to the communicative theoretical model, the constructive theory of 
interpretation is more ambitious in its inception.109 It draws a sharp distinction 
between the speakers’ utterances and the object of interpretation to the 
effect of proposing that, discerning the speakers’ beliefs about the object of 
interpretation and discerning the object of interpretation per se, are two 
different projects. Under this theoretical model, interpreters are seeing as 
genuinely interested in making the best sense of the object of interpretation 
–the object being the rule as embodied in the legal text. To this effect, they 
ascribe some scheme of interests or goals or principles that the subject 
matter of interpretation can be taken to serve, express or exemplify, rather 
                                                 
108 The latter works as an antidote to persistent disagreement threatening to upset stability and 
coordination. Here the analysis echoes M. Bratman’s view of law as a collective enterprise, which creates an 
obligation to overcome differences in pursuance of a common aim. M. Bratman, ‘Shared Cooperative 
Activity’, 101-102 Philosophical Review (1992), 327. See further, J. Coleman, The Practice of Principle in Defence of 
a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory (2001), 92. 
109 The constructive theory of interpretation is grounded on the assumption that the participants in a social 
practice like law or more generally rule-following approach their subject of interpretation with an 
interpretive attitude. Dworkin describes the notion of interpretive attitude by using the analogy of 
“courtesy”, a social practice of rule following, which after some point of time starts to change. Above note 
107, 46-49. I discuss this point in the subsequent chapters. 
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than simply understand each other’s utterances.110 It follows that under this 
theoretical scheme, what a rule means and what the interpreters take it to 
mean are not tautologous. Finally, contrary to the communicative theory, 
the constructive theory does not regard the presence of disagreement as a 
pathological feature, but as a manifestation of sound argumentative practice, 
which is tailor-made to meet the need for new and better interpretations of 
the rules in question. 
 
It is suggested that the theory of regulatory interpretation that emanates 
from Rules and Regulators is communicative in nature. It was pointed out 
already that the presence of an on-going dialogue between the regulator and 
the regulated population is implied in the discussion of the adoption of a 
conversational style of regulation. However, to get a deeper insight into the 
subject matter, purpose of regulatory interpretation and the source of 
authority, it pays to keep in mind the earlier remarks on the idea of 
interpretive convergence and turn our attention to the function of the regulatory 
interpretive community, not least because it is its members that conduct this 
conversation.111 In the remaining of this section, I examine the rationale and 
operation of the regulatory interpretive community in order to support my 
suggestion. Progressively, the discussion will pave the way to a more 
concrete account of the assumptions underlying the theory of regulatory 
interpretation that is embedded in Black’s work. 
 
That a regulatory interpretive community is created out of a concern to 
address informational asymmetries and promote stability and co-ordination -
namely the same difficulties that the communicative theory supposes as 
                                                 
110 In the case of Dworkin’s analysis the subject matter of interpretation (‘the object’) is a social practice –
specifically the practice of rule following. In the case of financial regulation the subject of interpretation is 
the various regulatory provisions as, for instance, COB rules. 
111 Above the discussion on interpretive communities (pages 167-169) and the idea of interpretive 
convergence (note 99 at page 176). 
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impeding effective communication, becomes clear once we pay attention to 
a very conspicuous feature of the practice of rule-use in the regulatory 
context, namely the mounting uncertainty about the interpretation of 
ambiguous regulatory norms.112 If everyone involved in the regulatory 
system had perfect information about how others would behave and what 
strategy they would adopt in interpreting regulatory requirements, if 
everyone agreed on how rules are to be understood, things would be ideal, 
and there would be no need for the creation of an interpretive community. 
Since things are far from ideal in reality, the formation of an interpretive 
community is essential in order to reduce information asymmetries and 
cultivate a shared understanding of the regulatory requirements.  
 
This insight is embedded in several remarks contained in Rules and Regulators 
with respect to the difficulties that a rule maker encounters as a result of the 
contingency of the application of rules to their interpretation. For example, 
Julia Black points out that “[b]ecause of the need to rely on others to apply 
and interpret the rule the rule maker needs to know how the rule will be 
interpreted: [...] The rule maker also has to know whether the terms that he 
or she uses will be clear to those interpreting the rules, and so whether the 
rule will give the certainty that is so demanded. […] Finally the rule maker 
has to know the extent to which the rule’s addressees can be relied upon to 
‘read in’ the tacit assumptions on which the rule is based.”113 Yet, the rule-
maker is not the only one who feels strained under conditions of imperfect 
information and interpretive divergence giving rise to disputes about 
ambiguous rules. The regulated firms experience similar distress, not least 
because they face an increased litigation risk, in the absence of any 
                                                 
112 In Rules and Regulators, the term “regulatory interpretive communities” connotes the presence of 
associations of rule makers, regulatees and virtually every one involved in the regulatory system, with the 
view to create a shared culture, set of norms, goals, definitions and common interpretative strategies. 
Above note 6, 31-32 and note 17. 
113 Above. 
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reassurance that their interpretation of regulatory requirements coincides 
with the one preferred by regulatory officials.114 
 
Taking into account that the regulator and the regulatees115 confront similar 
problems, it is suggested that both have good reasons to be looking forward 
to part taking in the interpretive community. Seeing things from the angle of 
the regulatory Authority, interpretive communities are to be welcomed 
because (a) they can help them make an informed interpretation of rules; (b) 
communicate how they expect others to interpret rules more effectively and 
(c) ensure optimal compliance by reassuring the regulated population and 
cultivating a sense of legitimacy. Seeing things from the angle of the 
regulated firms, interpretive communities are to be welcomed because (a) 
they can help them make an informed interpretation of rules (informed in 
the sense of knowing that it will accord with the regulator’s interpretation); 
(b) they give them reassurance by promoting certainty and predictability; and 
(c) they foster their confidence in the fairness of regulation. 
 
That the notion of regulatory interpretive community in Rules and Regulators 
is based on the assumptions, that the communicative thesis makes in 
relation to the subject matter and point or purpose of interpretation, 
becomes plain, once we consider what the interpreters do, as soon as a 
primitive form of interpretive community starts to take shape. Suppose that 
a regulatory interpretive community as of the kind described in Rules and 
Regulators is at an early stage of evolution and that it consists of the following 
three members: the regulator, who also happens to be the maker and 
                                                 
114 “In the demand for certainty what is being sought is the assurance that my interpretation of the rule will 
accord with others’, in particular the person or institution that ultimately has the responsibility for 
determining the application of the rule.” Above note 6, 32. 
115 Their role in the regulatory system always remains distinct. FSA plays the role of the policy maker, rule 
maker and enforcer, whilst the regulated firms stand at the other end as the recipients of regulatory 
commands and recommendations and as the regulator’s consultants. 
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enforcer of rules, the regulated firms and consumers.116 Suppose also that 
the regulator considers amending a particular regulatory provision – say, for 
the sake of argument, Conduct of Business rule (z)-, which establishes a 
favourable regime for consumers of personal pensions (‘packaged 
product’).117 Specifically, COB (z) requires financial advisers who sell a 
particular range of products and services118 to look outside their range of 
product and services before they recommend a personal pension to 
consumers, and explain in writing why the particular personal pension 
contract they have recommended is at least suitable for their customers as a 
form of stakeholder pension. With the view of bringing the selling of 
personal pensions in line with the selling of other packaged products, the 
regulator wishes to replace COB (z) with COB (z’) so that in the future “tied 
financial advisers” will not have this obligation unless their customer 
explicitly requires from them to do so.119 
 
The membership in the regulatory community (strictly speaking, a regulatory 
interpretive community is not yet fully fledged) instigates a communication 
process, which enables the regulator to assess whether the regulated firms 
and those that are likely to be affected by the proposed change are generally 
                                                 
116 I assume that the court is excluded from participation to make the constitution of regulatory 
interpretive community resemble to Black’s account as much as possible.  
117 The hypothesis draws heavily from COB 5.3.16 (3) (also known as RU64), which raised great 
controversy during the past two years. FSA expressed the view that COB 5.3.16 (3) was obsolete and 
considered removing it so that to bring the standards governing the selling of personal pensions into line 
with those of all other packaged products. This proposal was supported by the industry but found strong 
opposition from consumers. The Authority eventually decided to postpone its revision for the future. FSA 
‘Suitability Standards for Advice on Personal Pensions’, FSA Consultation Paper CP05/8 (June 2005); FSA, 
‘Suitability Standards for Advice on Personal Pensions: Feedback on CP05/8’ (February 2005), FSA 
Feedback Statement; D. Waters ‘FSA Move to Free Up Advice on Personal Pensions’, FSA Press Release (28 
June, 2005). According to the FSA Glossary, a “packaged product” is (a) a life policy; (b) a unit in a 
regulated collective investment scheme; (c) an interest in a collective trust savings scheme and (d) a 
personal pension scheme [available at www.fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/Glossary/P] 
118 These financial advisers are known as “tied advisers” as opposed to “wholesale advisers” (they compare 
the whole range of products and services that is available in the market before offering advice). Effectively, 
COB (z) asks from “tied advisers” to exceptionally act as “wholesale advisers” when they recommend 
personal pension contracts to their consumers. 
119 This means that in my fictitious example the regulator takes advantage of the operation of interpretive 
communities in order to perform his rule-making function. It is conceivable, however, that interpretive 
communities in varying degrees of participation aid the regulator’s more general attempt to adopt a 
conversational style of regulation. 
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in agreement with his proposals and, in addition, it provides a forum for 
persuasion in case of disagreement. This is not a monologue, however. Both 
the regulated firms and consumers seize this opportunity to make the 
regulator aware of their views to the effect of influencing regulatory rule 
making in their favour.120 Despite their conflicting interests, the members of 
regulatory interpretive communities develop an interpretive attitude that has 
some fundamentally common characteristics. They communicate with each 
other first because they wish to become aware of the extent to which their 
views differ (interpretive divergence), second, because communication gives 
an excellent opportunity to share information and third, because it is 
through this exchange of information that they can hope to cultivate a 
common understanding of COB (z).  
 
Discovering each other’s intentions stands at the core of this common 
pattern of interpretation, exactly as one would expect in a description of 
regulatory interpretation that follows the communicative thesis. Indeed, 
unless I know my co-discussant’s intentions I cannot make sense of his 
claims and, as a consequence, I cannot assess where our interpretations 
differ with the view of working out a strategy to bridge our differences and 
attain an agreeable interpretation. There is no point to treat the rule itself as 
an entity distinct from the discussant’s utterances because all I can make 
sense of -and all effective communication requires from me to make sense 
of- is my co-discussant’s sayings about the meaning of the rule in question. 
 
One might object that it is not accurate to say that the subject matter of 
interpretation is the interpreters’ intentions. In light of the positivist 
                                                 
120 The Public Choice school of thought and the doctrine of regulatory rent-seeking offers an excellent law 
and economics explanation of how different interest-groups compete to take regulatory decision making by 
their side. In this battle, the economically powerful group wins; its rationality dominates the regulatory 
arena and sets the tone for the subsequent interpretation of regulatory commands. D. C. Mueller, Public 
Choice III (2003), chapters 15 and 20. 
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foundations of Rules and Regulators is seems natural for one to suppose that 
only the intention of the person who authored the rule in question matters 
(in this particular case, the regulator).121 This objection does not apply where 
a regulatory interpretive community is fully fledged because the reign of a 
mature interpretive community implies the presence of absolute 
convergence between the author’s intention and the interpreters’ 
intention.122 It applies, however, in numerous other occasions where it is 
conceivable to assume that the regulator and the regulatees do not share the 
same interpretive intention and, therefore, it is worthy of attention.  
 
When I argue that the subject matter of interpretation is the interpreters’ 
intentions I do not mean to suggest that the author’s intention is excluded 
from consideration. Frequently, it will be a situation where interpreters will 
have to discern the author’s intention. But this will be so only because the 
‘author’ happens to be one of the co-discussants and members of the 
community of interpreters and particularly the one, who is delegated with 
the power to command adherence with COB rules, and with whom the 
other members of the regulatory community try to communicate effectively. 
After all we should not lose sight of the fact that regulatory interpretation is 
a constant dialogue between the regulator (and author of the rules) and the 
regulated population in the course of which the regulator is supposed to do 
more than simply author rules, monitor compliance and enforce them. He is 
expected in addition to sense interpretive discrepancies, revise the content 
of regulatory requirements in light of practitioner input and overall negotiate 
their application and enforcement. To cut a long argument short, it is the 
                                                 
121 Despite appearances to the contrary, the question as to who is the ‘author’ of a rule –especially when 
the latter takes the form of a regulatory requirement- is not at all straightforward. The notion of ‘intention’ 
is equally troublesome. For the purposes of this section I work on the assumption that the ‘author’ is the 
regulator and that the concept of ‘intention’ raises no problems. I will return to these points in the next 
chapter. 
122 Stanley Fish does not hesitate to talk about “uniformity” among the members of the interpretive 
community. S. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?, above note 11, at 15; and O. Fiss, ‘Conventionalism’, note 
16, at 177. 
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reciprocity of this dialectical practice that -in my view- lends support to the 
claim that the discovery of the intention of each regulated individual matters 
at least as much as the discovery of the author’s (the regulator’s) intention 
and this without turning a blind eye to the ex officio privileged position of 
the regulator as the sole member of the interpretive community who is 
entrusted with the power to resort to coercion in pursuit of its regulatory 
mandate. 
 
The centrality of the interpreters’ intentions has two implications. The first 
one is that in the absence of a mature interpretive community, it brings 
about a wealth of different and frequently conflicting interpretations. The 
ensuing plurality of interpretations presents a huge challenge for the 
effective use of rules, because it breeds conditions of disagreement and 
uncertainty. At the end of the day only one interpretation will be accepted as 
the ‘correct’ one and, given the special function of the regulator, this seems 
to be the regulator’s preferred interpretation.123 Does that mean that the 
regulator decides questions of interpretation and then enforces them to the 
other members of the interpretive community? The answer is no. The 
regulatory regime envisaged in Rules and Regulators is far from a typical 
command and control regime. Regulatory officials do not stand outside the 
interpretive community when performing their tasks. They work within it in 
pursuance of a mutual interpretation of regulatory norms. Accordingly, the 
“regulator’s preferred interpretation” is the outcome of a dialogue that aims 
at agreement and reconciliation through persuasion.124 It is this consensus-
based decision-making project that -not only filtrates the exercise of 
interpretive discretion and determines the margin of acceptability of the 
                                                 
123 Above note 6, 33. 
124 The interpretive community gives voice to all those that are likely to be affected by regulation –not for 
the sake of preserving differentiation in the interpretation of regulatory requirements but- because 
providing a forum of communication is the first step to bridge differences and work out an agreeable 
interpretation. On persuasion see, Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?, above, note 11, ch. 16. 
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proposed interpretation- but also manifests the point or purpose of the 
regulatory interpretive community. The second implication that derives 
from the centrality of the interpreters’ intention is that the authority in 
matters of interpretation lies with the interpretive community.125 As Stanley 
Fish claims and Julia Black endorses “it is interpretive communities, rather 
than either the text or its author, that produce meanings.”126 
 
Although many would feel at ease with my claim that in Rules and Regulators 
the point or purpose of regulatory interpretation seems to be the attainment 
of some sort of agreeable interpretation (interpretive convergence), the same does 
not apply with respect to my suggestion that the authority in matters of 
interpretation lies with the regulatory interpretive community. How is it 
possible –one might ask- to argue that the interpretive community is the 
arbiter of what is acceptable and non-acceptable interpretation in view of 
Professor Black’s attempt to disassociate herself with the radical 
interpretation school of thought?127 How is it possible to propound that 
rules mean whatever a community of interpreters wants them to mean, 
when in Rules and Regulators, it is explicitly stated that the authoritative nature 
of legal rules trims down the range of available interpretations?128 This is 
even more so, taking into account that the creation of an interpretive 
community presupposes the closure of the regulatory system from judicial 
interference and, as a consequence, immunity from any external control 
over the regulatory interpretation.129  
 
                                                 
125 Above note 23, 14. 
126 Above. 
127 Above note 21 at page 10. 
128 Above note 7, 17 and 32. 
129 Obviously the claim that members of the interpretive community will control each others exercise of 
interpretive discretion cannot apply here because the creation of an interpretive community presupposes 
uniform interpretation and lack of disagreement. 
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The difficulty to reconcile my claim with the spirit of Rules and Regulators is 
more apparent rather than real.130 Despite the disavowal of the radical 
school of thought and sporadic warnings that the authoritative nature of 
rules limits the remit of acceptable interpretations, the fact of the matter is 
that Julia Black clearly argues for the courts giving precedence to the 
regulator’s interpretation, striking it down only in exceptional 
circumstances.131 This alone leaves plenty of scope not only to construe that 
the regulatory interpretive community  (recall, here that the regulator acts as 
a member within this community) is the only source of constraints over 
interpretive discretion but to corroborate, in addition, the positivist and 
conventionalist affiliations of Rules and Regulators by arguing for a notion of 
acceptability that is based on social convention.132  
 
To conclude, I argued that in Rules and Regulators, we find the first materials 
for a theory of regulatory interpretation that is communicative in nature. Its 
underling assumptions can be summarised in the following points: (a) 
Regulatory interpretation is a form of communication, which takes place in a 
fragmented social context where each one of the discussants has its own 
personal point of view about how regulatory requirements (legal rules) 
should be understood. (b) The meaning of rules depends on the interpreters’ 
varying intentions. This bears with it the following overlapping implications: 
First, regulatory requirements may be assigned to an indefinite number of 
valid meanings as many as the views expressed by the interpreters. Second, 
in the presence of this plurality of meanings, communication is prone to 
failure. It is expedient therefore to ensure that interpretive convergence 
                                                 
130 This issue is far more complex than it is suggested here. It demands a thorough analysis of the 
relationship between the judiciary and public administration, which falls beyond the scope of this thesis. 
131 On that view, the courts are allowed to strike down the regulator’s interpretation provided that it does 
not fall with the range of interpretations that one would reasonably expect. This position was developed in 
Datafin case. R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex p. Datafin [1987], QB 815, especially 849-869, where Lloyd 
LJ argued that the availability of judicial review becomes much less controversial when the source of power 
is statutory (rather than contractual); Above note 6, 37; and P. Craig, note 66.  
132 Stanley Fish argues that, “the meaning and texts produced by an interpretive community … proceed… 
from a public and conventional point of view.” S. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?, above note 11, 14. 
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(rather than the search for truth) becomes the ultimate objective of 
regulatory interpretation. Third, the meaning of legal rules is informed by 
the prevailing perceptions of the interpretive community that is, the 
regulator who has the entrenched authority to use them and the regulated 
population whose sympathy and cooperation is crucial to make things work. 
The presence of an interpretive community is the only source of constraints 
over interpretive discretion. (c) In light of these claims, the communicative 
theory of regulatory interpretation answers the questions we set in the 
introduction of this chapter as follows: The subject of regulatory 
interpretation is the interpreters’ utterances, its objective is the attainment of 
consensus (interpretive convergence) and the only source of authority and 
constraints over interpretive discretion is to be found in the community of 
interpreters. 
 
3.3. The merits of the communicative theory of regulatory 
interpretation 
 
The merits of the communicative theory of regulatory interpretation become easily 
apparent once we reflect on the essence of its constitutive postulates in a 
little more detail. For example, it is not difficult to see what is so compelling 
in the supposition that the interpreters’ intentions are central in determining 
the meaning of rules. Rules are man-made and common sense suggests that 
their meaning is not out there in the world to observe it. Therefore, it seems 
that the only reasonable thing to do is to interpret them in light of the 
purposes, intentions and motives of each of the persons that are involved in 
the production and subsequent use of rules by asking why did they mean by 
that exactly the same way as we do in the course of a conversation when we 
are trying to grasp the meaning of utterances of our co-discussants in light 
of the purposes, motives and aspirations we suppose for them to have. 
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This brings me to the second point I wish to make concerning the authority 
of regulatory interpretive communities in imposing constraints over the 
exercise of interpretive discretion and the consensual character of 
interpretation. I can think of at least two arguments in support of the view 
that the presence of interpretive communities is the only source of 
constraints to interpretive discretion. 
 
The first one is once again common sense. Insofar as one subscribes to the 
idea that the meaning of rules is contingent to the interpreters’ intentions, 
one accepts that regulatory interpretive communities are the only logically 
conceivable source of control over interpretive discretion. Other candidate 
arguments would propound that boundaries are to be found in the legal text 
or that the interpreters’ beliefs about what a rule means are held in check by 
the authority of institutional principles. But is it not true that these claims 
commit us to a counter-intuitive world ontology? Is it not true that beliefs 
about the meaning of institutional principles and norms are no less 
subjective than beliefs about what a legal rule means? The meaning of a legal 
text does not stand out there waiting to be discovered. Similarly, institutional 
principles are nowhere really. Rather people use the language of principles 
to add to their subjective beliefs more persuasive power.133  
 
The second argument in support of the authority of interpretive 
communities as envisaged by the communicative thesis lies in its ethical and 
moral constitution. It seems to me that the case for interpretive 
communities as the only source of control over interpretive discretion draws 
directly on the powerful idea that those likely to be affected by regulation 
are human beings and as such they should have the freedom and 
                                                 
133 Above note 16. 
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simultaneously the burden to decide matters of their interest for 
themselves.134 Therefore, regulatory officials and bureaucrats should not be 
allowed to push them around and indoctrinate them or decide in their 
stead.135  
 
What I said so far in relation to the authority of the regulatory interpretive 
community applies with equal force to the consensual character of 
regulatory interpretation that emanates from the communicative thesis. 
There are, however, additional reasons for one to be favourably predisposed 
to the view that regulatory interpretation is consensual in that those 
practising it are committed to the attainment of interpretive convergence. 
This becomes clear once we consider the conception of rule-effectiveness 
that ensues from Rules and Regulators.136 It is suggested that Black embraces a 
conception of rule-effectiveness that captures adequately well the down-to-
earth concerns of the regulator and the regulatees; concerns, such as, being 
in a position to predict whether a particular mode of action will not trigger 
litigation risk, especially if we see things from the point of view of the 
regulated population or, how to cultivate the necessary psychological 
conditions for optimal compliance with the rules, if we see things from the 
point of view of the regulator. This conception of rule-effectiveness is 
consistent with one of our most basic intuitions about how financial 
regulation should go about, namely the intuition that financial regulation -
and consequently the use of rules- should be procedurally efficient.137 This 
                                                 
134 This idea is prominent in the work of John Rawls. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1997) at 54; B. Stroud, 
‘The Study of Human Nature and the Subjectivity of Value’ in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 
delivered at the University of Buenos Aires, June 7, 1998 at 219 [http://www. Tannerlectures.utah.edu].  
135 My claim presupposes that there is something valuable in encouraging adherence with regulatory 
requirements upon reflection. This is not universally accepted however. Joseph Raz, for example, argues 
that law (and -I would add- regulation) must consist of directives capable of replacing the subject’s 
judgment about how to behave. With other words, it must consist of commands that people ought to 
submit to without critical reflection. J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (1979), ch.1. 
136 This topic is discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 
137 As John Finnis puts it “One must not waste one’s opportunities by using inefficient methods. One’s 
actions should be judged by their effectiveness, by their fitness for their purpose, by their utility, their 
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means that in institutional terms financial regulation should be capable to 
address contingencies that hinder the efficiency of financial regulation as, 
for example, disagreements about the meaning of regulatory requirements, 
the lack of forseeability as to the perpetually changing market landscape, the 
need to regulate the interpretive strategy of rules and the need to control the 
exercise of administrative discretion as to the interpretation of rules. 
 
The consensual character of regulatory interpretation serves to bring this 
notion of rule-effectiveness into materialisation. It does so by setting a 
realistic agenda for the architects of financial regulation. Specifically, a policy 
of rule-use, that is informed by a communicative conception of regulatory 
interpretation, does not aim at discovering the objectively true meaning of 
regulatory norms; this would be naïve let alone dangerous, as it would bring 
the whole regulatory process into a deadlock. Rather, it encapsulates more 
modest and pragmatic objectives, as, for instance, the need to ensure that 
communication provides clarification, cultivates a common understanding 
of rules and fosters the necessary psychological conditions for optimal 
compliance. In addition to that, the idea that regulatory interpretation must 
be consensus-based brings with it a number of other advantages. These 
include strengthening regulatory accountability and gaining the trust of the 
public by opening up the regulatory system and cultivating a sense of 
fairness and legitimacy.  
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In Rules and Regulators, Julia Black develops a thesis for the nature and use of 
rules in financial regulation with the view of proposing ways in which we 
                                                                                                                                            
consequences.” John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (2003), 111. See also T. Scanlon, What We Owe 
to Each Other (2000), at 79-80. 
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can make more effective use of them. Focusing on the linguistic nature of 
rules, Black identifies three limitations that diminish the regulator’s capacity 
to use rules effectively: over- or under- inclusiveness, indeterminacy and 
interpretation. She argues that these difficulties can be dealt with by 
deploying a mixture of different types of rules, the creation of a regulatory 
interpretive community and the adoption of a conversational style of 
regulation. This chapter offered an overview of her thesis with the aim of 
shedding light on a wealth of insights, which –when put together- comprise 
a very interesting account of regulatory interpretation. Starting from the 
observation that interpretive convergence is crucial for using rules 
effectively, the discussion progressively spelled out all those assumptions 
that lie beneath this idea and constitute what it has been called the 
communicative thesis. 
  
According to the communicative reading, interpreting equals to 
communicating one’s personal beliefs about how regulatory requirements 
should be understood. It is an opportunity for sharing information and for 
reconciliation through persuasion. Significantly, the community of 
interpreters is seen as the only source of interpretive authority. What the 
rule in question means cannot stand independently of what the community 
of interpreters think it means, based on shared background of beliefs, 
intentions and expectations. Therefore, the subject matter of interpretation 
is not the rule itself but the interpreters’ utterances. Now, given the plethora 
of equally valid meanings that can be attached to a rule it becomes crucial 
that regulatory interpretation should work towards cultivating a shared 
understanding of regulatory requirements and ultimately towards 
interpretive convergence. 
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It is not difficult to see what is so compelling in the communicative theory 
of regulatory interpretation. On the one hand, it finds direct support to our 
common sense as well as to our fundamental intuitions about the moral 
constitution of the members of the regulatory community, which demands 
that they are not put aside when it comes to decide issues such as the 
production of new rules or the interpretation of existing ones. On the other 
hand, it offers an account of regulatory interpretation that is consistent with 
the idea that financial regulation -and consequently the use of rules- should 
be procedurally efficient. The communicative thesis is not free from 
problems. These are explored in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
Towards a Constructive Theory of Regulatory Interpretation 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter considers some difficulties that are endogenous to the 
communicative thesis and progressively the discussion will pave the way to 
an alternative account of the nature of regulatory interpretation –the 
constructive thesis. So far, it has been argued that the communicative theory 
is based on the idea that the use of rules in financial regulation is a form of 
communication among members of a community of interpreters. Three 
suppositions constitute the nucleus of this claim. The first one is that the 
meaning of rules depends on the interpreters’ intentions and, therefore, the 
subject matter of interpretation is making sense of the discussant’s 
utterances; the second one is that the community of interpreters have the 
authority of signalling out what counts as acceptable or non-acceptable 
interpretation (the community of interpreters is the sole source of 
constraints over the exercise of interpretive discretion) and, finally, the third 
assumption is that the point or purpose of regulatory interpretation is to 
attain interpretive convergence. 
 
These assumptions pose some very interesting questions. For example, with 
respect to the claim that the meaning of rules depends on the interpreters’ 
intentions, it comes naturally for one to ask: “How the notion of intention is 
to be understood?” “Do regulatory interpretive communities have 
intentions?” “If not, whose intention should we take into account in 
interpreting rules?” “Granted that interpreters often have more than one 
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intentions, how are we supposed to choose between them?” In relation to 
the second postulate, “Is it appropriate to say that there is nothing to 
constrain interpretive discretion –apart from the interpretive community 
and the dominant ideology of the time?” “What about the text, in which 
regulatory requirements are embodied?” “What about the fact that rules are 
produced by virtue of a statutory mandate that the rule-maker is bound to 
observe?” “Granted that the use of rules in regulation is part of our political 
history, is this practice not a continuation of our political tradition to be 
governed by the Rule of Law?” “Do all these not confine one’s available 
options?” Similarly, the suggestion that regulatory interpretation aims at 
interpretive convergence rather than ensuring that rules are correctly 
interpreted raises its own questions:1 “Can interpreters agree on the 
interpretation of rules and, still, get their interpretation wrong?” “In the 
event of mistaken interpretation, can we still argue that rules are used 
effectively?” 
 
All these questions touch upon very contentious issues with respect to 
interpretation. Therefore, it is suggested that before assessing the robustness 
of the communicative theory of regulatory interpretation, we should first 
improve our understanding of interpretation in general. Since regulatory 
interpretation is a species of legal interpretation, I propose to do so by 
comparing legal interpretation with interpretation in other fields of 
knowledge, particularly literature. 
 
                                                 
1 The idea of interpretive convergence was discussed in Chapter Four (note 99 at page 176 and page 177). 
No doubt, judges have the last word in deciding interpretive disputes. This, however, is not a licence for 
the regulator to do whatever he wants out of the rule in question. Insofar as he takes his office seriously, 
the regulator is bound to act within and not outside the premises of the Rule of Law. I will return to this 
point latter on. 
  
 
198
The thought that law is like literature and that theory may profit by 
comparing the two is neither old2 nor counterintuitive.3 Both depend on the 
activity of interpreting text. In both domains authoritative interpretation 
becomes institutionalised.4 Not unlike literary text, legal text is interpreted as 
something that is distinct from its creator. Similarly to the interpreter of a 
classical canon, the judges (and virtually every public official who is 
entrusted with the interpretation of rules) have behind them a history of 
previous interpretations that filtrate and refine their grasp the legal text.5 
Furthermore, legal philosophers and practitioners, struggle with the 
boundaries of linguistic sense as much as do critics of poetry and 
experimental literature. 
 
Below, I temporarily put the discussion of regulatory interpretation aside to 
go back to basics. I explore the practice of interpretation in general drawing 
on the field of literature, with the view of getting a deeper understanding of 
those themes that are central to any theory that aims to offer an account of 
regulatory interpretation such as, the point or purpose of interpretation, the 
determinants of meaning, the presence (or absence) of limitations over 
interpretative discretion and authority. My next step will be to compare the 
practice of interpretation in literature with regulatory interpretation in order 
                                                 
2 The Law and Literature Movement emerged in the USA around the late 70’s. R. Shiner, ‘Doing What 
Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies by Stanley 
Fish’, 49(4) The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (1991), 375 at 375. This school of thought assumes that 
law is intrinsically linked with the philosophy of language. Not everyone shares this view, however. On that 
point see, M. S. Green, ‘Dworkin’s Fallacy, or What the Philosophy of Language Can’t Teach Us About 
Law’, 89 Virginia Law Review (2003), 1897. 
3 R. Shiner, above, 375 at 376; S. Levinson, ‘Law as Literature’, 60 Texas Law Review (1981-1982), 373; J. B. 
White, ‘Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature’, 60 Texas Law Review (1981-1982), 415; G. 
Graff, ‘“Keep off the Grass”, “Drop Dead”, and Other Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford 
Levinson’, 60 Texas Law Review (1981-1982), 405; R. Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’, 60 Texas Law Review, 
(1981-1982) 527; S. Fish ‘Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision’ and ‘Working on the Chain Gang: 
Interpretation in Law and Literature’, 60 Texas Law Review (1981-1982), 495 and 551 respectively.  
4 Ronald Dworkin calls this kind of interpretation “creative interpretation” to distinguish it from other 
forms of interpretation namely interpretation in the course of conversation (“conversational”) and the 
interpretation of scientific data (“scientific interpretation”). R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (2000), 50-51. 
5 Regulatory officials are no exception to this rule, when asked to interpret their statutory mandate for the 
purposes of policy making, rulemaking and enforcement. These as well are the bearers of a wealth of past 
interpretations that shape their understanding of regulatory norms.  
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to highlight a plethora of features that share in common. Significantly, these 
features will reveal a picture of regulatory interpretation that is much 
different from the one under the communicative theory and, as a result- call 
into question the soundness of its underlying assumptions mentioned 
earlier. In light of this inconsistency, towards the end of this chapter, I will 
explore the possibility of developing an alternative theory of regulatory 
interpretation. 
 
 
2. Interpretation in literature 
 
2.1. The aesthetic hypothesis 
 
The comparative examination of interpretation in literature and 
interpretation in law cannot be fruitful, unless we are prepared to see literary 
interpretation in a “certain light”. Ronald Dworkin explained what that light 
is by developing the aesthetic hypothesis. 6 
 
Starting from the observation that many things fall under the description of 
interpretation in literature, he argued that in order to get an insight into the 
practice of legal interpretation, our focus should be on those arguments, 
which offer some sort of interpretation of the meaning of a work of 
literature  –say, a theatrical play- as a whole (interpretive arguments). A distinct 
characteristic of these arguments is that they have a practical point -for 
                                                 
6 The discussion in this section draws heavily on R. Dworkin’s comparative analysis of interpretation in the 
context of art and in the context of law. One of the core threads of his analysis is his criticism of the idea 
that the meaning of (legal) text depends on its author’s intention. His arguments become of particular 
relevance in the case under examination because many insights are equally applicable in connection to the 
communicative thesis and, in particular, the claim that the meaning of rules is contingent to the 
interpreter’s intention, the latter being reflection of the shared form of life of the interpretive community. 
Above note 4, chapter 2, particularly 49-86; R. Dworkin, Matter of Principle (2000), ch. 6 particularly 152-
154, where he defends the aesthetic hypothesis against various objections; R. Dworkin, note 3, 527; and 
‘My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don’t Talk about Objectivity Any More’ in 
W. J. T. Mitchell (ed), The Politics of Interpretation  (1983), 287. 
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example, they inform a director about how to stage a new performance of a 
play- yet, they may also be of more general importance, as they may help us 
gain a valuable insight into our literary culture. Interpretive arguments take the 
form of statements about characters or events in the story behind the story 
or statements about the “point”, “theme” or “meaning” of the play as a 
whole. With respect to Shakespeare’s famous theatrical play Hamlet, 
examples of statements of the first kind are claims asserting that Hamlet 
loved his mother, or that Hamlet hated his mother, that Hamlet was 
schizophrenic or that Hamlet was simply a confused young man. Examples 
of the second kind include claims such as the assertion that Hamlet and 
Ophelia were lovers in the past or that Hamlet and Ophelia were completely 
strangers. Finally, examples of the third kind of statements constitute claims 
such as that Hamlet is a play about the relationship between sexes or that 
Hamlet is a play about political corruption. 
 
Directors, critics, actors and members of audience alike disagree about how 
to answer questions that bear out interpretive arguments.7 According to 
Dworkin, these disagreements centre on the more fundamental question 
about which interpretation of Hamlet (or more generally any piece of 
literature) shows Hamlet the best work of art of its genre or –to put it 
differently- which way of reading or directing or acting reveals this play as 
the best work of theatrical art.8 In this regard, different theories of 
interpretation disagree, because they assume “different normative theories 
about what literature is and what it is for and about what makes a work of 
art better than another.”9 This is the first assumption of the aesthetic 
hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
7 R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, 149. 
8 Above, 152. 
9 R. Dworkin, above note 3, 534. 
  
 
201
The second one is the supposition that there is a sharp distinction between 
explaining a work of art and changing it into a different one.10 In relation to 
Hamlet, it is possible for one to contend that Shakespeare could have written 
a better play if the hero would have been a more decisive man. From that it 
does not follow that Hamlet -the play Shakespeare did actually write- is like 
that. Contemporary theories of interpretation use as part of their response 
to the requirement of the identity of the text the notion of canonical text.11 
Indeed, in the name of identity, the text circumscribes the scope of available 
interpretations in the sense that interpreters are not allowed to ignore words 
that are contained in the text or change them. But the presence of text is not 
the only source of restrictions. Other constrains include considerations 
about the integrity and coherence in literature as a form of art. 
 
All these constrictions represent different points of potential disagreement. 
Yet, interpreters do not simply disagree on formal or quasi-formal aspects of 
Hamlet. According to the aesthetic hypothesis, there is a deeper level of 
disagreement, a divergence of views concerning the point and function of 
art broadly conceived. As Dworkin puts it, works of art “do not exist in 
isolation from philosophy, psychology, sociology and cosmology”. For 
example, someone who accepts Feminism will probably have a different 
theory of art from someone who does not. Similarly, a director cannot 
defend a staging of Hamlet that is strictly faithful to the historical context of 
the play, unless he subscribes to a sub-theory about the point and function 
of art, according to which what is valuable in classical theatrical plays is their 
reference to a particular historical era.  
                                                 
10 R. Dworkin, above note 3, 531. On this account interpretation resembles to that of a chain novel in 
progress where each subsequent author is constrained by what has been already written by his predecessors 
in the sense that he must produce something that forms an organic whole with the previous chapters while 
making the entire novel the best it can be. See also, D. Litowitz, ‘Dworkin and Critical Legal Studies on 
Right Answers and Conceptual Holism,’ 18 Legal Studies Forum (1994), 135 at 143. 
11 In the case of music interpreters have as point of reference the canonical score, while in painting and 
sculpture a unique physical object. 
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Clearly, the interpreter relies both on beliefs of a theoretical character about 
identity and other formal properties of the piece of literature under 
interpretation as well as on more explicitly normative beliefs about what is 
good in art.12 Normative beliefs are ingrained in the structure of interpretive 
argument and so does evaluation in the course of interpretation. 
Consequently, another feature of the aesthetic hypothesis is that it does not 
endorse the frequently made sharp distinction between interpretation 
conceived as discovering the real meaning of a work of art –Hamlet, in our 
case- where evaluation is supposedly absent, and criticism, conceived as 
evaluation of this success or importance.13 Evaluative beliefs about art figure 
in both cases. 
 
That the aesthetic hypothesis is attentive to the presence of evaluation in 
interpretation does not entail that the aesthetic hypothesis subscribes to the 
sceptical view, according to which interpretive judgements in art cannot be 
objectively true or false.14 Specifically, the aesthetic hypothesis takes a very 
careful approach to the issue of objectivity.15 Although it accepts that no 
important aesthetic claim can be demonstrated to be true or false and that 
no interpretive argument can be produced that we can be sure that it will 
receive universal acceptance, it contends that it does not follow that no 
                                                 
12 Nonetheless, the interpreter need not consciously and fully adhere to a particular theory of art. What is 
important here is that the interpreter has genuine beliefs and not merely “reactions”. R. Dworkin, above 
note 7, 151-152. 
13 R. Dworkin, above note 7, 153. Many scholars draw this distinction because they are not comfortable 
with the presence of evaluation in interpretation. In their view evaluation is subjective and prejudiced and, 
therefore, erodes the real meaning of the text. O. Fiss, ‘Objectivity and Interpretation’, 34 Stanford Law 
Review (1981-1982), 739. 
14 It follows that the aesthetic hypothesis must not be confused with a very popular theory in the field of 
literature whose core postulate is that since interpretation creates a work of art and represents only the fiat 
of a particular critical community there are only interpretations and no best interpretation of any particular 
poem novel or play. A prominent advocate of this view is Stanley Fish. 
15 Objectivity in the context of law (including regulation) should be understood as accommodating 
creativity, disagreement and error. Above note 13, 747-748. 
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normative theory about art is better than any other, nor that one theory 
cannot be the best that has so far been produced.16 
 
In the same vein, the aesthetic hypothesis claims that in light of the public 
nature of the enterprise of interpretation, we should not assume a priori that 
interpretive statements must be capable of validity or what validity in 
interpretation is like (for example, whether validity requires the possibility of 
demonstrability). Instead, it is better to approach questions of validity in a 
more empirical manner by studying, first, “a variety of activities in which 
people assume that they have good reasons for what they say and which 
they assume that these reasons hold generally and not just from one or 
another individual point of view” and, then, judging “what standards people 
accept in practice for thinking that they have reasons of that kind”.17  
 
Finally, the aesthetic hypothesis draws a sharp distinction between what a 
work of art is and what the interpreter believes or intends it to be.18 In this 
manner it acknowledges as part of the practice of interpretation the fact that 
the interpreter treats a work of art as an object that exists independently 
from his initial beliefs and world-views. Moreover, it makes space so that 
the interpretation of a work of art is constantly revised and, when found 
mistaken due to the presence of false beliefs, remedied appropriately. 
 
To sum-up the aesthetic hypothesis comprises the following claims: (a) 
Theoretical accounts of interpretation in literature are candidates for the 
best answer to the substantive question posed by interpretation rather than 
candidate analyses of the notion of interpretation; (b) disputes about the 
proper interpretation of a work of art involve normative disagreement about 
                                                 
16 The question of objectivity is one of the most puzzling topics in the fields of law, ethics and philosophy 
of language. This is further discussed in the next chapter. 
17 Above note 7, 153-154. 
18 Above, 157-158. 
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the point and function of art in general, alongside disagreement about 
formal or quasi-formal aspects of the work of art in question; (c) there is a 
sharp distinction between making sense of a work of art as it is and 
changing it into a different one, given that in the former case considerations 
about the identity of the work of art as well as about integrity and coherence 
in literature  impose firm constraints on interpretive discretion; and (d) the 
interpreter treats the work of art as an object that exists independently from 
one’s personal beliefs and intentions. In this manner he acknowledges the 
possibility that his understanding of the object of interpretation may turn 
out to be mistaken and therefore in need of revision and change.  
 
2.2. Interpreting a piece of literature 
 
Here is how the aesthetic hypothesis works in the field of literature. Suppose 
that there is a group of three young directors –Tom, Stuart and John- who 
take directing very seriously and have the ambition to make a new staging of 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet.19 Among the things that they need to do is to 
interpret Hamlet in order to decide issues about the staging of the play. They 
have to answer questions that give rise to a host of interpretive arguments. 
They must take a stance as, to what extent the overall setting of the play 
must be faithful to the historical era of the play, whether the actors should 
‘mime’ notions or directions that figure in the narrative of the play, and 
whether it would be a good idea to arrange conjunctions and line endings in 
such a manner so that the audience, as they go on attending the play, 
develop contradictory assumptions so that at the very end their 
understanding of Hamlet is different from what it was at discrete points 
                                                 
19 I deliberately imagine a group of directors instead of one director acting on his own, in order to make 
this fictitious situation resemble an interpretive community. This term is used loosely and interchangeably 
with the term “community of interpreters” or “regulatory community”, unless otherwise specified. In any 
case participation in the interpretive community should be seen as open-ended so that progressively 
expands and engulfs theatrical critics and even members of the audience.  
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along the way. How they will decide these issues will depend on how they 
will conceive the character of the heroes (Is Hamlet indecisive or 
schizophrenic prince?), the nature of their relationship (Does Gertrude 
suspect that Claudius killed her husband? Does Gertrude marry Claudius 
out of interest or because she is deeply in love with him?), and the point of 
the play (What is the central message of Hamlet? To depict the insane state 
of mind of the prince of Denmark? To make a statement about the 
wickedness of political corruption? To condemn the presence of social 
inequality and oppression between sexes?).20 
 
In answering these questions, one might suggest that the group of young 
directors will interpret the play in a manner that will guarantee its 
commercial success. Urged by their interest to gain quick fame and money, 
they will interpret the text with the view of “putting in” things that in their 
belief will please the audience and hopefully keep critics happy.21 On that 
view, the point of interpreting Hamlet is to offer an understanding of the 
play that it will be agreeable to the viewers’ tastes. Despite the plausibility of 
this account, in my view, it is a mistake to say that the whole point of 
interpreting Hamlet is to propose ‘an understanding of the play that it will be 
agreeable to the viewers’ tastes’ because, in this case, it is unlikely that the 
directors take their job seriously. Suppose that you are a fun of theatre with 
a special interest in Shakespeare’s plays and you have a friendly chat with the 
directors of my example. At some point you are told that they decided to 
stage Hamlet in such a way so that in the famous scene where Claudius is 
preying, Hamlet does not abstain from killing him. In hearing that, you react 
in the following manner: “You know what? This is an interesting idea, but 
with all due respect I don’t think that this is the best interpretation of the 
                                                 
20 T. Griffith (ed), Shakespeare Five Great Tragedies (1998), 101-108. 
21 An alternative suggestion might be that the directors want simply to express themselves. This, however, 
would mean that the directors are not interested in staging Hamlet but in creating a new play inspired by 
Shakespeare’s famous play. 
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play because –if anything- Hamlet is supposed to be indecisive throughout 
the play.” If the directors defend their decision by saying “Well my friend 
perhaps you are right but we want to reassure the audience’s sense of justice 
and what a better way to do so by satisfying the audience’s appetite for 
violent and bloody scenes. There is no doubt that if we became famous we 
would owe our fame to this scene!” I am sure you would have good reasons 
to feel disappointed and to think that the directors of my example do not 
show the proper respect to the theatrical play.  
 
The reason that I invited you to imagine this fictitious chat is to make plain 
the following point:  That if John Stuart and Tom are really serious on what 
they are doing, than their priority should be not to please the audience or to 
become celebrities but to take care so that their interpretation of Hamlet 
does not compromise the aesthetic value of the play as a piece of art. 
Although there is nothing wrong in having personal ambitions and pursuing 
individual interests, it is the nature of directing that requires from those 
practising it to respect the object of interpretation and develop a sense of 
duty –a commitment that they will do the best possible to get the meaning 
of the play ‘right’. Were we to apply a theory of interpretation that would 
allow interpreters (acting individually or jointly as members of a community) 
to do whatever they wanted to do out of a piece of art, we would be bound 
to miss this important aspect of interpretation in literature namely, the fact 
that it makes certain demands to its practitioners to the effect of recognising 
that a piece of art has value that stands independently of whether it serves 
other purposes as, for example, financial gain, or social order. 
 
In my example, I also suppose that the directors wish to interpret Hamlet 
with the view of gaining a deeper understanding of the play as it is that is, 
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their aim is not to create a new theatrical play inspired by the original one.22 
It follows that part of their task is to depict the character of Hamlet –the 
main hero- as it is and not to change it into a different one.23 This means 
that, if they eventually come to believe that Shakespeare would have written 
a better play if the hero would have been a man of action rather than a man 
of words and gestures, this belief is irrelevant because it does not follow that 
Hamlet, the play that Shakespeare did actually write is like that. Similarly, if in 
the directors’ opinion Shakespeare would have ended up with a superior 
play if he had stressed and condemned the social inequality between men 
and women in medieval Denmark, this does not mean that this is the 
theatrical play that Shakespeare wrote. Their attitude towards Hamlet leaves 
beyond doubt that in the course of interpretation, the directors treat the 
work of art as an object that exists independently from their intentions and 
world-views.  
 
The difference between interpreting a work of art and change it into a 
different one bears with it the following implication. To the extent in which 
directors wish to stage Hamlet and not a different theatrical play that will be 
inspired by the original play, they are bound to attend certain restrictions. 
The identity of the work of art under interpretation, namely the fact that the 
directors are dealing with a text that happens to be a theatrical play rather 
than a novel or a poem, is one of them. Up to this point it is important to 
recall that they wish to stage Hamlet as a theatrical play. They do not aspire, 
for example, to adapt the text of the theatrical play so that it eventually 
becomes a philosophical novel to be read aloud in front of an audience. The 
identity of the text suggests that the directors are not free to ignore the 
words of the text or to change them.24 Coherence and integrity provide another 
                                                 
22 Recall that despite their personal aspirations “they take directing seriously.” See the discussion above at 
page 205. 
23 Above note 7, 150. 
24 Above. 
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set of restrictions to their interpretive style. No matter how much they 
aspire to make the staging of Hamlet an eminent piece of art, it is profound 
that the directors will have to avoid interpreting Hamlet in a manner that will 
make a large part of the text irrelevant. Accordingly, in their attempt to 
provide an interpretation of Hamlet that justifies the aesthetic value of the 
theatrical play as much as possible, the directors are not allowed to 
transform it from a theatrical play into -say- a philosophical novel, by virtue 
of their belief that a philosophical novel is aesthetically more valuable than a 
theatrical play. If this were the case, than the interpretation of Hamlet would 
fail because the interpretation would make the philosophical novel a mess 
not least because the organisation, style and figures would be appropriate for 
an entirely different genre.25 
 
The analysis above makes plain that there is a host of sources of constraints 
that interpreters must observe while interpreting a piece of art. However, 
one might object this claim and argue instead that in reality there are no 
limits when interpreting a piece of art like the theatrical play of our 
example.26 His protest could be captured in the following statement: “You 
are right in identifying a range of other factors –“constraints” as you call 
them- that mould the interpreters’ grasp of the text. You fail to see, 
however, that the interpreters’ (the directors, in my example) perception of 
these factors (text, integrity, coherence) relies upon their subjective world-
views, which are relative to their cultural upbringing. Furthermore, you fall 
short from realising that whether they will be taken into account and to 
what extent they will draw the line between acceptable and non-acceptable 
interpretation of Hamlet depends entirely on their subjective judgements. 
                                                 
25 The fact that this reinterpretation can be successful in some cases but not in others reaffirms further the 
constraint of integrity. R. Dworkin draws example from Agatha Christie’s stories and Raymond Chandler 
to illustrate this point. Above note 7, 150-151. 
26 Although I consider this objection in more detail in the next chapter, I feel that I should say a few things 
in advance, as this will allow me to shed light in a number of other aspects of the practice of interpretation 
that arguably should inform any theoretical framework of regulatory interpretation. 
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The restrictions that you identify are not out there in the world. They are 
made by the interpretive community (John, Stuart and Tom or more broadly 
the professional community of theatrical directors), within which the 
interpreters interact. They are “constraints” insofar as and to the extent in 
which the members of the interpretive community recognise them as 
such.”27 
 
There is no doubt that the directors’ beliefs about interpretive constraints 
are relative to cultural upbringing and the community in which they live. 
Similarly, claims about constraints and their ensuing interpretive arguments 
are subjective, if what we mean with the term ‘subjective’ is something that 
we cannot demonstrate to be true or false in the same way we can 
demonstrate for example that it is summer in the physical sciences. It is a 
mistake, however, to hold that we cannot really tell whether one 
interpretation is better than another, because by doing so we are bound to 
deny the possibility of a genuine debate about issues of interpretation and 
with that the possibility that interpreters can be mistaken in their views or 
their capacity to reflect on their views and revise them after rational 
judgement. To put it differently, the issue here is not whether the 
interpreters’ beliefs are subjective and relative  (of course they are) but 
whether it is intelligible to say that interpreters can rationally debate matters 
of interpretation as, for example, whether it is a right or wrong to regard a 
particular consideration as eligible limit to their interpretive discretion.28 
                                                 
27 To be precise, Fish argues that constrains over one’s interpretation come from consensus among 
members of the interpretive community. His point is that if the interpretive community in which I belong 
says that “x” is a “cycle” then, I am not free to call “x”, “square.” I am not free, in the sense that my 
interpretation will automatically be rejected by the interpretive community in which I partake. S. Fish, 
above note 3, ‘Working in the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature’, 555 and; ‘Wrong Again’, 
60 Texas Law Review (1983-1984), 299. In this manner he tries to disassociate himself from proponents of 
the idea that “anything goes” as, for example, Sanford Levinson (see above note 3). However, the 
successful of his endeavour is questionable. R. Dworkin, ‘Don’t Talk About Objectivity Any More’, above 
note 6, 295. 
28 Owen Fiss proposes a thought-provoking thesis about how the notion of objectivity should be 
understood in the context of law. He argues that essentially objectivity in law “connotes standards.” He 
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This point becomes clear once we consider how we actually think of two 
people debating the interpretation of a piece of art. Despite the fact that 
their views are informed by their cultural and social background, their 
disagreements about interpretation are genuine in the sense that there is 
always a case that they are trying to support or object.29 We also regard them 
as generally able to identify mistakes and correct them through rational 
deliberation. Moreover, we think that the worth of an argument does not 
depend entirely on the identity of the person that expresses it. For instance, 
if one of the directors said that “we should highlight the frustration of 
Gertrude and Ophelia in the play, so that to make a point about female 
oppression” you would think that a response of the sort “well, he says that 
because he is a feminist” to be beside the point, for the question here is not 
a question of biographical fact (“How it comes and he holds this view?”), 
but a question of value (“What kind of interpretation makes Hamlet the best 
possible play it can be? Is it true that if we highlight female frustration, we 
will make Hamlet the best possible play of its genre?” “Is it true that if we 
put emphasis on female frustration, we will justify the aesthetic value of the 
play in the best possible way?”).  
 
To conclude the advocate of the idea that there are no real constraints to 
circumscribe interpretive discretion for the community of interpreters has 
de facto authority over what is going to count as acceptable (or non-
acceptable) interpretation wants us to stop insisting on the presence of 
interpretive constraints, for otherwise we are bound to get trapped into a 
theoretical account of interpretation that commits us to accepting an absurd 
world-ontology. I argued that were we to follow this view of interpretation, 
                                                                                                                                            
further demonstrates convincingly that the notion of objectivity is compatible with the presence of 
disagreement as much as with the contingence of error.  Above note 13, 748. 
29 N. Stavropoulos, ‘Interpretivist Theories in Law’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2003) [www. 
plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-interpretivist]. 
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we would be bound to make interpretive debate look unintelligible. 
Consequently, the case against the presence of interpretive constraints is 
unfounded.30 
 
The analysis so far worked on the assumption that the theatrical play is 
treated as an object of interpretation that stands independently from the 
director’s intentions.31 This seems to contradict with a very popular view 
according to which there is no space between the object of interpretation 
and what the author or the reader intends it to be.32 There is something 
deeply problematic in this widely accepted thesis. If we assume that at some 
point John and Stuart claim that Hamlet is about death and Tom disagrees 
with them because in his view Hamlet is about political corruption, they do 
not disagree on the content of their utterances -what Tom believes Hamlet to 
be or to what John and Stuart believe Hamlet to be, as the popular view 
assumes. They disagree about what Hamlet as a theatrical play is. To say that 
disagreement about the object of interpretation is a façade suggests failure to 
appreciate that to treat a work of art independently of one’s intentions 
constitutes integral part of the practice of artistic interpretation. Moreover, it 
indicates a deeper misconception of how intentions for a work of art like a 
theatrical play and beliefs about it interact. 
 
To appreciate the interaction between intentions and beliefs, let’s suppose 
that after a long time of preparation the group of directors in my fictitious 
scenario stage Hamlet with some success. Suddenly in the seventh 
performance of the play they start seeing something “in” Hamlet that they 
                                                 
30 This point is further discussed in Chapter Six. 
31 See below Chapter Six. 
32 S. Levinson, above note 3, 373; and G. Graff, 405. Professor Fish is also an enthusiast of this view 
although with a twist. He argues that the interpreter’s intentions are manifestations of the shared 
understanding of the interpretive community in which he belongs and on that basis he concludes that the 
text is the product of a particular interpretive community. S. Fish, ‘Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 
above note 3, 503. 
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did not notice before. The central hero, Hamlet, shows towards Gertrude a 
kind of affection that is unusual in a relationship between mother and son. 
Thus they start to interpret Hamlet’s fragile mental state and his motivation 
to seek revenge very differently. In their mind Hamlet no longer figures as a 
young man who became mentally ill as a result of his father’s murder and 
who now wishes to take revenge for his father’s death. Rather, Hamlet 
figures as a mentally unstable young man due to his repressed sexual feelings 
for his mother Gertrude. His thirst for blood, his unhappiness and 
indecisiveness, all spring from Oedipus complex.  
 
What is it that has actually happened in the minds of the directors? Those 
who insist that directors in reality pretend to disagree about Hamlet want us 
to choose between two possibilities.33 To assume that either the directors 
suddenly realized that they had a “subconscious intention” earlier, which 
they only now discover, or they have changed their intention later. Neither 
of these suppositions seems to work in practice. The claim about the 
presence of a subconscious intention, cannot work, unless we are prepared 
to accept that, apart from the directors’ views, there is some independent 
evidence –as of the kind a psychologist would require- for otherwise the 
explanation would rest on unproved premises. This is not crucial to the 
point, however. To borrow from Dworkin once again, the directors’ 
decisions and beliefs about the character of the hero are not the outcome of 
the directors’ confronting their earlier decisions and beliefs but the outcome 
of the directors’ confronting the work they have produced.34 By the same 
token, it is not accurate to call the directors’ revised beliefs about Hamlet’s 
character new and discrete intentions, because these are beliefs about the 
character they have created and not “intentions” about what sort of 
                                                 
33 Above note 7, 154-158. 
34 Above, 157. 
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character to create.35 In short, Tom, Stuart and John changed their views 
about the character of Hamlet in the course of staging the play by 
interpreting Hamlet rather than by exploring the subconscious depths of 
some previous plan or finding that they had a new plan. 
 
This brings the discussion to a further and much more crucial point. 
Similarly to an author, a director (or a group of directors as the case might 
be) “is capable of detaching what” he has created “from his earlier 
intentions and beliefs”. He has the capacity to treat his creature “as an 
object” in itself and reach “fresh conclusions about his work grounded in 
aesthetic judgements”.36 Accordingly, any full description of what the 
directors intended, once they set out to stage Hamlet, must include the 
intention to produce something capable of being treated that way, by 
themselves and therefore by others, and so must include the intention to 
create something that is independent of their intentions.37 With other words, 
although we can isolate the full set of beliefs that the group of directors 
have at a particular point of time (say, at the premiere of Hamlet) and declare 
that these beliefs fix what Hamlet is about, it is inaccurate to call these beliefs 
“intentions”. Furthermore, it is inappropriate to choose them as point of 
reference for our interpretation of the theatrical play because, in doing so, 
we are bound to ignore “another kind or level of intention, which is the 
intention to create a work, whose nature or meaning is not fixed in this way, 
because it is a work of art.”38   
 
To recapitulate, in this section I overviewed the practice of interpretation in 
literature in light of the aesthetic hypothesis. It was suggested that the 
                                                 
35 Above, 157. 
36 R. Dworkin, above note 7, 157. 
37 R. Dworkin, above note 3, 539-540. He further develops these points in ‘Don’t Talk about Objectivity 
any More’ in W. J. T. Mitchell (ed) The Politics of Interpretation (1983), 287. 
38 Above note 7, 158. 
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subject matter of interpretation in literature is the work of art itself rather 
than the interpreters’ utterances of how they understand it.39 The point of 
interpretation is to make the work of art the best it can be. In doing so, 
those who interpret it are attentive to a range of considerations including the 
identity of the work of art, artistic integrity and coherence. Moreover, the 
discussion brought into the surface another feature that is integral in the 
practice of literary interpretation. It revealed that interpreters have a very 
special attitude towards the work of art; they treat it as an object that exists 
independently from their intentions and beliefs, so that to allow space for 
mistake and correction through rational criticism and deliberation.  
 
Does interpretation in literature differ from interpretation in law –in 
particular regulation? Provided we can show that interpreters in the 
regulatory context (a) try to make sense of regulatory requirements rather 
than each other’s utterances; (b) they are concerned with getting the 
interpretation of rules “right” over and above attaining some sort of 
interpretive convergence; (c) develop a particular interpretive attitude and 
(d) pay special attention to a number of considerations including those of 
the identity of the regulatory text, integrity and coherence, then we can 
reasonably argue that interpretation in literature and interpretation in 
regulation are identical in several crucial respects and, on this basis, propose 
that any candidate theoretical account of the nature of regulatory 
interpretation must be attentive to these features. This issue is discussed 
next. 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 To put it differently, the group of directors in our example do not try to answer questions like the 
following: “What Tom makes of Hamlet?” or “What is it that fuels Tom’s understanding of Hamlet? 
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3. Comparing interpretation in literature and interpretation in 
regulation 
 
Here is how literary interpretation can provide us with a framework for 
modelling the practice of interpretation in regulation.40 Literary 
interpretation aims at showing how a work of art can be seen as the most 
valuable work of art of its genre and so must attend to formal features of 
identity, coherence, and integrity as well as to more substantive 
considerations of artistic value. In a parallel way regulatory interpretation 
can be seen as purporting to make the best possible sense of the rule in 
question and, therefore, must take into account formal features of identity, 
integrity and coherence as well as its point or value. Similarly to literary 
interpretation, some conception of integrity and coherence in regulation will 
guide the interpreters’ understanding of the point or function of a particular 
set of rules (COB in our case) by way of circumscribing their convictions 
about how much an interpretation must fit prior interpretive decisions, 
which of them and how. It is profound that the point of value in the case of 
regulation cannot mean artistic value, because, unlike literature, law (and the 
institution of law includes rule-based regulation) is not an artistic enterprise. 
Law is a political enterprise, whose general point lies in coordinating social 
and individual effort, resolving social and individual disputes and overall 
securing justice.41 Accordingly, any interpretation of any branch of law 
(including regulation) must show the value of that branch of law “in political 
terms by demonstrating the best principle or policy it can be taken to 
serve.”42 
 
                                                 
40 Above note 7, 158-162 and; R. Dworkin, note 3, 540-550. 
41 In the context of regulation some of these features –for example, the advancement of social and 
individual coordination- are more conspicuous than others. 
42 R. Dworkin, above note 6, A Matter of Principle, 160. 
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The exploration of the practice of interpretation in literature made plain that 
evaluation is not a licence for the interpreter to make what ever he wishes 
from the object of interpretation. The same holds with respect to 
interpretation in the regulatory context.43 The regulatory community has a 
duty to interpret the regulatory history it finds not to invent a new one. In 
this vein it is bound to attend to formal features of identity, coherence and 
integrity as well as more substantive considerations of political value. 
Significantly, in performing this duty, interpreters are not infallible. Mistake 
is ingrained in the practice of interpretation and so it does the possibility of 
correction. 
 
Similarly, those involved in the interpretation of rules will frequently fail to 
produce a single interpretation of the rule in question exactly the same way 
as the directors in my case study failed to suggest a single reading of Hamlet. 
In the event where different interpretations find sufficient support in the 
text, substantive political theory will provide guidance as to which one to 
choose. Simply put, the interpretation of COB (z’), that the requirement of 
explicitness must be broadly understood, is probably better interpretation 
only insofar as it states a sounder principle of justice than any principle that 
distinguishes between written and oral communication.44 
 
Finally, as with interpretation in literature, the opinions expressed in the 
regulatory context about the best interpretation of regulatory norms will be 
founded on different beliefs about the point or value of regulation in general 
–beliefs that other members of the regulatory community need not share. 
For example, those members in the community who believe that the 
dominant purpose of regulation is some sort of economic efficiency, will 
detect in the past interpretations of conduct of business regulation, some 
                                                 
43 On the presence of constraints over interpretation see above note 13, 744-745. 
44 This is essentially an issue of political morality. Above note 29. 
  
 
217
strategy of reducing the economic costs of transacting with unsophisticated 
investors overall.45 But other members of the community may reject the 
claim that COB rules purport to cut transaction costs because, in their view, 
the main objective of regulation is not to promote efficiency but to ensure 
that the parties in market transactions are treated as equals.46 
 
To conclude, literary interpretation and regulatory interpretation coincide in 
a number of crucial respects. Consequently, a theory of regulatory 
interpretation must be similar (although not identical) to a theory of 
interpretation in literature that embraces the insights of the aesthetic 
hypothesis and as such accounts for the subject matter, purpose of 
interpretation and interpretive authority in a manner that makes interpretive 
disagreement genuine and intelligible. To this end, it is essential that it 
makes room for mistake and more generally it is sensitive to the special 
manner in which interpreters approach the object of interpretation. Below, I 
turn to the communicative theory, in order to assess the extent to which it 
meets these threshold conditions. 
  
 
4. A fresh look at the communicative theory of regulatory 
interpretation: Some difficulties 
 
A considerable part of this chapter was devoted in exploring the practice of 
interpretation in general as an intellectual enterprise that can be practised in 
various contexts including that of literature. The aim was to gain a deeper 
                                                 
45 Pareto efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency are perhaps the most frequently cited notions of economic 
efficiency in the literature of public administration. D. M. Hausman and M. S. McPherson, Economic 
Analysis and Moral Philosophy (2002), 87-99. R. Dworkin, ‘Is Wealth a Value?’, 9 Journal of Legal Studies (1980), 
191; and R. Posner, ‘The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman’, 9 Journal of Legal 
Studies (1980), 243. 
46 On the various notions of equality see, R. Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? Part 2’, 10 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs (1981), 283-345; and D. M. Hausman and M. S. McPherson, above, 135-149. 
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understanding of this practice. Now that I have explicated at some length a 
number of key issues such as the point of interpretation, the difference 
between interpreting and changing the object of interpretation into 
something different, the dual nature of interpretive arguments (both 
descriptive and evaluative), the function of interpretive constraints and the 
difference between beliefs and intentions, it is about time to move on and 
consider some difficulties that are inherent in the communicative thesis of 
regulatory interpretation.  
 
To start with, there is a striking difference between the picture of regulatory 
interpretation under the communicative theory and the outlook of 
regulatory interpretation that emerges from the comparative study of 
interpretation in literature and in law. Accordingly, if one wishes to insist on 
the communicative reading of regulatory interpretation, he must 
convincingly demonstrate that, despite this discrepancy, we have good 
reasons to subscribe to the communicative model of regulatory 
interpretation –say, for example, because it is better able to work in practice 
and/or more suitable to offer an attractive portrayal of the practice of 
interpretation in the regulatory context. It is argued that despite its initial 
appeal the communicative theory fails on both fronts.47 
 
Specifically, one of the core postulates of the communicative thesis is the 
supposition that meaning depends on the interpreters’ intention. This seems 
to be problematic. Given that the interpreters in the communicative theory 
are taken to act as members of a community48 and their intentions are 
considered significant in light of their membership, we have two options. 
The first option is to say that a regulatory interpretive community is a kind 
                                                 
47 The appeal of the communicative theory of regulatory interpretation was examined in Chapter Four 
above at pages 190 to 193.  
48 Above Chapter Four, note 14. 
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of a mysterious entity with an intention on its own. The second option is to 
acknowledge the absurdity of the earlier claim and explain that when we are 
talking about the intentions of the regulatory interpretive community what 
we really have in our minds is the intention of the prevailing interpreter, 
who sets the tone of the interpretive strategy for the whole regulatory 
interpretive community. 
 
The second option is too complicated to work in practice.49 Of course, we 
may suppose that the regulator is the prevailing interpreter, since at the end 
of the day it is the regulator that is officially responsible for deciding matters 
of interpretation.50 However, the regulator’s prevalence is not self-evident. 
For example, one could argue with equal force that it is the legislator’s 
intention that dominates the regulatory community, pointing to the fact that 
the regulator acts upon a statutory mandate, which must always observe, or 
that the regulator is expected to give voice to the views of all the members 
of the regulatory interpretive community and, therefore, it should interpret 
rules in a manner that is consistent with the intentions of the regulatory 
interpretive community collectively.51 Alternatively, one could even suggest 
that the interpretive intention that is crucial here is that of the judiciary, 
because only judges are constitutionally fit to decide conclusively matters of 
legal interpretation.52 Finally, a fourth option is to say that, as a matter of 
                                                 
49 Above note 4, chapter 9, particularly pages 313-327. 
50 This position seems to be favoured by Black. As she contends: “… rules are not literally texts where the 
more meaning and interpretation that can be found the better; for rules, only one interpretation will be 
accepted as ‘correct’. For the rule to ‘work’ in the sense of being applied in a way that would further the 
overall aims of the regulatory system, then the person applying has to share the rule maker’s interpretation 
of the rule; they have to belong to the same interpretive community.” Julia Black, Rules and Regulators 
(1997), 30 and 34-35; and ‘Using Rules Effectively’ in C. McCrudden (ed), Regulation and Deregulation (2000), 
95 at 101. 
51 Provided of course that it is possible in some way to resolve the ensuing problem of commensurating 
the various points of views expressed by the each one of the members of the regulatory community. On 
the persistent problem of commensurability see notably, D. Wiggins, “Weakness of Will, 
Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire”, in Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the 
Philosophy of Value (1998); B. Williams, “Conflicts of Values”, in Moral Luck (1981). 
52 On the role of courts and other tribunals see notably, S. Freeman and G. Morris ‘The Costs of 
Exclusivity: Public and Private Re-examined’, Public Law (1994), 69; and J. Black ‘Constitutionalising Self-
Regulation’, 59 Modern Law Review (1996), 24. 
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sheer fact, the interpretation of regulatory norms is always influenced by the 
dominant interest group’s intention that happens to take the regulator on its 
side.53 Whatever the case, the fact of the matter is that the prevalence of the 
regulator’s intention should not be taken for granted. Yet, even if we could 
unequivocally argue in favour of the regulator’s intentions, still this would be 
of little help. Regulatory bodies and organs do not have intentions, 
individuals have intentions, and in the absence of a theory to guide our 
choice, we would be unable to decide whose intention to pick up. So, to cut 
a long argument short, the idea that we need to discern someone’s intention 
if we hope to make sense of a regulatory requirement is not of much help 
because it leads nowhere.54 
 
A further issue that makes things even more complicated is the fact that 
interpreters’ typically have more than one interpretive intentions.55 To make 
this point clear let me return to the example of regulatory interpretation that 
I discussed earlier in order to show how –according to the communicative 
theory of regulatory interpretation- the members of the regulatory 
interpretive community go about in interpreting a rule. My hypothesis was 
that the regulator wishes to bring the selling of personal pensions in line 
with the selling of other packaged products and proposes to replace COB 
(z) with COB (z’), so that ‘tied financial advisers’ that deal with consumers 
will no longer have the obligation to compare personal pension contracts 
with products and services that fall outside of their range before 
recommending them, unless their customer explicitly requires for them to do 
so. Suppose rule COB(z) is now replaced with rule COB (z’), which is 
coupled with guidance COB (G) clarifying that communication via email 
                                                 
53 D. C. Mueller, Public Choice III (2005), ch.15. 
54 Above note 4, 321-327. 
55  See the discussion on the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution and the racial segregation of schools; 
in particular, the exposition of historicism as an interpretive approach to the US Constitution. Above, 359-
363. 
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satisfies the requirement of explicitness set out by COB (z’) (but remaining 
silent on whether ‘oral communication’ does the same). Initially the 
application of COB (z’) raises no issues of interpretation, however, after a 
while the following problem crops up. Having relied on the letter of 
COB(G), several tied financial advisers ignored oral communication with 
their clients and recommended personal pension contracts as suitable for 
their clients from their own range of products and services.56 Now they are 
faced with the risk of a legal suit and possibly the obligation to pay a huge 
amount of compensation.  
 
In relying on the letter of COB (G), the financial advisers of our example 
acted honestly. They seriously thought that, since the intention of the regulator is 
to bring the selling of personal pension contracts into line with the selling of other packaged 
products, COB (G) had to be strictly interpreted. However, consumers hold a 
totally different view about the proper interpretation of COB (G). They do 
not dispute the fact that the regulator wanted to bring the selling of personal 
pensions into line with other packaged products, they point out, however, 
that the regulator’s intention in regulating conduct of business with consumers has always 
been the protection of consumers and therefore COB (G) should be interpreted as 
broadly as possible so that, despite the letter of COB (G), adherence with 
the spirit of the regulatory requirement is secured. The fact that financial 
advisers and consumers identified two distinct intentions rather than one 
behind the regulator’s drafting of COB (z’) and COB (G) signals out the 
presence of more than one intentions. So even if we assume that the 
intention of the regulatory interpretive community should identify with the 
intention of the regulator, for once again we are bound to return to square 
                                                 
56 The problem is that if COB(G) is strictly interpreted, then consumers (probably the least educated, who 
are in need of protection more than anyone else) who ask orally their suppliers to take into account 
personal pensions outside their own range of products will not be protected because “oral 
communication” does not fall within the scope of “explicitness” of COB(G). This is a standard example of 
under-inclusiveness (the rule covers less cases than it was initially intended) and creative compliance. D. 
McBarnet and C. Wheelan, ‘The Elusive Spirit of Law’, 54 Modern Law Review (1991), 409. 
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one, given that we need to decide which one of the two intentions we 
should follow. 
 
The problems with the communicative theory do not stop there. What I said 
so far in relation to the centrality of the interpreters’ intentions in defining 
the meaning of rules challenge with equal force the supposition that 
authority lies with the community in which interpreters interact, for this 
claim works provided that we can overcome the difficulties that are 
associated with identifying the intentions of the regulatory interpretive 
community. However, there are additional reasons to cast doubt to the claim 
that the regulatory interpretive community is the only source of constraints 
over the exercise of interpretive discretion. Those who endorse this idea are 
moved by the belief that truth (and its opposite) is ‘man-made’; that truth is 
simply a matter of convention, something to be determined by the 
prevailing norms, beliefs and attitudes of a particular interpretive 
community. In their view, not only does the interpretive community define 
what is to count as ‘right’ (or ‘wrong’) interpretation, but also defines other 
considerations that may confine interpretation (for example, what is the kind 
of text under interpretation and whether and to what extent should the text 
preclude certain interpretations as ‘non-appropriate’).57 For the moment I 
cannot explain in full why scepticism about interpretation is a flawed 
thesis.58 I will limit myself by saying that despite its plausibility, scepticism is 
not at all consistent with the way we normally think about interpretation and 
interpretive disagreements. For example, scepticism about interpretation 
entails that people cannot be mistaken in their interpretive-judgements. 
Members of the regulatory community may find some interpretations 
distasteful but they have no ground for saying that those who hold them 
have made a mistake. Similarly, scepticism about interpretation assumes that 
                                                 
57 S. Fish, ‘Working in the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature’, above note 3, 555. 
58 This issue is considered in Chapter Six below. 
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interpretive judgements are nothing more than reports of the speakers’ 
subjective beliefs and prejudices. Accordingly, debates about interpretation 
are nothing more than an exchange of reports of the co-discussants’ 
psychological states and, consequently, disagreements about interpretation –
as, for example, the disagreement we have been examining a few paragraphs 
above on the proper interpretation of COB (z’)- have no subject matter, for 
there is nothing that members of a regulatory community actually disagree 
about. 
 
The difficulty with scepticism emerges, when we attend the way we normally 
think about interpretation and interpretive disagreements. For example, we 
actually tend to think that people can be mistaken in attributing a particular 
meaning to a rule and that they are generally able to identify and correct this 
mistake through rational argument. We believe that people’s disagreements 
are genuine in the sense that there is always a case that they are trying to 
support or object. We also think that the worth of an argument does not 
generally depend on the identity of the person who expresses it; if someone 
said that “it is a mistake to interpret COB (G) literally”, we would find a 
response of the kind “well, you say that because you represent consumer 
interests” beside the point, for the question we are interested in finding an 
answer is not “why does he say that” as a matter of biographical fact, but 
whether in the given circumstances it is true to say that the requirement of 
explicit communication set out in COB (z’) is not satisfied in case of oral 
communication. 
 
This last point brings me to the third assumption that permeates the 
communicative theory of regulatory interpretation namely, the claim that the 
point or objective of regulatory interpretation is not to ensure that rules 
receive correct interpretation but to work towards achieving the most 
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agreeable interpretation (interpretive convergence). In light of what we said so far 
on the possibility of mistake, it seems to me that it is odd to assume that the 
only thing that interpreters care of is to reach consensus. To return to my 
earlier example where those involved in the regulatory system disagree about 
the interpretation of the term ‘explicit communication’ contained in COB 
(z’), it is worth noticing that the financial advisers, who got into trouble by 
relying on the letter of COB (G), do not simply want to make others agree 
with them. Rather, provided that they are serious on what they are doing, 
they hope that through sound reasoning they could help their co-discussants 
see their point, identify their mistake and revise their views accordingly. The 
same observations apply with equal force to consumers. Both sides of the 
debate ask: “Does oral communication satisfy the requirement of 
explicitness set out by COB (z’)?” Both sides of the debate have a genuine 
interest in finding out whether the proposition “Oral communication 
satisfies (or does not satisfy) the requirement of explicitness set out by COB 
(z’)” is true or false. They do not ask: “What kind of interpretation is most 
likely to appeal to my co-discussants?” or “What mode of action should I 
take to persuade them that I am ‘right’/ take my side?” By saying that I do 
not mean to deny the role of persuasion in shaping the final interpretive 
judgement. My purpose is twofold: On the one hand, to refute the sceptical 
foundation of persuasion, on the other hand, to suggest that –for the 
purposes of mapping the nature of regulatory interpretation- persuasion 
should be understood as rational deliberation among individuals that are 
capable of reason rather than a manifestation of power politics in the 
regulatory arena.59  
 
Finally, special attention should be given to the role of the regulator. There 
is no doubt that the regulator is interested in making sure that the regulatory 
                                                 
59 If our purpose were to explain regulatory failure in interpreting rules appropriately, then it would be a 
point to offer an account of persuasion in terms of power politics. 
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process –especially when it relies so much on the use of legal rules- works in 
the sense that precious time is not wasted in endless debates about 
interpretation.60 To say, however, that procedural efficiency is his sole 
concern amounts to turn a blind eye to several features of regulation that 
suggest otherwise.61 Institutional configurations and other practices that aim 
to keep the regulator accountable, for example, consultation, publication of 
various communications and judicial review -to mention a few- suggest that 
a distinct characteristic of our political culture  (and the institution of law 
and regulation is part of this culture) is that we place value in getting the 
interpretation of rules ‘right’ and the case of regulation seems to be no 
exception. Taking all this into account, it is suggested that due to his task to 
decide matters of interpretation in the course of his public office, the 
regulator holds a special duty to guard against interpretive mistakes. 
Moreover, the regulator has a special duty to opt for an interpretation that 
goes against the popular view, if he has strong reasons to believe that the 
popular view is mistaken. So to cut a long argument short, the regulator’s 
job is not to keep his audience happy but to give reasons for his interpretive 
judgement, reasons that are eligible to justify the legality of rules as much as 
possible. Of course, I am not suggesting here that the regulator should see 
himself in the shoes of a judge, who after all is the only one institutionally 
delegated to resolve legal disputes and decide questions of interpretation 
conclusively. What I am saying is that in light of the fact that, the regulator 
is entrusted with the power to use rules in order to implement policies he 
                                                 
60 Considerations of procedural efficiency need not compromise the integrity of regulatory interpretation. 
Above note 13, 759-762. 
61 It is suggested that procedural efficiency and rule-effectiveness are conceptually distinct in the sense that 
rules may be used at a minimum time and cost and yet fall short from delivering the intended policy 
objectives. Of course, it is plausible to argue that as far as regulation is concerned we can ignore this 
distinction. I feel, however, bound to alienate myself from this claim because it is based on an instrumental 
account of the institution of law and as such it misses an important feature of law: It fails to see that law is 
not a directive of proper conduct made by anyone but a directive of proper conduct made by our political 
community and as such it has an intrinsic value. The idea of law as a political institution with no intrinsic 
value is widely accepted among proponents of the Law and Economics school of thought as well as 
scholars that belong to the Critical Legal Studies movement. See, for example, R. Posner, Economic Analysis 
of Law (1998) and A. Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (1990). 
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enjoys a privileged position, which he is not allowed to abuse.62 Compared 
to a judge, the regulator may enjoy greater scope of manoeuvre when 
interpreting rules. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that this 
holds only as far as it is necessary for the prompt delivery of his public 
mandate and never to the effect of absolving him from the duty to act 
within Law. 
 
To resume, the communicative thesis accounts for the subject matter and 
purpose of regulatory interpretation in a manner that appears to be 
unworkable and unappealing in practice. In light of this, it is suggested that 
it is worthwhile to explore the possibility of developing an alternative theory 
of regulatory interpretation. This is what I will try to do next.  
 
 
5. Towards an alternative theory of regulatory interpretation: The 
constructive theory 
 
In the preceding chapter, I argued that a theory of regulatory interpretation 
can be either communicative either constructive in nature.63 The distinct 
characteristic of the communicative thesis is that that it resembles the method of 
interpretation that we deploy when we try to understand our co-discussant 
in the course of a conversation. In this case we allot meaning to the 
speaker’s utterances in light of the motives, purposes and concerns we 
suppose for the speaker and we report our conclusions as statements about 
the speaker’s intentions in saying what he did. Under this theoretical model, 
interpretation is seen as a means for communicating each other’s 
                                                 
62 P. Craig, Administrative Law (2003), chapter 12 especially 388-393 and 400-401. 
63 In fact Dworkin talks about three different kinds of interpretation; “conversational”, “constructive”, and 
“scientific interpretation.” Given that when we interpret a social practice like rule following, we try to make 
sense of it by discerning its point or purpose, “scientific interpretation” does not qualify as a candidate 
theory of regulatory interpretation because it is causal rather than purposive in nature. Above note 4, 49-
53. 
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rationalities and interpreters are not concerned with finding out what the 
social practice of rule following “really” requires from them to do. Contrary 
to the communicative thesis, the constructive thesis is more sophisticated in its 
inception.64 It draws a sharp distinction between the speakers’ utterances 
and the object of interpretation in order to emphasise that, the intellectual 
enterprise of discerning the speakers’ beliefs about the object of 
interpretation is quite different from the intellectual enterprise of discerning 
the meaning of the object of interpretation. Under this theoretical model, 
the interpreters are depicted as trying to ascribe some scheme of interests or 
goals or principles that the practice in question can be taken to promote 
rather than simply understand each other’s utterances. Furthermore, they are 
seen as being genuinely interested in making the best sense of the object of 
interpretation. 
 
I suggested Black’s analysis of the use of rules in financial regulation 
provides the first seeds for a theory of regulatory interpretation that is 
communicative in nature. I further argued that despite its plausibility and 
initial appeal, the communicative theory presents some difficulties and, 
therefore, -I proposed- that it would be worthwhile to explore the possibility 
of developing an alternative theory of regulatory interpretation, this time, 
along the lines of the constructive account of interpretation (Henceforth, I 
will call this constructive thesis).65 To this end, it pays to consider the idea of 
interpretive attitude on the basis of which Ronald Dworkin built his 
constructive account of interpretation in law.66 Dworkin explains the notion 
                                                 
64 Above, note 4, 52-53. 
65 Given the limited space available, I am not going to elaborate a detailed account of the alternative 
theoretical framework for the use of rules and its institutional implications in relation to financial 
regulation. My intention is simply to make the first steps towards developing a different and perhaps more 
promising theoretical framework for the analysis of regulatory interpretation. 
66 Above note 4, 46-49. Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity is grounded on this constructive reading of 
legal interpretation. D. Litowitz, ‘Dworkin and Critical Legal Studies on Right Answers and Conceptual 
Holism’, 18 Legal Studies Forum (1994), 135 at 139-146. Up to this point it is useful to note that with respect 
to the nature of interpretation there are generally three streams of thought. Specifically one can distinguish 
among those commentators who offer a deterministic and mechanichal account of the practice of 
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of interpretive attitude by using the analogy of “courtesy”, a social practice 
of rule following, which after some point of time starts to change. I quote 
from the relevant passage in Laws Empire:67  
“Imagine the following history of an invented community. Its members 
follow a set of rules, which they call “rules of courtesy”, on a certain of 
social occasions. They say, “Courtesy requires that peasants take off their 
hats to nobility,” for example, and they urge and accept other propositions 
of that sort. For a time this practice has the character of taboo: the rules are 
just there and are neither questioned nor varied. But then, perhaps slowly, all 
this changes. Everyone develops a complex “interpretive” attitude toward 
the rules of courtesy an attitude that has two components. The first is the 
assumption that the practice of courtesy does not simply exist but has value, 
that it serves some interest or purpose or enforces some principle –in short, 
that it has some point- that can be stated independently of just describing 
the rules that make up this practice. The second is the further assumption 
that the requirements of courtesy –the behavior it calls for or judgements it 
warrants are not necessarily or exclusively what they have always be taken to 
be but instead sensitive to its point, so that the strict rules must be 
understood or applied or extended or modified or qualified or limited by 
that point; it is no longer unstudied deference to a runic order. People now 
try to impose meaning. 
 
The two components of the interpretive attitude are independent of one 
another; we can take up the first component of the attitude toward some 
institution without also taking up the second. We do that in the sense of 
games and contests. We appeal to the point of these practices in arguing 
about how their rules should be changed, but not  (except in very limited 
cases) about what their rules now are; that is fixed by history and 
convention. Interpretation therefore plays an external role in games and 
contests. It is crucial to my story of courtesy, however, that the citizens of 
courtesy adopt the second component of the attitude as well as the first; for 
them interpretation decides not only why courtesy exists but also what, 
                                                                                                                                            
interpretation (e.g. John Ely), those at the other extreme, who place emphasis on the creative role of the 
reader (e.g. Stanford Levinson) and those who stand some where at the middle. The latter are divided over 
the nature of the constraints that circumscribe the range of available interpretations. For example, whereas 
Owen Fiss appeals to the norms underlying the interpretive practice (“disciplinary rules”), Stanley Fish 
(taking into account his more mature writings) places emphasis on the social context. Dworkin’s inception 
of the practice of interpretation in the legal domain also occupies the middle ground bearing similarities 
with Fiss’s conception of legal interpretation at least to the extent they both focus on the underlying 
principles of political morality. J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980); S. Levinson, 
‘Law as Literature’, 60 Texas Law Review (1982), 373; O. Fiss, ‘Conventionalism’, 58 South California Law 
Review (1985), 177; and S. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in 
Literary and Legal Studies (1989). 
67 Above note 4, 47-48. 
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properly understood, it now requires. Value and content have become 
entangled.” 
 
The main insights in Dworkin’s description of the notion of interpretive 
attitude can be summarised in the following five points: First, the interpretive 
attitude engages with a complex relationship between what participants in a 
practice (here, courtesy) believe that this practice requires (taking off the 
hats) and what the practice in fact requires.68 For something to count as an 
interpretation of the practice, its must show most of the participant’s beliefs 
about this practice to be true. At the same time all of the participants’ 
individual beliefs about the practice are susceptible to revision in light of a 
better interpretation. What participants in the practice believe that the 
practice requires, and what the practice really requires are regarded as two 
different matters. Second, interpreting a social practice requires the 
interpreter to discern the point or purpose of the practice under 
interpretation as a whole and to use this as guidance. Third, interpretation 
evolves, as a result of the participants’ perpetually revised understanding of 
the overall value, point or purpose of the subject of interpretation. Similarly, 
the more widespread and radical the change in the ways participants 
interpret certain aspects of the practice, the more need there is for them to 
revise their understanding of its overall point and purpose. Fourth, as long 
as participants in a social practice are genuinely interested in making the best 
possible sense of it, there will always be a need for new and better 
interpretations. Fifth, as long as members of a community identify 
themselves as participants in a shared social practice, they are likely to have 
disagreements not just about the interpretation of some of its rules, but also 
about the overall point or purpose that the practice should be understood to 
have. This approach, which Ronald Dworkin calls constructive, does not 
                                                 
68 In the context of financial regulation, we may replace “courtesy” with “regulation” (that is controlling 
and guiding market conduct through the use of rules) performed by way of informal means, and the habit 
of “taking off the hats” with the established practice of “providing suitability letters to investors”. 
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suggest that the interpreters in a particular community are allowed to make 
of the practice anything they would have wanted it to be, for its history 
constraints the available interpretations.69  
 
It is important to stress from the outset that the notion of interpretive attitude 
introduces a critical dimension into interpretive practices like the use of 
rules in financial regulation.70 Those involved in the interpretive practice (for 
the sake of brevity I will call them “practitioners”) do not hold themselves 
responsible to a standard that is set by their individual or collective 
understanding of the value that justifies the interpretive practice. Rather 
practitioners hold themselves responsible to a standard that is set by a value, 
which in fact justifies the practice. This implies that the standard that governs 
an interpretive practice like the use of rules in financial regulation is taken to 
be in a crucial sense external to it. Participants accept that they may be 
collectively fallible, in respect of the conduct that the standard entails.71 “But 
while the standard in that sense is external, it is not in another. Participants 
are open-minded in respect of what makes their practice as it stands now to 
                                                 
69 As he puts it: “Creative interpretation, on the constructive view, is a matter of interaction between 
purpose and object.” See above note 4, 52; and D. Carlson, ‘Dworking in the Desert of the Real’, 60 
University of Miami Law Review (2005-2006), 505 at 522. The idea that the history of a certain practice 
constraints the available interpretations of this practice reveals that for Dworkin interpretation is properly 
thought of in terms of the “hermeneutical relationship between tradition and application” –a thesis that 
originates from Gadamer’s hermeneutics. See, H. G. Gadamer Truth and Method, J. Weinsheimer and D. 
G.Marshall (ed and trans) second edition. On the affiliation of Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity with 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics see, G. Burns, ‘Law as Hermeneutics: A Response to Ronald Dworkin’ in W. J. T. 
Mitchell (ed), The Politics of Interpretation (1983), 315; G. Leyh, ‘Dworkin’s Hermeneutics,’ 39 Mercer Law 
Review (1987-1982), 851 at 857-865. Although references to hermeneutics abound in contempary legal 
scholarship commendators are divided as to whether the hermeneutic turn has been a positive 
development. Those who welcome this intellectual turn include -alongside Gerald Burns- Michael Perry 
and D. Hoy. See, for instance, M. Perry, ‘The Authority of Text, Tradition and Reason: A Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation’, 58 South California Law Review (1985), 551; and D. Hoy, ‘Interpreting the 
Law: Hermeneutical and Post-structuralist Perspectives’, 58 South California Law Review (1985), 136. Those 
who approach the turn to hermeneutics with scepticism include Paul Brest, Mark Tushnet and Simeon 
McIntosh. See, P. Brest, ‘The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding’, 60 Buffalo University Law 
Review (1980), 204; M. Tushnet, ‘Following the Rules Laid Down: A. Critique of Interpretivism and Natural 
Principles’, 96 Harvard Law Review, 781 (1983); and S. McIntosh, ‘Legal Hermeneutics: A Philosophical 
Critique’, 35 Oklahoma Law Review (1982), 1. 
70 Above note 29. 
71 The example, I referred to earlier, where COB (z) is changed into COB (z’), can be used here as well as a 
case where interpreters, as a group, realise that they were collectively mistaken to think that consumer 
protection (the standard that underlies COB rules governing the provision of suitability letters) in certain 
occasions requires tied-financial advisers to act as if they were wholesale financial advisers. 
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require what it does.”72 When they correct their actual practice to conform a 
new and better interpretation they do so because the new interpretation 
better articulates the standard to which they were previously committed.73 
Moreover, the crucial dimension that the notion of interpretive attitude 
introduces into interpretive practices, namely the fact that it makes space for 
error, entails that a disagreement of a special kind is possible to emerge. 
Practitioners can sensibly disagree about what is the right answer to the 
substantive question posed by regulatory interpretation.74 
 
The idea of interpretive attitude is a useful analytical devise. It is capable of 
explaining various aspects of the practice of rule-use in financial regulation, 
for example, what it is like to follow a rule, why rules change, why and how 
as well as the place and significance of evaluation in the structure of 
interpretive judgements.75 The constructive theory of regulatory interpretation draws 
on the insights of the interpretive attitude. It describes regulatory 
interpretation as a perpetual dialectical practice, whose members’ primary 
concern is to get the interpretation of rules right (correct interpretation).76 
Correct interpretation figures at the top of their priorities because they 
acknowledge that rules are not ordinary directives made by anyone; they are 
directives made by the political community.77 As such, they constitute part 
of their political history, which sets limitations on interpretive discretion and 
demands that these be observed. 
 
                                                 
72 N. Stavropoulos, ‘Interpretivist Theories of Law’ in E. Villanueva (ed), Law: Mataphysics Meaning and 
Objectivity (2008), 3 at 11. 
73 This, however, does not mean that they substitute a new and more attractive standard for the old one. 
Up to this point recall the earlier discussion at pages 207-208 above on the difference between interpreting 
and changing the object of interpretation into a different one. 
74 As Stavropoulos observes, interpreters need not disagree in this special way at all times. Whether any 
actual disagreement is special in the sense here described depends on whether it is in fact best explained in 
those terms. Above note 72. See further note 29. 
75 The common denominator of these aspects of rule-use is the practice of interpretation. 
76 The idea of ‘correct’ (‘right’) interpretation is futher clarified in Chapter Six. See particularly the 
discussion in pages 263-265 below. 
77 Above note 4, 53. 
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The following example will help simplify these points.78 Imagine a set of 
COB rules, which govern the provision of suitability letters and which inter 
alia require from financial advisers to make sure that their customers 
understand the content of these letters. Everyone takes that the point of this 
set of rules is consumer protection. Initially no question arises whether the 
duties prescribed by this particular set of COB are really those the practice 
requires (ensuring that consumers actually comprehend the content of 
suitability letters even if this requires extra time and effort from the part of 
the financial adviser). COB rules are just there and are neither questioned 
nor varied. But after a while, things start to change. The financial advisers of 
our scenario develop a complex “interpretive attitude” towards suitability 
rules namely an attitude that has two components:79 The first is that they 
start to think that the provision of suitability letters does not simply exist 
but has value, that is, it serves some interest or purpose or enforces some 
principle that can be stated independently of just describing the rules that 
make up the practice in question. The second one is that they start to believe 
that what this practice requires from the financial advisers to do in terms of 
their conduct of business with unsophisticated investors, is not necessarily 
and exclusively what it has always been taken to be, but are instead sensitive 
                                                 
78 My example concerns regulatory interpretation at the stage of rule-following (rule-application and 
enforcement) and, admittedly, at first sight, it appears to be fit to inform our understanding of regulatory 
interpretation only in this regard. It is argued, however, that it can equally offer an insight into the project 
of interpretation in the course of rule-formation –namely, at that stage in which the regulator performs its 
policy-making and rule-making function, because here as well it is conceivable to suppose that the 
regulator (and virtually everyone involved in the interpretation of regulatory requirements) develops a sort 
of interpretive attitude similar to that described by Prof. Dworkin. The only difference is the degree of 
interpretive discretion allocated to the interpreters at different stages of regulatory interpretation and in 
accordance to their institutional role. The difference in the degree of interpretive discretion does not cancel 
out my claim that members of the community of interpreters can and should be seen as developing an 
interpretive attitude towards the object of interpretation. This is because there is always ample of scope 
allowing them to critically reflect on the content of regulatory requirements. 
79 Consumers, regulators and virtually anyone, who qualifies to be a member in the community of 
interpreters, can be equally thought in place of the financial advisers of my example. Recall also that under 
the constructivist scheme of regulatory interpretation one belongs to the interpretive community not as a 
result of a shared understanding of various issues of interpretation but in light of a commitment to make 
the best possible sense of the object of interpretation. On this latter point I follow Professor Owen Fiss 
and his vision of the judiciary as a community of interpreters. Above note 13, 746. 
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to its point, so that the set of COB that I am talking about must be 
understood or applied or extended or modified or limited by that point. 
 
Once this interpretive attitude takes hold, adherence to the practice of 
providing suitability letters along the lines prescribed by COB rules is no 
longer mechanical.80 Its assumed point acquires critical power in the sense 
that financial advisers begin to adhere to forms of conduct of business 
previously unknown or to refuse forms of conduct of business previously 
honoured (e.g. spending extra time to ‘educate’ their customers) claiming, 
for example, that true consumer protection would be better served if COB 
rules “stopped paternalising the interests of unsophisticated investors by 
requiring financial advisers to treat their customers as if the latter were 
incapable of assuming responsibility of the level of diligence that they show 
in their market transactions.” This initiates a reinterpretation of suitability 
rules, which alters the shape of the practice and eventually changes the 
content of COB governing the provision of suitability letters to the effect 
that financial advisers are no longer under the duty to be extra attentive to 
their clients’ interests.81 
 
The revised practice of furnishing consumers with suitability letters may 
encourage further interpretation and it is possible that the provision of 
suitability letters (and the rules governing them) changes even more 
                                                 
80 Were we to follow Stanley Fish on this point, we would be bound to acknowledge that the possibility of 
the interpreters adopting a critical attitude towards the object of interpretation is simply out of the 
question. As he puts it in one of his later works “there is nothing volitional in the relationship between the 
professional and the practices in which he is settled and therefore no sense can be given to the notion of 
accepting or rejecting.” S. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary 
and Legal Studies (1989), 75. See also, A. Goldsmith, ‘Is There Any Backbone in the Fish? Interpretive 
Communities, Social Criticism and Transgressive Legal Practice’, 23 Law and Social Inquiry (1998), 373, 376, 
388-391, where the author argues that “the resources for criticism within professional groups are more 
numerous and powerful that Fish allows.” See further, R. Dworkin, ‘Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True 
Banality’ in M. Brit and W. Winter (eds), Pragmatism in Law and Society (1991), 380, where the he asserts that 
Fish’s description of interpretation is “flat and passive, robbed of the reflective, introspective, 
argumentative tone that is in fact essential to its character.” 
81 Provided of course that in the meantime this revised interpretation has been crystallized by taking the 
form of a new rule.  
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dramatically later on. For instance, financial advisers’ views about the proper 
grounds of consumer protection may change from expressing the principle 
of equality to promoting market efficiency. The beneficiaries of consumer 
protection will then be only those buyers of financial products and services 
that are willing and able to pay in order to enjoy the privileged protection 
that unsophisticated investors used to benefit from, merely by virtue of their 
classification as ‘consumers’.82 Moreover, opinions may change along a 
different direction, about whether consumer protection requires the 
continuation of this practice at all. The provision of suitability letters will 
then figure as a trivial aspect of the way in which financial advisers conduct 
their business; -contrary to their predecessor- COB rules will no longer be 
legally binding; the interpretive attitude will languish and the practice will 
lapse back into the static and mechanical state in which it all began. 
 
The fact that the community of interpreters recognise that there is a point or 
value in adhering to COB rules and that they attach meaning to these rules 
in light of this point or value suggests the evaluation is indispensable part of 
regulatory interpretation. This, however, does not license interpreters to 
make whatever they wish when interpreting rules. The Rule of Law83 
demands that the members of the community of interpreters abstain from 
manipulating the content of suitability letters with the view of advancing 
their self-interest.84 Moreover the Rule of Law requires from the community 
                                                 
82 That is “private customer” or “retail client” according to MiFID. See also the discussion in sub-section 
3.12 of Chapter One above. 
83 D. Dyzenhaus, ‘Form and Substance in the Rule of Law: A Democratic Justification for Judicial Review’ 
in C. Forsyth (ed), Judicial Review and the Constitution (2000), 141; R. Fallon, ‘The Rule of Law as a Concept in 
Constitutional Discourse’, 97 Columbia Law Review (1997), 1; and P. Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive 
Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’, Public Law (1997), 467. 
84 Unlike regulatory officials, the regulatees enjoy greater freedom when asked to grasp what regulatory 
norms requires from them to do. This is because they are not entrusted with an institutional office (similar 
to that of the regulator) to which they are under the duty to remain truthful. That said the financial advisers 
of our example are not free to make any claim they wish about what suitability rules require from them to 
do but only claims that can be licensed and encouraged by the history of this practice. In short the 
difference between the regulator’s freedom when interpreting a regulatory requirement and the regulatee’s 
freedom when interpreting regulatory requirement is only a matter of degree. See also the discussion in 
  
 
235
of interpreters to never stop checking out the interpretation that rules 
receive, identify mistakes and remedy them appropriately. As long as 
interpreters are genuinely interested in making the best sense of COB rules, 
there will always be a need for better interpretation. 
 
Frequently the perpetual attempt to get the meaning of rules right will give 
rise to multiple readings and, as a result, trigger disagreement and a 
laborious debate about the proper interpretation of rules.85 This, however, is 
not a sign of weakness (a pathological feature that inevitably crops up due to 
the linguistic nature of rules). Rather it is an indication of a healthy 
interpretive process, for it is this disagreement that brings into the surface 
ambiguities and other problems of interpretation and it is through this 
painstaking process that those involved in the interpretation of rules can 
hope to come up with better interpretations.86  
 
This brings me to a further point I wish to make this time in connection to 
the notion of rule-effectiveness and how it shapes policy choices with 
respect to the use of rules. Contrary to the communicative thesis, which 
connects the effective-use of rules with considerations of procedural 
efficiency, the constructive thesis proposes a different understanding of this 
concept. On the constructive view, rule-effectiveness captures the fact that 
interpreters work towards discerning the true meaning of rules instead of 
simply making clarifications or trying to cultivate a common understanding 
of regulatory requirements. In practical terms, this implies that for the 
proponent of the constructive reading of regulatory interpretation a sound 
                                                                                                                                            
Chapter Six on the source of the regulatees’ duties to abstain from interpretations that do not fit the 
history of the practice under interpretation. 
85 J. B. White, above note 3, 444. 
86 It follows that the terms “over-inclusiveness”, “under-inclusiveness” and “legal indeterminacy” are not 
of much help in making sense of the workings and purpose of regulatory interpretation. At best they offer 
a distorted account of regulatory interpretation. This happens partly because these terms derive from a 
narrow and deeply problematic conceptualisation of the notion of intention in interpretation. On that see 
the earlier discussion on the complex interaction between intentions and beliefs at pages 211-213 above. 
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policy of rule-use should not just aim at certainty and predictability by way 
of promoting some sort of interpretive convergence. Its aim should be the 
far more challenging objective of encouraging a special attitude towards the 
subject of interpretation -an attitude that manifests a collective commitment 
to make the best possible sense of it. Accordingly, whereas for the 
communicative theory failure to make effective use of rules is failure of 
communication, for the constructive theory failure to use rules effectively 
amounts to failure to unearth the true meaning of regulatory requirements.87  
 
The above analysis suffices to make plain the differences between the 
constructive and the communicative thesis of regulatory interpretation. 
According to the communicative thesis, the subject matter of interpretation 
is the interpreters’ utterances. According to the constructive thesis, the 
subject matter of interpretation is the text that embodies the rule in 
question. On the communicative view, the purpose of interpretation in the 
regulatory context is to address failure of communication by working 
towards some sort of interpretive convergence. By contrast for the 
constructive account, the purpose of regulatory interpretation is correct 
interpretation. The constructive account is attentive to the special 
interpretive attitude that practitioners adopt when interpreting rules. 
Contrary to the communicative thesis, the constructive thesis depicts 
regulatory interpretation as practice in which interpreters treat the subject 
matter of interpretation as an object that exists independently from what 
they believe or intend it to be. Accordingly, “what the rule means” is not 
whatever the community of interpreters wants it to be but an interpretation 
                                                 
87 In terms of institutional architecture this would involve a far more active role for the judiciary than the 
one envisaged in Rules and Regulators (there it is argued that the regulatory system should be closed-off from 
external judicial interference. Above note 48, Rules and Regulators (1997), 35-36). It is suggested that the 
establishment of the Financial Services and Market Tribunal, the institutionalisation of expert legal advice 
within the bureaucratic organisation of the regulatory Authority and the availability of judicial review 
constitute firm manifestations that there is a clear trend towards strengthening the role of the judiciary, 
which can be explained in light of a change in perception of the notion of rule-effectiveness. 
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that best justifies the point or function of the rule in question. The 
communicative account misses this point and as a result offers an 
impoverished depiction of the practice of interpretation. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was twofold: On the one hand, to show that despite 
its initial appeal the communicative theory of regulatory interpretation is not 
free from problems and, on the other hand, to develop a position thesis for 
the possibility of an alternative theory of regulatory interpretation (the 
constructive theory of regulatory interpretation).  
 
The discussion started with the observation that the underlying assumptions 
of the communicative theory touch upon very controversial issues in 
relation to interpretation, for example, the point of interpretation, the 
difference between interpreting and changing the object of interpretation 
into a different one, the limits of interpretive discretion, the nature of 
arguments about interpretation, the difference between beliefs and 
intentions etc. Given the perplexity of these issues, it was suggested that 
before assessing the robustness of the communicative thesis it would be 
essential to gain a deeper understanding of the practice of interpretation in 
general. To this effect I compared regulatory interpretation as species of 
legal interpretation with interpretation in literature.  
 
The comparative analysis revealed that literary interpretation and regulatory 
interpretation are identical in a number of fundamental respects. In both 
domains we witness the institutionalisation of authoritative interpretation 
and both cases involve the interpretation of text, which –although ‘man-
made’- is treated as an entity that stands independently from its author or 
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interpreter as the case may be. Furthermore, a genuine commitment to make 
the subject of interpretation the best it can be is present in both literary and 
regulatory interpretation. Frequently, this finds expression in rational 
disagreement about matters of fact as well as about matters of value. 
 
The application of all these insights to regulatory interpretation revealed a 
picture of interpretation that is different from the communicative account. 
Specifically, the analysis made plain that the subject matter of interpretation 
is not the interpreters’ utterances as the communicative thesis assumes, but 
the rule itself. Similarly, the point of interpretation is not to attain consensus 
(interpretive convergence) but to make the rule in question the best it can 
be, paying attention to a number of considerations, which work as 
constraints over one’s interpretive discretion. Moreover, the discussion on 
the practice of interpretation divulged that interpreters develop an 
idiosyncratic interpretive attitude towards the subject matter of 
interpretation. They treat it as an object that stands independently of their 
intentions and beliefs in order to allow space for error and correction 
through rational criticism and deliberation. More importantly though, it 
showed that the communicative thesis offers a theoretical framework for the 
rationalisation of regulatory interpretation, that is neither workable nor 
appealing in practice. 
 
In light of these difficulties, an alternative account of regulatory 
interpretation was explored. Borrowing from Professor Dworkin’s analysis 
of the practice of interpretation in law and in particular the notion of 
interpretive attitude, I sketched a theoretical account of regulatory 
interpretation that describes this practice –not simply as an occasion for 
improving communication among the members of the regulatory 
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community but- as a dialectical practice whose ultimate objective is to meet 
the demand for new and better interpretations.  
  
Now that the two theoretical accounts of regulatory interpretation have 
been fleshed out it is time to spell out how they inform our understanding 
of the grounds for the interpretive shift in the policy of rule-use in financial 
regulation. Specifically, the communicative account of regulatory 
interpretation and its constructive counter-part offer two alternative 
explanations of the reasons for this policy development. According to the 
communicative thesis, the interpretive shift is justified as an attempt to 
secure the effective use of rules by remedying failure of communication 
between the regulator and the regulated firms. On this account the rationale 
for the interpretive shift in regulatory interpretation draws on the need to 
combat information asymmetries and interpretive divergence to the extent 
in which they impede effective regulation. According to the constructive 
thesis, the move towards an interpretation-centric policy of rule-use can be 
better explained as an initiative whose purpose is to facilitate the wider 
regulatory community in meeting the demand for new and better 
interpretations by duly identifying and remedying interpretive mistakes 
before and where possible in preclusion of judicial interference. 
Significantly, on the constructive view, the interpretive shift is not justified 
in terms of informational discrepancies and interpretive divergence. Rather, 
its rationale is grounded on an idea of regulatory interpretation as the 
ultimate dialectical practice that commands and encourages the participants 
of the wider regulatory community to work out the public standards 
(“principles”) that govern their inter-relations. 
 
Which of the two accounts of the interpretive shift in financial regulation is 
preferable? The inherent weaknesses of the communicative thesis were just 
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discussed. However, it would be too early to subscribe to the constructive 
thesis. This as well is subject to a range of objections. Of particular interest 
is the criticism that the constructive thesis must be abandoned either 
because –contrary to what it holds- there is no right answers to questions of 
interpretation or because it is not compatible with considerations of 
procedural efficiency. In the next chapter, the attempt will be made to 
reinforce the case for a constructive theory of regulatory interpretation and, 
consequently, a constructivist view of the interpretive shift of regulatory 
interpretation by defending the constructive thesis against this objection. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
Some Objections to the Constructive Thesis 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In light of the meagreness of the communicative account of regulatory 
interpretation, chapter Five concluded with a position thesis for the 
formation of an alternative theoretical description of regulatory 
interpretation, the constructive account as it was coined. Many 
commentators would feel unease with the constructive thesis. The 
constructivist describes the use of rules in the regulatory context in light of 
the interpretive attitude, which entails that interpreters make evaluative 
judgements in their attempt to describe a particular practice in its “best 
light.” Moreover, it assumes that “there is a truth of the matter” in questions 
of interpretation and that interpreters, insofar as they are serious in what 
they are doing, are committed to the task of finding out what regulatory 
requirements truly require from them to do.  An issue of concern therefore 
is how to decide what values describe a particular practice in its “best light.” 
We seem to lack the ability to decide this matter in an objective or rational 
manner. Values are not out there in the world for us to observe. Besides 
people differ considerably in what they value and how they value it 
depending on their upbringing, their cultural background, their interests and 
personal aspirations. Would it be naïve –if not an ultimate sign of 
dogmatism- to insist that only one holds the truth and that the rest is 
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wrong? Would a blind persistence to right answers not bring the regulatory 
process into a deadlock? 
 
This objection takes issue with a claim that stands at the heart of the 
constructive reading of regulatory interpretation, namely the assertion that 
regulatory interpretation should be understood as an argumentative practice 
in pursuit of “rightness”. It contends that there would be a point to worry 
about getting things right, if there were indeed such a thing as objectively 
true or false answers to questions of interpretation. But there aren’t. All 
there is perhaps is different answers and in light of this diversity we need to 
be wise and modest enough to keep our minds open and ready to recognise 
the rationalities of others. If we really care to secure that regulation remains 
a fruitful and worthwhile project, consensus (rather the pursuit of right 
answers) seems to be the only realistic way we can hope to make this 
happen. On that view, the constructive thesis fails. As long as it endorses 
the quite implausible idea of objectivity in questions of interpretation, it 
introduces a dialectical ethos that is dogmatic and indoctrinating. 
Furthermore, it traps the interpretive process to the chase of an unrealistic 
agenda. By contrast the communicative thesis is by far more promising. It is 
based on a pragmatic depiction of regulatory interpretation, it regards 
interpretive convergence as the ultimate objective of the project of 
interpretation and it is attentive to the fact that considerations of procedural 
efficiency are paramount when it comes to the day-to-day regulation of 
financial markets. 
 
This is a serious attack to the constructive thesis. It is essential therefore to 
address this challenge as fully as possible. Below I will try to explain why an 
attack along the lines of the claim that there are no right answers to 
questions of interpretation is bound to fail by locating the frequent 
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theoretical misgivings about the truth of evaluative claims within the 
broader philosophical trend of value scepticism. 
 
 
2. The philosophical foundations of the criticism: Value-scepticism 
 
The criticism to the constructive thesis that I briefly sketched in the 
introduction is informed by what has become known in academia as value 
scepticism, the influential stream of thought that refutes the idea of objective 
truth in evaluative judgements (moral, aesthetic, interpretive etc).1 Value 
scepticism comes in two forms. It can be either internal or external.2 The 
following example will help illustrating the difference between internal and 
external scepticism. Suppose that two sceptics happen to overhear you and 
me disagreeing about an art review in the newspaper, which claims that El 
Greco’s art of painting is superior to Picasso’s. One of them says: “These 
people are both mistaken. There is no point to compare El Greco and 
Picasso. Artistic merit should be assessed in terms of the painter’s capacity 
to capture light and, therefore, Rembrandt is the best of all times!” The 
other says: “No my friend. You are mistaken for the same reason as they 
are. By claiming that their views are false, you have already accepted that 
their evaluative judgements admit of truth-value. If you want to maintain 
your sceptic stance, all you have to do is to say that your view simply differs 
                                                 
1 Scepticism has been influential within academic philosophy since a long time ago and it has recently 
revived in legal scholarship (but also in other disciplines) under the names of “post-modernism,” “anti-
foundationalism” or “neo-pragmatism.” Value scepticism should not be confused with the general all 
encompassing version of scepticism, which attacks the very idea of objective truth about anything. 
However, adherents of both versions claim that it is possible to stand outside a whole body of belief and to 
judge it as a whole from premises that are independent to it. Therefore, Ronald Dworkin calls them 
“archimedean.” My concern is with the selective version of scepticism. R. Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: 
You’d Better Believe It’, 25(2) Philosophy and Public Affairs (1996), 87, 87-89. For a detailed analysis of 
philosophical scepticism and its various forms see, P. Klein, ‘Scepticism’ in Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy (2005)[www.plato.standford.edu/entries/scepticism]; O. Bueno, “Davidson and Scepticism: How 
Not to Respond to the Sceptic”, 9(1-2) Principia (2005), 1-18; B. Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical 
Scepticism (2003). 
2 R. Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It’, 25(2) Philosophy and Public Affairs, (1996), 87, 
89-94 and R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (2000), 78-80. 
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from theirs, and perhaps add that you have that view because you have 
always admired Dutch art, hate Spanish artists especially the manierist and 
cubist ones’ etc. What you definitely cannot do it so say that your view is 
objectively true and that theirs is false.” 
 
The first sceptic is an internal sceptic.3 His claim that you and I are mistaken 
because Rembrandt is the best painter is internal because it denies some 
group of positive claims (“that Picasso is the best painter” or “that El Greco 
is the best painter” and justifies that denial by endorsing a different positive 
aesthetic claim (“Rembrandt is the best painter”). The internal sceptic holds 
a substantive position, which has direct implications for action. For instance 
if someone is sceptical about the artistic merit of Picasso’s painting because 
he things that this should be measured against the painter’s capacity to 
capture the interplay between light and colour, he cannot consistently 
acknowledge artistic merit in the work of Braque or other cubists. 
 
The second sceptic is an external sceptic.4 His claim is external because it does 
not rest on any positive aesthetic judgement and it does not take sides in 
substantive evaluative controversies.5 External scepticism is not directed to 
substantive aesthetic convictions. It is directed to second-order opinions 
about such convictions. An external sceptic may agree with a number of 
other art lovers that Rembrandt is the greatest artist. He keeps saying 
however that this is only a personal view because there isn’t such a thing as 
artistic merit or value out there in the world. He holds that that we have 
projected aesthetic quality onto reality. It is our emotions and social 
conventions that make a school of painting look of higher quality to 
another. 
                                                 
3 R. Dworkin, 89-92, above note 1; and Law’s Empire, note 2, 78-79. 
4 R. Dworkin, above note 1, 92-93; and Law’s Empire, note 2, 79-80. 
5 Dworkin calls the first characteristic “austerity” and the second “neutrality”. R. Dworkin, above note 1, 
93-94.  
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Internal sceptics like the first speaker need to appeal to the concept of 
objective evaluative truth as much as their rivals. Although they question the 
objectivists’ substantive claims about what is the case, they do not question 
the objectivists’ claim that the substantive question admits of (objectively) 
true and false answers. By contrast external sceptics consider themselves 
wholly absolved from the task of disputing the truth of anyone’s evaluative 
claims. They simply insist that we should guard against the illusion of 
thinking that our preferences or beliefs are anything more than just our 
preferences and beliefs. To conclude, external sceptics prompt us to argue 
for, defend, promote or revise our evaluative judgements and to reject, 
criticise or accept those of others; but they warn us that we are not entitled 
to claim objective truth or falsity for either. 
 
A crucial feature of internal scepticism is that its advocates cannot be sceptic 
all the way down. They can’t because they build their scepticism on some 
affirmative evaluative position (aesthetic, moral etc). If they claimed that no 
aesthetic judgement of any kind could be true, they would condemn their 
own theory because they would negate the positive evaluative judgements in 
which it is grounded. Therefore, internal scepticism does not pose a serious 
threat to the claim that there are no (objectively) right answers to questions 
of interpretation. By contrast, external scepticism does. It bears with it the 
promise that it is possible to criticise a whole scheme of beliefs about values 
(aesthetic in our example) from a perspective that is external and totally 
independent from that scheme of beliefs. Given that internal scepticism 
poses a trivial challenge to the constructive thesis from now onwards I will 
concentrate on the external version of value scepticism. 
 
The virtues of external scepticism are particularly evident nowadays in light 
of the immense culture diversity that resides in secular western societies. 
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This is even more so, once our attention turns to the public sphere where 
debates are more likely to be passionate and more difficult to resolute.6 In 
this context, many people feel that if one’s views find great opposition by 
the majority then it is arrogant for that person to insist that he is the one 
who holds the sole truth and that all those who disagree with him are in 
error. External scepticism is an appealing doctrine because it allows people 
to be culturally relative and modest and at the same time embrace their 
morality perhaps even more enthusiastically then before. Indeed, external 
scepticism promises to offer the best of both worlds because it supposedly 
makes possible for members of a community that are divided by 
disagreement to revise their views not about the substance of their 
convictions but about their status. In this fashion they “can … fight… for 
they beliefs as they ever were, but now with a difference. They can have 
their moral convictions and lose them too.”7 To cut a long argument short, 
external scepticism is appealing because it is “agreeably ecumenical”.8 On 
the one hand, it engulfs all those ideals that make a sound conversational 
ethos (openness, equal respect to each other’s rationalities and deliberation 
to mention a few) and which command equality in front the law9 and, on the 
other hand, it envisages public dialogue as a consensus-building project. The 
latter is particularly valuable as it is thought to create favourable conditions 
                                                 
6 Typical examples in the literature are debates about abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment and freedom 
of expression. However, one can easily borrow examples from the financial services terrain, as, for 
instance, the current discussion on what should be the role of the Bank of England in times of cash 
shortage in the banking system especially where consumer interests are affected. For instance, in 
connection to the recent woes in the housing market where many consumers have being facing a serious 
risk to lose their homes after a number of British banks had gradually tighten up lending, one might argue 
that “it is unfair for mortgage buyers to suffer the consequences of events that were beyond their control.” 
FSA, ‘Northern Rock’ (21 January 2008) FSA/PN/005/2008; Marvin King, Turmoil in Financial Markets: 
What Can Central Banks Do? (12 September 2007), paper submitted to the Treasury Committee by the 
Governor of the Bank of England [www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/northernrock/index.htm]. 
7 R. Dworkin, above note 1, 94. Richard Rorty calls this “irony”. See generally, R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony 
and Solidarity (1989). 
8 R. Dworkin, above note 1, 93. 
9 Equality is here as a residual principle, which requires all political and legal institutions to acknowledge 
that, “…all members of a community equally have the right to respectful consideration…” J. Finnis, Natural 
Law and Natural Rights (2003), 173. I will return to this point later on when I will be discussing the 
compatibility of the constructive account of regulatory interpretation with considerations of procedural 
efficiency. 
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for the realisation of other desirable state of affairs including stability, 
certainty and predictability and overall procedural efficiency.10 
 
It is true that none can seriously disagree with the normative aspect of the 
sceptic’s thesis; on the one hand, his claim that we should respect other 
people’s views, that we should be open to them and that we should always 
be willing upon reflection to revise our ideas and beliefs and, on the other 
hand, his concern with the efficiency of public institutions (although an 
issue here is whether the communicative thesis is the only theoretical 
framework that is eligible to bring these state of affairs into fruition). 
However, the same is not true with respect to the metaphysical aspect of his 
argument namely, his claim that evaluative judgements cannot be true or 
false and his concomitant conviction that the constructive thesis cannot 
accommodate our reasoned concern with procedural efficiency as long as it 
bounds the interpreters to futile chase of right answers. 
 
For example, when I argue that taxation is theft and, therefore, I consider it 
to be “objectively” or “really” wrong, I genuinely believe this to be the case. 
If you replied that I say so because of my wealthy background I would think 
that this is beside the point, because I know that my aversion is grounded 
on my belief that it is not fair –if I do not wish to- to share with others the 
fruits of my own labour.11 Furthermore, if you insisted that this is simply my 
opinion and that there is no truth of the matter about whether taxation is 
fair or unfair, right or wrong, I would consider this to be bizarre because I 
                                                 
10 It is quite common to use the term procedural efficiency in order to establish some sort of affiliation 
with the economic analysis of regulation. For the purposes of this chapter, I do not mean to subscribe to 
any of the troubled definitions of economic efficiency however. I use this term loosely to highlight the 
basic idea that consequences matter and, as a result, regulation must not waste the community’s scarce 
resources by utilising inefficient methods. Its success must be measured inter alia against its effectiveness 
and its fitness for purpose. Above note 1, 111-118. On the various notions of efficiency see D. M., 
Hausman and M. S. McPherson, Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy (2003), ch.7; R. Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law (1998), 13; and M. Adler and E. Posner, ‘Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis’, 109 Yale Law 
Journal 165 at 199. 
11 This thought-provoking idea constitutes the nucleus of a libertarian conception of justice. See generally, 
R. Nozick, Anarchy State and Utopia (1974). 
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feel that I am capable to reach credible evaluative judgements and I believe 
the same for others who may disagree with me. I have considerable evidence 
in my own experience –as I think you have in yours- of people’s capacity to 
make evaluative judgements that bring conviction, that are mainly durable, 
and amenable to the judgements of a great many others. My experience also 
suggests that my capacity to make evaluative judgements is not infallible. I 
am open to criticism and all I need to revise my opinion is reasons that I will 
have to weight in favour or against my initial belief and which will shape my 
final conclusions. Moreover, if you sarcastically asked if I had seen, felt or 
touch any values lately, I would have no hesitation to answer no and, 
further, explain that I do not use the words “objectively” or “really” literally 
but rather emphatically in order to stress that if my claim is true, then it is, 
even if no-one (not even me!) thought it to be so. All I am trying to do is to 
make room for mistake and the only way to do so is by drawing a distinction 
between what I believe to be the case and what the case is. Finally, if you 
complained that this discussion leads no-where, I would feel reluctant to 
share your disappointment and I would reassure you that conducting vivid 
debates neither entails the collapse of the institutional framework that 
facilitates this on-going dialogue nor is it a sign of weakness and decay, for it 
is only through contestation and argumentation that we can hope to 
advance our ability to address present and future challenges.12 
 
With all these untidy thoughts I want to suggest that the case for value 
scepticism is not at all self-evident. Below, I will take issue with both the 
normative and the metaphysical aspect of value scepticism starting from the 
second first.13 In relation to the metaphysical limb of value scepticism my 
                                                 
12 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), 318. 
13 My preoccupation with the metaphysical limb of external scepticism might take some readers by surprise 
given the affinities of my thesis with interpretivism, a school of thought that doubts the relevance of 
metaphysics to practical concerns. I felt, however compelled to discuss at some length this aspect of the 
criticism for mainly two reasons. First, due to its great influence to the mainstream literature on regulation, 
and second because the interpretivists’ aversion to metaphysics is not shared by all. On that point see, M. 
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argument will be that value scepticism is a flawed philosophical doctrine. 
With respect to its normative aspect I will try to explain why –contrary to 
what the critique believes- adherence to the constructive account of 
regulatory interpretation neither opens the way to an unsound 
conversational ethos nor is incompatible with considerations of procedural 
efficiency.  
 
 
3. The metaphysical aspect of value scepticism: A critical appraisal 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
As a metaphysical doctrine, external scepticism claims to be “neutral” 
and/or “austere”.14 It is neutral in the sense that it is capable of questioning 
a whole scheme of beliefs about value without challenging the substantive 
evaluative claim. It is austere in the sense that it pledges to construct its 
criticism wholly independently of any positive evaluative claim or 
assumption. “Neutrality” and “austerity” are deeply problematic for reasons 
I explain below. 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Neutrality 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Moore, ‘The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?,’ 41 Stanford Law Review (1988-
89), 871-957. Martin Heidegger was the first to argue that the entire metaphysical debate since Plato and 
Aristotle must be left behind. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1926) translated by J. Macquarrie and E. 
Robinson as Being and Time (1962). 
14 R. Dworkin, above note 1. 
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Those advocating the neutral version of external scepticism do not cast 
doubt to substantive value judgements. Their scepticism is directed to 
second-order opinions about such judgements. With other words they are 
sceptical not about personal beliefs concerning matters of value (aesthetic, 
moral etc) but on what we might call the “self-value” view of the status of 
these beliefs.15 For example, an external sceptic, who subscribes to 
neutrality, might agree with me that taxation is wrong or unfair act –he 
would only deny that taxation, as an institution is truly (really or objectively) 
wrong. He maintains that the wrongness of taxation is not out there in the 
real world. It is projected onto reality due to the feelings of distress that are 
caused inside our hearts even by the thought of being deprived of part of 
the fruits of our labour on regular basis and irrespective of whether we 
consent to this practice or not. Events and actions are not in themselves 
right or wrong, good or bad. Rather, they are made right or wrong, good or 
bad as a result of our emotions, projects or conventions. 
 
How can we explain the fact that external scepticism of that form is not 
directed to substantive moral convictions but only to second order opinions 
about such convictions? Consider the following three moral statements.16 
“Taxation is wrong.” “It is true that taxation is wrong.” “It is objectively (or 
really) true that taxation is wrong”. For the sake of convenience, I will 
follow Ronald Dworkin and call the first statement I- (for internal) 
proposition, and the second and third E- (for external) propositions.17 
According to the proponents of the neutral version of external scepticism, 
there is a logical space between I- and E-propositions.18 Whereas I-
                                                 
15 R. Dworkin, above note 1, 92. 
16 Recall that value scepticism does not deny that propositions like “Every month £800 are deducted from 
my salary for tax purposes” admit of objective truth because the truth of this statement can be empirically 
assessed. 
17 R. Dworkin, above note 1, 92-93. 
18 An external sceptic need not be both neutral and austere. For those sceptics who endorse austerity but 
not neutrality I-propositions are as much subjective and biased as E-propositions. See below the discussion 
of John Mackie’s scepticism at pages 254 to 257 below. 
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propositions are part of substantive morality, E-propositions are not and, 
therefore, they are susceptible to criticism. They suppose that there is 
something altogether distinct from the ordinary substantive moral claims we 
all make, so that we may accept the sceptics’ arguments and at the same time 
continue to judge and act, in the moral dimension, as we did before. Richard 
Rorty, who is one of the most celebrated American exponents of wholesale 
external scepticism, explains why E-propositions are altogether distinct from 
I-propositions by distinguishing between two levels of thought or 
discourse.19 To cite from the relevant passage: 
 
“[O]ne of the obvious truths about mountains is that they were here 
before we talked about them. If you do not believe that you probably 
do not know how to play the language-games which employ the word 
“mountain”. But the utility of those language games has nothing to do 
with the question of whether Reality as It Is In Itself, apart from the 
way it is handy for human beings to describe it, has mountains in it.”20 
 
 
As Dworkin comments, Rorty imagines two levels of discourse.21 “The first 
is the ordinary level at which you and I live: at that level mountains exist, 
existed before there were people, will exist presumably, after there are 
people and would have existed, presumably, even if there had never been 
people.” The second level is a philosophical level. At that level the question 
“do mountains exist?” does not arise. Instead a different question can 
emerge: “whether Reality as It Is In Itself contains mountains.” Rorty 
believes that it is at this second level that the dispute should be located. A 
common criticism to Rorty’s position is that none of this makes sense, 
unless the proposition that mountains exist can be given a different meaning 
                                                 
19 The wholesale archimedean scepticism refutes the idea of truth about anything, either this relates to 
statements about matters of fact (“descriptive claims”) either this relates to statements about matters of 
value (“evaluative claims”). R. Dworkin, above note 1, 88. 
20 R. Rotry, ‘Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical Presuppositions?’ in The Future of Academic 
Freedom L. Menand (ed) (1996), 29-30. 
21 R. Dworkin, above note 1, 96. 
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from the proposition that mountains are part of Reality as It Is In Itself.22 
Rorty asserts that these two propositions do not share the same meaning. 
He further assumes that the first proposition (I-proposition) is internal to 
our vocabulary of geology, whereas the second (E-proposition) is external to 
it. However, he remains silent as to what is it exactly that makes these two 
propositions different. 
 
Given the artificiality of Rorty’s distinction between levels of thought or 
discourse, Dworkin proposes that we would be better off if we abandoned it 
altogether and opted instead for a more natural reading of I- and E-
propositions, where the latter reveal themselves as restatements or 
clarifications of the former.23 To illustrate this point consider the following 
example. Suppose that I am speaking at some length about taxation.24 I 
begin by saying “Taxation is wrong.” This is a first order I-proposition 
about morality. Then I add a variety of other propositions that fall within 
the category of E-propositions and constitute what we could call my 
“further claims”. I also claim, that “What I said about taxation was not just 
an expression of my emotions when I receive my payslip with the tax 
deductions each month. Similarly, my opinion is not informative of other 
people’s emotions or reactions. My opinion is true. It is true quite apart from 
any one’s emotions or preferences and quite apart from me intending it to 
be true or not. My view is universal and absolute and describes things (that 
“taxation is wrong”) as they really are. They are part of the fabric of the 
universe. They are reports about how things really are out there in an 
independent subsisting realm of the world.” Can we find a plausible reading 
of my “further claims” that shows them to be positive moral judgements 
themselves –either restatements or clarifications of the original first order I-
                                                 
22 R. Dworkin, above note 1, 96. 
23 Above, 96-99. 
24 Dworkin uses a similar example in relation to abortion. R. Dworkin, above note 1, 97-99. 
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propositions, or additional moral claims that explicate those I-propositions? 
If yes, then any scepticism about them must be morally biased rather then 
neutral. It is not difficult to answer this question in the affirmative. The 
most natural reading of the further claims shows them to be nothing but 
clarifications or emphatic or metaphorical restatements of the first I-
proposition that “taxation is wrong”.25  
 
Indeed, if someone thinks that taxation is wrong he might well say that, “It 
is just true that taxation is wrong.” Similarly, if someone chooses in addition 
to use the adverbs “objectively” and “really”, he does so in order to clarify 
the content of his opinion. His intention is to distinguish his opinion so 
qualified from other opinions that he regards them as “subjective” in the 
sense that they refer to something that is just a matter of taste. For example, 
if someone declares that tennis is a “bad” or “worthless” game, he may well 
concede, on reflection, that his distaste of tennis is entirely “subjective,” that 
he does not regard the game as in any “objective” sense less worthwhile 
than games he prefers to watch. It follows that, in ordinary discourse, the 
claim that taxation is objectively wrong seems equivalent to any of the 
“further claims” I made earlier. That read is just another way of emphasising 
the content of the original moral claim, of stressing for once again that 
taxation is just plain wrong, not wrong only because people think it is.26 
 
Furthermore, when I say that I know that taxation is wrong, it is reasonable 
to expect that I will be understood as claiming that I have compelling 
reasons for believing that taxation is wrong. So read, my further claim turns 
out to be an I-proposition as well. It implies that insofar as taxation involves 
the State’s deliberate exercise of coercion against my (or indeed any one’s) 
free will not to share the fruits of my (one’s) own labour with others or only 
                                                 
25 R. Dworkin, above note 1, 97-99; and Law’s Empire, note 2, 80-83. 
26 R. Dworkin, above note 1, 99. 
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with those I choose to, we have compelling reasons for condemning this 
practice. The further claim that “it is universally or absolutely true that 
taxation is wrong” can also be understood as a restatement of my original 
moral claim. It clarifies its scope by making it plain that in my view taxation 
is wrong for everyone, regardless of one’s social, racial or cultural 
background. Finally, my flamboyant assertions about moral “facts” being 
“out there” in an “independent” realm need not be read literally simply 
because these are not things that people might actually say. Rather, they can 
make sufficient sense, as metaphorical ways of repeating my earlier remarks 
about the moral quality of taxation. 
 
3.3. Austerity 
 
So far it has been argued that the first metaphysical component of external 
scepticism –its supposed neutrality- collapses. An external sceptic does not 
necessarily claim to be neutral, however. He may endorse a purely austere 
form of scepticism arguing that there is no logical space between first and 
second order propositions and that, as a result, first order propositions are 
biased and subjective as well.27 Take the example of John Mackie, one of the 
most celebrated proponents of value scepticism with respect to morality. In 
his book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, he contends inter alia that neither 
first order nor second order ethical views admit of objective truth because 
radical differences between moral judgements make it difficult to treat those 
judgements as apprehensions of objective truths. Mackie relied on two 
                                                 
27 It is not the first time that the question of objectivity in interpretation is discussed. In chapter Four, I 
touched upon this theme to the extent in which –I felt- it was necessary in order to elucidate a number of 
key issues that crop up with respect to interpretation in general as, for example, the subject matter of 
interpretation, the difference between interpreting and changing the object of interpretation into 
something else, the presence (if any) and function of interpretive constraints etc. This time I return to this 
topic and consider it in more detail in order to explain why value scepticism offers a lame support to the 
objections to the constructive thesis. 
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arguments to support his view: the argument from “relativity” and the 
argument from “queerness”.   
 
According to the argument from moral relativity or diversity, the fact that 
people disagree so much about morality, from time to time and from place 
to place and, even within particular cultures, shows that no moral claim can 
be true. At first sight, the intuition underlying this claim seems to be simple 
and compelling. “If others, who seem to be just as intelligent as I am, 
disagree with me, why should I be so confident that I am right and others 
are wrong?” Yet, after a second thought, it seems strange to jump to the 
conclusion that as a result of radical disagreement there is no truth of the 
matter when it comes to moral claims. “We would not count the popularity 
of our moral opinions as evidence for their truth, why should we count their 
controversiality as evidence against it?”28 Furthermore, there is an additional 
problem with the argument from relativity. Whether diversity in given 
intellectual domain has sceptical implications depends on whether “the best 
account of the content of this domain explains why it should.”29 The best 
account of scientific thought does explain when and why disagreement in 
scientific judgement is suspicious. If thousands of people claimed that they 
have seen green horses but disagreed vividly about their size and shade of 
colour, scientists would discount their evidence because if there really were 
green horses and people had seen them, there would have been more 
uniform reports about their properties. Things are different in the so-called 
soft intellectual domains (e.g., morality). Since moral opinions are not 
caused by moral facts, we do not conclude from the diversity of moral views 
that no positive moral claim is true.30  
 
                                                 
28 R. Dworkin, above note 1 at 113. 
29 Above, 113-114. 
30 Above. 
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Mackie’s second argument –the argument from queerness contemplates the 
argument from relativity. This time, however, the focus of attention turns to 
the peculiar ontology of values.31 As he puts it “If there were objective 
values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange 
sort, utterly different from everything else in the universe. Correspondingly, 
if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty or 
moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of 
knowing everything else. When we ask the awkward question, how we can 
be aware of the truth…, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory 
perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory 
hypotheses or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or 
any combination of these, will provide as satisfactory answer; ‘a special sort 
of intuition’ is a lame answer, but is the one to which the clear-headed 
objectivist is compelled to resort.”32  
 
Advocates of austere scepticism like John Mackie maintain that it makes no 
sense to suppose that acts or events or institutions have moral properties 
unless we have some plausible account of how we –as human beings-could 
be “in touch with” or aware of such properties. On that view, the only way 
to resolve disagreements about what is good, right, beautiful is to posit the 
existence of distinct and real entities called “values”, a bear appeal to which 
would settle the dispute in favour of one or the other competing claim. 
Some philosophers have attempted to confront the sceptics’ ontological 
argument by propounding that values exist as real features of the world. 
John McDowel, for instance, has maintained that there is no reason why we 
                                                 
31 Professor Mackie makes clear from the outset that his position is essentially an ontological thesis. As he 
points out, “…what I have called moral scepticism is an ontological thesis, not a linguistic or conceptual 
one.” J. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977), 18. 
32 Above, 38-39. 
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should treat our perception of values differently from our perception of 
different aspects of the world, such as the colour and texture of objects.33  
 
It seems to me, however, that this response is totally unconvincing. To the 
extent it relies on the supposition that the truth or falsity of evaluative 
judgements depend on whether values are real features of the world, whose 
existence affects our faculties of perception in one way or another, it 
demands from us to subscribe to a counterintuitive ontology. Indeed, if we 
were ever asked whether we have seen, heard, touched or felt any values 
lately, we would probably find the question absurd, for when we are making 
evaluative judgements we are not claiming that values exist anywhere or in 
anything. Therefore, it is suggested that a more convincing line of argument is 
the one provided by Donald Davidson.  
 
Davidson proposes that truth need not be thought of in ontological terms.34 
Starting from the observation that the existence of thought is perhaps the 
only thing that we can be sure of,35 Davidson demonstrates that we cannot 
have a belief without understanding that this belief may be falsified by the 
facts. Similarly we cannot attribute any content to our beliefs without having 
a basic grasp of what it would take for them to be true. For example, to 
make sense of my belief that I have three chocolate bars in my bag, I must 
have a grasp of what would make that belief true, namely the presence of 
three chocolate bars inside my bag (or false, namely the presence of less 
then three chocolate bars or none). Significantly, this condition holds even if 
I have no way of making sure that my belief is true. The statement “Life will 
never be found in another planet” will be perfectly intelligible to any 
audience even though there is no possibility that members of that audience 
                                                 
33 J. McDowell, ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’ in T. Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity (1985). 
34 D. Davidson, ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’, chapter 10 in Subjective, Intersubjective 
Objective (2001), 137-157. 
35 D. Davidson, ‘The Problem of Objectivity’, Essay 1 in Problems of Rationality (2004), 3, 6. 
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will be able to confirm whether the statement is true or not. The audience 
understands this sentence well enough insofar as it has a grasp of what 
would need to be the case for the statement to be true.  
 
The same point applies to our possession and use of concepts. To have a 
concept is to be able to classify things under it, i.e. to have criteria that 
distinguish things that fall within the concept from things that fall outside it. 
Moreover, awareness of the possibility of mistake in the course of its 
application is an essential part of having a concept (e.g. I believed that I saw 
a yellow object. But the object was actually orange, so my application of the 
concept seemed correct but was not.). In all, to have concepts and beliefs, 
one must be able to identify the conditions that would make them (or for 
concepts their application) true. If thought exists, then so does the idea of 
truth, which stands independently from the content of one’s beliefs about 
the world.36 
 
Davidson further argues that identifying the truth conditions of any belief 
presupposes that I have a grasp of a whole web of other concepts and 
beliefs (holism). My believing that there are three chocolate bars in my bag 
requires that I have a grasp of the concepts of “chocolate bar” and “bag” as 
well as of basic arithmetic and orientation. Given the flexibility of our use of 
language and sentence construction, this entails that there is no definite 
amount of beliefs that I must assume to be true in order to identify the truth 
conditions of a given belief.37 Rather, to identify the truth conditions for any 
one of my beliefs I must always rely on the assumption that my beliefs as a 
whole are (objectively) true.38 It is only against such a rich background of 
                                                 
36 D. Davidson, ‘What Thought Requires’, Essay 9 in Problems of Rationality (2004), 135. 
37 For example, consider the range of beliefs that I would need to assume as true in order to make sense of 
my belief that ‘someone took a picture of me while I was watching a star falling from the sky’! 
38 D. Davidson, ‘A Coherence Theory of True and Knowledge’, Essay 10 in Subjective, Intersubjective Objective  
(2001) 137, 138-40. Davidson has been at great pains to emphasise that his theory does not assume that a 
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truths that is makes sense to think that some of my beliefs or a particular 
application of a concept may be false.39 
 
The argument thus far shows that one can be certain that he possesses true 
knowledge of the content of one’s thoughts and -in light of the 
intersubjective nature of language- the content of the thoughts of his co-
discussants. But is this enough to guarantee that one also has knowledge of 
what is the world like? How can we be sure that our body of beliefs is 
actually true? How can we be certain that our brains are not inside a vat of a 
scientist’s laboratory wired to all “normal” sensations? With this regard, 
Davidson notes that sceptics assume that knowledge of our minds enjoys 
some sort of secure status because of its immediacy, and that it is that 
immediacy that is supposedly necessary but missing when it comes to our 
knowledge of the external world.40 He argues that this assumption is 
tenuous because the mastery of language, which grounds the knowledge of 
what is inside one’s mind as well as other people’s mind, is possible only 
through knowledge of the world. 
 
Specifically, Davidson asks the following question. Given that knowledge of 
any mind (one’s own or another’s) depends on the existence of a shared 
language, what conditions need to obtain for an interpreter to be able to 
interpret the verbal utterances of a speaker with success? In order to put the 
question of interpretation in its sharpest or most radical form,41 Davidson 
supposes that interpreter and speaker do not share the same language and 
asks what conditions would need to obtain for the former to interpret 
                                                                                                                                            
body of belief is true just in virtue of the fact that it is consistent. See ‘Afterthoughts’, Subjective, 
Intersubjective, Objective (2001), 154. 
39 One conspicuous consequence of holism is that my beliefs are not made true because they correspond 
or refer to particular aspects of the world, for the ideas of correspondence and reference acquire their 
sense from the false assumption that we experience the world in bits, of which our sentences are supposed 
to be mental representations. D. Davidson, ‘Indeterminism and Antirealism’, Essay 5 in Subjective, 
Intersubjective Objective  (2001), 69, 78-80. 
40 D. Davidson, ‘First Person Authority’, Essay 1 in Subjective, Intersubjective Objective (2001), 3. 
41 That is why he labelled this theory as the “Theory of Radical Interpretation”. 
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successfully the utterances of the latter. By discussing the problem of 
interpretation in this very difficult context, he brings to the forefront the 
kind of knowledge that is required for all linguistic understanding, without 
relying on any prior knowledge of the speaker’s language, beliefs or 
conceptual schemes. 
 
Davidson argues that radical interpretation is only possible on condition that 
the interpreter credits the speaker with two attributes, which collectively 
amount to what he calls the Principle of Charity in Interpretation.42 First the 
interpreter must credit the speaker with the same apparatus that makes the 
interpreter capable of having thoughts and language, i.e. the interpreter must 
attribute to the speaker’s beliefs the same degree of holism or coherence 
featuring in his own body of beliefs (the Principle of Coherence). Second the 
interpreter must credit the speaker with the same ability to respond to 
aspects of the world that the interpreter attributes to himself (and to other 
users of his language) (the Principle of Correspondence).  
 
Davidson’s argument demonstrates that, contrary to the assumption that 
gives scepticism its currency, knowledge of the content of any belief is only 
possible on the assumption that we, as the speakers, have a largely true view 
of the world. Our three varieties of knowledge (subjective, objective, inter-
subjective) are interdependent. Knowing the content of our minds and of 
the minds of others requires us to have knowledge of the shared 
environment in which thought acquires its content (so the idea of a 
                                                 
42 Some commentators argue that under the Principle of Charity the interpreter has a choice about how 
much of his own beliefs to attribute o his co-discussant. See, I. Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to 
Philosophy? (1975), 146-50; C. Taylor, ‘Understanding the Other: A Gadamerian View of Conceptual 
Schemes’, Essay 15 in J. Malpas, U. Arnwald and J. Kertscher (eds.) Gadamer’s Century (2002), 291-292. It is 
suggested that this argument is problematic, because an interpreter is committed to maximizing agreement 
between his beliefs and the speaker’s beliefs, only insofar as there is no cause for thinking that one of the 
parties labours under a misapprehension. D. Hoy, ‘Post-Cartesian Interpretation: Hans-Georg Gadamer 
and Donald Davidson’ Essay 3 in L. E. Hahn (ed), The Library of Living Philosophers: The Philosophy of Hans-
Georg Gadamer vol. XXIV (1997), 122-125. 
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conceptual scheme which is unintelligible to us is incoherent)43, while 
knowledge of the world is only possible for creatures that are able to have 
and to communicate thoughts and beliefs about it. 
 
To conclude, sceptics maintain that it is possible to understand the meaning 
of a person’s evaluative judgement and still be able to claim that this 
proposition cannot be objectively true or false. The coherence theory of 
truth and knowledge makes plain that this view rests on a misconception of 
what is involved in having a belief (indeed any propositional attitude) or 
understand someone else’s belief. To be able to understand any utterance 
whether one’s own or someone else’s as a belief one must necessarily posses 
the concept of objective truth.44 It is suggested that this is of immense 
significance in the study of regulatory interpretation because it shows that 
we can intelligibly argue for right answers to questions of interpretation 
without subscribing to an ontological notion of truth. 
 
 
4. The normative aspect of value scepticism: A critical appraisal 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The normative aspect of external scepticism and its appeal have been 
discussed already. It was argued that, as a normative doctrine, external 
scepticism attacks the idea of objective truth in matters of interpretation, 
first, by asserting that talk about objectivity introduces an weak 
                                                 
43 D. Davidson, ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 47 Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association (1973-1974), 5-20. 
44 It is interesting to note that in the course of exposing the sceptic’s challenge as incoherent, Davidson 
provided us with a theory of truth that proves correct an important part of the idea of interpretative 
attitude, on which the constructive account of regulatory interpretation was grounded. This is because his 
theory explained how it is possible for interpretive arguments to preserve the crucial space between what 
the participants in a practice believe that the practice requires and what the practice truly requires, by 
showing that truth and belief are connected to each other in a holistic manner.   
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conversational culture in the public domain and, second, by arguing that the 
constructive thesis is not attentive to considerations of procedural efficiency 
because the pursuit of right answers is more likely to bring public debate in 
deadlock. I will not spend more time on the first limb of this attack; the 
analysis above made plain that we have the capacity to get the interpretation 
of rules right without being stubborn, dogmatic or capricious. Rather I will 
concentrate on the second limb of the criticism, namely the argument that 
commitment to the chase for right answers is at odds with procedural 
efficiency.45 Below I will unpack the critic’s argument into more concrete 
claims against the constructive reading of regulatory interpretation and then 
I will try to address them as fully as possible. 
 
4.2. Is the constructive thesis inconsistent with the demand for 
procedural efficiency? 
 
Even if one accepts that there are right answers to questions of 
interpretation and that we can have genuine arguments about them, still one 
has reasons to refute the constructive thesis, for it is not enough to 
demonstrate the intelligibility of talk about right answers; one must also 
show that the search for right answers is a feasible and worthwhile project in 
light to the scarcity of resources and the peculiarities of regulation as a 
political institution whose prime concern is the delivery of efficient public 
                                                 
45 On the notion of procedural efficiency see note 9 above. The discussion in this section echoes the 
parallel debate in jurisprudence concerning the extent (if at all) in which natural law theories can 
accommodate a basic set of intuitions that make legal conventionalism an attractive theoretical doctrine as, 
for instance, its commitment to pluralism, consensus, neutrality, modesty and procedural efficiency. For 
instance, S. Shapiro argues that the insights of legal conventionalism are incompatible with the natural law 
tradition. S. Shapiro, ‘Law, Plans and Practical Reason’, 8 Legal Theory (2002), 387 at 441. A defence of the 
opposite view is provided by Kyritsis. See, D. Kyritsis, ‘What is Good About Legal Conventionalism?’, 14 
Legal Theory (2008), 135-166. The author makes special reference to Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity as 
an example of a robust natural law theory that is compatible with certain core postulates of legal 
conventionalism. Although there is some controversy as to whether law as integrity belongs to the natural 
law tradition, it seems that Dworkin does not object this. On this point see R. Dworkin, ‘Natural Law 
Revised’, 34 University of Florida Law Review (1982), 165. 
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administration.46 This is exactly, what the critic doubts when he argues that 
the constructive thesis is at odds with considerations of procedural 
efficiency. He questions the capacity of regulatory interpretation to meet the 
demand for new and better interpretations (as the constructivist advocates) 
at a minimum time and cost.47 The critic evokes a number of reasons in 
support of his claim. 
 
To begin with, he points out that it is a fact of life that people differ 
considerably in matters of value. The more it is important something, the 
more likely it is to raise disagreement and debate and the greater the chances 
are that the chase of right answers will bring decision-making into an 
impasse. Under these circumstances, procedural efficiency requires the 
bridging of differences so that both the regulatory authority and the 
regulated population read out from the same page.48 This is an essential 
precondition for otherwise it is not possible to maintain certainty and 
predictability and overall facilitate market co-ordination. Allegedly, the 
constructive account of regulatory interpretation is not attentive to this 
problem because it triggers friction and conflict. By contrast, the 
communicative thesis is by virtue of the fact that it places consensus into the 
forefront of regulatory interpretation. 
 
Despite appearances, the constructive account of regulatory interpretation is 
neither hostile to procedural efficiency nor out of touch with the realities of 
regulatory practice. When the constructivist posits that regulatory 
interpretation should be understood as an argumentative practice in pursuit 
                                                 
46 P. Craig, Administrative Law, (5th edition), 369-370; M. Elliot, Administrative Law: Texts and Materials, (3rd 
edition), 633; E. Page, Governing by Numbers (2001), ch.8. 
47 Obviously this will not be the case, if it takes the regulatory community ten years to resolve a trivial 
interpretive matter. 
48 See the discussion on interpretive convergence and its rationale in chapter Four above, pages 176 to 179. 
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of rightness, he has a short of principled-interpretation in mind.49 
Principled-interpretation is neither novel nor an extra-ordinary view of what 
actually happens in regulatory interpretation.50 It is implied in a number of 
long-established regulatory practices. More recently these practices have 
found expression in concrete policy initiatives concerning the design, 
interpretation and enforcement of rules by FSA. For example, the 
principles-based approach to regulation is an unequivocal manifestation of 
principled-interpretation. Similarly, consistency –one of the design 
objectives of the FSA Handbook- requires that regulatory provisions are 
internally coherent and that differentiation is permissible only where the 
regulator provides reasons explaining why deviation is considered 
appropriate. Finally a further aspect of FSA’s regulation that suggests that 
principled-interpretation is at play concerns the Authority’s approach to 
enforcement. In this connection FSA stressed its commitment to ensure 
that its decisions are consistent overtime and explained how past decisions 
affect present choices of what should be the appropriate mode of action. 
 
The constructivist favours a form of principles-interpretation because he is 
alert, that interpretive judgments are often subject to irregularities and 
distortions even where they were the outcome of due process. Therefore, he 
envisages a theoretical scheme of regulatory interpretation where each 
interpreter is expected to ascertain the scheme of principles of political 
morality, that gives the best account of the practice of regulation, and use 
this as interpretive guidance.51 In doing so the interpreter is invited to 
contest his views with the views of others. He must consider alternative 
                                                 
49 On the conception of “right answers” in Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity see, D. Carlson, ‘Dworkin 
in the Desert of the Real’, 60 University of Miami Law Review (2005-2006), 505 at 522. 
50 A. Georgosouli, ‘The FSA Policy of Rule-Use: A Critical Appraisal’, 28(1) Legal Studies (2008), 119-139 at 
121; and FSA, The FSA Approach to Enforcement, chapter 5 especially para. 23. Similarly, it is suggested that 
the Financial Services and Market Tribunal aids FSA in its task to conduct principled-interpretation. 
51 This applies with equal force to every member of the regulatory community that partakes in the 
interpretation of regulatory requirements either as a regulatory official or as a regulated firm or as a 
consumer during the consultation process or during other subsequent stages. The source of the obligation 
to conduct principled-interpretation will be considered in while. 
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interpretations of the rule in question as well as the force of various 
arguments that support them and -after due reflection- adopt the 
interpretation that matches his conclusive judgement in “reflective 
equilibrium”.52 Principled-interpretation entrusts each individual member of 
the regulatory community with the task of developing the public standards 
of their community. It urges them to see this project not just a matter of 
negotiated trade-offs (as the communicative thesis does with its emphasis on 
interpretive convergence) but as dialectical enterprise that involves 
commitment to a fundamental public conception of justice.53 
 
The conduct of principled-interpretation provides the community of 
interpreters with a normative scheme that is conducive to organic change. If 
the associates in the regulatory community (especially the regulated 
population) accept that “they are governed not only by explicit rules laid 
down in past political decisions but by whatever other standards flow from 
the principles that these decisions assume, then the set of recognised public 
standards can expand organically”, as they become “more sophisticated in 
sensing and exploring what these principles require in new circumstances 
without the need for detailed legislation or adjudication on each possible 
point of conflict”.54 Undoubtedly, disagreement prolongs principled-
interpretation. It is suggested however that if policy makers were to choose 
between a mode of interpretation that raises no disputes and a mode of 
principled-interpretation, in which disagreement constitutes an integral part, 
then principled-interpretation would be preferable because it furnishes the 
regulatory community with a vehicle for organic change, which otherwise 
                                                 
52 John Rawls introduces the term “reflective equilibrium” to elaborate a liberal theory of political justice. 
In this particular case the term is used in a different context. Its essence, however, remains by and large the 
same as it implies a state of affairs where our judgements and principles coincide (they are found in 
“equilibrium”) and in which we are able to tell what principles our judgements conform and the premises 
of their derivation. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2000), 18-19 and 42-43, especially, 18.  
53 In this manner it resembles the model of legal interpretation that emanates from Dworkin’s thesis of law 
and integrity. R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire above note 2, 95-96 and 216; and N. Simmonds, Central Issues in 
Jurisprudence (2008), 231-236. 
54 R. Dworkin, above note 2, 188-189. 
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would not have at all. After all we should not lose sight of the fact that by 
focusing exclusively on time constraints, we run the risk of missing another 
important parameter of sound decision-making namely the need to take into 
account the input of as many as possible.55 
 
Now, it is true that the critic is more likely to insist on his first point, 
perhaps more vehemently than ever before. He might complain that what 
the constructivist calls a “vehicle for organic change” for the regulatory 
community is nothing but a device in the hands of the powerful interest-
group to pursue its own agenda in the regulatory arena.56 He would remind 
the constructivist that the community of interpreters is not made out of 
angels. Each interpreter acts out of self-interest and, if he has the chance to 
affect regulatory decision-making, there is no question that he will go ahead 
to advance his own interests without regard to any responsibilities that may 
derive from his de facto involvement in regulatory interpretation.57 The 
opponent would further add that the trouble with the constructive thesis is 
that it makes it so easy for the members of the regulatory community to act 
in such a manner. It does so, because it asks them to address interpretive 
disputes by drawing from a pool of contradictory and often conflict-ridden 
principles that reside in past political practice.58  
 
                                                 
55 J. Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many are Smarter Than the Few (2004). 
56 The view of law as an arena of power politics is widely held among scholars of the Critical Legal Studies 
movement. D. Litowitz, ‘Dworkin and Critical Legal Studies on Right Answers’, 18 Legal Studies Forum 
(1994), 135 at 135-136. 
57 J. Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’, 2 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (1971), 3; 
J. J. Laffont and J. Tirole, ‘The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory 
Capture,’ 106(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics (1991), 1088; and D. Martimort, ‘The Life Cycle of Regulatory 
Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs’, 66(4) Review of Economic Studies (1999), 929. 
58 I use the term “past political practice” (and its equivalent “political history”) rather than “past legal 
practice” (or “legal history”) to suggest that the public standards or principles that may guide regulatory 
interpretation are not to be found in court decisions exclusively, but in whatever said and done by 
members of constitutional assemblies, legislatures, courts and administrative agencies. For a similar 
conceptualisation of “law practices” see, M. Greenberg, ‘How Facts Make Law’ in S. Hershovitz (ed), 
Exploring Law’s Empire (2008), 225, 234. 
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This time the critic attacks the case for a constructive account of regulatory 
interpretation on two fronts. On the one hand, he invokes the problems of 
regulatory capture and rent-seeking to demonstrate the futility of asking 
those involved in the interpretive project to get things right. On the other 
hand, he points to the chaotic legal background where political values, 
principles and policies dwell, to argue that bringing these materials at the 
forefront of regulatory interpretation is more likely to do harm rather than 
good, for it is bound to allow for arbitrariness and bias.59 
 
With respect to the first fraction of the critic’s new argument, it should be 
noted that regulatory capture and rent-seeking are not peculiar to the 
constructive account of regulatory interpretation. The same problems would 
arise if a communicative type of regulatory interpretation were in operation, 
for there as well would be no point for committing oneself towards working 
out an agreeable interpretation of rules if one had the power to stir up 
regulatory decision-making without having to compromise one’s interests. 
In any case, the aim of a theory of regulatory interpretation is not to resolve 
problems like these. Its objective is to provide the best possible explanation 
of why this mode of conduct (regulatory capture) should be regarded as a 
problem at all; a practice that we should refrain from institutionalising; 
something that we have good reasons to resent and discourage. So, if there 
is a difference between the constructive thesis and the communicative thesis 
in this respect, then this is put down to their different line of reasoning. 
Whereas the constructivist declares that these practices are objectionable 
because they are incompatible with our intuition that a life worth living is a 
life that is governed by the Rule of Law60 rather than the rule of the 
                                                 
59 D. Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law and Adjudication’, 89 Harvard Law Review (1976), 1685. 
60 There is no generally accepted definition of the Rule of Law. Here I follow Richard Fallon and his 
suggestion that this ideal should be understood as an “all-encompassing essentially contested concept” 
comprising a multitude of complexly interwoven strands. R. Fallon, ‘ “The Rule of Law” as a Concept of 
Constitutional Discourse’, 97 Columbia Law Review (1997), 1. See also J. Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and Its 
Virtue’, 93 Law Quarterly Review (1977), 195; above note 8, 270-273; R. S. Summers, ‘A Formal Theory of 
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powerful, the communicativist contends that these practices must be 
resisted only insofar as and to the extent in which they hinder the 
procedural efficiency of the regulatory process. 
 
The second fraction of the critic’s latest critique –namely, the accusation 
that principled- interpretation is unlikely to bear out the fruits it promises- is 
a version of the first one. That as well doubts the eligibility of the 
constructive scheme of interpretation to meet the demand for new and 
better interpretations. This time however attention is drawn to the chaotic 
and contradictory state of affairs of past political practice rather than to the 
imperfect nature of interpreters as human beings. Arguably this is a serious 
challenge to the constructive thesis because it claims that even if the 
problem of regulatory capture was vanished in some magical way, still 
regulatory interpretation, as it is envisaged by the constructivist, would fail 
to meet the tall order of “getting things right,” simply because there is 
enough in the reservoir of past political practice, for one to make in good 
faith whatever argument he wishes.61 Arguably, the communicative thesis is 
discharged from this problem, because it neither asks the interpreters to 
seek for right answers, nor urges them in vein to seek guidance by resorting 
to contradictory principles. 
 
This accusation is based on a familiar complain, Critical Legal Studies 
enthusiasts make, about the condition of law.62 The trouble with this 
pessimist depiction of law is that it relies on a simplistic account of 
                                                                                                                                            
the Rule of Law’, 6 Ratio Juris, (1993), 127; M. J. Radin, ‘Reconsidering the Rule of Law’, 69 Buffalo 
University Law Review (1989), 781; and B. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics and Theory (2007). 
61 The view of legal history as full of inconsistencies is shared by critical legal studies scholars, positivists 
and interpretivists alike. R. Unger, What Can Legal Analysis Become? (1996), 65; J. Raz, Ethics in the Public 
Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (1994), 277, 298-300; and R. Dworkin, note 2, 273. See 
further J. Waldron, Did Dworkin Ever Answer the Crits?’ in, S. Hershovitz (ed), Exploring Law’s Empire: 
The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin (2008), 155, at 180. 
62 E. White, ‘The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies’ 36 Stanford Law Review (1984), 649, 651.  
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contradiction. Law is far more complicated63 and precisely because it is so 
perplex in its nature, it is suggested that, there is nothing better one can do 
but try to put things in order, for nothing else will reveal whether an attempt 
can succeed or not.64 As Jeremy Waldron puts it in one of his eloquent 
articles on Dworkin’s idea of law as integrity, “it is not clear up front that 
attempts to argue in the mode of law-as-integrity are doomed to failure. If it 
were clear, we should have no reason to resist the siren charms of 
pragmatism … But sometimes legal argument looks promising, and when it 
does we are obliged to make the attempt…”65  
 
Yet, the justification of committing one self to principled-interpretation, 
even where the chances are to make mistakes, goes far beyond satisfying 
one’s adventurous spirit or curiosity to find out whether this project is going 
to be a success story or not. It emanates directly from our moral 
constitution and our social condition as members of a political community.66 
These dictate that we act in important matters with integrity that is, 
according to convictions that inform our lives as a whole rather than 
capriciously. In addition, our moral constitution and our political state of 
being demand that we are allowed and enabled to play an active part in 
shaping and revising the public standards of our political community.67 
Principled-interpretation, under the constructive vision of regulatory 
interpretation, makes this possible because it embraces a vision of the 
regulatory community whose members actively develop the public standards 
of their community because they treat their relationships as genuinely 
governed by these standards. 
                                                 
63 J. Waldron, Did Dworkin Ever Answer the Crits?’ in, S. Hershovitz (ed), Exploring Law’s Empire: The 
Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin (2008), 155, at 181. 
64 The idea of regulatory interpretation under the constructivist lenses is much more a matter of attitude 
rather than a matter of institutional dynamics and power politics. Dworkin approaches legal interpretation 
in a similar way. R. Dworkin, 239, above note 2, 413, 190. 
65 Above note 63, 155, at 181. 
66 The regulatory community is part of the wider political community. 
67 R. Dworkin, above note 2, 166. 
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Finally, one should not lose sight of the fact that principled interpretation 
furnishes the constructive thesis with a significant legitimacy advantage.68 
Under the constructive reading of regulatory interpretation there is a 
reciprocal relationship between the regulatory Authority and the regulatees. 
It is not just the regulated population that is required to conduct principled-
interpretation. Regulatory officials are asked to do the same. They are 
expected to justify their exercise of coercive power by showing how their 
decisions and actions flow from principles that the regulatory community 
unearthed out of past political practice.69  
 
There is one more argument against the constructive thesis that merits 
attention. The critic need not question the capacity of regulatory 
interpretation to bring fruits in order to show that the constructive thesis is 
at odds with considerations of procedural efficiency. As a matter of fact, the 
critic may not be a pessimist at all. His only objection now is that the search 
for right answers by way of principled- interpretation should be better left to 
the judiciary because it is better competent and, therefore, suitable to deal 
with this matter.70 In this connection, he might explain that he prefers the 
communicative thesis because the latter captures the following idea: that it is 
for the judiciary to detect and remedy interpretive mistakes and in this 
                                                 
68 Here, I cannot pursue the question of legitimacy further. Suffice is to point out that whereas the 
constructive thesis answers the question “why should one obey a scheme of interpretation that opposes” in 
terms of the notion of reciprocity as a form of associative obligation, the communicative thesis seems to 
rely on the idea of consent or tacit consent. Neither of the two approaches to the question of legitimacy is 
free from problems. It is suggested however, that the appeal to reciprocity is less problematic. S. Perry, 
‘Associative Obligations and the Obligation to Obey the Law’ and Dworkin’s response in S. Hershovitz 
(ed), Exploring Law’s Empire (2008), 183-205 and 304-305 respectively; R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 190-216; 
and A. J. Simons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (1981), chs. 3 and 4. 
69 Above note 63, 155, at 177; and J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999), 189-191. 
70 P. Craig, above note 46, chapter 12 particularly 388-393 and 400-401 and; R. Baldwin and J. Houghton, 
‘Circular Arguments: The Status and Legitimacy of Administrative Rules’ (1986) Public Law 239 at 298. As I 
will explain in a while, the constructive theory does not make the absurd claim that regulators and judges 
should be regarded as performing the same role. All it says is that regulation must not be viewed as a 
domain outside the Rule of Law. By the same token, those involved in regulatory interpretation must be 
taken to act within the Rule of Law, for otherwise is not sensible to say that they are under an obligation to 
respect it! 
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manner to ensure that everyone is treated as equal by the law; it is not for 
the regulator to bother with that; the regulator’s priority should be to ‘keep 
things moving’ as efficiently as possible. In addition, the critic might take 
issue with the suggestion that all members of the regulatory community bear 
a special moral obligation; the obligation to treat regulatory interpretation as 
a practice that involves commitment to a fundamental public conception of 
justice, which each interpreter individually has a responsibility to identify for 
himself and defend it against other competing conceptions. In this relation, 
he might say that the assumption of a moral obligation to interpret rules in a 
principled fashion is deeply problematic and unhelpful.  
 
It is problematic because the only interpreter who is institutionally fit to 
conduct principled-interpretation is the judiciary. There is a clear division of 
labour between the judiciary and the regulatory authority. Whereas the 
former has the task to ensure that deviations from the Rule of Law71 are 
duly detected and remedied the latter’s job is to bring about certain policy 
outcomes at the minimum possible cost; it is not for the regulator to look 
out for right answers in questions of interpretation. By the same token, it is 
incongruous to claim that each regulated firm and more generally everyone 
that is involved in regulatory interpretation other than the regulator has the 
moral obligation to carry out principled-interpretation first because it is unfit 
and second because this heavy moral burden would deprive each interpreter 
from the freedom to pursue one’s own individual goals and agenda.  
 
The critic is right to complain that involvement in regulatory interpretation 
should not yield one’s fundamental right of self-determination 
unattainable.72 He is also right to point out that there is a division of labour 
between the regulator and the judiciary, but the proposition that the 
                                                 
71 The difficulty to come up with a workable definition of the Rule of Law was discussed above in note 60. 
72 See above note 8, 169 and 177. 
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regulator has the moral burden to conduct principled interpretation does 
not entail blurring the institutionally distinct roles of the regulator and the 
adjudicator. The regulator is not a judge and he should not act as if he were 
one, not least because he confronts different challenges in performing his 
mandate. If anything, the regulator’s concern is with the making and 
execution of public policy –not with justice. This, however, does not 
absolve the regulator from abiding by and acting within the premises of the 
Rule of Law. This duty emanates directly from the statutory mandate by 
virtue of which the regulator is placed in a privileged position to make 
exclusive use of the State’s coercive power in the name of bringing into 
fruition certain desirable policy objectives.73 Furthermore, it finds expression 
in a wealth of court decisions on the discretion of administrative agencies to 
depart or change policies and the protection of legitimate expectations on 
the grounds of equality.74 
 
With respect to the regulated firms and any other participant in the 
community of interpreters other than legal or regulatory officials, things are 
less straightforward. Although many social practices create reasons for 
acting in a certain way –in this particular case, conducting principled 
                                                 
73 Up to this point it is useful to bring to mind the subtle Dworkinian distinction between the idea of 
integrity in legislation and integrity in adjudication. The first restricts what legislators and other lawmakers 
(e.g. regulatory agencies) may “properly do in expanding or changing” the system of public standards that 
prevails in a particular political community. The second requires the judiciary to treat “the present system 
of public standards as expressing and respecting a coherent set of principles”. Under this scheme judges 
are not allowed to make new law but to preserve and uphold the existing one. The past exerts some special 
power, which judges must not ignore. By contrast, policy makers and rule makers enjoy greater interpretive 
freedom when performing their institutional function, in the sense that they are allowed to be more 
creative when interpreting the public standards of the political community they represent. R. Dworkin, 
above note 2, 167 and 217; and note 56 at 142. 
74 R v Secretary of the State for the Home Department, ex p. Ruddock [1987], 2 ALL ER, 518; R v Commissioner of 
Police of Metropolis ex p P, The Times, 24 May 1995; R v DPP ex p C, The Times, 7 March 1994; R v Secretary 
of the State for the Environment ex p West Oxfordshire District Council, [1994] COB 134; R v Ministry for Agriculture 
Fisheries and Foods, ex p Humble Fisheries (Offshore) Limited (CO/2158/92), 11; R v Secretary of the State for the 
Transport, ex p Richmond-Upon Thames London Borrow Council [1994] 1 WLR, 74 at 94 especially the statement 
of Laws J; R v North West Lancashire HAE ex p A, D, G, [2002] UKHRR, 97; R(on the application of BAPIO 
Action Ltd) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2007] EWHC, 199 which was affirmed by the 
House of Lords case R(on the application of BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of the State for the Home Department, 
[2008] 2 WLR, 1073; and  R (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2008] 
EWCA Civ, 755. See also Y. Dotan, ‘Why Administrators Should Be Bound by their Policies’, 17 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies (1997), 23-41. 
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interpretation- not all do and even fewer engender reasons that have the 
force of an obligation.75 Legal practice is one of them and so is regulation at 
least insofar as one is prepared to endorse the view that regulation is integral 
part of the practice of law. In this relation, it is argued that the moral duty to 
commit oneself to a principled-interpretation of regulatory requirements can 
be based on a conception of associative responsibility that emerges from 
their de facto involvement in regulatory interpretation.76 In any case the 
claim that interpreters are morally bound to conduct principled-
interpretation does not intend to cancel out one’s right of self-
determination. Rather, the constructivist introduces the idea of a moral duty 
because he wishes to remedy a discrepancy that would otherwise emerge 
(given the recent trend towards decentralised patterns of interpretive 
decision-making in financial regulation) if interpreters were given the 
freedom to shape interpretive decision-making without at the same time 
bearing the burden of responsibility for their judgements.77 Clearly the 
regulator and the regulated population do not share identical burdens of 
responsibility. It should be noted however that the more the regulated 
population is expected to play an active role in developing regulatory 
standards the greater the burden upon its members to treat relationships 
between themselves as typically, not just sporadically governed by these 
standards.78 
 
                                                 
75 The term “social practice” is here broadly conceived encompassing all the different and widely divergent 
views about the nature and structure of the social practice currently on offer –in the case under 
examination, regulation. 
76 On the idea of moral duties emanating from partaking in an association or community see J. Simmons, 
‘Associative Political Obligations’, 106 Ethics (1996), 247; and R. Dagger, ‘Membership, Fair Play and 
Political Obligation’, 48 Political Studies (2000), 114. See also the notion of the political community of 
principle in R. Dworkin, above note 2, 211 and 214. 
77 The senior management responsibility regime –one of the main components of the FSA financial 
regulation, which is intrinsically linked with the implementation of principles-based regulation- seems to 
give support to the view that the regulated firms have a moral duty to conduct principled-interpretation, 
when, for instance, they have to decide how to comply with regulatory requirements. C. McCarthy, 
‘Principles-Based Regulation –What Does it Mean for the Industry?’ FSA Speech (31 October 2006); and J. 
Gray and J. Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice (2007), 94-134. 
78 In this sense, principled-interpretation has the potential of expanding and deepening the role of each 
individual interpreter in the regulatory context. 
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To sum up in this section I addressed the argument that the constructive 
account of regulatory interpretation is defective because it is not sensitive to 
considerations of procedural efficiency. I showed that when the 
constructivist maintains that regulatory interpretation should be understood 
as an argumentative practice in pursuit of rightness, he urges interpreters to 
conduct a principled-interpretation of rules namely, a mode of interpretation 
where everyone is invited to discern the scheme of principles of political 
morality, that gives the best account of the practice of regulation, to contest 
it against other competing conceptions and, after reflection, use his findings 
as interpretive guidance. Despite appearances to the contrary, principled-
interpretation promotes the flourishing of procedural efficiency alongside 
other valuable states of affairs because it furnishes the community of 
interpreters with a vehicle for organic change. The latter enables them to 
meet the need for new and better interpretations without transgressing the 
premises of the Rule of Law. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The constructive account of regulatory interpretation is not free from 
criticism. In this chapter I examined an objection that takes issue with an 
integral aspect of the constructive thesis namely the idea that regulatory 
interpretation does and should aim at getting the interpretation of rules 
right. According to this objection, talk about “right answers” and 
“objectivity” in interpretation must be resisted first because there is no truth 
of the matter in interpretation and second because pretending that there is 
introduces an unsound conversational ethos in regulatory practice and 
overall traps the interpretive process into the pursuit of an unrealistic 
agenda. Since this line of reasoning borrows heavily from value scepticism -
the influential school of thought that refutes the idea of objective truth in 
evaluative judgements- my project has been to explore its soundness by 
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locating the theoretical misgivings about the truth conditions of evaluative 
claims within the broader philosophical trend of external scepticism. 
 
As a metaphysical doctrine, external scepticism proclaims to be “neutral” 
and “austere”. It is neutral in the sense that it is capable of questioning a 
whole scheme of beliefs about value without challenging the substantive 
evaluative claims. It is austere in the sense that it pledges to construct its 
criticism wholly independently of any positive evaluative claim or 
assumption. Both these features are problematic. With respect to 
“neutrality”, external sceptics maintain that their scepticism is not directed 
to substantive moral convictions because, they argue, moral judgements 
(Internal-propositions) and second order opinions (External-propositions) 
about them are not one and the same thing. A careful analysis of the 
structure of this argument made plain the artificiality of this distinction and 
further showed that E-propositions are only more redundant or more 
elaborate forms of I-propositions. With respect to “austerity”, external 
sceptics posit that we cannot make sense of objective truth unless we are 
ready to subscribe to an absurd ontological view of the world where values 
are “out there” and “part of the fabric of the world.” It was suggested that 
truth and objectivity need not be thought of in ontological terms and further 
argued that a proper account of our capacity to understand and interpret 
propositions of value entails that value-scepticism cannot be coherently 
formulated. Insofar as one is able to understand any kind of utterance as 
proposition, one is already committed to the idea that this proposition 
admits of true value. 
 
The exploration of the metaphysical aspect of value scepticism also allowed 
the following conclusion to be drawn; that we have the capacity of getting 
the interpretation of rules right without being arrogant, dogmatic or 
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stubborn. Consequently, the accusation that the constructive thesis 
introduces an unsound conversational ethos in regulation fails. This is not 
the only normative claim that the external sceptic made. An additional and 
far more challenging criticism has been his suggestion that the constructive 
thesis must be rejected because it is at odds with considerations of 
procedural efficiency. It was argued that this claim fails as well. A closer 
look at the project of interpretation that ensues from the constructive thesis 
shed light on the idea of right answers in questions of interpretation under 
the constructivist account and further revealed the operationalisation of a 
principled mode of interpretation, namely a mode of interpretation that 
helps interpreters to meet the demand for new and better interpretations by 
furnishing them with a vehicle for organic change, which would not 
otherwise have. 
 
The defence of the constructivist thesis against the sceptic’s objection brings 
the exploration of the nature of regulatory interpretation to an end. It also 
accomplishes the comparative analysis of the communicative and the 
constructivist view of the rationale for the interpretive shift in financial 
regulation and, with that, the examination of the policy of rule-use in 
financial regulation. It is now clear that the constructive theory should be 
preferred to the communicative one, because it is better able to 
accommodate the demand to conduct principled-interpretation (this 
emanates from people’s preoccupation with a collective practice that is 
essentially political in nature) and considerations of procedural efficiency. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This doctoral thesis examined the policy of rule-use in the UK financial 
regulation. It took the current FSA conduct of business regulation as a case 
study to engage with broader questions about the nature of rules, the nature 
of regulatory interpretation and how the Rule of Law shapes our 
understanding of the policy choices underlying the use of rules in public 
administration. The thesis consisted of two complementary parts. Part I -
namely Chapters One to Three- considered the evolution of the policy of 
rule-use during the past twenty years of financial regulation. Part II –that is 
Chapters Four to Six- explored the grounds of this policy development by 
looking into the nature of regulatory interpretation. 
 
Specifically, Chapter One offered some background information about the 
case study of the thesis. It discussed the subject matter of Conduct of 
Business regulation (COB) and overviewed the arguments for and against its 
economic rationale. It was argued that despite the fact that the debate on the 
economic justification of conduct of business regulation is still unsettled, 
FSA has been a strong advocate of regulation dedicated in protecting 
consumers of financial services and products. Consumer protection is 
included among the statutory objectives that FSA is bound to pursue and 
substantive conduct of business requirements occupy a significant part of 
the FSA Handbook covering a variety of issues as, for example, (a) client 
classification; (b) financial promotion; (c) information disclosure; (d) 
suitability and advice; (e) best execution (f) conflicts of interest and (g) 
unfair practices. Chapter One overviewed the core FSA conduct of business 
requirements and concluded with a brief examination of a number of 
amendments that are going to be introduced by the New Conduct of 
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Business Sourcebook (NEWCOB), which will implement the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive in November 2007. Particular reference was 
made to client classification, communication, product disclosure, conflicts of 
interest, best execution and appropriateness.  
  
With COB regulation as their point of reference, Chapters Two and Three 
explored the policy of rule-use in financial regulation under the Financial 
Services Act 1986 and, under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
respectively. Special attention was given to the factors that shaped the policy 
of rule-use, its nature and objectives as well as its flaws. Chapter Two, which 
was devoted to the pre-FSMA era, identified three subsequent stages of 
policy development. The first phase had as its starting point the Financial 
Services Act 1986, which introduced a system of self-regulation under a 
statutory framework namely a sui generis system of command and control 
regulation with a degree of self-regulatory characteristics incorporated into 
it. The second phase was brought about by the New Settlement and the 
third one was launched by the Large Report. It was argued that in the 
middle 80’s the eroded market homogeneity, the mounting uncertainty in 
the marketplace and the evident distrust among the DTI, SIB and SROs led 
to the production of extremely detailed and prescriptive conduct of business 
rules. The exercise of interpretive discretion was limited and the risk of 
litigation was high. Clearly the balance was tipped too much in favour of 
certainty and predictability at the expense of flexibility and adaptability. It 
was pointed out that ever since that time the policy of rule-use had as its 
primary aim to restore the balance between these conflicting policy 
objectives. To this effect, the New Settlement via the Companies Act 1989 
put in place a number of measures to strengthen the position of self-
regulation. It restricted the private right of action under section 62 of the 
FSA, it substituted the statutory requirement of “equivalent” level of 
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investor protection with the requirement of “adequate” investor protection 
and introduced a three-tier system of rules. A few years later, the Large 
Report continued the reform in the same spirit. This time however the focus 
of attention was on the standardisation of the procedural aspects of 
regulatory decision-making -especially with respect to the interpretation of 
rules- alongside the relationship between SIB and SROs. SIB’s new role as 
the leader regulatory Authority, the progressive reliance on Principles, the 
resort to cost-benefit analysis, the emphasis on regulatory transparency, the 
provision of concrete performance measures all testify a change of focus 
and a methodical attempt to bring into fruition a more sophisticated policy 
of rule-use that were purposive and compliance oriented. 
 
The Large Report was short lived. Its underlying ideas however survived the 
unprecedented institutional reform of the UK financial regulation towards 
the end of the 90’s. These found its full expression in the launch of the 
Financial Services Authority and the Financial Services and Markets and Act 
2000. Chapter Three explored this latest phase of the policy of rule-use. It 
overviewed the formation of the design principles and objectives of the FSA 
Handbook, it described the typology of the regulatory requirements and 
spelled out the nature of the FSA policy of rule-use. The following were 
identified as the prevailing characteristics of the current policy of rule-use: 
(a) the sophisticated architecture of the FSA Handbook, which manifests 
itself in the extensive use of regulatory provisions that are termed in high 
level of abstractness and generality, the complex and fluid structural inter-
relation of the regulatory norms and the plethora of navigating tools that 
aim at making the Handbook user-friendly and accessible; (b) the purposive 
(“principles-based”) approach to rule use, which means that FSA produces, 
applies and enforces rules in a manner that is essentially outcomes-oriented; 
(c) its communicative nature namely, the distinctively participatory 
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dialectical practice that underpins the formation application and 
enforcement of rules and; (d) the risk-based approach, which makes possible 
the proportionate and cost efficient issuance of new rules or modification of 
the existing ones as well as the adoption of a targeted and commensurate 
compliance and enforcement strategy. 
 
It was argued that in theory, the FSA policy of rule-use is sound. While the 
sophisticated design of the rules and their legal framework was intended to 
make rules more accessible and easy to understand, purposiveness aimed at 
fostering compliance with the spirit rather than the letter of the regulatory 
norms, encouraging the development of market-based solutions and overall 
reducing the cost of rule-use. Similarly, the inclusion of communicative 
elements and the adoption of a risk-based approach were intended to 
cement the participatory and reflexive nature of the Authority’s policy of 
rule-use in an economically efficient manner. This withstanding, FSA’s 
approach to the use of rules seems to be problematic in practice. As it was 
shown, the Handbook remains complex and hard to read. The emphasis on 
high-level principles tips the balance too much in favour of flexibility and at 
the expense of certainty and predictability. It is also unlikely to reduce the 
cost of regulation because it involves the maintenance of a costly 
communication network. Purposiveness precipitates the creation of a new 
climate of risk and uncertainty. The adoption of conversational style of rule-
use triggers conditions of regulatory capture, and -to the extent it pushes 
institutional developments towards heterarcical structures of governance-
breeds problems of cooperation and coordination. ARROW II has its own 
limitations as a technical device for the proportionate, targeted and efficient 
use of rules, not least because future risks may turn out to be different from 
those predicted. Finally, the implementation of MiFID may have reduced 
the size of the New Conduct of Business Sourcebook (NEWCOB), 
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however, it is generally considered to be an additional source of constraints 
holding back FSA’s plans for innovation and experimentation. 
 
The analysis in Part I made plain that financial regulators in the UK have 
always sought to accommodate conflicting policy objectives like flexibility, 
certainty and predictability and that for nearly two decades they have been 
consciously trying to direct the interpretive strategy of the regulated 
population towards adhering with the spirit rather than the letter of the 
regulatory requirements. That said the major difference between the present 
and the past regulatory practice lies in the ways in which these objectives are 
brought into fruition. Nowadays all these goals are pursued through novel 
means which insinuate inter alia the abandonment of legal rules as means for 
defining jurisdictional boundaries, the opening up of the regulatory process, 
the de-centralisation of the interpretive decision-making and the attempt to 
bring about legal certainty by way of managing the interpretive process per 
se rather than by way of redrafting regulatory requirements. It was suggested 
that all these developments signal out the emergence of an interpretation-centric 
approach in the policy of rule-use.  
 
Indeed, past failure helped the architects of the regime to become conscious 
of the limitations of legal text as a form of guidance for regulating 
behaviour, the futility of attempting to exhaust all possible applications of 
the rule within its wording, the inevitability of re-interpreting regulatory 
requirements in the presence of perpetual change in the marketplace and the 
importance of sharing a common understanding of the regulatory norms. 
Once these lessons were learnt the architects of the regime changed their 
perception of the nature of the problem and of the means of addressing it. 
It became clear, that the fluidity of legal interpretation did not need to be 
treated as a sign of weakness but as an indispensable property of the nature 
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of rules, which secured their adaptability and endurance across time and on 
the other hand allows interpretive mistakes to be duly detected and 
remedied. Therefore, the objective of the policy of rule-use was no longer to 
produce rules, which would be self-contained in terms of their meaning, but 
to regulate the interpretive practice that attributes meaning to rules in light 
of the idiosyncratic and constantly evolving circumstances of each particular 
case. 
 
A major consequence of this change of attitude was the gradual 
transformation of self-regulatory elements into a centrifugal regime of meta-
regulation, where the attainment of policy objectives is pursued by way of 
regulating the interpretation of rules per se rather than by way of opting for 
different combination of rule-type and rule-restructuring. In this new 
institutional set up, the de-centralisation of interpretive decision-making has 
been so immense that regulatees have a much more active and indeed 
burdensome role to perform in making sure that they regulate themselves 
properly. To assist them in this challenging task, FSA officials too have 
started to change the way in which they perceive their role. In the FSMA era 
‘being a regulator’ resembles to being in the role of a facilitator of a complex 
network of communication, which is interpretive in nature and whose aim is 
twofold: to explicate, review, and rework the essence of regulatory norms; 
and to bring about cultural change as to what it means ‘to be regulated’ and 
what it is like to ‘abide by the rules’. Contrary to what one would expect 
from a statutory-based system of regulation, these are now discharged from 
any connotations of passive adherence with exogenous commands coming 
directly from the above. More than ever before, the regulated population is 
asked to work out for itself and on ad hoc basis what it is like to internalise 
basic moral norms into its day-to-day business, and it is deemed capable to 
become cognisant of the collective responsibility that its active participation 
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in regulation entails. 
 
An additional consequence of the interpretive shift in the policy of rule-use 
has been the institutionalisation of the perpetual re-assessment of what 
regulatory norms require in terms of acceptable and non-acceptable 
conduct. This development marks a radical departure from the past. In old 
days, the proposition of putting into operation a policy regime that would 
embrace the constant review of the interpretation of rules had been received 
with scepticism and suspicion, given that the frequent changes in the 
drafting or interpretation of rules were thought to be a source of legal 
uncertainty and poor public accountability. More recently, however, the 
constant revision of the interpretation of regulatory requirements has been 
welcomed as the best possible way to guarantee the production of new and 
better interpretations in light of the changing market landscape. 
 
Whereas the aim of Part I was to examine the development of the policy of 
rule use in financial regulation, the purpose of Part II was to account for the 
grounds of the interpretive shift in FSA’s policy of rule-use by drawing on 
the nature of regulatory interpretation. Since studies on the nature of 
interpretation in the regulatory context have been rudimentary a great part 
of the second half of this thesis was devoted to the elaboration of a 
theoretical description of what it is like to interpret rules in the regulatory 
domain. In this connection, Chapter Four construed the communicative 
thesis drawing on the main ideas illustrated in Professor Black’s Rules and 
Regulators -one of the most acclaimed works in the current literature on the 
use of rules in public administration. Chapter Five brought attention to 
some difficulties that are endemic in the communicative thesis and argued 
for an alternative account of regulatory interpretation –the constructive 
thesis. In addition it fleshed out the implications of these two alternative 
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accounts of regulatory interpretation with respect to the grounds for the 
interpretive shift in financial regulation. Finally, Chapter Six defended the 
case for a constructive reading of regulatory interpretation against certain 
objections.  
 
Specifically, the discussion started with a brief overview of Rules and 
Regulators, where Julia Black develops a thesis for the nature and use of rules 
in financial regulation with the view of proposing ways in which we can 
make more effective use of them. Chapter Four brought attention to a 
wealth of insights, which –when put together- comprise a very interesting 
account of the nature of regulatory interpretation. Starting from the 
observation that one of the basic ideas in Rules and Regulators is that 
interpretive convergence is crucial for using rules effectively, the analysis 
progressively spelled out all those assumptions that lie beneath this idea and 
constitute what it has been called a communicative account of regulatory 
interpretation. 
  
According to the communicative thesis, interpreting rules in the day-to-day 
regulation equals to communicating one’s personal beliefs about how 
regulatory requirements should be understood. It is an opportunity for 
sharing information and most importantly for reconciliation through 
persuasion. Significantly, the community of interpreters is seen as the only 
source of interpretive authority. What the rule in question means cannot 
stand independently of what the community of interpreters think it means, 
based on shared background of beliefs, intentions and expectations. 
Therefore, the subject matter of interpretation is not the rule itself but the 
interpreters’ utterances. Now, given the plethora of equally valid meanings 
that can be attached to a rule it becomes crucial that regulatory 
interpretation should work towards cultivating a shared understanding of 
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regulatory requirements and ultimately towards interpretive convergence. 
The communicative thesis is compelling. It finds direct support to our 
common sense as well as to our fundamental intuitions about the moral 
constitution of the members of the regulatory community, which demands 
that they are not put aside when it comes to decide issues such as the 
production of new rules or the interpretation of existing ones. Moreover, it 
offers an account of regulatory interpretation according to which financial 
regulation -and consequently the use of rules- should be procedurally 
efficient.  
 
Despite its appeal, Chapter Five showed that the communicative account of 
the nature of regulatory interpretation is far from satisfactory. Taking into 
account that the underlying assumptions of the communicative thesis touch 
upon very controversial issues in relation to interpretation, it was suggested 
that before assessing the robustness of the communicative thesis it would be 
essential to gain a deeper understanding of the practice of interpretation in 
general. To this effect regulatory interpretation was compared with the 
practice of interpretation in literature. The comparative analysis made plain 
that literary interpretation and regulatory interpretation are identical in a 
number of fundamental respects including the institutionalisation of 
authoritative interpretation, the tendency to treat the interpretation of the 
text (literal or legal as the case may be) as interpretation of an ‘object’ that 
stands independently from its author and/or interpreter and the genuine 
commitment to make the subject of interpretation the best it can be –a 
commitment that  frequently fuels rational disagreement about matters of 
fact as well as about matters of value. 
 
The application of all these insights to regulatory interpretation revealed a 
picture of interpretation that is different from the one offered by the 
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communicative thesis. Specifically, the analysis made plain that the subject 
matter of interpretation is not the interpreters’ utterances as the 
communicative thesis assumes, but the rule itself. Similarly, the point of 
interpretation is not to attain consensus (interpretive convergence) but to 
make the rule in question the best it can be, paying attention to a number of 
considerations, which work as constraints over one’s interpretive discretion. 
Moreover, the discussion on the practice of interpretation divulged that 
interpreters develop an idiosyncratic interpretive attitude towards the subject 
matter of interpretation. They treat it as an object that stands independently 
of their intentions and beliefs in order to allow space for error and 
correction through rational criticism and deliberation. More importantly 
though, the comparative analysis revealed that the communicative thesis 
offers a theoretical framework for the rationalisation of regulatory 
interpretation, that is neither workable nor appealing in practice. 
 
In light of these difficulties, the possibility of an alternative account of 
regulatory interpretation (the constructive thesis) was explored. Borrowing 
from Dworkin’s analysis of the practice of interpretation in law and in 
particular the notion of interpretive attitude, Chapter Five proposed a 
theoretical account of regulatory interpretation that describes this practice –
not simply as an occasion for improving communication among the 
members of a community of interpreters but- as a dialectical practice whose 
ultimate objective is to meet the demand for new and better interpretations 
of the regulatory requirements in accordance with the conditions of 
interpretation that are set out by the political history of this practice.  
  
The two theoretical accounts of regulatory interpretation represent two 
alternative schools of thought with respect to the grounds for the 
interpretive shift in the policy of rule-use in financial regulation. According 
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to the conversation thesis, the gradual adoption of an interpretation-centric 
approach to the policy of rule-use is justified as an attempt to secure the 
effective use of rules by remedying failure of communication between the 
regulator and the regulated firms. On this account the rationale for the 
interpretive shift in regulatory interpretation draws on the need to combat 
information asymmetries and interpretive divergence to the extent in which 
they impede effective regulation. According to the constructive thesis, the 
interpretive shift in the policy of rule-use is seen as an initiative whose 
purpose is to facilitate the wider regulatory community in meeting the 
demand for new and better interpretations by duly identifying and 
remedying interpretive mistakes before and where possible in preclusion of 
judicial interference. Significantly, on the constructive view, the interpretive 
shift is not justified in terms of informational discrepancies and interpretive 
divergence. Rather, its rationale is grounded on an idea of regulatory 
interpretation as the ultimate dialectical practice that commands and 
encourages the participants of the wider regulatory community to work out 
the public standards (“principles”) that govern their inter-relations. 
 
The constructive account of regulatory interpretation is not free from 
criticism. Of particular importance is the objection that the constructive 
thesis must be abandoned either because –contrary to what it holds- there is 
no right answers to questions of interpretation or because it is not 
compatible with considerations of procedural efficiency. On this view there 
is no truth of the matter in questions of interpretation. Pretending that there 
is introduces an unsound conversational ethos in regulatory practice and 
traps the interpretive process into the pursuit of an unrealistic agenda. Since 
this line of reasoning borrows from value scepticism -the influential school 
of thought that refutes the idea of objective truth in evaluative judgements, 
Chapter Six considered its soundness by locating the theoretical misgivings 
  
 
288
about the truth conditions of evaluative claims within the broader 
philosophical trend of external scepticism. To this effect it assessed the 
perceived merits of external scepticism as a metaphysical and as a normative 
doctrine. 
 
As a metaphysical doctrine, external scepticism proclaims to be “neutral” 
and “austere”. It is neutral in the sense that it is capable of questioning a 
whole scheme of beliefs about value without challenging the substantive 
evaluative claims. It is austere in the sense that it pledges to construct its 
criticism wholly independently of any positive evaluative claim or 
assumption. It was argued that both these aspects of external scepticism rely 
on flimsy premises. Whereas the claim to neutrality is based on an artificial 
distinction between moral judgements and second order opinions about 
them, the claim to austerity fails because it assumes that the only way we can 
make sense of (objective) truth is to subscribe to a surreal world ontology 
where values are “part of the fabric of the world.” Drawing on the 
philosophy of Donald Davidson, it was suggested that (objective) truth need 
not be thought of in ontological terms and further argued that a proper 
account of our capacity to understand and interpret propositions of value 
entails that value-scepticism cannot be coherently formulated. Insofar as one 
is able to understand any kind of utterance as a proposition, one is already 
committed to the idea that this proposition admits of true value. 
 
In light of the flaws of external scepticism as a metaphysical doctrine, the 
sceptic’s claim that being committed to the chase for right answers 
engenders a weak conversational ethos cannot sustain. However, this is not 
the only normative claim that the external sceptic made. An additional and 
far more challenging criticism has been his suggestion that the constructive 
thesis must be rejected because it is at odds with considerations of 
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procedural efficiency. It was argued that this claim fails as well. Chapter Six 
considered the constructivist’s idea of rights answers to questions of 
interpretation, to the effect of making plain that -on the constructive reading 
of regulatory interpretation- the commitment to right answers equals to a 
commitment to principled interpretation namely a mode of interpretation 
that is similar to the one currently practised in the UK financial regulation 
and which helps interpreters meet the demand for new and better 
interpretations by furnishing them with a vehicle for organic change, which 
would not otherwise have. 
 
The analysis in Part II made plain that the communicative thesis of 
regulatory interpretation and its constructive counterpart allow for two 
alternative answers to the question about the grounds for the interpretive 
shift in the policy of rule-use. Grounded on a conception of regulatory 
interpretation as an exchange of information that is prone to fail, the 
communicative thesis justifies the interpretive shift in financial regulation as 
a tactic that aims to remedy failure of communication between the regulator 
and the regulated population. Contrary to the communicative account, the 
constructive thesis views regulatory interpretation as the ultimate dialectical 
practice that commands and encourages the participants of the wider 
regulatory community to work out the public standards that govern their 
inter-relations paying attention to the political history of this practice. In 
light of this, it explains the gradual move towards an interpretation-centric 
regime as a policy initiative that aims to meet the demand for new and better 
interpretations by duly identifying and remedying interpretive mistakes 
before and where possible in preclusion of judicial interference. It was 
argued that the constructive thesis is preferable to the communicative one 
because the ideas of interpretive attitude and principled-interpretation, on 
which it is based, make it sophisticated enough to accommodate two 
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fundamental intuitions about the practice of regulation; the intuition that –
since the use of rules entails the monopolistic exercise of the State’s coercive 
power- the resolution of interpretive disputes in the regulatory context must 
be the outcome of a genuine commitment to a public conception of justice, 
rather than the product of unprincipled and therefore arbitrary negotiated 
trade-offs; and the intuition that procedural efficiency matters in the sense 
that scarce resources should be used for purposeful activities rather than 
wasted in the pursuit of frivolous and unrealistic projects. 
 
This doctoral thesis contributed to the current literature on the use of rules 
in public administration in general and on financial regulation in particular in 
a number of ways. First of all, it complemented earlier studies on the use of 
rules in financial regulation by offering an up to date discussion of the 
recent policy developments with respect to the formation, application and 
enforcement of rules after the launch of the FSMA and the establishment of 
the Financial Services Authority. In this connection it considered how 
recent institutional reform confirmed the transition from a rule-centric 
towards an interpretation-centric regime, it explored the rationale for this 
policy developments, it assessed its merits and flaws and, last but not least, it 
drew attention to the likely impact of the increased Europanisation of the 
UK financial regulation to the evolution of the policy of rule-use. 
 
In addition, an extensive part of this thesis was devoted to the examination 
of the nature of interpretation in the context of regulation –a theme that up 
till now had been relatively underdeveloped. In this relation, it proposed two 
alternative theoretical accounts of the nature of regulatory interpretation; the 
communicative thesis, which regards interpretation as a form of 
communication that is bound to fail due to informational asymmetries and 
interpretive discrepancies, and the constructive thesis, which views 
  
 
291
regulatory interpretation as the ultimate dialectical practice that commands 
and encourages the participants of the wider regulatory community to work 
out the public standards that govern their inter-relations paying attention to 
the political history of this practice. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis demonstrated how Dworkinian jurisprudence could 
inform our understanding of the nature of interpretation in the regulatory 
sphere and further enrich our apprehension of policy developments in the 
field of financial regulation. Specifically, by resorting to the doctrines of 
interpretive attitude and integrity in interpretation, it proposed a theoretical 
framework for making sense of policy developments with respect to the use 
of rules that departs from and at the same time challenges a number of 
commonly accepted views in scholarly writings in this field of law. For 
example, it argued that -when it comes to the rationalisation of policy 
developments with respect to the use of rules in the regulatory context- one 
must look at the norms underlying these developments rather than the social 
context in which they take place. In the same spirit, it propounded the 
relevance of right answers to questions of interpretation and showed that 
commitment to “get things right” neither introduces a weak conversational 
ethos nor is bound to bring regulation into a deadlock. Moreover, it 
suggested that what is important in regulatory interpretation is not to reach 
consensus, as it is widely thought, but collectively to be able to work out 
new and better interpretations of the regulatory norms in light of a public 
conception of justice. 
 
Finally, this doctoral thesis proposed that the study of the use of rules in 
public administration does not have to be incidental. It could be thought of 
as a distinct policy regime with its own unique subject matter and policy 
objectives. In this relation it was suggested that policy approaches to the use 
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of rules could be of two sorts: rule-centric or interpretation-centric.1 Rule-
centric regimes identify with policies that take the effectiveness of rules as 
predominantly a function of the rules themselves. Therefore, their focus is 
on the production of self-contained and static regulatory norms. These 
regimes are associated with command and control regulation or more 
generally with regulatory settings that are vertical, legalistic and prescriptive 
in character rather than horizontal open and participatory in nature. 
Ascribing meaning to regulatory requirements is not regarded as a common 
interpretive project. As a matter of course, the exercise of interpretive 
discretion is tightly controlled and the outcome of interpretive-decision 
making is dictated. Deliberation by way of self-regulatory configurations 
may be a feature of the regulatory system. Nonetheless its nature is symbolic 
rather than substantive not least because self-regulation is never fully 
operationalised. Interpretation-centric regimes differ in that they regard rule 
effectiveness as mainly a function of their interpretation. Therefore policy 
makers and regulatory officials place emphasis on the regulation of 
interpretive process that makes possible the formation application and 
enforcement of rules rather than their design. They are associated with 
meta-regulation and market-based regulatory settings that are substantially 
open, participatory and discursive in nature and whose implementation 
involves the decentralisation of interpretive decision-making. Significantly, 
under an interpretation-centric regime, regulatory interpretation is treated as 
a common dialectical process, which is administered but never curtailed by 
the regulator. 
 
As far as the aims of this doctoral thesis are concerned (to examine the 
evolution and rationale of the policy of rule-use in financial regulation and 
                                                 
1 In practice, approaches to the use of rules may not be ‘purely’ rule-centric or interpretation centric. This 
distinction, however, remains useful not least because it offers a more comprehensive theoretical 
framework for the study of the interaction of the policy of rule-use with other regulatory policies (e.g. 
enforcement) and for making sense of the parameters of success or failure of the various regimes. 
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provoke debate) my task is now complete. However, due to the limited 
space available several issues were not fully addressed. For instance, I argued 
for a constructive theory of regulatory interpretation but I stopped short 
from spelling out its institutional implications. I pointed to the presence of 
evaluation in the interpretation of regulatory requirements but I did not fully 
explore its interaction with the use of highly technical language in assessing 
the appropriate mode of action (e.g., cost-benefit analysis and Arrow II). I 
referred to the notion of rule-effectiveness but I did not consider in detail 
how this concept should be understood. Moreover, my account of the 
criticism against the constructive thesis was not an exhaustive one, given 
that some commentators may take issue with a number of other aspects of 
my argument –notably, the suggested dissemination of competences 
between the regulator and the regulatory population. In this regard, one 
might counter-argue that regulatees could benefit by the regulatory 
Authority's decisions only if they could establish the purpose and content of 
their existence “in ways which do not depend on raising the very same 
issues which the authority is there to settle.”2 Clearly, these themes should 
be addressed as well alongside a range of other issues including a critical 
overview of the new dynamics between public administration and the 
judiciary, a critical appraisal of the doctrinal background underpinning 
contemporary studies of the use of rules in public administration and how 
the insights into the nature of interpretation in financial regulation could 
apply to other regulatory contexts (utilities, environmental protection etc). 
Undoubtedly, this is not going to be an easy project. It will be, however, an 
intellectual journey worth taking. 
                                                 
2 J. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (1994), 219. 
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